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Since 2001, the forest sector and forest communities across Northern Ontario have experienced 
many challenges.  In response, there has been significant provincial debate and policy reform 
surrounding the use and control of Crown forests, and some local leaders have established the 
Northeast Superior Forest Community Corporation (NSFC) under the federal Forest 
Communities Program (FCP) to collaborate for much needed economic and governance 
alternatives. This process has been difficult and characterized by uncertainty and conflict.  This 
research examines evolving social framings of Northern Ontario‘s ‗forestry crisis‘ and the 
consequences of uneven power relations in the Northeast Superior Region of Ontario, Canada. 
Four core research questions were pursued: 1) how do different actors frame the forestry crisis in 
the Northeast Superior Region (e.g., problems, solutions and different actors)?  2) Do actors‘ 
frames change over time?  3) What forms and sources of power are present and how do they 
influence, if at all, the construction of shared meaning?  4)  How does social learning influence 
the way actors approach forest management problems related to policy, planning and practice? 
A single embedded case study design and mixed methods approach enabled analysis at the 
regional and organizational scales, for the period 2001-2009.  A key informant survey assessed 
regional public-civic-private perceptions regarding the use and control of Crown forests.  Fifty-
nine interviews and over 200 documents from local and regional newspapers and reports were 
examined.  Direct observations from two NSFC meetings and two regional conferences 
regarding Ontario‘s forest governance challenges supplemented these data.  Actors‘ contrasting 
and shifting views were coded using QSR Nvivo 7 and analyzed for convergence as evidence of 
collective reframing. 
Survey results and frame analysis established two main perspectives of the ‗forestry crisis‘: 1) a 
conventional perspective in which forest companies hold the primary interest in resource 
extraction as policy agents; and, 2) an alternative view that seeks increased municipal and 
Aboriginal control of forests to achieve equity and provide regional stability.  Power relations 
reinforced an entrenched community of interest, including both internal and external actors (e.g., 
investors, mill managers and workers, bush workers, and government regulators), that has 
formed around a common goal and/or set of beliefs (i.e., timber extraction and scientific 
forestry).  These interests have historically reproduced uneven social relations and overridden 
communities of place and collective place-based identities. 
The analysis builds to 14 conclusions that address the core research questions, highlights of 
which include: 
 Social framings of the forestry crisis in the Northeast Superior Region, as well as identities 
and local culture, are mediated by core-periphery dynamics.  Such conditions normalize 
ongoing community instability and oversimplify notions of sustainability which prioritize a 
perpetual timber supply and economic values. 
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 Commitment to place before interests provides a basis to develop trust and mutual 
understanding of each other and shared problems, and enable reframing of common identities 
based on shared values and local problems/opportunities. 
 Public control and collaboration are strongly valued in the Northeast Superior Region. Many 
leaders and residents want control over resources devolved to the municipal level; however, 
awareness and a model for effective implementation are needed. 
 Independent local forums are valuable for developing alternative and representative social 
framings. 
 Relational power works to consolidate various forms of agent-based power in dominant 
actors rather than facilitating its distribution. 
 Actors with unmatched positional and expertise power can (un)intentionally subvert 
reframing processes through limiting the participation of dissenters, thereby controlling the 
organizational framings guiding actions. 
 Dominant social relations influenced the perceived range of reasonable or desirable options 
as dominant actors bounded the problem to serve conventional interests, which in turn 
constrained debate about solutions. 
 Reframing a common place-based identity inclusive of Aboriginals and municipalities 
requires the willing redistribution of agent-based power and full recognition of Aboriginal 
and Treaty Rights. 
This research builds understanding of how power relations affect the social framings that drive 
action in settings of crisis, conflict and uncertainty, and provides new evidence to bridge 
concepts from framing and social learning theory.  It supports the premise that social learning is 
a political process inherent in multi-party collaboration, in which reconciliation of individual and 
group identities occurs alongside the negotiation of problem and solution definitions.  By 
documenting regional and NSFC perspectives, this research supports the search for alternative 
tenure models to reinvigorate Ontario‘s forest economy and communities.   
Ten recommendations for NSFC, the Forest Communities Program or emerging collaborative 
organizations focus on organizational governance and practice to improve conditions affecting 
power relations and social learning.  Main points include considering the need to organize 
culturally appropriate public workshops on forest issues to meet the need for deliberative space; 
increase access to organizational information and opportunities for NSFC plans to be publicly 
reviewed; actively participate in Ontario tenure policy reform discussions to develop, publicize 
and implement policy alternatives; support Aboriginal and Treaty Rights and meaningful 
resolution of First Nations settlement negotiations; expand NSFC board representation to include 
at-large public and ex-officio provincial members; decentralize organizational structures to 
establish a physical presence in partner communities and draw on leadership and capacity from 
the whole region; and, establish an explicit rationale for and clearly identify geographical 
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Defining the Research Problem and Context 
Changes in Canadian forest management reflect a global response to the limitations of 
conventional resource and environmental management (REM).  As a field of practice and 
research, REM has been criticized for becoming too concentrated on the specialized knowledge 
of scientific ‗experts‘, top-down government decision making, and technical and market 
solutions (Ostrom 1990; Bryant and Wilson 1998; Röling 2002).  Alternately, there is a drive for 
more collaborative and adaptive approaches that include multiple knowledge forms, non-state 
actors with different interests and values, as well as more consideration of contextual forces 
influencing human-environment interactions.  It has been documented that collaboration can 
foster social learning and so bridge disconnects and balance power relations through building 
mutual understanding and joint problem solving competency (Keen et al 2005; Susskind et al 
2007).  Social learning approaches support the ongoing and interactive process in which groups 
of people with diverse values and knowledge negotiate and reflect on experience to develop 
shared meaning to resolve common problems through social change.  Such novel approaches are 
expected to produce outcomes that are more acceptable to various actors with different training, 
levels of expertise, values, and ultimately, political motivations. 
 However, as Armitage et al (2008: 96) point out, ―learning is neither value free nor 
politically neutral.‖  Increasingly, scholars emphasize that the effects of power relations and 
politics in social learning require more attention (Sinclair and Diduck 2001; Keen and Mahanty 
2006; Wildemeersch 2007; Armitage et al 2008).  In particular, how power relations affect 
learning among actors in a given ‗problem domain‘ is (or should be) an important question in the 
context of REM crises in which emerging collaborations stand to increase regional stability. 
Early problem and solution definitions can have a lasting effect on resultant formal 
organizations. 
 These overarching ideas provide the entry point for my research with the nascent 
Northeast Superior Forest Community Corporation (NSFC) in Northern Ontario, Canada.  Forest 
dependent communities in Northern Ontario are said to be in ‗crisis‘ (Stewart 2005; Woods 
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2007) due to the decline of the forest sector since 2001.  In the Superior East Region alone, four 
of five major forestry employers closed between 2003 and 2009, variously affecting six 
neighbouring towns and eight Aboriginal communities.  The ensuing spiral of decline presents 
well-documented problems of the classic mill town life cycle: widespread unemployment, out-
migration and the loss of skilled labour and youth, a declining tax base and service loss (Lucas 
1971; Beattie et al. 1981; Decter et al. 1989).   
 Faced with idled mills, industry restructuring and the spectre of fading conventional 
forest development, some leaders and residents are working to create new collaborative spaces 
and opportunities to re-imagine human-forest relationships.  At a time of significant provincial 
forestry debate and policy reform (Table 1.1), municipal, and more recently, Aboriginal leaders 
have formed the NSFC under the federal Forest Communities Program (FCP) to search for much 
needed socio-economic solutions.  In the context of an escalating forestry crisis, my research 
focuses on the evolving perspectives and interactions of organizational and regional actors. 
 
Table 1.1. Recent Events and Publications Surrounding Ontario‘s Current Forestry Debate 
February 18, 2009 – Ontario Forest Industry Association (OFIA) holds panel discussion on forest tenures at annual 
general meeting 
March 4-5, 2009 - Northern Ontario Sustainable Communities Partnership Workshop: Community Forests: A 
Tenure Reform Option for Community Sustainability in Northern Ontario. Thunder Bay 
April 22-24, 2009 - Ontario Professional Foresters‘ Association 52
nd
 Annual Meeting: Whose Forest is it Anyway? 
The Role of Tenure, Pricing and Ownership in the Future of Ontario‟s Forests. Sudbury 
April 23, 2009 - Hon. Donna Cansfield, Minister of Natural Resources announces formal review of Ontario‘s Crown 
forest tenure system 
May 7, 2009 - OMNR Industry Relations Branch presents provincial plans for tenure reform at Federation of 
Northern Ontario Municipalities Annual Meeting, Sudbury 
June 23, 2009 - Premier McGuinty announces move of OMNR forestry branch to Ministry of Northern 
Development and Mines 
August 27, 2009 - Ministry of Northern Development, Mines and Forestry releases discussion paper, Ontario‟s 
Forests, Ontario‟s Future: Modernizing Ontario‟s Forest Tenure and Pricing System 
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1.2. Purpose and Approach 
Understanding how people linked by a common societal problem interpret experience in the 
context of uneven power relations is a central challenge for resource management.  Informed by 
social learning (e.g., Argyris and Schön 1978; Keen et al 2005) and framing theory (Gray 2003; 
Forsyth 2003), my research follows the constructivist view that people create meaning through 
an ongoing and interactive social process of co-constructing reality (discussed in Chapter 3 and 
4).  Inspired by political ecology (e.g., Forsyth 2003; Escobar and Paulson 2005; Raik et al 
2008), I apply a critical lens to understand the values and interests that underlie dominant and 
marginalized social framings in Ontario forest governance. 
 This approach to studying emerging collaborations amidst crisis, conflict, and change, 
helps to identify different sets of perspectives (or social framings) and actors, and enables 
examination of their dynamics in a given context and policy community.  It also highlights shifts 
in dominant ideas and actions and whose interests are being served. 
 
1.3. Assumptions  
This research is guided by basic assumptions about the nature of social learning and power 
relations, as well as the relationships of certain concepts and their relevance.  First, using frame 
analysis to study social learning is appropriate because double-loop learning is conceptually 
analogous with reframing processes that guide action (Argyris and Schön 1978; Mezirow 1994; 
Parson and Clark 1995; Pahl-Wostl 2009) (discussed in Chapter 3).  Second, changes in 
individual and organizational actions and perspectives (social framings) are one indication that 
learning has occurred (Argyris and Schön 1978; Dale 1989).  Third, groupings of social framings 
and actions can be identified that indicate subscribership to one or more discourses (Dryzek 
2005; Escobar and Paulson 2005).  Fourth, frames are not mutually exclusive and can be 
contradictory (Gray 2003).  Fifth, dominant framings can be linked to powerful groups and used 
to elicit different forms and sources of power as a way to understand how power affects social 
learning (Forsyth 2003).  Making these assumptions explicit grounds the research in the 
literature, explains the beliefs and logic underpinning the research design, justifies the methods 
for data collection and analysis, and links the researcher to the research. 
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1.4. Core Research Questions and Objectives 
1.4.1. Research Questions 
The specific questions for this research are: 
1. How do different actors frame the forestry crisis in the Northeast Superior Region? 
(e.g., problems, solutions, and perspectives of different actors); 
2. Do actors‘ frames change over time?  How? Why? 
3. What forms/sources of power are present and how do they influence, if at all, the 
construction of shared meaning (frame convergence/divergence)?  
4. How does social learning—evidenced by the construction of  ‗shared meaning‘ 
through the development of common frames—influence the way actors approach forest 
management problems related to policy, planning and practice?  
1.4.2. Objectives 
Based on the above questions, four main objectives are pursued: 
1. Use frame analysis methods to study social learning and the response to Northern 
Ontario‘s forestry challenges, in order to conduct a systematic assessment of frames 
among different actors, and to identify events and interactions contributing to reframing 
(Questions 1 and 2). 
2. Identify different sources and forms of power held by actors and analyze how power 
relations influence social learning and the construction of shared meaning (Questions 3 
and 4). 
3. Observe what has been learned by actors about the problem domain and determine the 
implications in terms of changes to forest management policy and practice (Question 3). 
4. Develop a conceptual framework which integrates concepts from social learning, 
collaborative management/planning and political ecology to guide critical research on 




1.5. Organization of the Dissertation 
This dissertation has 8 chapters.  In Chapter 1, I have introduced the research problem context 
and case study focus.  I have also outlined the main strands of social learning, collaboration and 
political ecology theory I draw upon, as well as the guiding questions and main objectives. 
 In the next chapter (2), I outline the development of conventional forest management in 
Canada since 1900.  I discuss the formation of forest governance institutions that have long 
supported primary industry as well as the common strengths and weaknesses of the conventional 
approach to contextualize public and academic calls for change. 
 Chapter 3 reviews relevant themes from the collaboration, social learning and political 
ecology literatures.  This review provides the conceptual and empirical background that has 
informed the identification and refining of the research questions, objectives and relevant 
concepts and methods for the research design.  I present and explain the conceptual framework 
for the study at the end of Chapter 3.  
 I present the research design in Chapter 4.  I position the research as primarily embracing 
a constructivist view of reality and describe my approach to inductive, community-based 
research.  I map out the research process and criteria for selection of the case study.  The 
application of a mixed methods approach is explained and an argument is made for the utility of 
a single embedded case study design to account for nested scales of analysis.  I then specify 
methods used for data collection and analysis. 
 Chapter 5 is the first of three analysis chapters.  I introduce the case study region and 
examine the influence of historical and geographical hinterland contexts on forest governance 
and development.  An overview of the research site is provided, including discussion of 
biophysical, cultural and socio-economic characteristics relevant to current challenges in the 
forest sector.  I then present results from a survey of the Crown forest tenure system to highlight 
‗high-level‘ themes and differences among actors‘ attitudes relating to the ongoing forestry crisis 
and potential responses. 
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 Chapter 6 provides a closer examination of how different actors framed the forestry crisis 
since about 2001.  Through a frame analysis of documents and interviews focussed on the 
Northeast Superior Region, I examine how the perspectives and interactions of traditionally 
dominant and marginalized groups evolved.  In particular, I show how several grassroots forums 
emerged in response to the crisis to reframe problems, solutions and identities. 
 Chapter 7 analyzes the emergence of the Northeast Superior Forest Community 
Corporation and the Northeast Superior Regional Chiefs Forum as part of the local search for 
solutions to the forestry crisis.  I examine different social framings as well as forms and sources 
of power at work among the different actors within the NSFC and how different actors‘ actions 
have shaped the development of NSFC. 
 In the final chapter (8), I synthesize the main research findings with reference to the core 
research questions and offer 14 main conclusions.  I then highlight the main conceptual, practical 
and methodological contributions and reflect on the strengths and limitations of the study.  Ten 














CHAPTER 2 -- CONVENTIONAL FOREST MANAGEMENT: EMERGENCE, 
LIMITATIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES 
2.1. Overview 
This chapter briefly reviews the origins of conventional forest management in North America as 
part of the burgeoning conservation movement, with a focus on prevailing ideology and forestry 
institutions in Canada.  Key characteristics and critiques of conventional forest management (and 
resource management in general) are provided to explain public and academic calls for change 
surrounding the use and control of public forests.  Specifically, attention is given to growing 
recognition of the social and ecological complexity of forest management and planning, 
contrasting and evolving public and professional values and issues of representation surrounding 
forest use and control.  In doing so, this chapter provides context for why collaborative and 
learning approaches to Crown forest management are being pursued in Canada and points to the 
significance of research on power relations in emerging collaborative settings. 
 
2.2. Origins of Conventional Forest Management 
Strengths and limitations of conventional forest management must be considered in the context 
from which it emerged.  In North America, conventional forest management developed under the 
dominant forest management paradigm of the early 1900s—utilitarian conservation—which was 
based primarily on instrumental values and the products or functions provided by forests for 
human use.  The German forestry tradition, fostered in North America by E.B. Fernow and 
Gifford Pinchot in the late 1800s, provided the main foundational influences for the forest 
conservation era (Drushka 1985; Apsey et al 2000).  Based on the principles and practices of 
scientific forest management, Fernow advocated sustained yield forestry to produce ‗normal‘ 
forests that could support both commercial harvesting and preservation (Drushka 1985).  
However, this required the conversion of existing ―abnormal‖ forests to ―create a certain type of 
age-stratified forest which would provide predictable and equal volumes of timber each year, in 
perpetuity‖ (Apsey et al 2000: 49).  An important oversight or misunderstanding was that it had 
taken centuries of deliberate management to produce such forest conditions in Europe (Drushka 
1985; Apsey et al 2000).  Economic values and forest protection prevailed under the 
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conservation ethic and timber liquidation, fire, insects, and disease all became foci of 
management control.  The multiple use component of sustained yield forestry, meant to ensure a 
flow of non-timber resources such as fuel, water and fish, was deemphasized or claimed rather 
than realized (Behan 1990). 
 Fernow‘s vision for sustained yield forest management was expected to be achieved by 
―governments and perpetual corporations or large capitalists‖ (Drushka 1985: 29).  Industrialists 
supported the newly forming Canadian forest tenure system because it provided an inexpensive 
timber supply without the burden of ownership (Apsey et al. 2000).  The early boom years (about 
1900-1930) of the conservationist era encouraged the notion of a permanent forest industry, and 
private forest enterprise was considered essential to economic growth (Apsey et al. 2000; 
Beckley 2003).  Development-oriented policies successfully attracted private capital to develop 
public forests and create economic growth, infrastructure and provincial revenues (Hayter and 
Barnes 1997).  Forest resource development was primarily concerned with generating resource 
rents and taxes on industrial and employment income, rather than local development. 
 This was a formative period of creation and change in North American forestry because 
much of the industrial structure of forestry was built, many of the forestry schools in existence 
today were opened, the profession of forestry evolved, research establishments were founded, 
and the technological revolution began replacing muscles with machines in the woods and mills 
(Apsey et al. 2000: 31).  Both the US and Canadian Forest Services were established in the first 
decade of the 1900s (Beckley 2003).  In Canada, large bureaucracies and closed policy networks 
consisting of government and industry actors alone were formed to administer large-scale forest 
development (Ross 1995; Hessing et al 2005).  Forestry schools were established across Canada 
(e.g., University of Toronto 1907; University of New Brunswick 1908; Laval University 1910; 
University of British Columbia 1918; Lakehead 1947) to address the created need for trained 
forestry professionals
1
.  Canada‘s first forestry congress was held in Ottawa in 1906 under Prime 
                                                 
1 This self-supporting view endures in the language of the Canadian forestry profession today.  For example, to address growing concerns for 
decreasing forestry program enrollment, The Canadian Institute of Forestry released a report entitled: The crisis in post-secondary enrollments in 
forestry programs: A call to action for Canada‟s future forestry professional/technical workforce – A White Paper on Post-Secondary Forestry 
Recruitment.  According to the Interim National Recruitment Strategy Steering Committee of the Canadian Institute of Forestry (2006: 57): 
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Minister Wilfrid Laurier to consider national concerns for forest resource use (Mitchell 1986).  
The forest industry, government, and labour (with links to and counterparts in professional 
forestry associations and schools) assumed the primary role in management.  It was also during 
this period that the dominant ideologies of the resource management era—economism, 
scientism, and technocracy (Ludwig 2001) (Table 2.1.)—were enshrined in North American 
forest management. 
 
Table 2.1. Dominant ideologies of the modern resource management era 
Economism  Economic values emphasized at the expense of all others.  An anthropocentric ideology that 
views nature based on conferred value. 
 
Scientism Belief that science is inherently capable of solving all human problems; derives from the 
unquestioned achievements of science.  Reflects an oversimplified view of how science relates to 
social and political issues. 
 
Technocracy Tendency to view technological innovation as the magic bullet for resolving policy problems. 
(based on Caldwell 1990 in Ludwig 2001) 
 
2.3. Characteristics and Critiques of Conventional Forest Management 
2.3.1. Basic Characteristics: Linearity, Efficiency and End Goal(s) 
The main goal of conventional forest management is timber production for human use (Binkley 
1999; Menzies 2004; PROFOR and World Bank 2004).  Streamlined planning and management 
processes emphasize efficiency in producing plans and attaining management goals.  This 
approach is associated with synoptic planning, or the rational comprehensive approach, which is 
the dominant planning tradition (Hudson 1979).  The focus on a single resource, productivity, 
threat mitigation and economic value is maintained through top-down and centralized 
management authority, usually held by a single agency.  Under this model, the goal is to use the 
immense resources and administrative capacity of large government bureaucracies and private 
industry to achieve certain management functions efficiently and effectively. 
                                                                                                                                                             
―Graduates of technology and baccalaureate forestry programs are the professional human resources required to steward and manage forest 
resources across Canada.‖ 
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 As Holling (1995: 7) points out, conventional management aims to control a given 
variable(s) (e.g., fire, pestilence, flood or drought) and focus on a narrow purpose to solve 
problems: ―modern engineering, technological, economic, and administrative experience can 
deal well with such narrowly defined problems.‖  The management response to spruce budworm 
problems in New Brunswick, Canada is a good example: ―as a feat of logistics, the program 
[which has been ongoing since 1952] has been outstanding.  To track annual distribution of 
budworm populations and resultant damage over millions of hectares of forest with such 
precision and effectiveness of crop protection was exceptional‖ (Baskerville 1995: 51).  Over the 
past century, forest fire prevention and suppression efforts in America have demonstrated similar 
capability in mitigating fire in large-scale forest ecosystems (Pyne 2004).  But prescriptive 
technical solutions often overlook the complexity of ecological systems and disregard social 
systems, which can introduce further change or problems (Baskerville 1995). 
2.3.2. Main Critiques: Reductionism, Control-Oriented and Social Conflict 
Behan (1990: 14) observes that resource and environmental management (REM) has become 
fragmented through increased ―specialization and reductionism‖ intended to help better 
understand complex problems (or sets of problems).  Sustained yield management is taught on a 
disciplinary basis to produce individually certified professionals who specialize in forestry, 
recreation, wildlife biology, hydrology and range conservation.  This ‗silo‘ approach limits 
coordination and cooperation and can create jurisdictional problems and interagency turf battles 
(Mitchell 2002, 2005; Hessing et al 2005).  Isolated resource managers and ‗experts‘ from 
different disciplinary backgrounds work on resource-specific issues in vertically and horizontally 
fragmented organizational settings with minimal attention to the interrelatedness of REM 
problems. 
 Criticism is also directed at sustained yield forestry, which is based on an equilibrium 
model that assumes balance between growth and harvest can continue supply indefinitely (Behan 
1990).  Sustained yield can be generally defined as ―the quantity or amount that a crop or 
population can produce continuously at a given intensity of management‖ (Ross 1995: 324).  A 
central assumption is that ecosystems can be held static through manipulation to maintain certain 
preferred conditions.  Sustained yield forestry holds that forest land area, nutrients and pests can 
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be controlled in isolation of the rest of the ecosystem to produce a balance between net growth 
and harvest.  This view also holds that forest ecosystems will return to a predictable state or set 
of conditions when usual management steps are followed.  Main criticisms of the equilibrium 
view are that it does not account for ecosystem complexity, that dynamics are influenced by 
factors at multiple scales, that disturbance is a key feature of ecosystems, and multiple stable 
states are possible (Walker and Salt 2006). 
 Accordingly, Annual Allowable Cut (AAC) calculations in forestry have been criticized 
for using simplistic and unrealistic assumptions that fail to inventory resource stocks accurately 
and overestimate wood supplies (Baskerville 1995; Clapp 1998; Marchak et al 1999; May 2005).  
Subjectivity, manipulation, and politics have influenced the calculation of sustained yield quotas 
in forestry and fishing.  Resultant overharvesting and insufficient reforestation, together with fire 
suppression, and pest treatment have contributed to significant fibre supply shortages across 
Canada (Baskerville 1995; Drushka 2003; May 2005; ECO 2005).  Similarly, Hutchings et al‘s 
(1997) controversial paper ―Is Scientific Inquiry Incompatible with Government Information 
Control‖ illustrated how bureaucratic interference in the scientific debate behind cod stock 
assessments during the mid 1980s inflated stock estimates and downplayed fishing impacts.  The 
―selective exclusion of scientific information‖ on the part of bureaucrats enabled ongoing 
overfishing, which led to the decline of the fishery and significant socio-economic crisis in 
resource dependent communities (Hutchings et al 1997: 1202). 
 A related critique of conventional forestry concerns the leasing of public land to private, 
often transnational, corporations, and the uneven distribution of costs and benefits from the 
development of public resources.  Critics argue that short-term leases (e.g., 25 years) 
administered through centrally-controlled state management systems and the mobility of capital 
in the global economy do not provide adequate incentives to profit-seeking companies to manage 
for multiple values, practice silviculture (replanting), pay regard to community concerns, or 
uphold pre-existing indigenous rights (Pedersen 1995; Contreras et al 2001; Haley and Nelson 
2007).  The current Canadian tenure system does not encourage private companies (and 
governments) to engage the spectrum of cultural and environmental values increasingly 
demanded by communities (Haley and Nelson 2007).  The continued dominance of sustained 
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yield policy and focus on economic values in an era of Sustainable Forest Management 
(Adamowicz and Burton 2003) suggests that companies, without institutional reform, are 
unlikely to pursue alternatives (e.g., collaboration, learning and ecosystem-based approaches) 
that could better consider and share costs and benefits and facilitate learning from management 
practice and local experience. 
 Forestry challenges in New Brunswick illustrate the issues exacerbated by conventional 
forest management, in the context of technical solutions targeting spruce budworm, a naturally 
occurring defoliator species in the fir/spruce forests of north-eastern North America (Baskerville 
1995).  The success of conventional forest management in producing ‗normal‘ or homogenous 
forest conditions that consistently maintained fir stands ideal for budworm would make the 
―budworm a perpetual problem for forest managers instead of a periodic problem‖ (Baskerville 
1995: 60).  Ongoing pest protection created more dense fir stands that contained more trees but 
of smaller diameter, creating higher harvesting costs and lower material value.  Increased stand 
density also contributed to inconsistent regeneration, which reduced the timber available for 
harvest.  Pest management at the provincial scale could not eradicate spruce budworm in an 
ecological system that extended beyond political boundaries.  Spraying of insecticides created 
public controversy.  The professional forestry community would not acknowledge these 
problems due in part to ―an unwillingness to admit that the problem had occurred under what 
were supposed to have been controlled forest management conditions‖ (Baskerville 1995: 69).  
In complex and uncertain conditions, conventional forest management was unable to adapt to 
remedy pressing social and ecological problems.  As discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, a similar 
situation of conflict emerging from crisis has arisen in Northern Ontario. 
 Beckley (1998) posited an emerging legitimacy crisis in Canadian forestry between the 
public, and professional forest managers (and their academic and government institutions) who 
have traditionally controlled the management of public forests.  Such conflict is thought to 
derive, in part, from the public perception that foresters hold a ―science knows best‖ attitude and, 
on the other hand, that foresters‘ are frustrated with perceived public ignorance of forests 
(Robinson et al 2001).  Hamersley Chambers and Beckley (2003: 120) link growth in public 
demand for involvement in forest management decision making to a general sense among 
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citizens that the natural and social sciences alone are unable to solve societal problems and that 
―politicians seem increasingly obligated to advance the interests of corporate globalization, 
labour unions, or the solidarity and dogma of political parties rather than the interests of their 
constituents‖.  Several additional factors contribute to this divide. 
 Surveys of forest values, attitudes, and perceptions held by Canadian forest managers 
(Robinson et al 2001), American forest managers (Shindler 2003) and members of forest 
management planning public advisory committees (Wellstead et al 2003) reveal significant 
differences between these ‗representatives‘ and the populations they are to serve.  Regarding the 
Canadian advisory committees, such divergence has been partially attributed to the non-
representative demographic profiles of committees, which mainly include men who are more 
educated and report higher incomes than the general public, and who more directly economically 
depend on forest/resource industries (Wellstead et al 2003; Parkins et al 2006). 
 Inadequate demographic representation in the forestry profession indicates a similar 
challenge.  For example, while the proportion of Aboriginal people and women with forestry 
expertise has increased over the past decade, their numbers remain low (Hoberg et al 2003; 
Parsons and Prest 2003).  Table 2.2 indicates the relative increase yet still low number of 
Aboriginal people with formal forestry training in Canada.  Women too are underrepresented, 
when professional association involvement and postsecondary program enrolments are 
considered.  For example, a 2004 survey of the Association of British Columbia Professional 
Foresters (ABCPF) membership (n=736) found that only 18% of its members were female 
(ABCPF 2004).  Furthermore, female enrolment in traditional forestry programs at The 
University of British Columbia Faculty of Forestry is also only 26% (personal communication, 
C. Parsons, October 15, 2009).  Reed (2003) provides evidence of male dominance in the  
Table 2.2. Aboriginal people with professional and technical expertise in forestry in Canada 
 1990 2003 
PhD degrees  0 3 







(Adapted from Parsons and Prest 2003) 
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Canadian forest sector more broadly, which permeates forest industry workplaces, participation 
processes and media surrounding forest issues. 
 Also contributing to the negative image of foresters and forestry by the general public is 
the public perception that the forestry profession is environmentally destructive and 
economically unstable (Hoberg et al 2003).  A 2003 Angus Reid poll (n=500) (ABCPF 2003) 
conducted for the ABCPF found that 45 per cent of public respondents in British Columbia (BC) 
were dissatisfied with forest management compared to 37 per cent who were satisfied.  Only 16 
per cent believed that forest management in BC had improved over the previous 5 years (since 
1999), while more than one third believed it had worsened.  13 per cent indicated that 
clearcutting was their biggest concern with BC‘s forestry practices.  Overcutting, the surtax on 
softwood export, and general job loss tied (7%) as the second biggest concerns among 
participants.  By 2009, a follow-up poll (n=572) conducted by the ABCPF (2009) found that the 
number of dissatisfied BC residents had increased to 51 per cent, while 37 per cent were again 
generally satisfied.  Once again, only 17 per cent of respondents felt forest management had 
improved over the previous 5 years (since 2003), while 42 per cent felt it had worsened.  The 
2009 survey did not ask respondents about their ‗biggest concerns‘ regarding forestry in BC.  
According to these surveys, BC residents feel that the general quality of forest management has 
been decreasing since 1999.  Evidently, Canadian forestry professionals are concerned about 
these negative perceptions and link them to falling forestry school enrolments and forecast 
human resource shortages for government and industry employers (e.g., Hoberg et al 2003; 
CIFINRSSC 2006).   
 The above challenges indicate a need for professional foresters and the forest industry to 
continue work to accommodate shifting societal values.  Some (Kimmins 2002; Lane and 
MacDonald 2002) suggest that forestry has always evolved as a response to society‘s demands 
and needs.  Encouraging perhaps is that longitudinal survey research on public involvement 
processes for forest management in Quebec found that attitudinal differences between public 
participants and forest managers can evolve (Cote and Bouthillier 2002).  Cote and Bouthillier 
(2002) found that ongoing interaction between forest managers and users led to increased 
information-sharing and trust and contributed to the reduction of potential conflicts among 
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parties interested in forest management.  Recognition of the expertise of non-professionals 
enabled the contribution of valuable substantive knowledge that would not have otherwise been 
incorporated into management planning.  The general trend towards more ―inclusive and open‖ 
(McGurk et al 2006) forest management processes in Canada suggests that some policy makers, 
industry managers, scientists and residents value collaboration as a way to overcome the 
challenges of managing public forests in Canada.    
 
2.4. A Way Forward for Managing Canada’s Public Forests? 
Against this backdrop, it should not come as a surprise that civic, public and private groups are 
seeking alternative models of forest governance.  Participatory and collaborative decision 
making processes are intended to expose a range of forest sector actors to and incorporate a 
wider range of perspectives and knowledge into the social framings of environmental problems 
that drive political debate and action (Forsyth 2003).  Notable is the move towards increased and 
broader public involvement in forest decision making, which reflects a worldwide trend in REM 
(Dorcey and McDaniels 2001; Plummer and Fitzgibbon 2004a; Armitage 2005; McGurk et al 
2006).  In Canadian forest management, public or stakeholder engagement has been advanced 
using several models: advisory committees/boards to government and industry (Parkins et al 
2004; McGurk et al 2006; Robson and Kant 2009), public engagement processes required for 
environmental assessment and regional land use planning (Pedersen 1995), community forests 
and multi-group management authorities (Teitelbaum  et al 2006; Bullock et al 2009), forest 
certification (Venne 2008: 115), and research-based organizations such as Model Forests 
(Sinclair and Lobe 2005), and more recently, the Forest Communities Program (Bullock 2009). 
 Academics (e.g., Robinson et al 2001; McGurk 2003; Bullock 2006), public (e.g., 
NRTEE 2005; CFS 2006), and civic groups (e.g., Greenpeace 2009) often cite widespread public 
ownership of Canada‘s forests—and their economic and ecological significance to rural resource 
communities, Aboriginal peoples and Canada as a whole—to justify increased participation and 
collaboration (Table 2.3).  Indeed, with 374.14 million hectares of government-owned forest 
land, Canada far exceeds other G8 countries (except Russia at 882.98 million hectares) and all 
other developed nations with significant forest lands (Kant 2009).   Perhaps the more compelling 
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justification for increasing participation and collaboration is the recognition that management 
capacity, information, and understanding do exist locally (Wismer and Mitchell 2005; CCFM 
2008).  Canadians increasingly are reaching higher levels of education, communication networks 
are improving, and interest groups are more organized (Hamersley Chambers and Beckley 2003: 
119).  Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK), if incorporated in a culturally appropriate 
manner, can also offer insights that sustainable forest managers and planners frequently need but 
generally cannot access (Stevenson and Webb 2003).  Slow diversification of governance 
structures is creating new forums for collaborative engagement among groups with traditionally 
uneven opportunities for participation, as well as redefining decision making roles and processes 
that contrast with previously criticized conventional state-lead, top-down, centralised, and 
technocratic approaches to environmental management and research (Bryant and Wilson 1998). 
Table 2.3. Canadian Forest Facts, 2003-2008 
 
 93% publicly owned; 
 300 ―forest-dependent‖ communities derived >50% of their employment from the forest sector in 
2000; 
 800 Aboriginal communities located within Canada‘s productive forests, many dependent on the 
forest for  traditional, non-economic uses; 
 400,000 jobs in wood product and paper manufacturing, logging, and forest services; 
 $40 billion in wood products exported annually 
 




In this chapter, key developments and critiques of the conventional approach to forest 
management in North America have been presented.  Moves toward collaborative approaches are 
part of efforts to address today‘s complex management problems.  Such moves are significant 
with regard to the research questions in Chapter 1, especially how different actors perceive 
problems and solutions and how different views evolve and become dominant in collaborative 
settings as a response to shared crisis and common societal problems.  The following chapter 
looks more closely at collaboration theory and how perspectives on social learning and power 
relations can be incorporated into a conceptual framework for the analysis of the ‗forestry crisis‘ 
experience in Northern Ontario, Canada. 
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CHAPTER 3 -- TOWARDS COLLABORATIVE AND SOCIAL LEARNING 
APPROACHES TO PUBLIC FOREST MANAGEMENT IN CANADA 
3.1. Overview 
In this chapter, literature on collaboration, social learning, and political ecology is examined to 
explore links between selected concepts and methods relevant to studying the research problem 
outlined in Chapter 1.  The first two sections briefly review definitions, key concepts and 
critiques from the collaboration and social learning literature in the context of REM.  This is 
followed by a discussion that draws together elements necessary for and useful to conducting a 
critical frame analysis of learning in REM multiparty problem settings characterised by 
complexity and social conflict.  In particular, I show that these literatures all provide some 
version(s) of what this research refers to as ―social framings‖ (or frames in the case of 
individuals).  Social framings can be used to study social learning as a response to crisis and 
change, as well as the effect of power relations on learning, actions and outcomes.  A conceptual 
framework is presented to help explain the relationships among social framings, multi-loop 
learning, and different sources and forms of power. 
 
3.2. Collaboration in Complex Problem Domains 
Collaboration is associated with various REM approaches, for example, collaborative 
management and planning (Margerum 2002; Conely and Moote 2003), community-based natural 
resource management (Armitage 2005), community forestry (Bullock et al 2009), adaptive 
management (Lee 1993), co-management (Plummer 2006), adaptive co-management (Plummer 
and Armitage 2007), integrated and ecosystem-based management (Mitchell 2002; Slocombe 
and Hanna 2007) and sustainable forest management (Lane and McDonald 2002; Adamowicz 
and Burton 2003; CCFM 2008).  The core concept of collaboration is the involvement of 
multiple parties linked by a mutual interest (Plummer and FitzGibbon 2004a).  Gray (1985: 912) 
provides a straightforward definition and entry point: ―(1) the pooling of appreciations and/or 
tangible resources, e.g., information, money, labor, etc. (2) by two or more stakeholders, (3) to 
solve a set of problems which neither can solve individually‖.  While a good starting point, this 
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definition masks nuances of societal problem conditions, forums or processes, and stakeholders 
that can contribute to a richer understanding of collaboration in REM. 
 Gray‘s (1989) seminal work on multiparty collaboration assumes an interorganizational 
setting and problems that cut across levels of society.  She was not concerned with single 
organizations and internally relevant problems that could be resolved unilaterally.  Gray‘s (1989) 
rationale is based on the common acknowledgement that society‘s environmental and resource 
problems have become increasingly complex and uncertain, requiring diverse public, private and 
civic actors to become involved (Gray 1985, 1989; also Funtowicz and Ravetz 1991; Mitchell 
2002).  Complexity and uncertainty cause turbulent conditions characterized by rapid change and 
interconnections among organizational actions, whereby the actions of individual organizations 
often result in unanticipated consequences for themselves and a few others.  However, unstable 
and seemingly unpredictable conditions create societal problems that exceed the capacity of even 
large and powerful organizations acting unilaterally (Gray 1985; 1989).  The ongoing forestry 
crisis in Northern Ontario (described in Chapters 5-7) is one example of this sort of complex 
―problem domain‖. 
 Gray (1989: 28) believes that ―collaboration offers an antidote to turbulence by building a 
collective capacity to reduce these unintended consequences.  By building collective 
appreciations and sharing resources, organizations increase variety in their repertoire of 
responses.‖  Significant here is the perceived importance of developing collective appreciations 
that are more comprehensive and detailed than individual views to serve as the basis for selecting 
future courses of action.  Generating a more commonly accepted and richer understanding of 
complex problems implies some reconciliation of different problem perspectives, as well as 
underlying values and assumptions.  Gray‘s (2003) later work develops this notion of shared 
appreciations by examining the construction and evolution of ―frames‖ in multiparty 
environmental problem domains.  Explained in a subsequent section (3.3), my research interprets 
the process of developing these shared appreciations or social framings as social learning. 
 A range of benefits is cited in the collaboration literature based on normative and 
operational considerations (Table 3.1).  In addition to these benefits, collaboration is pursued for 
two general needs (Gray 1989; Conley and Moote 2003): 1) to resolve conflict by linking 
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opponents through a joint search for information and solutions that satisfy different interests 
(e.g., Daniels and Walker 1996a; Lewicki et al 2003; Gray 2004); and, 2) to advance shared 
visions for the ―collective good of the stakeholders involved‖ (Gray 1989: 8).  But stakeholders 
must first agree to work together as a preliminary step to defining what the shared vision will be, 
which can then be discovered or refined through social learning processes supported by 
collaborative arrangements relevant to the broader problem domain and context (e.g., Daniels 
and Walker 1996a; Schusler et al 2003; Plummer 2006).  Both motivations are likely to be 
present in many collaborative settings.   
Table 3.1. Commonly cited benefits of collaboration  
 
Social Justice and Equity 
 Ensures consideration of interests of each stakeholder and future generations 
 Encourages more inclusive and representative engagement 
 Increases stakeholder awareness and education 
 Increases resource access and use rights can improve livelihoods and social security/new sources 
of income 
 Enhances long-term sustainability of resources and related community cultures 
 Improves discipline, accountability, and legitimacy in problem domain through checks and 
balances 
 Empowerment improves governance in state and community institutions 
 
Technical, Effectiveness, and Efficiency 
 Broad problem analysis (various perspectives and knowledge) improves understanding and quality 
solutions 
 Participation enhances acceptance of solution/actions and commitment to implementation 
 Diversifies response capability 
 Can help to reopen deadlocked negotiations or avoid future impasse 
 Stakeholders retain ownership of solutions 
 Stakeholders most familiar with the problem invent most suitable solutions 
 Increased potential for innovation 
 Costs are shared and/or high costs of alternative methods avoided (e.g., litigation) 
 Reduce enforcement costs 
 Including those with most impact on resources means solutions with more impact  
 Improved resource quality through better protection 
 Collaboration improves adaptability 
 Improves stakeholder relations and trust (social capital) as basis for future actions 
 
(Gray 1989; CIFOR 2005: 11; Schusler et al 2003) 
 
 Opportunities to influence the earliest stages of emerging collaborative arrangements are 
critical for structuring future stakeholder interactions, organizational functions, and outcomes 
(Gray 1985; 1989).  Social learning begins during this loosely defined informal process stage, 
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during which people and groups become interested in learning about a common problem, other 
stakeholders, and their own personal positions towards developing common understanding and 
values—the core social framings—for mutual benefit and future engagement.  Linked to this 
stage is the existence and development of trust and relationships that constitute ―social capital‖ 
which can be both a process feature and a product of collaboration and social learning (Plummer 
and FitzGibbon 2007). 
 Collaboration implies a process of interaction for sharing ideas and resources, and for 
sharing power and decision making among participants (Selin and Chavez 1995).  Power 
relations among different actors mediate the exchange and coproduction of social framings that 
in turn guide actions.  Following a critical political ecology approach (Forsyth 2003) to 
collaboration and learning means examining how, why, and by whom dominant social framings 
are created.  This requires close attention to the contexts, social interactions and processes that 
facilitate the development of social framings as well as how different forms of power manifest in 
dominant social framings guiding human-environment interactions.  Outlined below, social 
learning theory and political ecology furnish additional insights for the conceptual framework for 
this research. 
 
3.3. Social Learning: Definitions and Critiques 
Social learning often remains an implicit or ‗background‘ process in collaboration and so is 
promoted for many of the same benefits (Table 3.1) and is subject to similar challenges related to 
access, capacity, and communication (Table 3.2).  Advocates suggest that social learning can 
produce ‗better‘ citizens through moral and cognitive development and thereby affirm and 
improve democracy (Mezirow 1994; Webler et al 1995; Fitzpatrick 2006; Angeles and Gurstein 
2007).  A focus on learning—defined here as the revision and expansion of an individual‘s 
―frames‖ used to assign meaning and interpret experience for understanding (Mezirow 1994; 
Parson and Clark 1995)—reveals underlying processes and interactions among stakeholders that 

















 Lack of inclusiveness and opportunities for involvement (e.g., elitism, closed policy 
networks, exclusion of marginalized groups) 
 Negative influences of power imbalances and coercion 
 Lack of capacity (e.g., personnel, organizational, financial, and informational resources) 
 Lack of willingness among individuals and groups to work together (turf battles, intractable 
conflict) 
 Information challenges: poor communication (including dishonesty); lack of accurate and 
complete information; information storage (organizational memory) 
 Closed-mindedness, resistant cultures and ideology 
 High turnover rates that erode experience, creating learning shortfalls 
 Lack of time; more value placed on action rather than thought 
 Restrictions on innovation and experiment/―margin for learning‖ (e.g., high risk) 
 Complexity makes learning outcomes and causal links  difficult to interpret 
 Learning processes that do not match different learning styles 
 
 
(Argyris and Schön1978; Levitt and March 1988; Gray 1989; Mezirow 1994; Selin and Chavez 1995; Bernard and 
Armstrong 1998; Sinclair and Diduck 2001; Diduck and Mitchell 2003; Diduck et al 2005) 
 
 Scholars from diverse backgrounds (e.g., REM, organizational development; planning; 
social psychology; adult education) have shaped the social learning literature.  Social learning 
means various things to different people in terms of who is involved, what is learned, and how 
and where learning occurs (Parson and Clark 1995; Maarleveld and Dangbegnon 1999; Armitage 
et al 2008).  In addition to its use in REM (Leeuwis and Pyburn 2002; Keen et al 2005; Wals et 
al 2007), we see learning as governance (Angeles and Gurstein 2007), planning (Friedmann 
1987), the policy process (Glasbergen 1996; Clark 2002; Hessing et al 2005; Michaels et al 
2006) implementation (McLaughlin 1976; Majone and Wildavsky 1979), and adaptive 
monitoring (Guijt 2007).   
 As a tool meant to address uncertainty and complexity in large-scale managed 
ecosystems, adaptive management explicitly focuses on learning by treating policies and 
management interventions as experiments in order to build lessons from monitored outcomes 
into future decisions and actions (Walters 1986; Lee 1993; Holling 1995; Jiggins and Roling 
2000).  A ―logical extension‖ (Plummer and Armitage 2007: 63), adaptive co-management 
(ACM) can be seen as a novel governance approach to social-ecological systems, which 
emphasizes power sharing, flexibility, and experimentation and is positioned at the confluence of 
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social learning and collaboration (Plummer and FitzGibbon 2007; Resilience Alliance 2007; 
Armitage et al 2008).  Although social learning is increasingly acknowledged and adopted for its 
utility, its ambiguity and a consequent need for conceptual clarity and consistent application in 
REM research are also well recognized (Parson and Clark 1995; Maarleveld and Dangbegnon 
1999; Plummer and Fitzgibbon 2007; Armitage et al 2008). 
 Researchers identify two main perspectives on social learning (Pahl-Wostl and Hare 
2004; Parson and Clark 1995; Webler et al 1995).  1) The psychological perspective focuses on 
individual learning processes as dependent upon social interaction, observation, and imitation 
(i.e., Bandura 1977).  This perspective is too narrow to account for all the learning processes 
linked to REM (Pahl-Wostl and Hare 2004).  2) The sociological perspective is concerned with 
learning processes within social groups (e.g., project groups, public planning workshops, private 
and public bureaucracies) and societies (e.g., Argyris and Schön 1978; Wynne 1992).  The 
sociological approach transcends socially conditioned learning by individuals to look at 
―coordinated cognitive and normative adjustment‖ (McCarthy 2006) or group-level behavioural 
and moral change.  The latter approach provides the main theoretical foundation for social 
learning in REM research and my research. 
 Key articles on social learning in REM show variation regarding definition (e.g., Webler 
et al 1995; Daniels and Walker 1996a, Glasbergen 1996; Schusler et al 2003).  Ambiguity 
remains as to who is learning, whether individuals or groups, and in what forum.  It is also 
unclear which actors are involved and whose interests are represented in terms of lay people, 
civil society organizations, governments, scientists, and policy makers.  Some see social learning 
as a citizen-centered public process (e.g., Webler et al 1995; Daniels and Walker 1996a), while 
others limit social learning to government policy makers and ―well-organized‖ active interest 
groups (Glasbergen 1996: 177).  Keen et al (2005) do not limit learning to either civilians or 
closed policy networks. 
 Scholars of social learning in REM often conceptualize learning based on an idealistic 
view of direct and broad citizen involvement in democracy, but conduct their research in the 
complex political reality of ‗indirect‘ citizen involvement based on limited representative multi-
stakeholder policy forums and public participation processes in developed regions.  Most studies 
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evaluate participatory processes sponsored by government or industry, such as environmental 
assessment (e.g., Webler et al 1995; Diduck and Mitchell 2003; Fitzpatrick and Sinclair 2003; 
Fitzpatrick 2006) or forms of collaborative management (Diduck et al 2005).  Others stage 
participatory workshops and ―search conferences‖ to promote involvement and collaboration 
among stakeholders through learning activities for a certain purpose (plan development, conflict 
resolution) and to evaluate learning processes and outcomes (e.g., Webler et al 1995; Daniels and 
Walker 1996a, 1996b; Schusler et al 2003; Pahl-Wostl and Hare 2004; Tippet et al 2005; 
McCarthy et al 2006).  Some (e.g., Dale 1989; Gray 2003) take a broad view of how perspectives 
change among multiple parties both engaged in and ―outside‖ of environmental debates.   
 Diduck (2010) addressed these concerns by delineating different social units of learning 
(individual, action group, organizational, network, and societal learning).  Diduck‘s (2010: 4) 
analysis supports the need for clarity when delineating learning participants and processes to 
recognize ―the untidy mesh of relationships, acting across all levels simultaneously‖ in multi-
level learning.  Ongoing fuzzy articulations of social learning in the REM literature, when 
considered alongside the emphasis placed on social learning to solving environmental problems, 
contributes to what has been referred to as the ―learning paradox‖ (Armitage et al 2008). 
 In spite of diversity, common elements (Table 3.3) from seminal social learning 
scholarship can be synthesized to formulate a more complete definition for social learning: 
an ongoing and interactive process in which individuals and groups with diverse values 
and knowledge negotiate and reflect on experience to develop shared meaning as well as 
appreciation for their interdependence to resolve common problems through social 
change. 
This definition is generic to account for various potential participants, forums, and dynamic 
interactions, and specific enough to identify the purpose of social learning in REM. 
 As outlined in Chapter 4, this research seeks to take a broader and more long-term view 
of social learning processes [i.e., rather than focussing on ephemeral learning platforms (e.g., 
conferences, Schusler et al 2003; public participation sessions, Daniels and Walker 1996a] to 
account for nested learning processes at both the organizational and organizational network 
levels (Diduck 2010).  This approach works well with the embedded case study method (Yin 
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2003) adopted here to investigate social framings in the Northeast Superior Forest Community 
Corporation and wider Northeast Superior Region it claims to represent.  Social framings, their 
relevance to learning modes and processes, and the importance of power relations in multi-actor 
forums are further explained below. 
Table 3.3. Common definitional elements of social learning in REM 
Common Elements Key Sources 
 
Learning by individuals and groups [private, public, 
civic] 
 
Friedmann 1987; Daniels and Walker 1996a; Schusler et 
al 2003; Keen et al 2005; Wildemeerisch 2007 
 
Working on common problem(s) 
 
Webler et al 1995; Keen et al 2005 
 
Interactive, ongoing, social process  
 
Argyris and Schön 1978; Friedmann 1987; Daniels and 
Walker 1996a; Schusler et al 2003; Keen et al 2005 
 
Deliberating and negotiating 
 
Daniels and Walker 1996a; Keen et al 2005; 
Wildemeerisch 2007 
 
Combining diverse perspectives, experiences, values, 
and knowledge 
 
Daniels and Walker 1996a; Schusler et al 2003; Keen et 
al 2005 
 
Developing mutual understanding [framework for 
constructing meaning] to guide joint action 
 
Webler et al 1995; Daniels and Walker 1996a; Schusler 
et al 2003 
 
Reflecting on action/experience 
 
Keen et al 2005; Wildemeerisch 2007 
 
Recognising  interconnections and interdependence 
 
Webler et al 1995; Daniels and Walker 1996a; Keen et 
al 2005 
 
Seeking change in social behaviour/practice 
 
 
Webler et al 1995; Keen et al 2005 
 
 
3.4. Social Framings, Multi-loop Learning, and Power Relations: A Conceptual Framework 
3.4.1. Frames, Social Framings and Discourses 
As defined by Miles and Huberman (1994: 18), ―a conceptual framework explains, either 
graphically or in narrative form, the main things to be studied—the key factors, constructs or 
variables—and the presumed relationships among them.‖  The conceptual framework for my 
research draws on concepts from the work of Gray (1989; 2003) on collaboration and frame 
analysis and organizational learning theory (Argyris and Schön 1978) from the field of 
organizational development.  Political ecology (Peet and Watts 1996; Forsyth 2003; Dryzek 
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2005) is also instructive for considering social framings of problems resulting from human-
environment interactions and the construction of knowledge in REM settings.  Together, this 
framework conceptualizes how power relations affect learning processes and outcomes in 
complex problem domains.  Key concepts and their relationships are described below as a guide 
for this study. 
 Social learning theories have been influenced by John Dewey‘s (1859-1952) 
philosophical pragmatism and the concept of ―learning by doing‖ (Friedmann 1987: 188).  His 
epistemology was constructivist, guided by the belief that knowledge derives from experience 
and that through action people transform the world and simultaneously develop understanding by 
imposing meaning on individual experience.  A constructivist approach to social learning (e.g., 
Argyris and Schön 1978; Mezirow 1994; Keen et al 2005) requires attention  to how people build 
shared meaning through socially constructing common ―frames‖—the cognitive structures that 
enable people to interpret experience—which provide the basis for collective action (e.g., 
Argyris and Schön 1978; Schusler et al 2003; Gray 2004). 
 According to Gray (2003: 13), ―a frame provides a heuristic for how to categorize and 
organize data into meaningful chunks of information.‖  Frames guide our perception and how we 
represent reality (Figure 3.1).  ―Reality‖ is always interpreted and filtered through the human 
senses and so there are multiple, often competing, realities.  When two or more people hold the 
same frame(s) regarding a situation, they are said to be socially constructing reality. 
 Sets of related social framings of environmental issues or problems constitute larger 
discourses or ―shared way[s] of apprehending the world‖ (Dryzek 2005: 9).  It is within the 
confines of a particular discourse that subscribers find the ―basic terms‖ (i.e., assumptions, 
judgements) that position investigation, viewpoints, agreements and disagreements (Dryzek 
2005: 9).  Individuals and groups of people sponsor discourses that in turn lead them to ―frame‖ 
situations in a certain way.  Discourses include social framings that set out problem definitions 
and solutions—and indeed a range of related frames—that together portray a particular story or 
account of a situation.  Knowledge must therefore be considered in the context of the human-
environment interactions (and the related discourse) in which it was produced.  Reality is 
interpreted and social framings both emphasize and omit information. 
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Figure 3.1. Relationship among frames, social framings, and discourses. 
 
  
 Following Goffman‘s (1974) pioneering Frame Analysis
2
, several literatures (e.g., 
political science, planning, adult education, organizational development, political ecology) offer 
a version of the frame concept.  Each of these concepts places importance on individual and 
group perception in human-environment interactions related to learning and knowledge 
generation in REM (Table 3.4).  Geographers in particular have used behavioural approaches for 
analysis in REM to study human attitudes, perceptions, and behaviours (Mitchell 1989).  But as 
Mitchell (1989: 102) points out, such ―subjective geographical concepts‖ can be a source of 
confusion, require operational definitions, and are usually accessed through observing behaviour 
and listening to people.  The frame concept and discourse analysis, when linked to a social 
learning process model that describes relationships among frames, actions, and outcomes, 
provide a way to analyze peoples‘ perspectives on common issues, and resultant behaviour. 
 Frames are subject to slightly different research questions in collaboration, social 
learning, and political ecology (Table 3.5).  In political ecology, frames are linked to the political 
economy of environmental knowledge construction and discourse and to the ―apparatuses‖ for  
                                                 
2 Chapter 4 outlines relevant frame analysis methods.  
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Table 3.4. Parallel frame concepts linking perception and meaning at individual and group scales 
 
Concept Description Literature 
Frames 
Gray 2003 
―We all use frames to make sense of the world around us.  
A frame provides a heuristic for how to categorize and 
organize data into meaningful chunks of information [and 
interpret experience]‖ (13). 
Collaborative 
REM 
Frames of reference  
Mezirow 1991 
Consist of 1) a learner‘s meaning perspective or way of 
looking at the world, and 2) meaning scheme or way of 





Kim 1993; Senge 1994 
in Mitchell 2002 
―engrained assumptions, generalizations and images that 
influence how individuals see the world and what action is 





Theory of reality 
Friedmann 1987 
Consists of a theory of history or actor‘s worldview, and 





Schusler et al 2003 







Argyris and Schön 
1978 
Espoused and tacit theories-in-use consist of multiple 
―images‖ [frames] stored in organizational memory 
comprising public maps and private images. 
Organizational 
learning 
Frames and social 
framings  
Forsyth 2003 
―The local perception or evaluation of environmental 
changes may be referred to as ‗framings‘. This term refers 
to the principles and assumptions underlying political 
debate and action‖ (77). 
Political 
Ecology 
Regime of Articulation  
Escobar 1999 
―…regimes are thus the subject of tensions and 
contestations; biophysical laws, meanings, labor, 
knowledge, and identities are important, although with 
diverging intensities and configurations, in all of them.  
The regimes represent actual or potential apparatuses for 





Peet and Watts 1996 
―…whole complexes of [region-derived] imaginaries, with 





knowledge production involving high-level influences from epistemic communities, dominant 
ideologies, and dispersed, often global, interests (Escobar 1999; Forsyth 2003; Dryzek 2005).  
Political ecologists also use the frame concept with reference to the social construction of nature 
and localized human-environment interactions affecting livelihoods (Peet and Watts 1996).  In 
the REM and social learning literatures, frames are usually analyzed at the individual and small 
group levels of scale with a view to understanding how shared meaning and narratives are 
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generated through social interaction (e.g., deliberation and negotiation in the sense of Gray 1989; 
2003; 2004; Dewulf et al 2005; Keen et al 2005).  Others are more concerned with how 
environmental problems and policy controversies are represented at the network or societal level 
of scale (e.g., Dale 1989). 
Table 3.5. Example questions related to frames and discourse in collaboration, social learning 
and political ecology literature. 




 What range of frames do stakeholders hold? 




 What are the process components, structure, and 
functions that promote individual and group learning? 




 How are frames constructed, by whom, and when? 
 How does context influence social framings and how 
does that influence society-environmental interactions? 
 
(e.g., Lewicki et al 2003; Diduck and Mitchell 2003; Schusler et al 2003; Escobar and Paulson 2005; Robbins 2006) 
 Researchers from different backgrounds have employed discourse analysis techniques to 
examine the frames used to construct knowledge in situations of conflict and domination (e.g., 
Zimmerer 1996; Gray 2003; 2004; Forsyth 2003; Dryzek 2005).  Informed by Benford and 
Snow‘s (1990) work on the importance of framing for collective mobilization and social 
movements, Gray‘s (2003) systematic approach to frame analysis classifies different frames used 
in situations of intractable conflict to identify the self and others, describe powerful actors, and 
define problems and appropriate solutions.  My research will employ Gray‘s (2003) method for 
data collection, analysis and presentation, as specified in Chapter 4. 
 Informed by the above approaches, my research views social framings as politically 
motivated perspectives generated through REM struggles mediated by different forms of power 
(Forsyth 2003; Gray 2003; Dryzek 2005) (Figure 3.2).  As part of its original and significant 
conceptual contribution, my research also advances the notion that social learning approaches 
implicitly study the convergence (or divergence) of individual frames and how social framings 
are developed through collective ―framing‖ and ―reframing‖ (see Gray 2004; 2003) (Figure 3.2).  
A small group of researchers is now linking reframing and social learning (Dale 1989; Bouwen 
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and Taillieu 2004; Pahl-Wostl and Hare 2004; Tippet et al 2005; Pahl-Wostl 2009), recognizing 
that these concepts overlap and are complementary.  Dale (1989) appears to have been the first to 
make the link between social learning and frame analysis in an environmental management 
context, yet this paper is rarely cited.  A social learning perspective helps to link social framings 
to a social process and provides a model to understand how frames and reframing are linked to 
debate, power relations, and actions in problem settings.  These connections are further explained 
below. 
3.4.2. Multi-loop Learning and ‗Reframing‘ 
Scholars following the sociological approach to social learning agree that research must consider 
the interplay between the individual and collective learning to account for human agency within 
larger social structures and to link learning at individual and social scales (i.e., to recognize the 
roles and actions of individuals that, when taken together, are an expression of the larger 
organizations they form) (Argyris and Schön 1978; Kim 1993; Diduck et al 2005; Fazey et al 
2005).  Given its focus on group learning and interpersonal dynamics, organizational learning 
theory prevails in REM research and is central to the conceptual framework for this research 
(Figure 3.2).  In particular, the framework draws on Argyris and Schön‘s (1978: 14) seminal 
Theory of Action Framework and Kim‘s (1993) Integrated Model of Organizational Learning 
which clarifies and develops concepts from the former. 
 Social learning theorists (Argyris and Schön 1978; Kim 1993) distinguish between two 
main modes of learning (Figure 3.2).  Single-loop learning (SLL) is ―concerned with changing 
skills, practices, and actions‖ that affect outcomes (Keen et al 2005: 16).  This supports ongoing 
pursuit of current organizational policies and objectives without changing basic values and 
norms (Argyris and Schön 1978; Diduck et al 2005).  Double-loop learning (DLL) results in 
fundamental changes to underlying values, norms, and objectives that in turn cause change in 
strategies and action.  Kim (1993) highlights this difference between using ―know-how‖ and 
―know-why‖ to influence the two aspects of ―mental models‖ that guide action: 1) procedural 
routines and 2) common frameworks—the latter being conceptually analogous to the concept of 
a social framing (Gray 2003, 2004; Pahl-Wostl 2009).  The terms ‗social framing‘, ‗collective 
frames‘ or ‗common frames‘ and ‗frameworks‘ are used interchangeably herein to refer to 
30 
 
frames held by groups of individuals.  Altering frameworks through DLL expands frameworks 
and enables the ‗reframing‘ of problems in order to establish new routines for action.  
Importantly, collaboration and DLL are considered necessary to produce new common 
frameworks (social framings), actions, and outcomes needed to facilitate transition during times 
of turbulence and crisis (Gray 1989, 2003; Pahl-Wostl 2009).   










(based on Argyris and Schön 1978; Gray 1989, 2003; Kim 1993; Raik et al 2008) 
 Following Argyris and Schön‘s (1978) foundational work, management and 
organizational development theorists (e.g., Flood and Romm 1996) added the notion of triple-
loop learning, which is intended as a refinement of double-loop learning.  Triple-loop learning is 
not well-defined and seeks to separate learning modes that involve reflection on cause-and-effect 
assumptions, goals and objectives, from critical reflection on dominant governing values (Pahl-
Wostl 2009).  I have elected to use the original model of double-loop learning (Argyris and 
Schön‘s 1978), which links reflection on values, goals and assumptions as part of the same 






























Schön‘s (1978) work provides a straightforward and inclusive model with demonstrated utility in 
REM research (e.g., Diduck et al 2005), and is directly amenable to framing theory. 
 Learning advances through social interaction as people continually co-construct their 
individual frames in relation to those shared among the collective.  Since ―organizations do not 
literally remember, think, and learn‖, collective learning only occurs as individuals encode what 
they have learned in collective memory (Argyris and Schön 1978: 11).  The organization 
worldview slowly changes as the thinking of its members is exchanged and absorbed, and shared 
meaning drives action (Kim 1993).  Social learning therefore requires structures for information 
sharing, interpretation and storage (for collective memory) (FitzPatrick 2006).  Mental models 
and public maps (e.g., reports, policies, legislation, regulations, bylaws, manuals, informal rules) 
are the media of collective memory that hold common frames (Argyris and Schön 1978; Diduck 
et al 2005).  As discussed in Chapter 4, discourse analysis techniques (i.e., Gray 2003) can be 
used to reveal different frames embedded in various verbal and written communications, such as 
interview transcripts, policy documents and reports, and newspaper articles covering key events.  
 Social framings ―define what an organization pays attention to, how it chooses to act, and 
what it chooses to remember from its experience‖ (Kim 1993: 44).  Social framings and routines 
together represent an organizational guide for action, which shapes and is shaped by experience 
and culture, and influences perception and awareness (Argyris and Schön 1978; Kim 1993).  
Thus, social learning processes involve the convergence and synthesis of individual frames for 
collectively generated social framings, which in turn produce shared meaning and understanding 
as the basis for action (see Argyris and Schön 1978; Schusler et al 2003; Gray 2004).  Building 
shared understanding and values among stakeholders helps bolster capacity to deal with 
turbulence in problem domains by creating a mutual willingness to act on agreed problem 
definitions and the course for action (Gray 1989; Kim 1993).  Following this model, social 
framings shape how people depict problem situations, what is emphasized, downplayed, omitted, 
or silenced and which solutions and actions are preferred and deemed possible. 
 Through social interaction there is potential for frame conflicts as competing individuals 
and organizations try to or do assert their dominance, which can create dysfunction.  This is not 
to say that disagreement is always ‗bad‘.  When conflict is viewed constructively it can indicate 
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process or procedural flaws and turn attention to marginalized perspectives (Mitchell 2002).  
Indeed, this is what interest groups do when they struggle to cause decision makers to reframe 
issues of concern and change associated policies that drive action. Social learning scholars see 
deliberation and negotiation as important aspects of democratic public participation and decision 
making (Keen et al 2005).   
 However, if collaborators cannot, or will not, socially construct shared meaning, social 
learning cannot be realized (i.e., social framings are not constructed).  Those with influence can 
affect what others, and therefore an organization or society, learn in terms of what frames are 
adopted to represent reality.  Competing discourses embody different social framings of 
problems and solutions that shape and are shaped by different knowledge, experience and 
culture.  What and whose perspectives prevail, and the differential influence of actors in complex 
problem domains, are central concerns for this research. 
3.4.3. Forms of Power and Social Framings in Complex Problem Domains 
Scholars have stressed the need for more attention to the influence of power relations, including 
the forms and sources of power in REM and social learning (Sinclair and Diduck 2001; Keen and 
Mahanty 2006; Wildemeersch 2007; Armitage et al 2008; Raik et al 2008).  Some consider how 
planning and management process design, structure and function can contribute to forums, 
techniques, ―new‖ knowledge, and decisions that can recreate hegemonic power relations 
(Maarleveld and Dangbegnon 1999; Schusler et al 2003; Quaghebeur et al 2004).  For example, 
development-oriented, government- or donor-designed social learning processes can be 
problematic when they shape or complicate power relations, or ignore local needs and desires 
(Quaghebeur et al 2004; Keen et al 2005; Armitage et al 2008).  How resource system 
boundaries are defined can influence the identification of legitimate stakeholders, and exclude 
certain people and knowledge based on location, age, gender, race, professional (non)affiliation, 
and time (i.e., generations) (Maarleveld and Dangbegnon 1999; Mitchell 2002).  Limiting 
problem definitions, dissent, participation and conflict, as well as opportunities for stakeholder 
discussion and reflection needed for learning, are examples of how powerful actors intervene 
(Maarleveld and Dangbegnon 1999; Sinclair and Diduck 2001; Diduck and Mitchell 2003; 
Quaghebeur et al 2004).  Attention must be paid to the embeddedness of learning and decision 
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making processes within political and institutional contexts, and how political economy 
influences learning processes and REM outcomes at the local scale (Glasbergen 1996; Diduck et 
al 2005; Wildemeersch 2007).   
 Political ecology offers a lens for viewing power relations and how social framings are 
constructed in complex REM problem domains and collaborative forums.  Recent political 
ecology provides detailed understandings of how social and cultural identities and power 
relations influence human-environment interactions (Bryant 1998; Paulson et al 2003).  In 
particular, a central theme in critical political ecology is pluralism of perspectives on 
environmental issues and how social, cultural, political, and economic contextual influences 
shape perceptions, meanings, science and discourses that in turn affect practices and outcomes 
(Peet and Watts 1996; Escobar 1999; Forsyth 2003).  Struggle in this sense is as much about 
dominant ways of making meaning as it is about institutional control or material needs (Peet and 
Watts 1996). As summarized by Forsyth (2003: 81-85): 
In effect, exploring social framings means questioning how, when, and by whom such 
terms were developed as a substitute for reality.... A ―critical‖ political ecology seeks to 
indicate how far explanations of environmental problems reflect – or fail to reflect – the 
perspectives of different social groups.  [This requires] questioning existing definitions of 
environmental problems (problem closure); the linguistic basis of science and reference; 
and the problem in identifying, communicating, or empowering the perspectives arising 
from different social groupings. 
Congruent with the ―new‖ political ecology, researchers are illustrating how civil society 
organizations, governments, scientists and consultants, Aboriginal peoples, and other resource 
users are involved in local struggles for control over environmental knowledge and the 
ideologies and visions that will be imposed through resource management institutions (e.g., Reed 
and McIlveen 2006; Rikoon 2006; Robbins 2006; Dengler 2007; Reed 2007; Bullock et al 2009).   
 Informed by the work of Paulson et al (2003), power relations can be conceptualized as a 
set of social relations that shape and are shaped by human interactions within which agents 
exercise different sources of power to cause change, both intentionally and unintentionally, for 
certain outcomes.  The uneven distribution of risks and benefits associated with actions and 
outcomes works to drive political processes.  With respect to forest governance settings 
involving multiple actors, power relations enable and constrain the flow of power between and 
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among actors as they negotiate diverse needs, wants, and meanings.  In social learning forums in 
which constructed meanings embody certain values and interests, power relations can work as a 
filter to propagate the frames of power actors, while excluding others. 
 Operational definitions for the different forms and sources of power at work in REM 
assist in examining how power relations influence social framings and reframing of Northern 
Ontario‘s ―forestry crisis‖.  My research draws on notions of power from recent works in REM 
(Gray 2003; Raik et al 2008).  Raik et al (2008: 730) point out that the concept of power, as it is 
commonly used in natural resource management research, is a nuanced concept with hidden 
implications for practice, rather than an idea that is obvious and ―inherently understandable‖.  
Based on Raik et al‘s (2008) analysis, two main forms of power are portrayed: agent-centred and 
structural. The agent-centered view explains power on the basis of coercion and constraint, or 
the ability of one actor to either cause certain behaviours or limit certain behaviours in another.  
Coercive power can be exercised to force or coax actors to do things they do not want to do.  
Constraining power works to limit action through, for example, limiting discourse or dialogue to 
prevent what could happen and ―ensure inaction on issues‖ (Raik et al 2008, 733).  The 
structural view ―understands power as forces above and external to the individual (e.g., race, 
gender, class) that can operate unacknowledged to influence people and their behavior‖ (Raik et 
al 2008, 734).  To Raik et al (2008, 734) social structures embody certain interests while 
excluding others.  Thus, power is commonly conceived as a force possessed and exercised by 
individual actors in social settings and one that infuses the social structures that link and affect 
the behaviour of individuals.  Both are germane to studying how power affects learning in the 
NSFC as a response to crisis. 
 Gray (2003) identifies several sources of power in environmental conflict settings (Table 
3.6).  This typology will be used to analyze the sources of power in the NSFC and Northeast 
Superior Region.  My research posits that a discourse analysis approach to social framings is not 
only amenable to exploring how different people and groups frame and reframe the forestry 
crisis in Northern Ontario, but is also useful for viewing how power works to advance certain 
frames over others, as well as how social framings, in turn, affect views and actions.  Methods 
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for qualitative analysis, including how these typologies will guide data analysis, are presented in 
Chapter 4. 
Table 3.6. Typology of power sources in environmental conflict settings 
 
Sources of power Definition 
 
Authority/positional 
Actual ability to make decisions based on formal role, job title/ 
description, organizational position 
 
Resources 
Have power because of resources (e.g., time, money, support staff) 
that others do not possess 
 
Expertise 
Possess relevant and unique knowledge that others do not have 
 
Personal 
Individual interpersonal style (e.g., charisma, competent 
communication skills, etc.) that grants credibility and influence 
 
Coalition/relational 
Membership in and/or affiliation with group of people who support 
individual‘s perspective (strength in numbers) 
Force/threat Actual or threat of coercive action 
 
Moral/righteous 
Position is on the ―moral high ground‖ or belief that one is ethically 
or morally ―right‖ 
Sympathy/vulnerability Victim role that garners support from others on an emotional level 
(adapted from Gray 2003) 
3.5. Summary 
This chapter examined concepts and methods from the collaboration, social learning, and 
political ecology literatures relevant to the research questions outlined in Chapter 1.  In 
particular, I connected key aspects of the emerging conceptual framework that guide my research 
on how power relations influence social learning in multiparty problem domains.  I showed how 
Argyris and Schön‘s (1978) single- and double-loop organizational learning model could be 
usefully linked to social framing theories from the environmental conflict and collaboration 
literatures (Dale 1989; Rein and Schön 1994; Gray 2003) and political ecology literature 
(Forsyth 2003; Raik et al 2008) to provide an expanded and more contextualized view of social 
learning processes amidst power relations.  As demonstrated in Chapters 6 and 7, the framework 
has been designed to enable systematic analysis of the different sources and forms of power that 
shape framing and reframing processes among different actors as well as the social framings that 
emerge as dominant to guide action and outcomes in multiparty problem settings.   
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 In Chapters 6 and 7, the framework will be applied at both the organizational network 
and organizational level (Diduck 2010) to assess social framings of the ‗forestry crisis‘ and 
power relations among various actors in the Northeast Superior Region and a nascent 
collaborative organization formed in response to the crisis—the Northeast Superior Forest 
Community Corporation.  The next chapter (4) presents the research design and discusses the 




















CHAPTER 4 – RESEARCH DESIGN 
4.1. Research Approach 
Research design is guided by a researcher‘s paradigm, which establishes ―epistemological, 
ontological and methodological premises‖ that structure inquiry (Denzin and Lincoln 2003: 33).   
The researcher‘s paradigm reflects beliefs and assumptions about the nature of reality, 
knowledge and truth, and suitable procedures for examination.  A basic distinction identifies two 
general ‗camps‘ with respect to research tradition (Guba 1990; Denzin and Lincoln 2003).         
1) Positivists believe there is one physical and external reality which objective researchers can 
come to know through empirical observation.  The scientific method and quantitative methods 
and data are central to this traditionally dominant approach.  2) Alternatively, constructivists 
maintain there are multiple realities in that knowledge is relative to the people and contexts from 
which it was produced.  Researchers in the latter tradition tend to use qualitative modes of 
inquiry and data collected from interviews and participant observation to enable interpretation of 
the lived experiences of participants, where the researcher is viewed as a participant in the 
research.  In contrast to positivist field work which seeks to objectively measure isolated 
variables in an external reality, the qualitative approach often involves field work during which 
the researcher attempts to gain a ―holistic overview‖ of the context and perceptions of local 
actors ―from the inside‖ (Miles and Huberman 1994: 6).  There are additional (e.g., critical 
sciences) and hybrid approaches that meld aspects of these and other positions (see for example 
Johnson 1991, Patton 2002, Creswell 2003, Denzin and Lincoln 2003 for nuanced comparisons). 
 Debate between quantitative and qualitative supporters about whose way is ‗better‘ 
indicates not only disagreement but competition between paradigms (Miles and Huberman 1994; 
Denzin and Lincoln 2003).  Interdisciplinary researchers see the benefit and need for mixed 
approaches to inquiry, recognizing different approaches are suited to answering certain kinds of 
questions (e.g., the development of in-depth and detailed understanding of cases versus 
generalizing from a sample to a population) (Patton 2002; Creswell 2003).  As Miles and 
Huberman (1994: 40) point out: ―numbers and words are both needed if we are to understand the 
world‖.  To them, more productive questions are whether different methods and data should be 
linked, how this will be done and for what (or whose) purposes?  Creswell (2003: 12) aligns 
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mixed methods research with a third paradigm, pragmatism, given a shared focus on the research 
problem as a starting point rather than methods.  The focus on the problem enables researchers to 
freely combine methods and data ―to provide the best understanding of a research problem‖ at a 
particular time and place. 
 My research is informed by the constructivist and pragmatic paradigms.  Through this 
research I seek to understand how people linked by a mutual problem interpret experience in the 
context of uneven power relations.  Informed by social learning (e.g., Argyris and Schön 1978; 
Keen et al 2005) and framing theory (Gray 2003; Forsyth 2003), my research primarily engages 
the constructivist view that people generate meaning through an ongoing and interactive social 
process of co-constructing reality.  The constructivist view holds that people‘s subjective 
meanings are socially reproduced through historical and cultural norms that shape life and work 
in specific settings (Creswell 2003).   
 However, in keeping with an inductive research mode (Miles and Huberman 1994) data 
collection and analysis methods were later expanded to include a survey, in order to establish a 
community-based component that was problem-oriented.  The addition of the survey added a 
quantitative perspective (i.e., descriptive statistics at nominal and ordinal levels of measurement) 
also relevant to the guiding research questions.  Hence, my research evolved into a mixed 
methods study (Creswell 2003) to accommodate the expressed information needs of the 
partnering organization, the Northeast Superior Forest Community Corporation.  The ability to 
combine different types of data and collection methods helped to develop a more complete 
understanding of the research problem and context.  The flexibility of a case study strategy 
(discussed below) was beneficial to accommodate an evolving dataset and make use of various 
data types and sources to develop a detailed analysis (Stake 2003; Yin 2003; Pierce 2008).   
 Constructivist and pragmatic approaches openly acknowledge that research and 
knowledge are embedded in specific political, social and historical contexts and so each can turn 
a critical eye to political motivations in society and research (Creswell 2003).  Accordingly, I 
apply a critical lens through my analysis in that I seek to understand the values and politics that 
underlie dominant and marginalized social framings in forest governance in Ontario.  Particulars 
on how data were collected and analyzed are presented below. 
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4.2. Research Process 
4.2.1. Scoping the Research 
This research builds on my MES thesis on community forest implementation, which furthered 
my interest in what I then understood as ‗human organization‘ in environmental policy conflicts.  
That research (Bullock 2006; Bullock et al 2009) indicated a need to study learning in emerging 
collaborations, that is, the local, informal, antecedents of broader social movements.  In 
particular, I was interested in how actors shared their experiences and acted based on newly 
adopted perspectives, interests, values and identities.  This provided the general topic as a 
starting point for the current research (Figure 4.1). 
 Based on advice from my doctoral committee, and through course work and 
comprehensive examination preparations, I read broadly but with a focus on the collaboration, 
social learning and political ecology literature between October 2006 and November 2007.  I 
also began a concurrent search for potential case studies.  As Pierce (2008) observes, conducting 
‗research‘ about potential research case(s) is crucial to effective case study research.  Scoping 
research conducted prior to choosing the preferred case was important to verifying self-
containment and typicality (Pierce 2008: 52).  A case satisfies self-containment when it 
noticeably contains the variables of central interest to the research.  Typicality refers to the 
presence of qualifying similarities among the potential range of cases.  Conscious case selection 
should also consider whether access to key people and data will be possible, and whether there is 
willingness among potential participants to be involved (Pierce 2008). 
 Accordingly, I explored the internet and literature for potential case studies, presuming 
that timing would be a challenge for site selection, given my interest in studying an emerging 
organization.  It was also important to find a community-based forest group with momentum that 
would be receptive to an outside researcher.  In October 2006, I learned about Natural Resources 
Canada‘s plans for the Forest Communities Program while attending the Canadian Institute of 
Forestry annual meeting in Cochrane, Northern Ontario.  I monitored the progress of that 
program via the internet and one year later established contact with a group of municipal leaders, 
the Northeast Superior Mayor‘s Group, who were awarded a Forest Communities Program site 





















































and a research gap, guided site selection.  The Northeast Superior case directly influenced the 
research design from that point onward.  
 The literature review, research questions and conceptual framework for the study were 
developed simultaneously through an ongoing process of exploration and refinement.  Setting 
out the research questions, scoping the preferred case, and developing the provisional conceptual 
framework were also important to identifying the appropriate methods for the study.  In this way 
it was my interest in a particular case that specified the choice of methods, rather than the other 
way around (Stake 2003; Luck et al 2006).   
 A case study is the process of comprehensive and systematic data collection and analysis 
about a particular case as well as the final research product (Patton 2002).  A case study research 
strategy was useful because of my interest in contemporary phenomena that could not be 
examined in isolation from context (i.e., examine how a nascent organization had emerged and 
how it was evolving relative to contextual influences) (Yin 2003).  Case studies are frequently 
equated with research that is in-depth, intensive and longer-term, which produces rich, case-
specific knowledge about certain phenomena in particular contexts (Lee 1999; Patton 2002; Luck 
et al 2006; Tharenou et al 2007; Pierce 2008; Liamputtong 2009).  Case studies are often used in 
organizational research to study social processes of change in organizations and include historic, 
longitudinal and contextual analyses of processes, events and outcomes (Lee 1999; Tharenou et 
al 2007). 
4.2.2. Single-Case Study Research Design 
Yin (2003: 41-42) provides two relevant rationales for conducting single-case study research: 
first, when a case is considered ‗typical‘ in order to ―capture the circumstances and conditions of 
an everyday or commonplace situation.‖  The lessons derived from such case studies are thought 
to be informative about the experiences of common phenomena.  The Northeast Superior Region 
and NSFC provide an ideal case to examine how power relations influence social learning 
processes and outcomes at a formative stage in an emerging collaboration.  This case also 
typifies a Canadian extractive resource hinterland consisting of several small resource-based and 




and government which often exert influence from ‗outside‘.  The broader movement for 
increased local control of forest resources in Northern Ontario juxtaposes potential collaborators 
as dominant and marginalized actors who have had uneven opportunities to steer forest 
development and decision making.  A mix of experts, consultants, practitioners and lay people 
provides further opportunity to assess power differentials. 
 Second, single-case studies are appropriate for the longitudinal case in which the same 
case is studied at two or more points in time (Yin 2003).  There is a need for longitudinal 
research on social learning and evolving social framings at the social organizational scale (Kim 
1993; Gray 2003).  Given the timing of this research and the early developmental stage of the 
NSFC and the Forest Communities Program, it was appropriate to initiate a longitudinal research 
program to study framing and learning processes involving an emerging set of organizational 
actors.  The research draws on participant data from three periods in time: 
 the recent past, based on participants‘ memory and documents, 
 the first round of fieldwork (May-August 2008), and 
 the second round of fieldwork, about one year later (May-June 2009).3 
The current research is also intended to be the first phase of a longer study. 
 A single embedded case study design was also used to accommodate multiple units of 
analysis (Yin 2003).  Specifically, embedded case study designs include nested units of analysis 
within the overall case study analysis.  A strength of embedded case study designs is that 
different types of data and collection methods can be used at each unit of analysis, ranging from 
historical to survey analysis.  Following the concurrent procedure for data collection associated 
with mixed method approaches enables the convergence of qualitative and quantitative data and 
integration of information into an overall impression of the case (Creswell 2003: 16).  Drawing 
on multiple sources of evidence enables triangulation for factual corroboration, which is a major 
strength of case study research (Miles and Huberman 1994; Yin 2003).  This mix of data and 
analysis can also support a well-developed understanding of the single case and help the 
                                                 
3 Pending successful completion of doctoral studies, postdoctoral research funding was approved (March 2010) which will support ongoing 




researcher gain new insights by ―turning ideas around‖ (Rossman and Wilson 1984,1991 cited in 
Miles and Huberman 1994: 41). 
 Setting the case boundaries is a common challenge for researchers studying events that 
may not have well-defined beginning and end points, and requires explicit rationale for bounding 
the chosen case (Liamputtong 2009; Yin 2003).  As identified above, the Forest Communities 
Program site in the Northeast Superior Region is the collaborative forum of interest.  However, 
due to its relatively short history as a formal organization and the narrow scope of involvement 
of relevant actors, it was important to investigate perspectives and events in the region that 
preceded the Natural Resources Canada project.  As a result, it was helpful to interview people 
outside of the NSFC to include and compare different actors‘ (e.g., First Nations, municipal, 
provincial and federal government, industry, civil society organizations) perspectives on key 
forestry issues in the Northeast Superior Region and Northern Ontario in general.  As a partner in 
the research, the NSFC requested and participated in the development of a survey intended to 
provide baseline information on perceptions of the tenure system (outlined below).  This 
combination of data was also important for developing and understanding the case history and 
context.   
 There are two main units of analysis for this case study (Figure 4.2): 1) the wider group 
of public-private-civic actors in the Northeast Superior Region who are dealing with the forestry 
crisis as part of a multi-level governance system (the forest ‗policy community‘) (Chapters 5 and 
6), and 2) the Mayors Group and advisors within the NSFC (Chapter 7).  An analysis of both 
groups was conducted to examine how the forestry crisis was collectively framed and to see 
which framings were emerging as dominant within the NSFC as a guide for action to ‗learn the 
way out‘.  It was also reasonable to establish temporal boundaries for my analysis based on the 
period of the unfolding crisis, beginning with the 2001 Softwood Lumber Dispute flare-up until 
the provincial announcements for Ontario Crown tenure reform and ministerial reorganization 
(fall 2009).   
 Analyzing how different framings are constructed and how they converge/diverge with a 
single case study design is significant as results can help build the mutual understanding and 




some within the NSFC believe is necessary to move the region as a forest system into a more 
desirable and stable domain.  Examining dominant social framings can also indicate whose 
desires are being acted upon and whose are being overlooked.  Methods for data collection and 
analysis are outlined below. 
 







     (adapted from Yin 2003) 
 
4.2.3. Data Collection and Analysis in Social Framing and Social Learning Research 
Frame analysis is an approach to studying communications between different actors (often 
oppositional) and has roots in the related areas of media and public policy analysis (e.g., 
Goffman 1974), the study of social movements (Benford and Snow 2000) and intractable 
environmental conflicts (e.g., Dale 1989; Gray 2003; 2004; Lewicki et al 2003; Dewulf et al 
2004).  Frame analysis (Rein and Schön 1994; Gray 2003) seeks to detect the tacit and explicit 
frames—and the underlying assumptions and values—that shape human perceptions and drive 
action, as well as how social framings change over time.  Political ecology researchers also 
analyze discourse to examine the tacit frames used to construct meaning in situations of conflict 
and domination (Zimmerer 1996; Forsyth 2003; Dryzek 2005).  Simply put, ―frame analysis is 
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one analytical tool for sorting out many viewpoints and stances as the objects of inquiry‖ (Creed 
et al 2002: 38).  As Creed et al (2002:38) summarize: 
Eliciting these frames from historical texts helps us understand the contesting interests, 
the deep logics beneath them, and how they were reflected in discourse and polemics at 
the time.  Seeing which frames were advocated by whom and which ultimately 
dominated pushes deeper understanding about power, politics, and interests. 
 Guided by the theoretical perspectives contributing to the conceptual framework for this 
study (figure 3.2.), my research detects social learning by looking at the alignment (or 
divergence) of individual and organizational frames, and how they are constructed and change 
over time.  A small group of researchers, mainly associated with the European HarmoniCOP 
(Harmonizing Collaborative Planning) project (i.e., Bouwen and Taillieu 2004; Pahl-Wostl and 
Hare 2004; Tippet et al 2005; Pahl-Wostl et al 2007), recognize potential for bridging concepts 
and methods for frame analysis in multi-party collaboration (e.g., Schön and Rein 1994; Lewicki 
2003; Dewulf et al 2004; Gray 2004) and social learning theory (Argyris and Schön 1978; Kim 
1993).  Yet, both Gray (2003) and Kim (1993) point out that there have been few systematic 
research studies on frame changes in collaborative settings.  Frame analysis has recently 
appeared in the literature on forest policy analysis in Canada (Ashton et al 2007).  While Ashton 
et al‘s (2007) analysis is cursory and an isolated example, it shows that scholars concerned with 
the social aspects of forest management are acknowledging the untapped potential and value of 
this form of analysis.  This research will address these gaps as part of its contribution to the 
literature. 
 Researchers (e.g., Dale 1989; Lewicki et al 2003; Dewulf et al 2004) identify frames by 
analyzing the perspectives reflected in spoken, written, or signed (e.g., physical gestures) 
language.  Content analysis is used to examine various communications, such as interview 
transcripts, policy documents and reports, meeting minutes, websites, artwork and newspaper 
articles (Patton 2002).  Content analysis involves the systematic analysis of qualitative data to 
identify patterns and themes for organizing and reporting data (Patton 2002).  To illustrate, 
content analysis of interviews and documents in my research showed a pattern of participants 
expressing concern for the dominance of large forestry companies in their towns, and that the 




sustainability.  Such patterns denote ‗low local control‘ as a prominent theme associated with 
forestry towns in crisis. 
 Both inductive and deductive data coding procedures are often used for qualitative data 
analysis (Miles and Huberman 1994; Patton 2002).  Qualitative researchers typically follow an 
inductive mode early on to discover possible patterns, themes and categories emerging from their 
data (Patton 2002).  Inductive or open coding can be used to develop a framework of codes that 
can then be used to code subsequent data, in a deductive coding mode.  An existing typology 
may also be used as a starting point for deductive coding. 
 My research uses a combination of deductive and inductive coding for data analysis (i.e., 
interviews and documents).  In particular, I draw on Gray‘s (2003) typology of actor frames, 
which was developed through a multi-researcher (Lewicki et al 2003), multi-case temporal study 
of environmental conflicts (lasting years to decades).  Gray‘s research team used content analysis 
to code various frames at the ‗thought unit‘—words, sentences, or paragraphs used to express 
discrete thoughts—and reviewed over 300 recorded interviews and 1600 newspaper articles, as 
well as a suite of internet sources, meetings, administrative records, video clips, and meeting 
minutes to develop and refine the typology.  Gray‘s (2003) typology is systematic as she 
identifies different frames used in environmental problem domains to identity the self and 
characterise others, describe influential actors, diagnose problems, and identify perceived 
solutions.  Gray‘s (2003) approach is amenable to my research and her typology provided the 
basis for interview questions and analysis of all qualitative data (Table 4.1). 
 A preliminary step in data analysis was to organize and prepare the different forms of 
data (Creswell 2003).  All qualitative data collected (i.e., transcribed interviews, articles, 
observation, open-ended survey responses, research notes) were entered into a database created 
in QSR NVivo 7.0, a computer software program used to store, organize, present and analyze 
different data. 
 I employed an iterative coding approach that advanced from broad categories of codes 




Table 4.1.  Gray‘s (2003) Typology of Frames in Multi-stakeholder Environmental Conflicts 




People understand themselves belonging to certain social categories with particular 
characteristics, often formed in comparison and opposition to other groups.  Identity 
frames are important because they are attached to characterisation and diagnostic 
frames.  Conflict occurs when identity frames are challenged because they are linked 
to fundamental beliefs and values.  Commonly based on five factors: demographics, 




relative to the 
problem domain? 
Characterisation Understandings of others that ―arise from the attribution of causality and blame that 
we make about our experiences and about what others have done to shape our 
experiences‖ (Gray 2003: 23).  Often involve derogatory stereotypes.  Can also be 
positive. 
How does the 
respondent view 
others? 
Diagnostic  Understanding of the problem situation and issues as well as what has caused the 
problem; often targeted at who is seen to be responsible for the problem. 
How does the 
respondent define 
the problem and 
main issues? 
Prognostic  What should be done to resolve the problem, including strategies and tactics for 
solving the problem and who ought to be responsible to act. 
What does the 
respondent think 





Power is gained in several ways:  
1. authority/positional 
2. resources 
3. expertise  





9. having a voice at the table (forum) 
Who is powerful 
and why? 
 
more refined and nuanced system of linked themes and subthemes.  I conducting a first reading 
of all transcripts and documents to get a ―general impression‖ of the case data, making 
occasional notes about initial ideas (Creswell 2003: 191).  I then conducted a second reading of 
interview and documents to code words, sentences and paragraphs of data according to Gray‘s 
(2003) broad frame categories.  Subsequent readings enabled further classification based on 
descriptive wording adopted from actual texts.  For example, a perspective that described the 
‗forest industry as powerful due to financial capital‟ was coded simply as ‗power‘ in the first 
pass, which was further recoded as: 
 ‗agent-based power‘;  
  ‗resources‘;  
   ‗industry‘;  





Five levels of classification commonly emerged using this technique, with some categories 
containing as many as 15 themes and 30 subthemes to account for the diversity of perspectives 
and actors involved. 
 Working back and forth between my coding scheme and dataset helped me to refine and 
rename codes and also consolidate and recode data as the analysis evolved (Patton 2002).  This 
step of the analysis involved much selection and focussing, which is consistent with the ongoing 
process of data reduction in qualitative research (Miles and Huberman 1994).  I entered 
emerging codes into my qualitative analysis database and grouped data passages from 
interviews, documents and field notes, which provided easy access to all quotations and notes on 
content on a given theme and related themes.  Note taking was helpful in documenting 
relationships between themes and organizing themed content, which helped to structure the 
write-up (Patton 2002; Creswell 2003). 
 Inductive coding was also used to identify themes emerging related to substantive issues 
such as names, facts, places (Patton 2002; Creswell 2003).  In this way the coding process was 
used to fill out the descriptive setting, events and actors.  In particular, related dates, events and 
actions were recorded chronologically and reorganized based on triangulation as additional 
sources of evidence were analyzed.  This approach was helpful in building the case histories 
presented in Chapters 6 and 7. 
 The core research questions (Chapter 1) and conceptual framework (Chapter 3) pointed to 
several potential sources and types of relevant data, which helped to alleviate ―data overload‖ 
(Miles and Huberman 1994: 56).  Collection methods and analysis are further outlined below. 
4.2.3.1. Semi-structured Interviews 
The main mode of data collection was semi-structured interviews with key informants and other 
actors.  Key informants are both very knowledgeable about the setting and subject of inquiry and 
are willing to share their insights freely with the researcher (Lindoff and Taylor 2002; Patton 
2002; Bernard 2006).  According to Bernard (2006), key informants will introduce you to the 
people and places they think you ought to know about.  Following the work of previous 




of experience and/or employment, social ties, and the convergence of recommendations by other 
informants was important to identifying key informants.   
 Six key informants (i.e., NSFC, OMNR, small forest industry, municipal and provincial 
government, and academia) were gradually identified through the interview process.  Key 
informants were typically political elites (e.g., senior civil servants, local councillors, members 
of think tanks, business leaders) (Pierce 2008) and were especially helpful in providing further 
insight at times when the analysis was not ‗adding up‘.  Key informants provided additional 
information to corroborate my own accounts or explain certain perspectives, which could then be 
verified through further triangulation with perspectives from other informants.  Key informants 
were also helpful ‗gatekeepers‘ (Creswell 2003) who assisted me with gaining access to the 
research site by advising who to contact given the nature of my research interests, as well as 
direct referrals. 
 Semi-structured interviews are preferred when second interviews are unlikely and the 
researcher wants to ensure consistency in data collection across interviews (i.e., that certain 
points are covered and solicited in the same manner) while maintaining flexibility to ―follow new 
leads‖ during the discussion (Bernard 2006: 212).  Standardized open-ended questions were used 
in a conversational format to encourage a free flow of information between participants and the 
researcher (Patton 2002; Yin 2003).    An evolving set of interview questions (Appendix A) was 
developed to operationalize a specified version of Gray‘s (2003) typology (Table 4.1).  Probing 
questions were used to flesh out participants‘ perspectives (Patton 2002).  The UW Office of 
Research Ethics reviewed the interview protocol and questions and provided clearance (May 
2008) for the research prior to conducting field work. 
 In all instances, potential participants were contacted via telephone, email, or in person 
and provided with the information letter and verbal consent form (Appendix B).  Interviews did 
not begin until participants had stated they had reviewed the letter, given verbal consent and 
agreed to be sound recorded.  Participants were interviewed in their preferred location.  This 
typically included open door and ‗visible‘ space in band and government offices or meeting 
rooms, restaurants/coffee shops and industry board rooms, but also indoor and outdoor public 




(e.g., kitchen table, front porch).  Interviews lasted between 20 minutes to over 3 hours in length, 
but averaged about 45 minutes.  With consent from participants, and where possible, interviews 
were conducted in-person and were sound recorded to enable transcription and coding.  Five 
interviews were conducted via conference call and sound recorded; in-person discussions took 
place with three of these participants either before or after the telephone interview.  All inputs 
were kept confidential and non-attributable.  Voice recognition computer software was used to 
make transcribing more efficient (i.e., Dragon Naturally Speaking 10.0). 
 Based on the nature of the research as a critical study of how the forestry crisis was being 
framed by actors with uneven influence, and given the array of potential forest stakeholders to be 
covered, two main purposeful sampling strategies for qualitative inquiry were used (as opposed 
to random probability sampling) (Miles and Huberman 1994; Patton 2002).  1) Maximum 
variation sampling was used to deliberately document a broad range of diverse views and 
identify possible common patterns.  2) Opportunistic sampling enables the researcher to follow 
new leads that arise and take advantage of the unexpected.  For example, site visits lead to many 
spontaneous interviews where additional participants were contacted via referrals (i.e., snowball 
technique) or through cold calls when ongoing reading or informal conversations identified new 
potential participants.  This combination of sampling strategies was intended to support an 
inductive approach targeting specific and diverse actors, including those with marginalized 
perspectives who are not likely to be among the ‗key‘, ‗primary‘, or ‗active‘ stakeholders 
(Grimble and Wellard 1997; Mitchell 2002).  A pertinent question to ask key informants was: 
―whom do you know who sees things differently‖ (Miles and Huberman 1994: 29). 
 Seventeen weeks were spent in the Northeast Superior Region across the two field 
seasons, with brief trips to Sudbury and Thunder Bay for participant observation at conferences.  
Altogether, 59 people (17 female, 42 male) were interviewed (Table 4.2).  Nine participants from 
the NSFC were interviewed a second time based on the original set of questions to assess any 
frame shifts as an indication of multi-looped learning.  Representatives from a broad range of 





Table 4.2. Interview Participants 
 Total Participants NS Region NSFC 
First Round   
(June-Sept 2008) 
37 26 11 
Second Round  
(May-June 2009) 
22 17 5  (+9 follow-up) 
Total 59 43 16 
 



















 Determining sample size sufficiency ―is the terra incognita of qualitative sampling 
strategy‖ (Lindolf and Taylor 2002: 129).  Given the focus of qualitative research on in-depth 
coverage of data-rich cases, it is not unusual for qualitative researchers to work with very small 
samples (i.e., n=1) (Lindolf and Taylor 2002; Patton 2002).  Qualitative researchers accept that 
the ideal number of participants will not be known until a later phase of data collection 
(Liamputtong 2009).  However, Patton (2002) recommends that a minimum sample be estimated 
based on the purpose of the research.  Factors to consider include the project scope; the range of 
stakeholder interests; the complexity of the research problem; the accessibility of potential 
participants; and, available time and resources of the researcher (Lindolf and Taylor 2002; Patton 
2002). 
 I initially set out to capture as many perspectives as possible within the range of potential 
participants demarcated by the membership of the NSFC (about 20 board members, resource 
people and staff from municipal, provincial and federal government, First Nations, forest 
industry and consultants).  Due to the scope of the study and the forestry crisis, I also sought out 
participants from various forest-related groups within and connected to the Northeast Superior 




Table 4.4. Alphabetical Listing of Examples of Participant Position Titles and Organizations 




Chief Executive Officer 
Chief Forester 





Director of Services 


















Senior Policy Advisor 
Tourism Operator 
Vice President 
 Clergue Forest Management Inc. 
Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union 
Community Futures Development Corporations 
Domtar Inc. 
Dubreuil Forest Products Ltd. 
FedNor 
Labour and Community Adjustment Committees 
Lakehead University 
Laurentian University 
Municipality of Wawa 
Nature and Outdoor Tourism Ontario 
Niska North Inc.  
Northeast Superior Forest Community Corporation 
Northern Haul Contracting 
Northern Ontario Sustainable Communities Partnership 
Natural Resources Canada, Canadian Forest Service 
Olav Haavaldsrud Ltd. 
Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources 
Ontario Ministry of Northern Development and Mines 
Ontario Nature 
Pukaskwa National Park 
Regional Employment Centre 
St. Mary‘s Paper Corp. 
Tembec 
Township of Chapleau 
Township of Dubreuilville 
Township of Hornpayne 
Township of Manitouwadge 
Township of White River 
  
NSFC.  As my sample evolved, I purposefully selected additional participants belonging to 
certain groups that were initially underrepresented (e.g., First Nations, labour).  Using both 
maximum variation and opportunistic sampling strategies, I determined sufficiency based on 
coverage (fifty-nine interviews conducted with more than 30 organizations representing at least 8 
sectors primarily involved with forestry matters in Northern Ontario) and informational 
redundancy (Patton 2002) or saturation (Liamputtong 2009) (when little or no new data emerged 
from additional interviews with actors from diverse backgrounds). 
 While the original intention was to identify participants by stakeholder organization, I 




and close working/personal relationships in and between communities, small staff sizes at local 
organizations, and the sensitive nature of some local issues.  Table 4.3 presents a general 
breakdown of participants by sector while Table 4.4 provides examples of position titles and 
affiliations listed alphabetically to illustrate the range and experience of participants without 
linking positions to particular organizations (i.e., non-corresponding).  In addition, selected titles 
and organizations have not been listed to protect confidentiality and these identifiers cannot be 
matched or counted.  For the analysis, Chapter 6 employs the identifiers from Table 4.3 while 
chapter 7 classifies participants according to those involved in the NSFC (e.g., NSFC 1, NSFC 2, 
etc.). 
4.2.3.2. Document Review 
Documents are essential to case study research as they provide stable and unobtrusive sources of 
evidence that record information about past events and can be used to corroborate evidence from 
other sources (Patton 2002; Yin 2003).  Documents provide additional practical benefits in that 
they can be reviewed in a time and place convenient to the researcher and enable researchers to 
obtain statements made by participants that are already in written form (Creswell 2003).  Main 
challenges with document review include finding and gaining access to relevant materials (i.e., 
documents that include protected information and/or are hard to locate) and document quality 
(i.e., completeness, accuracy or authenticity) (Creswell 2003).   
 Document review was a major source of data for my research and mainly involved two 
activities.  I reviewed newspaper and magazine articles to chronicle events and changing 
perspectives on the forestry crisis from about 2000 to 2009 (Chapter 6).  Following the work of 
Gray (2003), I examined over 200 articles from local papers such as The Algoma News Review 
(Wawa), The Chapleau Express, The Echo (Manitouwadge) and The Jackfish Journal 
(Hornepayne), regional papers such as The Sault Star and The Timmins Daily Press and major 
papers such as The Toronto Star.  Remarkably, The Toronto Star was the only major and 
southern Ontario newspaper to run an article on challenges in the forestry sector in Northern 
Ontario during the period 2000-2009.  Monthly industry papers focussing on Northern Ontario 




 Time was allotted during site visits to manually search, review and photocopy articles at 
town and university libraries and resource centres.  In addition, keyword searches (e.g., forestry 
crisis; crisis; Northeast Superior Forest Community; Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal community 
names) were performed through the University of Waterloo library database Eureka.cc, which 
provided archival access to key regional and national papers.  I designed a media log sheet to 
systematically track headlines and articles from these sources related to forestry crisis and NSFC 
(Figure 4.3).  Both hard copy and electronic articles were reviewed chronologically, and relevant 
excerpts were immediately transcribed into the case study database for coding.  The same 
codebook was used to code both interviews and documents.   








News media data provide the base for the first part of Chapter 6, namely the event chronology 
and frame analysis of the unfolding forestry crisis.  Reviewing relevant websites, written reports, 
legal documents (e.g., Robinson-Huron Treaty, SFL agreements), policy and planning 
documents and maps, administrative documents such as proposals and meeting minutes was also 
important for developing the case context.  In some instances participants directly provided me 
with relevant reports during interviews that I did not yet know about or could not access (e.g., 
NSFC Strategic Plan; Superior East Labour Force Study).  Data triangulation was important for 
crosschecking informational accuracy and completeness (Patton 2002). 
MEDIA LOG SHEET  
Date   Headline                                     Media Source 
 
      03/01 Forestry Sector Large Contributor to Northern Economy    Northern Ontario Bus. 
      12/01 Impact of Ongoing Lumber War Filters to North     Northern Ontario Bus. 
      03/02 Survival of the Fittest: Northern Mills Invest in Future Liability    Northern Ontario Bus. 
07/27/02 World Trade Body Rules in Favour of Canada in Lumber Dispute with U.S.   Timmins Daily Press 
      07/02 Lobbying for Support        Northern Ontario Bus. 
      11/02  Northern Softwood Lumber Mills Riding Out The Storm    Northern Ontario Bus. 
11/06/02 Dubreuil Forest Products Lays Off 20: Soaring Hydro Rates Blamed For Move  Sault Star 
15/03/03 150 to be Laid Off in Dubreuilville      Timmins Daily Press 
      07/03 Triple Blow: Current Market Conditions Creating a ―Poisonous‖ Environment for the Industry Northern Ontario Bus. 
26/05/03 White River Mill Closes for 6 Months      Sault Star 
28/05/03 Mill Shutdown ‗Devastating‖ News: White River Told to Prepare for Worst Case Scenario Sault Star 
     






4.2.3.3. Site Visits and Direct Observation 
Direct observation was a third method for data collection employed during site visits.  This 
included passive observation (Patton 2002; Yin 2003) of one Mayor‘s Group meeting 
(Dubreuilville, June 2009) and one NSFC meeting (Hornepayne, June 2009).  I also visited 
operational forest company facilities, government and band offices, towns, reserves and local 
forests to assist my description of the setting and different actors—the physical and human 
environments (Patton 2002)—presented in Chapters 5 through 7.  In addition, I attended two 
regional conferences on Ontario‘s tenure system organized by the Northern Ontario Sustainable 
Communities Partnership (Thunder Bay, March 2009) and the Ontario Professional Foresters 
Association (Sudbury, April 2009).  Both of these conference events provided an opportunity to 
be a passive observer among two groups (i.e., a grassroots community group and a professional 
organization) that in general sponsor the local control and conventional industrial forest 
management discourses examined in the following chapters.   
 A research journal was used to keep notes from site visits and document the content and 
context of the above meetings.  Research notes were written-up within one week of each event 
and entered into the case study database.  Documented public statements from different actors 
were occasionally used to supplement the analysis presented in Chapters 6 and 7.  Each event 
also provided opportunities to follow-up with previous interview participants and to identify and 
confer with future potential participants by simply ‗being there‘. 
 Photographs were taken of public spaces to illustrate the case description and support the 
analysis in order to ―convey important case characteristics to outside observers‖ (Yin 2003: 92).  
I often revisited photographs and field notes while conducting interview and document analysis 
to revive my impressions of the context, which helped to me to articulate observations. 
4.2.3.4. Mail Survey 
A mailed survey was used to gather data on and explore forest stakeholders‘ perceptions of the 
Ontario Crown forest tenure system in the Northeast Superior Region to inform NSFC decision 
making.  Email and telephone conversations with NSFC staff contributed to the initial topical 




range of ‗top of mind‘ issues and opinions among regional forestry stakeholders as an entry point 
for further inquiry regarding organizational policies and programs. 
 Non-probabilistic, purposive sampling methods were used for the survey.  When using 
non-probabilistic sampling methods, Schreuder et al (1999: 289) stress that it is important to 
―clearly state the assumptions and what the sampled information can and cannot be used for, and 
draw inferences on that basis.‖  I used non-probabilistic, purposive sampling based on the 
following rationale: 
 the intention to focus on exploring the range of views held by certain 
people/organizations about a specialized topic in a specific historical, cultural and 
geographic context, and so findings were not intended to be generalizable (Lindlof and 
Taylor 2002; Berhard 2006); 
 the small scale (i.e., small regional population and number of specialized respondents) 
and in-depth nature of the research project (Kraus and Allen 1998; Patton 2002; Trochim 
2005; Pierce 2008); 
 to gather additional information that describes the range of social framings related to the 
use and control of forests, in order to augment and enrich the dataset for an intensive case 
study (Bernard 2006); 
 the cost, time and physical constraints of conducting a randomized, probabilistic sample 
(Schreuder et al 1999; Dillman 2009). 
 The survey sample was purposive (i.e., maximum variation strategy) in that it focussed 
on reaching all identifiable forest groups within a limited geographical area (i.e., Northeast 
Superior Region).  However, this does not mean that the sample does not represent the 
population—only that it is difficult to verify (Parfitt 2005; Trochim 2005).  The main limitation 
of purposive sampling is that responses from some accessible subgroups might be overweighted 
(Trochim 2005).  While descriptive statistics from the sample are not generalizable to a larger 
population, they do hold within the given sample and indicate the issues and frequency of 
responses relative to the particular respondents.  A main strength of this sampling method was 
the generation of a list or range of issues, challenges and opportunities which are instructive as 
the basis for further inquiry (Berhard 2006).  Thus the selected sampling method was suitable 




 Core survey questions were developed around broad concerns gleaned from literature on 
Canadian tenure system reform (e.g., Haley and Nelson 2007; Nelson 2008).  These include: 
where does control over forest resources reside, what (or whose) values are emphasized in forest 
development, and how are forest-derived benefits distributed?  There was intentional overlap 
between my interview and survey questionnaires (Appendices A and C respectively) on 
questions pertaining to the control and benefits of public forests.  However, survey questions 
pertaining to perceptions of and preferences for the distribution power and benefits followed a 
closed-ended (or fixed choice) ranking format (Patton 2002).  A closed-ended format for the 
survey was used to focus respondent‘s attention on a selected range of key forest stakeholder 
groups in the region identified through interviews in the first field season.  Closed-ended 
questions also provided ‗high-level‘ and unambiguous data for analysis (Bernard 2006), which 
was intended to complement the in-depth descriptive data gathered through interviews conducted 
within the same pool of forest actors. 
 In addition, the survey included open-ended ranking questions to identify different 
peoples‘ perspectives on the challenges and strengths of the current tenure system, their 
suggestions for other tenure models that could be useful in Ontario, and opportunities to improve 
tenure arrangements.  Open-ended questions were used for these themes because I wanted to 
explore and ―understand the points of view of other people without predetermining those points 
of view through prior selection of questionnaire categories‖ (Patton 2002: 21).  The 
questionnaire was reviewed by NSFC staff, colleagues, and the Office of Research Ethics at the 
University of Waterloo in order to refine the survey questions and format (Appendix C). 
 A thorough list of respondents concerned with forestry issues in the Northeast Superior 
Region (Appendix D) was compiled from available ‗sampling frames‘, which can take on a 
variety of different forms including mail or published lists of potential participants (Creswell 
2003; Pierce 2008; Dillman 2009).  Helpful sampling frames included The Working Forest and 
Northern Business News business directories which were supplemented with contact information 
assembled from government, industry and NGO forestry reports, internet searches, and 
consultation with NSFC staff.  Participants were selected based on their experience as part of 




had been sensitized to the effects of the crisis through their interaction with the wider community 
of forest groups involved in forest governance, development and conservation. 
 With approval from the NSFC and UW Office of Research Ethics, the first round of 
surveys was distributed by surface mail in early December 2008.  NSFC arranged and paid for 
French translation and mailing.  Self-addressed stamped envelopes were included to encourage 
return.  Two rounds of follow-up requests were sent via email in February and again in April 
2009.  Surveys were also made available at a NSFC public workshop in September 2008.  This 
‗mixed-mode‘ survey design was used to enhance coverage and response rates, and lower costs 
associated with repeated surface mail outs (Dillman et al 2009). 
 A 15 per cent response rate was achieved, based on 28/186 surveys returned.  This 
response rate was satisfactory given the non-probabilistic purposive sampling technique utilized 
and that mail surveys often achieve 10 per cent to 40 per cent returns (Palys 1997; Parfitt 2005; 
Trochim 2005).  Mail surveys often capture low returns due in part to difficulties with providing 
detailed written responses, the impersonal nature of mail surveys, peoples‘ purported lack of 
interest or knowledge about ‗the issues‘, and problems with survey design (Palys 1997; Parfitt 
2005; Trochim 2005; Dillman et al 2009).  Other factors contributing to the response rate here 
included a lack of awareness about the NSFC and about the researcher.  Residents in small 
communities frequently ‗wear many hats‘; consequently, it is possible that multiple surveys were 
sent to the same individuals for different roles and/or the same roles in different organizations 
(e.g., Local Citizen Committees).  It is not possible to determine if and how many redundant 
surveys were sent; however, the latent effect would be a decreased mail out and increased 
response rate, which would be a positive effect.  A limitation of this sampling method is that 
there was no way to determine the number of responses by organizations/groups relative to those 
sent. 
 The combination of closed-ended and open-ended survey questions necessitated two 
approaches to data analysis.  Ordinal survey data were manually entered into a spreadsheet 
created in Microsoft Excel 2007 to assist with tallies and rankings.  I used Excel to generate 




 Subsequently, descriptive data gathered through open-ended survey questions were 
manually entered into QSR NVivo 7.0.  I again used an iterative, inductive coding approach to 
identify themes emerging from the open-ended survey responses (Patton 2002; Creswell 2003).  
Response coding typically generated between 6 and 13 major themes for open-ended questions.  
I then assigned rankings using two counting methods for confirmation.  The first method counted 
the total number of times each answer statement was ranked as number 1.  The second method 
determined ranking by counting the total number of times answer statements were listed.  Both 
methods produced similar results, especially with items ranked among top three categories. 
Exceptions are noted in the discussion of survey findings.  Ranked responses from open-ended 
survey questions were then presented in table form to illustrate my discussion of results. 
 A draft report was presented to the NSFC for feedback during fall 2009.  A copy of the 
final report (Bullock 2009) was sent to OMNR‘s Crown tenure system review team in March 
2010.  Relevant survey findings are included in Chapter 5 to illustrate basic differences in 
perceptions and preferences emanating from actors in the Northeast Superior Region.  This 
provides a high level entry point for the more detailed frame analysis and event chronology of 
the forestry crisis in Chapter 6 as well as the analysis of dominant social framings and power 
relations at work in the formation of the NSFC in Chapter 7.  Results are synthesized for 
discussion to illustrate the conclusions and recommendations in the closing chapter. 
 
4.3. Summary 
Adhering to an interpretative and inductive approach to this research, the ―case study is both the 
process of inquiry about the case and the product of that inquiry‖ (Stake 2003: 136).  By 
interacting with and interpreting a set of events and perspectives about the case, the researcher is 
also co-constructing the knowledge presented within the case.  As outlined above, case study 
methods enable a deep understanding of a single case by accommodating several data sources 
incorporated into an evolving database and analysis (Patton 2002; Creswell 2003; Yin 2003).  
The current study draws on and integrates four sources of evidence (interviews, document 
review, direct observation and a survey) to achieve data and methodological triangulation, and a 




dataset reinforces factual cross checks and provides different insights from different sources 
about the same research questions (Table 4.5).  Data analysis is informed by Gray‘s (2003) 
techniques for frame analysis, which provided the platform for both the interview questionnaire 
and coding set developed for the qualitative data collected.  The next chapter introduces the case 
study region and presents results from the survey on perceptions of the Crown forest tenure 
system. 
Table 4.5. Summary of Data Collection Methods used to address Core Research Questions 

































1. How do different actors frame the forestry crisis in the Northeast Superior 
Region?  
X X X X 
2. Do actors‘ frames change/not change overtime?  How? Why? X X   
3. What forms/sources of power are present and how do they influence, if at all, the 
construction of shared meaning?  
X X X X 
4. How does social learning—evidenced by the construction of  ‗shared meaning‘ 
through the development of common frames—influence the way actors approach 
forest management problems related to policy, planning and practice?  














CHAPTER 5 – THE CONTROL OF PUBLIC FORESTS IN NORTHERN ONTARIO 
5.1. Overview 
This chapter presents the case study region and results from the Northeast Superior Region 
survey on perceptions of the Crown forest tenure system.  The first section outlines the 
provincial significance of Ontario‘s forest sector, including differences in the distribution of 
forest resources, employment and community dependence between southern and Northern 
Ontario.  Challenges linked to the recent decline of Ontario‘s forest sector are then described.  A 
brief historical overview of the main provincial tenure policy and legislative framework for 
forest resource governance in Ontario follows. 
 The second section presents key political and economic forces shaping human-forest 
interactions and patterns of forest and community development in the Northeast Superior Region 
of Northern Ontario.  This region includes the cluster of communities that form the Northeast 
Superior Forest Community.  The biophysical context sets the stage for a description of colonial 
influences on the form and control of northern communities.  A brief history of Aboriginal and 
non-Aboriginal settlements is then provided.  Governance arrangements are described to present 
differences between the conventional roles and levels of involvement among towns, First 
Nations, provincial and federal agencies, and forest industry actors in service and program 
delivery and forest management and planning. 
 The third section briefly examines demographic and economic changes associated with 
challenges in the forest industry in the Northeast Superior Region.  Forest group survey results 
are presented to highlight perceived strengths and weaknesses of the conventional approach to 
fibre allocation, perceptions of the distribution of power and forest-derived benefits and regional 
personal interpretations of sustainable forest management.  Taken together, this chapter provides 
the foundation for subsequent detailed analysis of social framings of the ‗forestry crisis‘ within 




5.2. Regional Dynamics of Ontario’s Forest Resources, Economy and Governance 
5.2.1. Provincial Forest Land, Population, and Economy 
Ontario‘s vast forest resources have long been a source of wealth for the Province of Ontario.  
The provincial forest products sector shipped more than $18 billion in wood products in 2005 
(OMNR 2008).  However, a downturn in Ontario‘s forest economy, part of a larger national 
downturn, continues to challenge communities across the province.  Natural Resources Canada 
(NRCAN) (2007) reported that Ontario has lost more forestry jobs than any other region in 
Canada.  In Ontario, between 2003 and 2007 about 8,000 direct jobs were lost through mill 
closures and temporary layoffs.  This downturn impacts Northern Ontario disproportionately, as 
does the resulting conflict surrounding forest policy and planning.  Impacts of the forestry crisis 
must be considered with regard to the uneven geographical distribution of Ontario‘s forests and 
population, as well as the locus of forest governance control. 
  Southern Ontario (shaded areas south of the Forest Management Planning Area in Figure 
5.1.) is more densely populated and urbanized than the north—93 per cent (about 11 million) of 
the provincial population lives in the southern area that represents less than 8 per cent of the 
province (about 86,000 km
2
).  There is also a high degree of private land ownership, about 87 per 
cent (OFA 2009), and 20 per cent of the southern land base is farmland (OMAFRA 2009).  Close 
to large markets in the USA, southern Ontario‘s economy is heavily industrialized. 
 In contrast, Northern Ontario contains the majority of Ontario‘s commercially productive 
forest lands, referred to as the Forest Management Planning Area (OMNR 2008) (Figure 5.1).  
The provincial north (about 989 000 km
2
) is 95 per cent public Crown land and 66 per cent 
forested.  Northern Ontario‘s boreal forest accounts for 76 per cent of provincial forest land and 
is the backbone of the forest industry (Province of Ontario 2008).  The region is home to 16 of 
the province‘s 33 pulp and paper mills.  Ontario‘s 25 largest sawmills produce 80 per cent of the 
province‘s lumber; 22 of these are in Northern Ontario. 
 About one-third of northern communities are forest industry dependent (Province of 
Ontario 2008).  Although 800,000 people live in Northern Ontario—just 7 per cent of the total 




industry in 2005 (Robinson 2007).  This represents 31 per cent of provincial forest workers.  
Employment in this sector has continually dwindled due to the downturn in the forest economy.  
In Northern Ontario, about 2,200 direct jobs in forestry were lost between 2003 and 2005 
(Minister‘s Council of Forest Sector Competitiveness 2005), while others suggest this number of 
lost jobs increased to 9,000 by fall 2007, representing a loss of $869 million to the northern 
economy (NDP 2007).  Northern forest resources and industries are important to Ontario‘s forest 
sector.  In additional, their vital contribution to the northern economy and communities must not 
be overlooked. 




5.2.2. Evolution in Forest Governance in Ontario 
The majority of commercially productive forests are located in Northern Ontario where there is a 
high degree of community dependence on resources. However, forests have long been controlled 
by the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources (OMNR) and the commercial forest industry 
through the Forest Licensing System (or ―tenure system‖) (OMNR 2008).  The current system is 
rooted in colonial ideology of the mid-1800s, when Ontario‘s foundational policies and 




control of forest lands and resources, 2) promote industrial extraction and sale of timber from 
public lands, and 3) create provincial revenues from Crown timber sales (Drushka 2003; Nelles 
2005).  In addition to creating a longstanding provincial government dependence on Crown 
timber revenues, ―these policies formed the basis of a unique Canadian partnership between 
timber-based forest industries and colonial (later provincial) governments that controlled the 
majority of the forest land‖ (Drushka 2003: 30). 
 Under this early system, harvesting fees were paid when timber was sold rather than 
when the rights were conferred to industry.  This approach helped to mobilize limited capital 
during a time of colonial development, promote land clearance for settlement and agriculture, 
and at the same time generate revenues for government to spend on ―measures popular with the 
electorate‖ (Drushka 2003: 30) (presumably in the more settled provincial south). Ontario‘s 
forest policies have since been developed through ongoing collaboration with large-scale pulp 
and paper and forest products companies, resulting in regulatory capture and a closed policy 
network (Hessing et al 2005; Nelles 2005; Robinson 2007).  A provincial focus on industrial 
forestry and commodity exports has since limited the flow of fibre to secondary manufacturing, 
constraining development within Northern Ontario, the Province‘s principal forest territory. 
 The Crown Forest Sustainability Act (1994) and Environmental Assessment (EA) Act 
(1994) provide the current legislative framework for forest management in Ontario.  Both were 
partly the result of high profile public protests over logging in Temagami, Ontario during the late 
1980s and early 1990s, and the ensuing Class Environmental Assessment of timber management 
that involved over 4 years of public hearings (Lawson et al 2001; May 2005; OMNR 2008).  
Under the Crown Forest Sustainability Act, Sustainable Forest Licences (SFLs) held mainly by 
industry grant long-term (20 year) harvesting rights to licensees for all species of trees in a given 
Management Unit.  These licences have requirements for renewal and maintenance.  Forest 
Resource Licences are also granted for up to 5 years for activities such as salvage and non-
commercial uses such as firewood.  These are generally smaller in scale and can overlap with 
other licenses as they outline specific species, volumes and stands to be harvested.  The EA Act is 
meant to improve management practices through conditions for increased reporting on wildlife, 




in decision making through the creation of Local Citizen Advisory Committees.  Such measures 
were introduced to redress perceived inadequacies pertaining to ecological and social concerns 
created by conventional policies.  However, the conventional model of industrial forestry and 
tenure prevails in Northern Ontario. 
 A growing awareness among governments, communities, industry, and academics (Haley 
and Nelson 2007; Robinson 2007; Rosehart 2008) is that the conventional tenure system has 
constrained diversification and innovation by limiting access to fibre for new entrants such as 
local enterprise, First Nations and communities, and has hampered the development of non-
conventional forest products and uses (e.g., bioenergy; medicinals; forest foods).  Dating back to 
the 1940s post-WWII era, Ontario‘s current tenure policies are based on the notion of sustained 
yield harvesting, intended to ensure steady fibre flows to designated processors through the 
liquidation of timber (Lawson et al 2001; Haley and Nelson 2007).  Consequently, these policies 
emphasize timber harvesting rights (deemphasizing non-timber products) and long-term security 
for large investors through leases that are renewed every five years.  Furthermore, 80 per cent of 
annual fibre allocations are associated with large-scale processing facilities that by design require 
minimum fibre volumes to be economically viable, and 100 per cent of the annual cut is 
designated to come from specific forest areas (Haley and Nelson 2007).  In this rigid institutional 
and operational setting, it is difficult to adjust policies, reconfigure mill operations, and redirect 
fibre flows without invariably impacting specific mills, towns, and forests.   
 A perceived need among civic-private-public actors to reform the institutions for forest 
governance and decision making is at the centre of a complex and contentious decade-long 
debate on how best to stimulate Ontario‘s failing forest sector and communities.  The 
increasingly shaky state of the forest industry and severity of the problems to be faced by the 
province (since about 2001) has given a louder voice to groups that have been historically less 
visible.  Emboldened municipal leaders, First Nations and non-government organizations (both 
external environmental and internal community groups), among others, are lobbying senior 
governments and industry with their desires and ideas for change.  Over the last decade, several 




Saving the Region of Ontario North Group (STRONG); Northern Ontario Sustainable 
Communities Partnership (NOSCP), see Chapter 6].  
 The next section presents the regional context from which another informal group of 
actors emerged to form the Northeast Superior Forest Community Corporation, as a response to 
economic and social challenges shared by a group of forest communities northeast of Lake 
Superior in Northern Ontario (Figure 5.2).  Results of the key informant survey are presented to 
provide a ‗high-level‘ analysis of perceptions of and attitudes about the existing Crown forest 
tenure system, sustainable forest management and the distribution of power and forest-derived 
benefits found in the Northeast Superior Region.  These general perceptions are discussed here 
as an entry point for a more nuanced analysis of social framings presented in Chapters 6 and 7. 
 
5.3. Hinterland Geographies of Lake Superior’s North Shore 
5.3.1. Biophysical Setting 
The Northeast Superior Region is located adjacent to the north eastern shore of Lake Superior in 
Northern Ontario.  This roughly 60,000 km
2
 vernacular region straddles the transition between 
the Eastern Great Lakes-St Lawrence Forest and the northern boreal forest region (Albert et al. 
2006).  Boreal softwoods (black and white spruce, jack pine, larch) and shade intolerant 
hardwoods (trembling aspen, white birch, balsam poplar) are common species to the northwest 
where disturbances from fire, wind, and pest outbreaks play an important role in the natural 
regeneration of new forests (OMNR 2009).  The Great Lakes-St. Lawrence forest to the 
southeast is considered a transition zone between the Carolinian deciduous forest of eastern 
North America and the predominately coniferous boreal forests to the north.  As such, it contains 
some boreal tree species but is characterised by a greater variety of deciduous broad-leaf species, 
typically yellow birch, sugar and red maple, basswood, and red oak interspersed with coniferous 
eastern white pine, red pine, eastern hemlock and white cedar.   
 The transition from Great Lakes-St. Lawrence to boreal forest conforms with the 5°C 
mean annual isotherm east of Lake Superior and the 4°C mean annual isotherm to the west 




from 90 to 100 cm/year along the northeast shore of Lake Superior (among the highest in the 
province), to between 70-90 cm/year further inland.  The more northern boreal forest ecosystem 
is generally less productive and species diverse due to longer, colder winters. 
 The retreat of the Laurentian Ice Sheet from this area (between about 10.6 and 9.0 
thousand years before present) exposed the scoured and fractured granite bedrock, leaving 
shallow surface deposits of till, thin soils, and myriad lakes and wetlands (Armson 2001; 
Warkentin 2001).  The Northeast Superior Region also crosses a major continental drainage 
divide, ‗the height of land‘ that separates the northward draining Hudson Bay/James Bay Basin 
(Arctic) and the Lake Superior-Lake Huron Basin (Atlantic) to the south.  Along the precipitous 
northeastern shoreline of Lake Superior, the Algoma Plateau decreases in elevation from over 
600 to 250 metres above sea level in the north (Warkentin 2001). 
5.3.2. Colonial and Company Influences: Treaties, Settlements and Development 
The Northeast Superior Region offers scenes, history, and a natural resource base that Canadian 
geographers suggest have been important to shaping a national consciousness (Wallace 1987; 
Bone 1992; Warkentin 2001).  This scenic yet often severe landscape has been celebrated in 
paintings by Canada‘s famous Group of Seven painters.  Ongoing characterisations, whether by 
artists or the provincial government, have portrayed the provincial north as a rich Crown 
resource storehouse largely devoid of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people (Lawson et al 2001; 
Ballamingie 2009).  Geographers have shown how north Superior maps have historically been 
used to convey romantic and inconsistent notions of the region that focus on specific external 
interests (e.g., ‗playground‘ for American and Canadian outdoorsmen who will meet welcoming 
Indian chiefs and giant game fish) with negative social implications (Young and Wilson 2010). 
However, forming and linking isolated settlements throughout the heart of Northern Ontario has 
been important to provincial and national development.  The processes and outcomes of colonial 
expansion and later resource development have likewise influenced community form and culture 
in Northeast Superior Region, for better or worse. 
  The region includes several affiliated forest-dependent communities, including: 




Brunswick House, Chapleau Cree, Chapleau Ojibwe
4
, Hornepayne, Michipicoten, Missanabie 
Cree, Pic Mobert and Pic River First Nations communities (Figure 5.2).  Located between 
47.8°N and 49.2°N latitude and 83.4°W and 85.8°W longitude, this is a relatively isolated and 
thinly populated region on the peripheries of the larger regional centres of Sault Ste. Marie (300 
km southeast) and Thunder Bay (300 km west).  As such the Northeast Superior Region 
represents a distinct geographical, social, economic space between major urban and service 
centres where resource sector employment, small town living, wilderness recreation and the 
TransCanada Highway and national railroads are prominent. 
Figure 5.2. Northeast Superior Region, Northern Ontario, Canada  
 
(Source data: DMTI 2009 and OMNR 2009) 
                                                 




 Positioned on the boundary between Northwestern and Northeastern Ontario, the 
Northeast Superior Region lies at the centre of a hinterland that has been referred to as politically 
unfocussed (Wallace 1987: 447) and that lacks functional integration (Warkentin 2001).  These 
characterisations have much to do with observations that settlement and transportation patterns 
as well as government and corporate decision making, migration, communication and resource 
flows were designed to serve ‗outside‘ interests, rather than those concerned with forming an 
internally cohesive and functional provincial north.  Historically, external private and senior 
government interests have prevailed. 
 The early discovery of minerals along the northern shores of Lakes Huron and Superior 
during the 1840s prompted the Province of Canada to pursue treaty negotiations with the resident 
Aboriginal peoples in order to ‗open‘ the region‘s natural resources to exploration and 
development (Surtees 1986; INAC 2008).  Under the Robinson Treaties of 1850, certain groups 
of Ojibwa exchanged ―...forever, all their right, title, and interest in the whole territory‖ between 
the lake shores and the ―height of land‖ (i.e., Hudson Bay-Great Lakes divide) in exchange for 
payment, the creation of reserves, and the right to continue to hunt and fish in the manner to 
which they were accustomed (except on private property) (INAC 2008). 
 By 1905-1906, the federal government was motivated by Cree and Ojibwa petitions to 
negotiate terms for Treaty 9 (or the James Bay Treaty) due to ongoing pressures from non-
Aboriginal settlement, resource development (mining, forestry and later energy) and the building 
of the railroads throughout First Nations‘ traditional territory (INAC 2008).  However, for 
various reasons (e.g., poor timing of treaty negotiators, disease outbreak), many distinct groups 
of First Nation and Métis people did not sign the treaties of 1850 and 1905-06, leading to several 
outstanding land claims (Surtees 1986).  These treaties marginalized the Aboriginal population 
and at the same time extended the geographic and resource base for what would become the 
Province of Ontario.  Such arrangements formalized linkages to a centrally controlled heartland 
government and urban centres.  Discussed below, two forms of socio-economic control soon 
emerged to shape human-forest relations, work and settlement in Northern Ontario—Indian 




5.3.2.1. Indian Reserves 
The establishment of reserves and forced settlement of previously nomadic Cree and Ojibwa 
hunters was extremely damaging to First Nations people and culture.  Several First Nations in the 
Northeast Superior Region have endured ongoing resettlement, poor housing conditions and 
services, exclusion from resource benefits, little compensation, ongoing land claims negotiations 
and an overall disrespect for First Nations‘ rights and way of life
5
.  For example, not all First 
Nations in the Northeast Superior Region received their initial land entitlements relative to the 
terms of the Robinson-Huron Treaties and Treaty 9. Chapleau Ojibway, Pic River Ojibway, and 
Missanabie Cree never signed treaties and waited several decades for a community land base.  
Missanabie Cree are still in negotiations with the provincial and federal government for 24 km
2
 
of Crown land (OMNR 2002; OMAA 2009). 
 Conversely, the federal government did establish an 80 ha reserve for the Michipicoten 
First Nation in 1885.  However, the reserve was not recognized by the provincial government 
and was subsequently sold to land speculators during the Wawa gold rush in 1900 (Michipicoten 
First Nation 2010).  Further, despite local and OMNR recognition for their historic presence and 
involvement in community and commerce (Douglas 1995; OMNR 2002), Hornepayne First 
Nation is not recognized by Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC).  The First Nation does 
not have reserve land and remains loosely organized. 
 Some First Nations which received land were subsequently forced to move several times.  
This was due to ongoing government land sales, poor land and health conditions, and physical 
distance from modern service and employment centres.  For example, in 1925 the Province 
formed the 700,000 ha Chapleau Crown Game Preserve, which surrounded the existing 7000 ha 
Brunswick House First Nation reserve (Brunswick House First Nation 2010).  The First Nation 
was landless until the federal government purchased provincial land for a new reserve in 1947.  
In 1973, Brunswick House First Nation traded 260 ha of their existing reserve to again move to a 
new site closer to Chapleau.  Officially closed to hunting and trapping, the Game Preserve 
                                                 
5 Others (e.g., Dickason 2002) have examined the wider socio-economic context and effects of the government‘s policy of assimilation.  My 




remains a source of conflict because traditional First Nations occupants and the Provincial 
representatives hold different views about First Nations‘ right to hunt and trap in the Preserve.  
In contrast, large-scale industrial logging has long occurred in what is supposed to be a wildlife 
sanctuary. 
 Michipicoten First Nation also made several moves due to ongoing servicing problems 
with ‗new‘ settlements.  For example, there were environmental problems at their penultimate 
site, which was built by resource company interests in 1955.  This site was condemned in 1971 
by the Algoma Health Unit as ―unfit for human habitation‖ due to serious problems with very 
poor drainage and sanitation (Michipicoten First Nation 2010).  In another example, the Town of 
Chapleau constructed the town sewage reservoir within 300 metres of the original Chapleau Cree 
reserve.  This long discouraged band member settlement until the new Fox Lake reserve was 
established in 1989 through negotiations with the federal and provincial governments 
(Wakenagun Community Futures Development Corporation 2010). 
 Ongoing unstable and unhealthy conditions have scattered band members and constrained 
First Nations community development and culture.  With respect to forests, First Nations control 
over forest management remains limited to reserve lands (Rainforest Alliance 2006: 16): 
Historically, the Province of Ontario has interpreted Treaties as providing the continual 
right to fish, hunt and trap with no notion that treaties provide for co-management or for 
sharing of natural resources. In general, First Nations do not share this narrow view of 
treaty rights and the governments and First Nations agree forest management could 
impact these rights. 
Alienation from traditional hunting and fishing areas, the intentional exclusion from decision 
making over and benefits from timber, mineral and hydro development (Kuhlberg 2003), as well 
as limited local employment and services, have disempowered many First Nations.  The practical 
limitations for First Nations forestry enterprise and decisions-making are elaborated below.  As 
one example, as of 2006 only one First Nation—Pic River Ojibway—had a fibre commitment on 
an SFL (Black River) in the vicinity of the Northeast Superior Region (Table 5.2).  In Chapters 6 
and 7, First Nations participants describe challenges to their participation and lack of benefit 




5.3.2.2. Company Towns 
The towns of the Northeast Superior Region have been shaped by the unique planning history 
and community culture associated with single-enterprise company towns and provincial 
government authority.  Provincial and federal support for resource exploration and exploitation 
encouraged private investment in Northern Ontario and gave rise to the ‗company town‘.  In an 
effort to attract (and retain) individuals and families to isolated places, all housing, service, and 
recreation needs were provided by one major employer (Goltz 1992).  Numerous company towns 
were established across Northern Ontario during the late 1800s and first half of the 1900s and 
perpetuated features associated with ―a ‗colonial-frontier setting‘, including resource 
dependency, environmental pollution, external control and an uncertain future, a low quality of 
life and a corporate paternalism‖ (Saarinen 1992: 165).  Saarinen‘s depiction refers to the 
significant role of ‗the company‘ as provider and administrator of day-to-day economic and 
social life.  Similarly, Reed (1990) described the prominent position of OMNR in northern 
resource towns given its visible daily presence and its role in controlling citizen-forest 
interactions, whether for recreation or industry, through the regulation of wilderness road access, 
hunting and fishing, and forest and water resource use. 
 Most Northeast Superior towns emerged from former trading posts and work camps 
populated by European newcomers pursuing opportunities in trade with the Aboriginal 
inhabitants, resource extraction, and transportation.  For example, both Wawa and Chapleau have 
historic roots in the early fur trade (1700s), and later emerged as larger centres based on forestry, 
mining and the railroad.  The current site of Chapleau was established when the Canadian Pacific 
Railroad was extended in 1885.  The discovery of gold during the mid-1890s and later iron ore 
brought additional people and industry (i.e., Algoma Steel) to Wawa. 
 The other four Northeast Superior towns were specifically established as permanent 
settlements to service major industries located in the area.  White River (1884) and Hornepayne 
(1918) were railroad towns, functioning as important service and overnight centres for 
transcontinental passenger and freight trains travelling through the heart of Northern Ontario 
between Toronto/Montreal and Winnipeg (Douglas 1995; Township of White River 2010).  




Copper Mine (Warkentin 2001).  Dubreuilville (1961)—a forest company town in the truest 
sense—was formed when Dubreuil Brothers Ltd. relocated their French Canadian family 
sawmilling operations, village, and 200 people (Magpie circa. 1954) to the current town site 
(Town of Dubreuilville 2009). 
5.3.2.3 Governance Structures and Processes 
Wallace (1987: 443) points out that the Shield hinterland in general ―lacks the institutional 
structures through which its inhabitants‘ common regional interests can be focussed and 
pursued‖.  Rather than dismissing the presence and importance of a shared ‗northern culture‘, 
Wallace‘s observation refers to hinterland traits such as physical distance between centres and 
vital heartland linkages that presumably override regionalism and the development of internal 
linkages.  These challenges are apparent in the Northeast Superior Region where a small 
population is geographically dispersed among several small settlements surrounded by vast areas 
of Crown land.  Important ties to industry and senior government are also readily apparent.  For 
example, the region‘s major resource companies are directed by head offices located in larger 
regional centres (e.g., Thunder Bay, Toronto) or other provinces and countries.   
 There is a prominent senior government presence linked to northern resources, services 
and economic development.  The Ministry of Natural Resources, Ministry of Northern 
Development, Mines, and Forestry
6
, and FedNor typically act as government overseers and 
funding partners for northern service and infrastructure projects, socio-economic services and 
local planning, and resource planning and management—all central to northern development.  
For the purpose of provincial service delivery, towns and First Nations in the Northeast Superior 
Region fall within the districts of Algoma, Sudbury and Thunder Bay.  However, districts 
themselves are not incorporated and so do not have the same level of administration (and 
therefore regional representation and decision making influence) as counties and regional 
municipalities in Southern Ontario.   
                                                 




 In much of Northern Ontario, regional and even municipal planning, as well as resource 
planning and management, have been top-down and focussed on physical rather than social and 
economic development (Anthony Usher Planning Consultant and OMNR 1994).  In this situation 
the interests of provincial ministries, resource producers and consumers have prevailed ―while 
local community interests have taken a back seat‖ (Anthony Usher Planning Consultant and 
OMNR 1994: 7).  While factors such as low or dispersed population and small tax base 
challenge the development of local environmental resource decision making institutions in 
Northern Ontario (Bullock and Watelet 2006), advocates for northern development suggest that 
this is because local capacity has not been developed, disputing that it cannot be developed. 
 The reeves and mayors of many small towns typically work on a part-time basis to fulfill 
local administration and leadership duties.  To present a unified voice and advance their mutual 
interests, municipalities in the Northeast Superior Region (and across the provincial north) 
belong to one of two municipal associations representing the districts of Northern Ontario [i.e., 
Northwestern Ontario Municipal Association (NOMA) or Federation of Northern Ontario 
Municipalities (FENOM)]. 
Table 5.1. First Nations Governance Structures in Ontario 
First Nation Band Tribal Council Tribal Organization 
Chapleau Cree 
Missanabe Cree 







Pic Mobert First Nation Nokiiwin Anishinabek Nation  
[Union of Ontario Indians (UOI)] Michipicoten First Nation 
Ojibways of Pic River 
Unaffiliatated 
(source data from: NAN 2009; UOI 2009) 
 Each First Nation elects a Chief and Council to manage band affairs.  First Nations within 
the NSFC can also be part of larger regional tribal councils that typically include 6-8 different 
bands and tribal organizations that represent provincial level administrative units (Table 5.1).  
                                                 
7 There were conflicting listings for tribal council membership across Canadian federal and First Nations websites.  For example, while the 
Hornepayne First Nation is listed as a member of the Matawa Tribal Council by both NAN and Chiefs of Ontario, neither the Matawa Tribal 




These organizations offer various socio-economic services and programs, act as forums, and as 
policy advocates on issues of importance to First Nations (NAN 2009; UOI 2009). 
 With respect to forestry matters, Sustainable Forest Licence holders presently have the 
primary role and responsibility for forest management and planning.  In addition to logging and 
silviculture, SFL holders are responsible for the preparation and implementation of Forest 
Management Plans (FMP), gathering information on licensed plan areas, conducting operations 
in accordance with approved plans, and monitoring and reporting on compliance (Clergue Forest 
Management Inc. 2005; Domtar Inc. 2008).  The OMNR in turn is responsible for reviewing and 
approving plans, auditing reports to ensure that operations comply with approved plans, and 
communications with First Nations.   
 While the Northeast Superior Region does not have formal administrative boundaries, the 
previously identified towns and First Nations are distributed among nine Forest Management 
Units (FMUs), which are administered by several local and regional corporate and provincial 
government offices (Table 5.2). The FMUs are the Algoma Forest; Big Pic Forest; Black River 
Forest; J.E. Martel Forest; Nagagami Forest; Magpie Forest;  Pic River Ojibway Forest; Pineland 
Forest; and White River Forest.  These licences are overseen by district level OMNR offices 
(e.g., Chapleau, Wawa, Sault Ste. Marie) as part of OMNR‘s Northeast (head office in Timmins) 
and Northwest Regions (head office in Thunder Bay). 
 Licensing arrangements involve several major forest companies whose interconnected 
business dealings variously affect towns throughout the region.  In addition to the SFL holder, 
licenses typically specify one or more companies that have been guaranteed a certain 
amount/species of wood by the Minister (‗ministerial fibre commitments‘) (Table 5.2).  This has 
created a complex network of fibre flows among different companies, forests and towns—the 
logic of which is often challenged on economic, social and ecological grounds.  What happens in 
one forest, town or forestry operation can therefore have an immediate ripple effect in the area 
through non-delivery of wood, the loss of employment, or allocations becoming available. Under 
this arrangement, forest companies and the provincial government influence forest access, use 
and the distribution of benefits through management planning processes, regulation as well as 









Main License Holder and/or Company(ies) MNR District Other commitments on the forest as 




Clergue Forest Mgt. Ltd. (S.S. Marie) includes: 
Boniferro Mill Works (S.S. Marie); 
Columbia Forest Products-Levesque Division 
(Hearst); 
Domtar (Espanola); 
Midway Lumber Mills (Thessalon); 
St. Mary‘s Paper (S.S.Marie); 
Weyerhaeuser (Wawa) 





St. Mary‘s Paper (S.S. Marie); 
Weyerhaeuser (Limer);  
Midway Lumber Mills Ltd. (Thessalon);  




Nagagami Forest Mgt. Ltd. (Hornepayne) 
includes: 
Olav Haavaldsrud Timber Company Ltd. 
(Hornepayne);  
Columbia Forest Products (Hearst);  




Levesque Plywood Ltd. (Hearst);  
Longlac Wood Industries Inc. 
(Longlac);  
Weyerhaeuser (Limer);  




Domtar (White River) Wawa District, 
NE 





Dubreuil Forest Products Limited (Buchanan 




Kimberly-Clark Forest Products Inc. 
(Terrace Bay); 
Columbia Forest Products-Levesque 










Buchanan Northern Hardwoods Inc. 
(Thunder Bay);  
Kimberly-Clark Inc. (Terrace Bay); 








Kimberly-Clark Forest Products Inc. 
(Terrace Bay);  
Longlac Wood Industries Inc. 
(Longlac);  









Kimberly-Clark Forest Products Inc. 
(Terrace Bay); 
Dubreuil Forest Products Limited 
(Dubreuilville); 
Pic Heron Indian Band (Heron Bay);  




J.E. Martel and Sons Ltd  (Chapleau) (now 






Levesque Plywood Limited‘s Hearst;  
Grant Forest Products Inc. (Timmins);  
Weyerhaeuser (Limer);  
Pineal Lake Lumber Company Limited 
(Pineal Lake);  









Norbord Industries Inc. (Cochrane); 
Grant Forest Products Inc. (Timmins);  
Pineal Lake Lumber Company Limited 
(Pineal Lake) 
(source data: OMNR 2009) 
 The strong relationship of community/regional and natural resource development and 




the mid-1990s, Local Citizens Committees (LCCs) have played a consultative role with the 
forest industry and the province in the development of area Forest Management Plans (Robson 
and Kant 2009).  LCCs typically include groups with non-consumptive and/or non-commercial 
rights of access to public forests (berry pickers, naturalists, recreationalists), groups with 
additional rights to resource taking (hunters, sport fishers, hunting guides, lodge operators, 
trappers and independent logging contractors), groups with Aboriginal Treaty rights (First 
Nations, Métis), and those with long-term timber harvesting rights and management 
responsibilities (forest products companies) (Smith 1996; Robson and Kant 2009).  However, 
these local committees do not hold formal authority over decisions affecting the allocation, 
access and use of public forest resources located nearby.  The strong association between 
regional forest employment and population trends also makes a case for structural change to 
provide local and regional stability. 
5.3.2.4. Recent Changes in Northeast Superior Population and Employment 
Northeast Superior towns are home to about 9506 and 1175 non-Aboriginal and Aboriginal 
people, respectively (Statistics Canada 2008) (Table 5.3).  However, the Aboriginal population 
rises to 2340 when local First Nations reserves are included (Table 5.4).  Table 5.3. presents 
Statistics Canada community profile data for towns and reserves in the Northeast Superior 
Region and does not include off-reserve Aboriginal individuals as these persons may live outside 
of the region.  Still, about 20 per cent of the 11 856 residents are Aboriginal (i.e., North 
American Indian and Métis). 
 Forest dependence is illustrated by recent population decreases associated with several 
recent mill closures (Tables 5.3 and 5.5).  Between 2001 and 2006, the region‘s total population 
declined by 16.4 per cent, compared to a provincial increase of 6.6 per cent (Statistics Canada 
2008).  As a subset of the total population, municipal Aboriginal populations in Northeast 
Superior Region experienced large shifts, both up and down, during the same period.  Notably, 
the Aboriginal population of Dubreuilville dropped by more than 60 per cent, while the 
Aboriginal population of White River apparently grew by over 75 per cent.  This enormous 
increase in White River could correspond to the large number of band members (66) who moved 




Dubreuilville during this same period, although this is speculation.  Overall, municipal 
Aboriginal populations are decreasing (-17.5% from 2001-2006) in keeping with the broader 
trend of population decrease in the Northeast Superior Region. 

























Chapleau 2,832 2,354 -16.9 315 250 -20.6 
Dubreuilville 967 773 -20.1 155 60 -61.3 
Hornepayne 1,362 1,209 -11.2 215 140 -34.9 
Manitouwadge 2,949 2,300 -22.0 115 130 +13.0 
Wawa 3,668 3,204 -12.6 445 275 -38.2 
White River 993 841 -15.3 180 320 +77.8 
Total 12771 10681 -16.4 1425 1175 -17.5 
(Source data: Statistics Canada 2008) 
Table 5.4. First Nations Population, Various Years. 
First Nation Date Reserve Pop. Off-Reserve Pop Total 
Brunswick House First Nation 2009 175 473 653   
Chapleau Ojibway 2009 32 8 40 
Ojibway of the Pic River 2009 496 411 987 
Pic Mobert 2009 325 503 829 
Michipicoten 2009 54 717 771 
Chapleau Cree First Nation 2007 83 287 370
a
 
Missanabie Cree 2004 - - 348
b
 
Hornepayne 2002 - - 125
c
 
Total   1165 2399 4123 
(Source data: OMNR 2002
c
; Dubreuil Forest Products Ltd. 2003
b
 Statistics Canada 2008; Town of Chapleau 2010
 a
) 
 More than 900 jobs were eliminated  in the NSFC region with the closure of Domtar 
Forest Products in White River, Weyerhaeuser Oriented Strand Board (OSB) in Wawa, and 
Dubreuil Forest Products in Dubreuilville in late 2007 and early 2008 (AWIC 2008) (Table 5.5).  
These simultaneous closures have had an added impact in that these facilities were all located 
approximately 100 kilometres from one another, where local people, families and economies are 
closely intertwined.  Numerous forest-dependent small businesses and ‗jobbers‘ have been 
affected, for example, tree planters, truck drivers, loggers, heavy equipment operators, roadside 
                                                 
8 Includes both non-Aboriginal and Aboriginal residents, but not Aboriginals on-reserve. 
9 ―Included in the Aboriginal identity population are those persons who reported identifying with at least one Aboriginal group, that is, North 
American Indian, Métis or Inuit, and/or those who reported being a Treaty Indian or a Registered Indian, as defined by the Indian Act of Canada, 




mechanics and other support services.  At least two First Nations owned companies were also 
affected.  Pic River Development Corporation had a logging contract with Weyerhaeuser to 
supply poplar to Wawa‘s OSB plant and had an allocation of 76 000 m
3
 from Domtar, which 
would have been affected by these closures (OMNR 2002).  Michipicoten First Nation also owns 
a forestry company that supplies mills in the region (Rainforest Alliance 2006).  The high level 
of interdependence among neighbouring forest-reliant communities has become apparent as local 
actors work to understand and deal with rapid change. 
Table 5.5. Recent Major Forestry and Mining Closures Affecting NSFC Communities 
Town Company/facility Closure Date # Jobs lost 
Chapleau Domtar Forest Products Spring 2005 67 
Dubreuilville Dubreuil Forest Products Winter 2008 329 
Hornepayne Olav Haavaldsrud July 2006 to Spring 2008, 
temporary lay-offs (fire) 
125 
Manitouwadge Newmont Canada Ltd. Summer 2006 245 
Wawa Weyerhaeuser OSB Fall 2007 163 
White River Domtar Forest Products Fall 2007 229 
(Source data: AWIC 2008; NSFC 2008) 
 The above communities have been grappling with mill closures and job loss, population 
decline due to the mass outmigration of skilled labour and youth, falling real estate values and 
foreclosures, declining municipal tax bases, and service loss.  This series of changes is typical of 
the ‗downward spiral‘ usually experienced by extractive resource-dependent towns associated 
with the loss of a primary industry (Beattie et al. 1981; Decter et al. 1989).  However, given the 
number of communities affected and the extent of the decline, this combination of economic, 
demographic, policy and ecological challenges is seen as part of the ongoing ‗forestry crisis‘ in 
Northern Ontario. 
 Survey results reflect varying levels of satisfaction with forest governance and the tenure 
system in its current state.  These ranged from strategic insights where minor improvements to 
the existing system could be made, to strong normative calls for major overhauls that should be 
undertaken.  Results are presented here to help establish different views surrounding the 
emerging debate on how best to address the ongoing forestry crisis.  This sets the stage for 




and personal interviews between 2000 and 2009, which details how conventional and emerging 
local control advocates constructed the ‗forestry crisis‘ as an unfolding experience.  Evolving 
problem, solution and identity frames and power relations are further analyzed to enrich and 
ground the survey data presented here. 
 
5.4. Survey Results: Perceptions of the Crown Forest Tenure System, Northeast Superior 
Region 
5.4.1. Respondent Demographics 
As discussed in Chapter 4, a mailed survey was conducted with the NSFC to assess stakeholder 
perceptions of the Crown tenure system in order to provide baseline information for agency 
decision makers.  Most survey respondents self-identified as being from municipal, provincial 
and federal government as well as industry (Table 5.6).  Industry respondents were from large 
(2) and small firms (1).  Overall, respondents were older and had many years of experience in 
their positions and in the region, confirming their specialized informant status (Bernard 2006).  




Years in group  Years in Region 
5 or 
less 
6-14 15 or 
more 
 5 or 
less 
6-14 15 or 
more 
Municipal 6 2 3 1  1 2 3 
Provincial 5 2 1 2  2 1 2 
Federal 3 1 - 2  1 - 2 
Forest Industry 3 - - 3  - - 3 
First Nations 2 - 2 -  - 1 - 
Tourism 2 - - 2  - - 2 
Baitfisher/Trapper 2 1 1 -  - - 1 
Outdoor Recreation 2 - - 2  - - 2 
Forest Worker 1 1 - -  - - 1 
Env./Conservation 1 1 - -  - - 1 
Consultant 1 - - 1  - - 1 





For example, almost half of respondents had 15+ years of experience with their group (including 
5 with >25 years).  About two-thirds of respondents had more than 15+ years in the NSFC 
region.  Of the 5 respondents with the shortest involvement in the region (5 or fewer years) all 
held positions with municipal, provincial, or federal governments.  Most respondents (18) stated 
that they had a very good (37%) or good (26%) level of understanding. 
5.4.2. Strengths and Weaknesses of Tenure System 
Respondents were asked to describe and rank what they thought were the main strengths (up to 
5) of the existing tenure system (Table 5.7).  Based on the highest frequency of number 1 
rankings, about 50 per cent of respondents stated that the top strength of the current system is 
that it guarantees long-term access to wood fibre, which is deemed important for reducing 
uncertainty and increasing security for large private investors.  Another 20 per cent (2 of 3 from 
industry), stated that the current system maintains sustainable levels of harvest and forest 
renewal for a constant supply of timber for production.   
 Conversely, 40 per cent of respondents believe a major weakness of the existing system 
is that it limits access to fibre for new entrants and non-conventional uses, namely for those 
involved in small enterprise, First Nations, and communities.  Four of five provincial and the one 
small industry representative were among those giving this response.  Just over 20% of people 
stated that the current system limits local control in decision making processes; perhaps not 
surprisingly, all of these respondents were from local government (2), First Nations (1), 
trappers/baitfishers (1), outdoor recreation (1) and tourism (1).  Fewer still (11%) felt community 
and regional development in Northern Ontario were hindered by the existing system
10
.  The two 




                                                 




Table 5.7. Perceived Strengths and Weaknesses of Current Forest Tenure System 
Rank Main strengths of tenure system Freq 
n=23 




1 -Guarantees, long-term access to fibre 
and upholds certainty/security for large 
private investors 
12  -Limits access to fibre for new 
entrants/non-conventional uses (small 
enterprise, FNs, community)  
11 
2 -Ensures sustainable level of harvest 
and forest renewal for constant supply 
of timber for production 
5 -Limits local control in decision 
making processes  
6 
3 -Provides apparatus enabling large-
scale, systematic management of 









-Limits community and regional 
development in Northern Ontario 
3 
4 -Supports stakeholder involvement and 
integration of wider values 
 
-Maintains measure of government 





-Restrictive business environment 
 
2 
5   -Does not promote env. stewardship 
-Unsupportive fees and licences 
-Promotes wastefulness of big 
companies 
-Creates conflict among licencees 
-Contributes to false ―cozy‖ 









5.4.2.1. Suggested Opportunities for Improvement 
On the positive side, 82 per cent of respondents agreed that it was possible to make 
improvements regarding the challenges they discussed
11
.  Most respondents (54%) called for a 
complete rethinking and fundamental changes to the existing tenure system. The priority in this 
regard is to enable collaborative decision making and increased regional/local control of forest 
resource and timber allocations, as well as increased access to fibre for smaller locally-based 
enterprise.  
 Community or town managed forests were perceived as a useful alternative.  Resource 
boards were also suggested, presumably with a variety of local stakeholders who decide on 
                                                 




where and how wood fibre is to be used.  Moving along this continuum, others suggested that a 
provincial-municipal partnership would be suitable, while some felt that OMNR should retain 
management control with smaller operations rather than having large corporations managing the 
forest ―under the Crown‘s watch‖ (provincial government respondent).  In all but two instances 
(i.e., where OMNR was given priority), respondents envisioned that decisions regarding the 
allocation and flow of fibre would be made collaboratively by a full range of stakeholders with 
an equal vote, and or by public entities rather than by a single private interest.  The collaborative 
model was perceived to contribute to decision making that was more democratic and transparent, 
more aligned with local realities of use and management.  Collaboration was also identified as 
enabling more responsible and efficient decision making, with positive implications for society 
and the environment.  Respondents thought this structure would contribute to quicker decisions 
about the availability of resources and costs associated with new or proposed opportunities.  
Such decision making bodies would have the authority to ―release‖ Crown timber to new 
entrants via competitive processes to make resources and derived benefits ―more broadly 
available‖.  The following statement summarizes the perspective expressed by many: 
A complete reform of the tenure system needs to be investigated. There needs to be a 
system in place where all stakeholders can come together and make decisions that are in 
the best interest of everyone involved.  A series of community controlled forests and 
forest co-operatives should be fully examined (municipal representative). 
Provincial representatives focussed on the need to create opportunities for ―new‖ or ―small‖ 
business, suggesting that auctions and/or earmarked fibre allocations would help create this 
access.  A variety of specific additional recommendations was offered: 
 Earmark a certain number of hectares of each forest management area for local/regional 
development (municipal); 
 Guarantee licence holders the benefits of allowable cut increases from intensive forest 
mgt and more government support for more intensive management, especially where 
communities endorse such practices (industry and provincial); 
 Crown should explore short-term tenure/sale of fibre rights by auction on Forest 
Management Units where the current licence holder is not utilizing the full fibre 




 Allow a portion of the forest management unit area/volume to be available to new 
businesses.  If no new businesses are developed then allow the SFL holder to harvest the 
wood in the last year (s) of the Forest Management Plan (provincial); 
5.4.2.2. Awareness of Other Forest Tenure Models 
When respondents were asked if they were aware of any other model(s) or form(s) of forest 
tenure that might be useful improvements for Ontario, less than one half of the people (42%) 
answered ―yes‖.  All five provincial representatives answered ―no‖.  Also, five of six municipal 
representatives answered ―no‖.  Most (8) mentioned various models of locally controlled 
collaborative management of public forest lands in British Columbia, Quebec, and Ontario.  
Alternatively, one industry representative suggested that 99 year leases should be granted at a 
nominal cost (after the Australian model) to boost security, intermediate stand management and 
incentives for long-term investment.  One trapper/baitfisher mentioned that ―tweaking‖ the 
existing system was enough, stating that LCCs and Cooperative SFLs were ―making 
improvements‖.  Overall, no detailed descriptions were provided and respondents did not seem 
to be familiar with other arrangements (even from elsewhere in Ontario). 
5.4.3. Perceptions of the Distribution of Power and Forest-derived Benefits 
Respondents were asked to rank a list of predefined forest stakeholders according to who they 
thought a) has the most power and b) who should have the most power over public forest 
resources in the Northeast Superior Region (Figure 5.3).  The provincial government (70%) was 
by far considered to be the most powerful actor, followed by the forest industry (26%) and First 
Nations (4%).  Local residents and the federal government were considered least powerful by 
one third of respondents.  All other groups were considered to hold intermediate power.  A 
significant reshuffling took place when respondents were asked who should have the most 
power: provincial government (57%), local government (22%), and forest industry (9%).  First 
Nations moved to fourth position tied with local residents, and environment/conservation groups.  










 Differences became apparent when comparing the relative change between perceptions of 
who has power and who should have power.  Percent change was determined by calculating the 
difference between the number of rankings each group received in higher (1-5) and lower (6-10) 
rank positions for each category (i.e., has power/should have power).  Local residents (+40%) 
and local government (+39%) experienced the most change (i.e., most people moved these 
groups to higher positions of power based on who they thought should have more power), while 
environment/conservation (-32%), outdoor recreation clubs (-29%), the federal government (-
27%) and tourism (-27%) were downgraded. 
 Likewise, respondents were asked to rank the same groups according to which ones they 
thought actually benefited the most and should benefit the most from public forest resources in 
their region (Figure 5.4).  The forest industry (66%) was seen to benefit most from public forest 
resources, followed by the province (16%), and local residents (8%). Once again, one third of 
people ranked the federal government last in terms of actual benefits.  A different order occurred 
when respondents were asked who should benefit most from public forest resources.  One half of 




and forest industry (18%) tied for second, followed by the province (9%). First Nations were 
ranked fourth. 
Figure 5.4. Perceived Benefit Disparity among Forest Groups in the Northeast Superior Region 
 
  
 When comparing the change between perceptions of who actually benefitted most and 
who should benefit most, local residents (+49%), local government (+38%), and First Nations 
(+18.5%) experienced the most change, followed by recreation clubs (+16%).  On the contrary, 
tourism (-20.7%) dropped the most in terms of groups that should benefit most.  This was 
followed by the federal and provincial governments (-17%), and forest industry (-16%) as groups 
also downgraded. 
5.4.4. Defining ‗Sustainable Forest Management‘ 
Respondents were asked to define sustainable forest management (SFM) in their own words in 
order to determine how different people in the Northeast Superior Region interpret the concept 
and to what extent their views reflected current guiding theories. SFM is based on the notions of 
sustainability and/or sustainable development as conceived at the 1987 Brundtland Commission 
report.  While advanced as ―a social ideal worth pursuing‖ (Francis 2004: 21), at best the 
approach represents a constellation of principles to work towards but does not spell out exactly 




2002).  Likewise, SFM has been referred to as ―a magic formula for achieving consensus‖ and a 
―vague idea‖ (von Gadow et al 2000).  Lane and McDonald (2002) identify 5 key principles to 
be the foundations for the present paradigm for forest management (Table 5.8). 
Table 5.8. Principles of Sustainable Forest Management (after Lane and McDonald 2002) 
1. maintains forest ecosystems, focusing on biodiversity and health 
2. considers local to global scales, now and in the future 
3. manages for tangible as well as intangible resources 
4. openly addresses a strong social component in support of social, economic, and cultural heritage values 
5. empowers people by enabling community involvement in forest management decision making 
 Most respondents (58%) referred to managing all forest resources in a manner that 
maintains a full range of forest uses and/or benefits to humans, including those valued from 
ecological, economic and social perspectives.  Holistic respect for the ‗needs‘ of the forest 
ecosystem and biodiversity were a secondary consideration established on the basis of 
maintaining ecological conditions needed to ensure the continued delivery of ecosystem services 
to humans.  However, four people specifically referred to the importance of protecting forest 
ecosystem health. 
 Most definitions (50%) emphasized the perpetuation of timber production by balancing 
or monitoring harvesting and forest regeneration.  This focus on creating a long-term and 
constant timber supply, while important to meeting future needs, is more in keeping with 
sustained yield.  Moreover, optimizing the quantity and quality of yield was also equated with 
notions of sustainability (4).  Benefits for future generations (7) and local communities (5), as 
well as local power sharing emerged as social equity concerns for SFM.  Results confirm what 
Adamowicz and Burton (2003) describe as an ongoing over-emphasis on the economic aspect of 
SFM, which can be attributed to the fact that sustained yield remains the foundation of SFM.  
 Respondents held a human-centred view of human-environment relations, exemplified by 
their focus on the human utility of forest ‗resource‘ and maintaining maximum timber supply.  
This is not surprising due to the high degree of forest dependence in the Northeast Superior 
Region and the tradition of industrial timber extraction that has prevailed over the past 100 years 




definitions did not fully reflect current thinking about SFM with regard to acknowledging the 
need to explicitly focus on multi-scaled and interdependent influences on forest management 
(i.e., being part of a larger, dynamic social-ecological system) and the need for explicit and 
increased attention to social equity and ecological health concerns as well as intangible forest 
values.  This finding confirms that the slow adoption of SFM principles, policies and practices 
must be viewed as evolutionary, rather than a wholesale move away from sustained yield 
(Adamowicz and Burton 2003). 
 The above results offer some insights into stakeholder relations in the Northeast Superior 
Region and how various actors perceive one another in terms of current and desired governance 
arrangements.  There is a perceived need for increased access to fibre for new entrants to create 
new forest-related opportunities, forest product innovation and ‗fresh ideas‘ for forest 
management and planning.  It is hoped that this will increase diversity in forest economies and 
communities and help maximize and redistribute the benefits derived from public forest lands.  
At the same time respondents recognized that maintaining security for existing and new forest 
industry investors is important to encourage a long-term commitment to development and the 
viability of forest communities, economies and ecosystems.  Thus many respondents indicated a 
willingness to consider alternatives in light of recent impacts on forest dependent communities 
within the Northeast Superior Region (see Chapters 6 and 7).   
 
5.5. Conclusion 
This chapter outlined the provincial significance of Ontario‘s forest sector with respect to 
regional disparity in the distribution of forest resources, employment and community 
dependence.  I provided a historical overview of the development of Ontario‘s forest governance 
system and described current critiques of the tenure system as well as mainstream views 
regarding the recent decline of Ontario‘s forest sector.  This was followed by an introduction to 
the case study site, the Northeast Superior Region.  I presented relevant biophysical and social 
attributes shaping forest and community development, with a focus on the biophysical setting, 




demographic and economic changes in the Northeast Superior Region were examined to 
illustrate hinterland dynamics. 
 The final section presented key survey results which highlighted some major themes and 
differences among actors‘ perceptions of the Crown tenure system, the distribution of control 
over and benefits from forest resource development, and interpretations of sustainable forest 
management.  Survey results indicate that there are numerous and often competing perspectives 
concerning Northern Ontario‘s forestry challenges and what should be done to remedy current 
problems.  In the context of sweeping mill closures affecting the Northeast Superior Region, 
there are individuals within the forest industry, government, municipal politics and 
administration as well as local forest user groups who embrace and defend the conventional 
industrial forestry model.  There are, however, others from these same groups who want 
fundamental changes to the nature of power relations among different forest groups. 
 Chapters 6 and 7 discuss evolving social framings of the ‗forestry crisis‘ and power 
relations emanating from human-forest relations in the Northeast Superior Region in general and 
Northeast Superior Forest Community Corporation in particular.  Results from the qualitative 
analysis of interviews, media and policy documents as well as direct observation are presented to 
elaborate how certain perspectives become dominant or marginalized and how these social 












CHAPTER 6 – FRAMING THE ‘FORESTRY CRISIS’ IN NORTHERN ONTARIO 
6.1. Introduction 
This chapter examines the different social framings of the ‗forestry crisis‘ produced by actors 
with varying perspectives and political motivations.  I illustrate how traditionally marginalized 
groups, namely municipal officials, First Nations, non-traditional forest products users and 
NGOs, came together in alternative forums and spaces created by a failing industry to re-imagine 
human-forest relations and reframe the ‗forestry crisis‘. This included emphasizing local control 
and values, place-based identities and collaboration.  My objective is to understand the views and 
interests that dominant framings ‗shelter and propagate‘. 
 In the first section, I analyze the social framings of different actors embedded in print 
news media, reports and websites for the period of the unfolding crisis, from the 2001 Softwood 
Lumber Dispute flare-up, until the provincial announcements for tenure reform and ministerial 
reorganization (fall 2009).  The second section draws on interviews with actors from the 
Northeast Superior Region to assess different framings of problems, solutions, identities and the 
forms and sources of power at work during the crisis.  This analysis sets the stage for Chapter 7, 
where I discuss the emergence of the NSFC. 
As presented below, perspectives on the problems and possible solutions vary, but at least 
two main positions have emerged.  As introduced in Chapter 5, the dominant and conventional 
framing is that changing economic forces have driven the few large companies that control most 
of the fibre supply in Northern Ontario to scale back operations or close.  ‗Outside‘ forces are 
blamed for the industry collapse that has deeply affected forest-dependent communities.   In 
contrast, for some local residents and forest stakeholders, the fundamental cause(s) of the 
problem is different and more pervasive.  Their view is that internal resistance to change is the 
main problem and solutions will necessitate wholesale changes to the structure of regional forest 
economies and power relations believed to limit community and regional development.  Their 
bottom-up response to the crisis involves developing new understandings of problems and 
solutions through unconventional discursive forums forming outside of forest industry advisory 




6.2. Dominant Framings of the ‘Forestry Crisis’: Events, Actors and Perspectives 
6.2.1. Early Signals: The Storm Warning (2001-2002) 
Forest industry representatives, mainly executives, managers and lobbyists, and the popular news 
media were instrumental in the initial framing of the ‗forestry crisis‘.  It began with framing the 
difficulties for the forest sector alone and was labelled very early on as an economic crisis for 
industry.  Rising costs associated with the Softwood Lumber Dispute mark the beginning of what 
was eventually collectively referred to as the ‗forestry crisis‘ in Northern Ontario.  In 2001 the 
Softwood Lumber Dispute was escalating as American penalties on Canadian softwood imports 
reached 32 per cent. Martin Michaud, vice-president of Tembec‘s Northern Ontario operations at 
the time described the situation to the Northern Business News: ―We‘re swimming in red ink‖ 
(Northern Business News, March 2001:4).  As a single prominent issue affecting industry, 
Michaud framed the problem as a government-to-government conflict affecting neighbouring 
markets: ―It‘s totally political.  It has nothing to do with free trade, and it prevents the U.S. 
consumer from having the best deal.‖  These comments characterised the American government 
as the main villain.  Canadian producers and American consumers were portrayed as caught in 
the middle.  Early calls from industry for ‗swift action‘, such as these from Tembec‘s vice-
president, were aimed at the Canadian government: ―somebody better move fast because how 
long can we be expected to survive in this marketplace?‖  Under the headline Survival of the 
Fittest, then Minister of Northern Development and Mines, Dan Newman, confirmed provincial 
support when stating, ―The Ontario government is fighting for a return to a system of free trade, 
where Ontario‘s softwood lumber manufacturers can compete fairly in the American and 
international markets‖ (Northern Business News, March 2002: 9). 
 At that time, a Tembec spokesperson indicated that there was ―good co-operation among 
employees to cut costs‖ (Northern Business News, Dec 2001), suggesting that some Northern 
Ontario workers were sympathetic to industry‘s cause.  By March 2002, forestry employees in 
the Northeast Superior Region had not experienced any layoffs.  Domtar spokesman Marc 
Perrault attributed the persistent operation of Northern Ontario lumber mills to ―good 
management and good inventory control‖ (Northern Business News, Dec 2001: 21).  As trade 




federal and provincial governments, softwood producers and industry associations was 
committed to fighting the Americans together (Northern Business News, March 2002: 9).   
Initially, community problems received brief mention in the mainstream media, and were 
usually used to justify and instigate government action.  By early summer 2002, layoffs and 
closures were affecting northern towns.  On June 21, 2002, OMNDM Minister Jim Wilson 
appealed to federal Trade Minister Pierre Pettigrew for community adjustment funding to assist 
northern communities beyond unemployment insurance support, citing that ―time may be 
running out for many Northern Ontario communities where hopes still run high, but the potential 
onset of pain is imminent.‖ The letter restated Ontario‘s commitment to find ―a long-term 
durable solution to this problem and that Ontario would be willing for talks to resume if the U.S. 
indicates a willingness to be reasonable‖ (Northern Business News, July 2002: 23).    Senior 
governments were seen as responsible for the trade problem, which was framed as an economic 
problem for industry.  In late July 2002 there was cautious optimism among local industry and 
municipal leaders when the World Trade Organization ruled in favour of Canadian softwood 
producers.  The preliminary ruling would make it more difficult for the U.S. to justify ―punishing 
duties‖ that averaged 27 per cent (Timmins Daily Press, July 27, 2002: 1). 
By fall 2002, the problem and solution continued to be framed in an economic, market-
oriented manner. In November 2002, under the headline “Northern Softwood Mills Riding Out 
the Storm”, U.S. softwood penalties were a ―major financial burden‖ for Tembec‘s mills 
(Northern Business News, November 2002: 24).  Seemingly over-optimistic in hindsight, 
Tembec‘s Gord Wilson stated: ―We think the market has bottomed at this point....‖  While profits 
were apparently ―non-existent‖, the company was adjusting by ―cutting costs, cutting costs and 
cutting costs.‖  Tembec claimed that ―all of our employees are aware of that, and they understand 
what we are up against‖.  The company again uses ‗we‘ to refer to the both the management and 
forest workers under the same interest-based identity.  Also in November 2002, a major 
employer in the Northeast Superior Region, Dubreuil Forest Products, shed 20 workers, citing 
rising costs associated with the softwood dispute and rising energy costs (Sault Star, November 
6, 2002: A11).  Dave Jennings, General Manager for Dubreuil, reported that the mill‘s energy 




energy sector.  With 570 workers, the 20 lost jobs were a small layoff but an early sign of what 
was to come in the region. 
6.2.2. Increasing Turbulence and ‗The Perfect Storm‘ (2003-2004) 
By 2003, forest companies and communities were experiencing increasingly turbulent conditions 
and adopting various metaphors to explain their challenges.  For forest companies, the economic 
situation further deteriorated into what Jim Lopez, executive vice-president for Tembec, referred 
to as ―a poisonous atmosphere for sawmills‖ (Northern Business News, July 2003: 17).  In the 
same article, representatives from major forest companies collectively identified the convergence 
of three main economic challenges as affecting their businesses, namely, the rising Canadian 
dollar, fibre supply shortages (especially for paper producers that depend on fibre from sawmills) 
and softwood lumber penalties.  Buchanan‘s Hartley Multimaki pointed to Ontario‘s Living 
Legacy land use plan and guidelines for habitat protection and fire emulation for decreasing 
supply by removing forest lands from the eligible harvest area.  Ontario‘s Living Legacy was 
announced March 1999 to expand Ontario‘s park system. The goal was to protect 12 per cent of 
the land base. 65,000 Ontario residents participated in the Lands for Life consultations, which 
contributed to the Ontario Living Legacy Land Use Strategy.  This planning process has been 
criticised  for the way First Nations were involved and the inordinate control of environmental 
organizations (i.e., World Wildlife Fund, Wildlands League, Federation of Ontario Naturalists)  
(Smith 2007; Ballamingie 2009).  In addition, Carl Grenier, executive vice-president of the 
Canadian Free Trade Lumber Council, advocated for the softwood producers stating that if the 
federal government was ―not going to stand behind the industry‖, forest companies would be at 
―a big disadvantage‖.  Senior governments were seen as not doing enough and in fact 
contributing to the problem.  Also implied was that the prescribed ecological measures were bad 
for business.  The main problem then, as defined by the dominant industry, was basic economics.  
Sue Prodaniuk, spokesperson for Bowater, summarized, ―Add these factors and soon it no longer 
becomes profitable to operate‖. 
Mill closures and increasing uncertainty sparked public questioning of business and 
senior government intentions, as well as the basis of popular economic explanations (e.g., 




the Northeast Superior Region.  On March 13 2003, Dubreuil Forest Products announced it 
would drop one shift affecting 150 workers, bringing its total layoffs to 170 since November 
2002 (Timmins Daily Press, March 15, 2003: 2).  An 80 per cent average increase in energy costs 
and OMNR‘s reduction of industry wood supply were blamed.  Dubreuil‘s Forest Products 
Manager commented:  
Difficult times call for difficult decisions and decisions about closures are never easy....  
This, I feel, is the best thing our company can do here to help maintain our competitive 
position and remain viable and be prepared to return to full production once the wood 
supply constraints have been eliminated, the electricity has been sorted out and we‘re 
ready to go. 
Dubreuilville and Wawa had appealed to the province and Great Lakes Power for months prior 
regarding regional disparity in power rates and the negative impacts on residents and business.  
Wawa Reeve Doug Wood stated that the layoff was ―a prime example‖ of low government 
support, and that Wawa only wanted ―to be treated equal and have the same power rates that the 
rest of Ontario is getting‖ (Timmins Daily Press, March 15, 2003: 2). 
As the layoffs continued, managers and labour representatives publicly disagreed about 
the rationale for closures.  On May 23, 2003, Domtar announced it would shut down its White 
River mill for six months.  Effective June 23, the temporary closure affected 283 workers.  
Domtar spokesperson William George cited flooded lumber markets, decreased demand and U.S. 
duties on Canadian softwood for the closure, calling the situation ―a real killer‖ (Sault Star, May 
26, 2003: B2).  Speaking from Montreal, George also said the White River mill was the only one 
of 16 Domtar mills to be closed and needed to become more efficient.  Local union officials were 
puzzled, given that the mill was considered the envy of the industry due to close proximity to its 
wood supply: ―There are other mills that have to haul wood for hundreds of kilometres that are 
still operating‖ said Joe Hanlon, president of IWA-Canada Local 2693 (Sault Star, May 26, 
2003: B2).  Chapleau‘s Weyerhaeuser sawmill also closed temporarily for six weeks, effective 
June 2, which affected 125 workers (Sault Star, June 13, 2003: A1). 
As forest companies adjusted their operations in efforts to maintain production, residents, 




available resources for short-term relief.  More bad news came on June 13
 
when Dubreuil Forest 
Products announced another 180 workers would be laid off, reducing its total workforce to 110.  
Echoing a popular metaphor being used by industry leaders and OMNR, Dubreuil‘s Dave 
Jennings explained the industry was in a ―perfect storm‖ which presented two options: ―one is to 
shut down, that‘s our cheapest option but as a company, that‘s not what we‘re about... We‘re 
about finding ways to make our operation more efficient and to make sure we‘re one of the ones 
surviving when this thing is all over‖ (Sault Star, June 13, 2003: A1). The rash of closures led 
Wawa Reeve Doug Wood to comment: ―it‘s becoming a depressed area‖ (Sault Star, June 13, 
2003: A1).  The Sault Star reported that adjustment committees funded by senior and municipal 
governments, First Nations, labour groups and industry had been set up to help residents of 
Dubreuilville, White River and Pic Mobert First Nation to cope with the sudden change.  
According to a local union member, in addition to services for stress and financial management, 
career planning and resume writing, White River‘s centre ―basically gave [laidoff workers] a 
place and something to do and not sit at home and not worry about their bills‖.  With a combined 
population of 4800, the three towns had lost 750 high paying direct jobs in three months. 
To this point, all criticism was levelled towards the provincial government for ignoring 
the increasingly ‗poisonous‘, ‗stormy‘ or ‗deadly‘ business environment, and industry and 
municipal leaders believed that mass unemployment was being ignored by provincial leadership.  
In response to White River‘s closure, Mayor Angelo Bazzoni stated, ―The first thing our 
municipality is trying to do is get the ear of the provincial government; I don‘t think we have it 
in Northern Ontario‖ (Sault Star, May 28, 2003: B5).  Bazzoni had sent a letter on May 27, 2003 
to Premier Ernie Eves requesting aid for the Northeast Superior Region.  By August, the 
Northeastern Superior Mayors Group was meeting with provincial deputy Ministers from the 
OMNDM and OMNR in Sault Ste. Marie to request an ―interministerial task force be developed 
to resolve the economic crisis facing the area‖ (Sault Star, August 18, 2003: B3).   But by mid-
September 2003, the local representatives were frustrated, as expressed by Wawa Reeve Doug 
Woods: ―Unfortunately it appears the province is not willing to move as quickly as is required‖ 




The complexity of the larger ‗crisis‘ became apparent as more voices entered the debate.  
With increasing job loss, major labour unions surfaced in mainstream media for the first time 
regarding this issue.  Cecil Makowski, vice-president of the Communications, Energy and 
Paperworkers Union, also called for an economic task force on the ―tremendous economic 
disaster being visited upon the communities around Northern Ontario... The entire economic 
engine of Northern Ontario is grinding to a halt‖ (Sault Star, July 25, 2003).  Pointing to the 
―proactive response‖ to Toronto‘s outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in 
April 2003, the provincial government was again being criticized, albeit this time by labour: ―We 
cannot sit idly by while more Ontarians are thrown out of work, while children leave Northern 
Ontario due to lack of opportunity and while communities wither and die‖
 
(Sault Star, July 26, 
2003: A5).  The weak response of the senior government was also contrasted with the Bovine 
Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) crisis at this time.  A notable difference in this framing of 
forest sector problems is that labour identified with the interests of Northern Ontario, 
communities and children.  The problem was scoped to include the concerns and interests of 
forest towns directly, siding labour with ‗northerners‘ rather than being solely united with 
industry.  At the same time, labour and youth outmigration and business closures were occurring 
due to extended layoffs and imminent closures in Northeast Superior towns. 
Dissenting voices of local control advocates were occasionally amplified across the 
provincial north at this time.  Laurentian University economics professor David Leadbeater was 
publicly critical of the forest companies‘ rationale and motivations for job cuts as being short-
term and profit-based: ―They just don‘t ring fully true... You can look at it from the viewpoint of 
a stock analyst in Toronto, but you can also look at it from the viewpoint of a municipal 
councillor or an employee.  There is a difference in orientation‖ (Northern Business News, Sept 
2003: 17).  Pointing to overdependence by the region on a ―small number of very powerful 
transnational corporations‖, Leadbeater stated ―there has to be a shift in the balance of power and 
our provincial and federal governments have to be more active in doing something about this.‖ 
Earlier in the year, guest columnist to the Sudbury Star, Stan Sudol, questioned why, with 
growing outmigration and economic need in the north, two-thirds of Ontario‘s value-added wood 




harvesting and commodity production which made ―most northerners bristle with anger‖ 
(Sudbury Star, January 31, 2003). 
Calls for attention to alternatives, such as increasing local control of forests and fostering 
opportunities in value-added wood processing, were overshadowed by worker recalls, layoffs 
and takeovers across the provincial north.  In the Northeast Superior Region, Dubreuil recalled 
24 workers in August and another 15 in September 2003, which turned out to be temporary 
because another 35 were laid-off in November.  Dubreuil‘s General Manager told the Sault Star 
(November 4, 2003: B10) that the layoffs were made ―to improve economic stability for the 
future and to ensure the survival of our community and our industry‖. 
Municipalities became desperately optimistic with corporate restructuring impacting 
operations in neighbouring towns.  On October 31, Tembec took over Weyerhaeuser‘s Chapleau 
sawmill. Tembec‘s President and CEO framed the takeover as a strategic opportunity to provide 
a secure long-term fibre base for Marathon Pulp (Tembec) and ―much needed consolidation in 
the softwood lumber industry in North America‖ (Tembec Press Release, Oct 31, 2003).  As a 
standalone mill for Weyerhaeuser, it had to either operate efficiently or shut down.  Chapleau 
councillor Richard Bignucolo expressed support for Tembec‘s purchase: ―We haven‘t heard such 
positive news in a long time... They are community minded and add a sense of stability to our 
community...‖ (Chapleau Express, November 2003).  In early fall 2003, the Domtar sawmill in 
Chapleau had dropped a shift, citing a shortage of large-diameter logs, which contributed to the 
sense of instability.   
In January 2004, after a week of discussions between management and union members, 
Domtar announced that 230 workers would be called back to reopen the White River mill.  One 
union representative responded, ―We have to maintain a good morale and a good relationship 
with the mill to make sure that it‘s running, and the woodlands, to make sure we‘re making a 
profit‖ (Algoma News Review, January 21, 2004).  But in March 2004 Domtar announced the 
Chapleau mill would drop a second shift affecting 64 employees.  This time Chapleau Mayor 
Earle Freeborn characterised the community as being ―in shock and disappointed‖ (Algoma News 




Training, Colleges and Universities to assist unemployed workers.  Under the auspices of The 
Chapleau Regional Economic Development Corporation (CRDC), Economic Development 
Officer Dr. Sylvie Albert also organized ‗Business after 5‘ meetings in early April 2004 to 
address excessive ―speculation‖ among area businesses regarding the future of Chapleau‘s forest 
companies and to promote local purchasing policies (Chapleau Express, March 2004).  Domtar‘s 
manager of corporate communications and external relations attributed that layoff to 
...additional pressures being put on the fibre sources through new parks and 
 protected areas, so there‘s even less out there. When you put all these things 
 together, we‘re stuck with a situation where we just don‘t have access to the fibre  at a 
 reasonable cost for us to operate the two shifts (Algoma News Review, March 17, 2004). 
 Dubreuil Forest Products‘ Dave Jennings publicly criticised the province regarding 
similar wood supply challenges on the front page of Wawa‘s Algoma News Review: 
Unfortunately the policies of the MNR don‘t appear to be supporting wood supply jobs in 
small communities.... The provincial policies with respect to natural resources, and the 
MNR looks after all natural resources, are not supporting that [wood supply and local 
jobs] and it‘s very troubling.... Ultimately there has to be some sort of revitalization of 
policies in place.  We have to somehow convince government that all natural resource 
industries are vital to the economy of Ontario, they‘re vital to the economy of Canada and 
I mean that‘s what keeps communities in Northern Ontario (Algoma News Review, April 
28, 2004). 
Despite uncertainty, municipal representatives were continually sympathetic to industry 
challenges related to fibre supply.  For example, in late February 2004 Wawa received bad news 
from the OMNR that it had rejected a 2002 proposal from Wawa Forest Products (part of 
Buchanan Group).  A proposed hardwood allocation would have brought a $30 million facility 
and 150 jobs to the community ―with no industrial base‖ (Algoma News Review, March 2, 2004).  
Bill Thornton, OMNR Director of Industry Relations Branch, was quoted as saying that the 
request for proposals was purposefully designed to attract one business that could make use of 
poor quality wood scattered across 10 management units between Blind River and 
Manitouwadge (roughly 550km).  He further explained: 
...we always find ourselves in a situation where we don‘t see the benefits to Northern 




is questionable from the beginning and where the wood supply appears to rely on 
quantities and of quality of crown timber that isn‘t available. 
Soon after, Wawa Mayor Rod Morrison told the Minster of Natural Resources Doug Ramsay 
that, given the magnitude of the decision, he was ―somewhat disappointed‖ and ―slightly 
insulted‖ that the news came from industry relations staff: ―I felt that this decision on the 
government‘s part was so big, so serious, that it could have come from him as minister.‖  
Municipal leaders also expressed discontent with the lengthy duration of discussion between 
industry stakeholders and OMNR officials on new guidelines for conservation areas and the 
amount of forest available to harvest, suggesting that the ―MNR has to become more proactive in 
trying to work with companies in preserving the jobs‖ (Northern Business News, July 2004: 17). 
Wawa and Weyerhaeuser representatives were also later concerned for wood supply shortages 
that could negatively affect the existing Oriented Strand Board facility.  Mayor Rod Morrison 
recognized the importance of the facility to the town: ―You‘re the backbone. We‘re going to 
have to do everything we can to preserve the strength of that backbone‖ (Sault Star, January 28, 
2005: A7). 
6.2.3. The Industry Response: Corporate Reorganization (2005-2006) 
In November 2004, the Minister of Natural Resources finally responded to industry and 
municipal calls for action by appointing 17 private, public and civic representatives to serve on 
the Minister‘s Council on Forest Sector Competitiveness.  The Council was asked to ―identify 
measures to be taken in order to avert significant adverse economic and social consequences‖ 
(MCFSC 2005).  Heavily weighted with forest industry representatives (6 of 17), the committee 
also included 3 northern mayors and 2 First Nations, 1 Toronto-based environmental 
organization (Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society), as well as a forest industry business 
consultant, a major lender (CIBC) and one senior forest scientist.  Meanwhile the debate among 
industry, governments and labour groups on the problems and solutions continued around a 
limited set of forest industry-centred economic factors affecting the efficiency and 
competiveness of large-scale industrial operations. 
 Early in 2005 the calamity facing the forest sector was collectively framed by labour, 




in the deepest crisis in its history in this province,‖ said Cecil Makowski from the Union of 
Communications, Energy and Paperworkers (Northern Business News, 2005: 4).  Under the 
headline Northern forestry industry faces challenges, forum hears: Lumber mills closing or 
moving, others facing rising costs, Tembec‘s Chief Provincial Forester Rick Groves stated ―The 
forest industry in Ontario is in the midst of its most challenging period in recent memory‖.  Bill 
Thornton, Director of Corporate Relations with the OMNR, made an equally blunt assessment: 
―It has been a long time since the sector has experienced changes as profound as what will take 
place this year‖ (Sudbury Star, February 18, 2005: A2).  Jamie Lim, a vocal industry lobbyist 
with the Ontario Forest Industry Association (OFIA) and former Timmins mayor, publicly 
blamed the Province, warning that competitive disadvantages would drive the sector to collapse: 
―and it‘s not because the sector‘s dying but because the government let it. That‘s the truly sad 
thing‖ (Sault Star, June 14, 2005: A3).  Tembec‘s Rick Groves observed that more constructive 
relations needed to be fostered: ―Government and industry cannot lob bombs at one another, 
accusing one another of creating the situation, but instead suck it up, make tough decisions, and 
move forward.‖  Seeing a need for change, he suggested both sides needed to ―Look at this as an 
opportunity.  Investigate maximum revenue from the forest -- not just traditional product‖ 
(Sudbury Star, February 18, 2005: A2). 
At the same time, industry restructuring was hinting at a future with fewer, high-capacity 
‗super mills‘ operated by fewer employees.  A Domtar-Tembec merger was announced.  
According to Jim Lopez, president of the Tembec Forest Products Group, ―we have no other 
option but to adapt and make the right choices, which are fewer more efficient large mills that 
are capable of attracting capital investment‖ (Canadian Forest Industries, January-February 
2005).  Weyerhaeuser spokesperson Sarah Goodman commented: 
It‘s the way of the world, what with companies changing names and refocusing.... The 
fine paper business has been a challenging business to be in of late.  We see some 
electronic substitution and whatnot, so we clearly needed to put together a strong set of 
assets to compete from a position of strength. (Northern Business News 2005: 4)   
Restructuring actions were framed as unavoidable rather than as simply decisions made to 
preserve companies, reinforcing the idea that corporations were being forced by external factors 




sawmills had closed over a period of 30 years and that ―only a few families remain in control of 
mills that were once family-dominated‖ (Sudbury Star, February 18, 2005: A2). 
In some towns, corporate restructuring created alternative opportunities.  In the Northeast 
Superior Region, on January 5, 2005 Domtar announced it would permanently close its Chapleau 
mill, shedding 81 jobs (Algoma News Review, January 26, 2005).  As part of the restructuring, 
Tembec‘s Chapleau sawmill would gain wood supply and be adding a third shift with about 20 
jobs.  A Domtar press release stated ―in keeping with its corporate values, the Company would 
do its utmost to help employees affected by today‘s announcement‖ (Domtar Press Release, 
January 17, 2005).  Chapleau Mayor Earle Freeborn was quoted as saying ―we never saw it 
coming‖ (Algoma News Review, January 26, 2005).  About one week later, Chapleau Cree First 
Nation and Mayor Freeborn met with Minister Ramsay to table a proposal for a new cedar mill, 
which received provincial support pending assessment of available fibre.  The town hoped the 
new facility would offset other closures.  A Domtar representative (Industry 3) reflected on the 
company‘s role and position regarding the closure and future opportunities: 
We worked with Mayor Freeborn because when we closed the mill we didn‘t want to just 
leave the town in complete chaos.  I mean it was in chaos, but part of us leaving Chapleau 
as an example... we dismantled our sawmill and cleaned up the site.  We donated half of 
the property to the town. The transaction was for a dollar to give them serviced industrial 
land and so we turned that over to the town. They have the ability now to go out and 
attract new business.  So... we worked with the cedar sawmill and we sold the other half 
of our property and some buildings and some equipment for a very nominal price.  So 
when we permanently closed Chapleau... you know we‘re leaving town... we made sure 
that part of that wood supply was transferred to Tembec to help Chapeau because it helps 
the economic viability of that Tembec mill. It‘s no surprise that Tembec mill continues to 
run on three shifts, while that helps to provide that strong primary anchor to the town....  I 
don‘t know how successful they‘ve been, but they have the opportunity....  That‘s the best 
we can do. 
Tembec Manager Mel Jones later publicly stated that the town was supportive: ―The mayor and 
council have recognized that it is better to have one very efficient mill versus two mediocre mills 
that are subject to the ups and downs of the industry‖ (Logging and Sawmilling Journal, 




 For a time, there was growing corporate and political support for the dawn of a new era in 
forestry operations in Northern Ontario—one that contrasted smaller, often locally-owned, long-
term businesses with high volume processing facilities.  Expressing his support for the Domtar-
Tembec consolidation, Minister Ramsay told Chapleau Express (January 22, 2005): 
We now have a supermill in Chapleau that‘s going to provide sustainable jobs in the next 
30 to 40 years in that operation... So, it does mean that probably every town that maybe 
has a small mill is not going to continue. But what we can do is have these major mega-
mills throughout Northern Ontario and then supplement those forestry jobs with smaller 
value-added operations that are labour intensive and create a lot of employment.  
In contrast, a few months later, after 57 years of operation, Pineal Lake Lumber near Chapleau 
closed in mid July, dropping 15 workers (Chapleau Express, June 11, 2005). 
Despite the Minister‘s optimism, the prospect of amalgamation did nothing to settle 
concerns for already shaky operations.  Competition between mills and towns for wood fibre was 
ongoing.  Management from Weyerhaeuser at Wawa met with Minister Ramsey in January 2005 
to share concerns that Montreal-based Kruger Inc. would be getting an allocation for a new 
expanded facility to replace two older facilities in Longlac, Ontario: ―Right now there‘s enough 
wood out there for us – we are not in a crisis state... Our concern is if another 500,000 cubic 
metres of wood is allocated to somebody else, will we have enough wood at that point?‖ 
(Algoma News Review, February 2, 2005).  The ministerial response was to hire an independent 
review of the wood supply in February 2005 to ensure that fibre was available.  The company 
and town asked Algoma-Manitoulin MPP Mike Brown for support who stated: ―my job is [to] 
make sure that we have good supply for the mills in my constituency and they‘re not jeopardized 
by other areas‖ (Algoma News Review, May 18, 2005: A1).  Wawa Mayor Rod Morrison was 
also concerned about forest inventory data and possible implications for the town: 
I can accept the minister making the decisions - I can accept that he got professional 
advice from these consultants and his staff and they know a lot more about forestry than I 
do however there is a gap between what the scientists say and what the operators are 
telling me... The wood that comes into the mill is not the same wood that‘s scientifically 
calculated to be in the forest – sometimes there is a 30 per cent gap between what they 




Mill closures, buyouts and new initiatives from competing businesses and government to start 
forestry operations in neighbouring towns raised insecurities among mill managers and local 
representatives.  At this time Northeast Superior towns were still hoping that idled mills would 
eventually reopen when market conditions improved. 
Meanwhile, the prospect that wood flows could be redirected away from weak or idled 
mills was a major concern for forest workers and their families, and municipal staff.  Jamie Lim, 
CEO and president of the Ontario Forestry Industries Association, later publicly deflected 
criticism of industry by appealing to a wider forest interest-based identity and definition of the 
crisis presumed to be held by residents, workers and industry: ―You can‘t draw lines in Ontario 
when it comes to forestry... This affects all of us and everyone has to be concerned.  The industry 
is in crisis across the province and there could be more of these kinds of announcements within a 
week‖ (Timmins Daily Press, December 16, 2005: A1).   
Part of what would become the emerging local control movement, Saving the Region of 
Ontario North Group (STRONG) was formed in March 2005 by laid-off mill workers and 
residents to combat the very issue of redirecting fibre flows away from mills in the proximal 
towns.  STRONG outlined its position in contrast to conventional views held by many in 
industry, government, workers and by mill town officials: 
In our opinion it is not only the economic realities that have caused hardship in the forest 
and mining industries.  Federal and provincial policies have been implemented that 
continue to disregard tangible solutions put forward by the communities and the people 
of Northern Ontario....  All of our natural resources including the forests, the rivers, and 
the minerals belong to the people of Ontario, not to the companies that have been given 
the privilege to develop them on our behalf. 
STRONG was one of the first of several self-organizing groups to challenge how the forestry 
crisis was framed by industry and governments.  STRONG urged local workers to mobilize and 
provided an expanded view of the problem and solutions—one advocating for local control and 




6.2.4. The Government Response: Aid for Industry (2005-2007) 
Over the next three years (2005 through 2007), various committees, working groups and task 
forces including representatives from industry, government, labour, municipal and Aboriginal 
groups [i.e., Minister‘s Council on Forest Sector Competitiveness (2005); Ontario Forestry 
Coalition (2006); CEP/USW Task Force on Resource Dependent Communities (2007); 
Northwestern Ontario Economic Facilitator Report (Rosehart 2008)] commonly cited five 
economic factors as contributing to the ongoing problems in Northern Ontario‘s forest industry 
since about 2001: 1) the American dollar fell by 48 cents relative to the Canadian dollar between 
2002 and 2007 (Bank of Canada 2009); 2) decline in demand for housing materials and 
newsprint [e.g., American housing starts fell by more than half between 2005 and 2008, from 
over 2 million to 900 000 (US Home Builders Association 2009)]; 3) increased American duties 
on Canadian softwood lumber and increasing global competition from low-cost producers 
reduced demand for forest exports; 4) energy costs in Northern Ontario had increased sharply, 
including a 50 per cent increase in diesel costs between 2003 and 2008 (OMEI 2009) and a 30 
per cent average increase in electricity costs between 2003 and 2006 (NRCAN 2006), and 5) 
access to industry-desired fibre volumes and types had become problematic in Northern Ontario.  
Distance between wood supplies and mills was increasing (NRCAN 2006) compounded by a 
forecast 80 year supply shortage of softwood and poplar (ECO 2005).  Combined, the above 
pressures decreased demand for provincial forest products and increased industrial operating 
costs, contributing to widespread layoffs and closures, thereby adversely affected numerous 
northern companies and communities. 
 Senior governments responded with forest sector reports and aid programs, which critics 
deemed to be long overdue and insufficient.  As part of the provincial government‘s response, 
the Minister‘s Council on Forest Sector Competitiveness report was submitted to the government 
in early June 2005. Citing the forestry crisis and framing the industry as the ―economic bedrock 
of Northern Ontario‖ on the first page, the report offered 26 recommendations to alleviate 
industry challenges surrounding wood supply, delivered wood costs, energy and encouraging 
investment.  Commenting on the report, Northern Business News (July 2005) staff observed that 
the ―forestry stakeholders group might not have achieved total consensus on what ails Northern 




come to the industry‘s aid‖.  While the report met mixed reviews, the government acted upon 
many of the recommendations (discussed below). Nevertheless, Meakin Forest Enterprises 
president called for the government to recognize their common ground with industry, stating: 
―We are not two separate identities... We need [the MNR] to be more conciliatory towards the 
forest industry and realize [forestry] is their bread and butter as much as it is ours.‖  Furthermore, 
feeling that their perspectives had not been addressed through their participation on the Council, 
First Nations Economic Development Officer Byron Leclair said ―If the Ministry wants to stick 
their head in the sand, then they are not addressing the real issues‖ (Northern Business News, 
July 2005).  Neither the Ojibway of the Pic River nor Industrial Wood and Allied Workers of 
Canada signed off on the final report.  Industry giant Domtar was critical that the report did not 
address industry‘s problems ―head-on‖.   
Nonetheless, the first of three major provincial initiatives was announced in June 2005 
with the unveiling of a $350 million loan guarantee program to promote forestry investment and 
modernization.  Following the announcement, Minister Ramsay confirmed that ―Ontario‘s fragile 
forestry industry will receive help from the provincial government within a month... The forestry 
industry is in crisis...  It‘s very important that the government step in and help...‖ (Timmins Daily 
Press, August 17, 2005: A5).  Liberal Premier Dalton McGuinty explained that the assistance 
―would act not as a bail-out, but rather as an incentive for new investment that‘ll put our industry 
on a more competitive footing... I think our specific responsibility is to help through this 
transitional period‖ (North Bay Nugget, August 18, 2005: A6).   
In September 2005, another $330 million in grants was made available through the Forest 
Sector Prosperity Fund, intended to encourage company expansion and modernization.  Feeling 
that the government was again failing to address industry‘s challenges, Tembec executive vice-
president James Lopez called for broad public support in a special letter to the Sudbury Star on 
October 7, 2005 entitled ―Province lets North‘s forest industry down‖.  Lopez evoked strong 
identity frames linked to place and interests and a shared forestry heritage to try to unite workers 
with industry: 
For more than two centuries, the forest industry has demonstrated tremendous ability to 




84,000 Ontarians, second only to the auto industry and its 90,000 workers.  But today, its 
dynamic legacy is in danger.... In recent years, a number of government decisions and 
indecision put the forest industry at risk. The sector now faces a crisis like never before.... 
The only way the entire forest industry can secure employment for its workers is to 
restore the industry‘s ability to compete.  We have to work together to convince the entire 
government to address our concerns now. (Sudbury Star, October 7, 2005: A11) 
Union leaders were also disappointed with the government‘s response, which they saw as 
―pathetically anemic to the challenges that face this industry‖ (Peterborough Examiner, October 
22, 2005: A4).  Industry and labour groups were not terribly explicit in the media about their 
prescriptions, but they appeared to want policies that would provide short-term stability during a 
period of rapid change (i.e., cheaper electricity and diesel through rebates and guaranteed access 
to fibre, and the liberalization of forest management planning and environmental policies seen to 
affect operation costs (i.e., ‗cut red tape‘).  Instead, the government was seen to be offering 
incentives for reinvestment to assist with inevitable transformation in the sector, which needed to 
‗run its course‘.  Minister Ramsay was quoted as saying ―I think in the end we‘ll probably have 
the same number of jobs in the forestry sector but they‘re not going to be the same and in the 
same places‖ and that ―the industry will adapt, but no amount of government money will stop the 
change‖ (Owen Sound Sun Times, October 22, 2005: A4). 
Federal aid programs intended to respond to nation-wide challenges in the forests sector 
again met with mixed reviews from industry and the political opposition.  In December, the 
Liberal federal government announced the Forest Industry Competitive Strategy, which would 
provide 1.5 billion dollars to softwood producers affected by the U.S. tariffs through tax breaks 
and loan insurance to support and encourage the development of new technologies and product 
markets.  Having cut another 45 workers in November, Dubreuil Forest Products was ―pleased‖ 
with the federal aid package (Algoma News Review, December 7, 2005: A1).  New Democratic 
Party candidate for Algoma-Manitoulin-Kapuskasing, Carol Hughes, criticized the federal 
Liberals for the slow response and waiting to act until an upcoming election was inevitable 
(Timmins Daily Press, January 17, 2006: A1).  In February 2006, the provincial Liberals 
revealed another $220 million in industry aid to assume costs for road construction and 
maintenance and reduced stumpage fees (Timmins Daily Press, February 23, 2006: A1).  




construction and maintenance costs should be assumed by the province.  But labour groups also 
remained critical of provincial programs, claiming they ―did not save a single job‖ because they 
―did not adequately address the two issues identified by all the stakeholders as the real cause of 
this crisis: the high costs of harvesting wood and energy in Ontario (Pembroke Daily Observer, 
January 12, 2006: 2).  A much later announcement that a 140 million dollar energy rebate would 
be given to pulp and paper producers in November 2006 was the last industry support program.  
Livio Di Matteo, an economics professor at Lakehead University, stated it ―won‘t make much of 
a difference‖ (Sault Star, November 21, 2006: A9). 
One after another, government aid programs were announced and condemned by 
industry, government opposition, labour leaders and academics.  At the same time, the voices of 
residents and First Nations remained largely unheard in the mainstream discourse.  However, 
self-organizing groups of actors were emerging that represented new and conventional 
perspectives and values. 
6.2.5. The Local Response: Reframing the North, Communities and Forests (2005-2007) 
The persistent downturn in Ontario‘s forest sector and perceived failings of senior government 
leadership sparked the formation of several local and regional groups containing private-public-
civic actors.  From mid-2005 to mid-2007, notable differences emerged in the views, affiliations 
and motivations among different actors.  It was during this period that the Northeast Superior 
Mayor‘s Group was working on a new economic development strategy and preparing a proposal 
for the Forest Communities Program that would lead to the formation of the Northeast Superior 
Forest Community Corporation.  The focus of Chapter 7, the NSFC and Northeast Superior 
Regional Chief‘s Forum were two of several collaborations that materialized in response to the 
forestry crisis to address the perceived needs of different actors, many of whom felt they were 
not represented in the mainstream industry-centric discourse. 
 Emergent civil society organizations represented a cross-section of interests and values 
including individuals and organizations from municipalities, First Nations, social welfare groups, 
labour, conservation groups, academics and timber interests.  After the formation of the pro-local 




leaders formed the Ontario Forestry Coalition (OFC) in summer 2005.  A coalition of forest 
industry associations, northern municipal associations and a First Nations development fund, 
members purportedly shared a ―common purpose of promoting and enhancing the Ontario 
forestry sector‘s ability to continue to create jobs and economic prosperity in Ontario‖ (OFC 
2006).  The Coalition was reportedly led by the Northern Ontario Municipal Association based 
in Thunder Bay (Common Voice 2007) but its head office was (and still is) the Ontario Forest 
Industry Association in Toronto.  OFC contributed to The Common Voice Northwest Initiative, 
which addressed regional challenges associated with a perceived lack of effective governance, 
economic development, and infrastructure.  The Common Voice also wanted greater regional 
independence and ―realistic Northern solutions‖.  Despite obvious links to industry, the group 
claimed: ―The Ontario Forestry Coalition, which is led by NOMA, has been working on behalf 
of all communities in the Northwest to get other orders of governments to respond in a way that 
will prevent further layoffs and assessment loss‖ (Common Voice 2007).  The group was 
concerned for the future of Northwestern Ontario, but this raised questions about representation 
for citizens and communities both in terms of their geography and interests.  The objective was 
clearly to maintain existing mills and provide a tax base for northern towns.  The Coalition was 
seen by one interview participant as ―basically the front group for industry‖ and status quo 
mayors (NOSCP 1).  Addressing overarching themes such as education, natural resources and 
transportation, The Common Voice did however advocate for the creation of a policy research 
institute and a research, investment and development corporation to establish the Northwest ―as 
the locus for new government/industry forest management and manufacturing research 
institutions in order to assist in the retention and attraction of new investment to the Northwest‖ 
(Common Voice 2007). 
Labour groups played an important role early on by staging independent public forums to 
address local concerns, document community experiences, and lobby senior governments with 
alternative solutions.  By summer 2006, unions were calling for meaningful public involvement 
to broaden the debate and help address issues facing forest communities in Northern Ontario.  
This placed the unions firmly on side with the growing local control movement.  In September 
2006, the Timmins Daily Press (September 28, 2006: A5) reported: ―the union is calling for a 




closes and a [northern] provincial forestry office.‖  The unions then created their own public 
forum.  The CEP/USW Taskforce on Resource Dependent Communities (Butler et al 2007: 2) 
was formed and weeks of public meetings and discussion during the summer of 2007 culminated 
in these perspectives: 
Northern Ontario is a land of emptying mills and job losses. Tens of thousands of 
workers, put out of work by plant closings of sawmills and paper mills, are leaving 
Northern Ontario for jobs elsewhere.... Many Northern Ontarians are dissatisfied, not just 
with the situation in the forestry industry but with the state of our political debate 
regarding the forests. Our communities deserve a debate that prizes substance over 
rhetoric, and we deserve a forest policy that is adequately funded and sustainable.... The 
provincial and federal governments must address the forestry crisis.... 
 The Task Force (Butler et al 2007: 4) recommendations called for increased provincial 
advocacy for the North through assigning a Chief Provincial Forester and having the OMNR and 
OMNDM be ―champions‖ for mill towns enduring closures; creation of a regional energy utility 
and pricing in support of northern economic development; improvement of forest resource 
inventories; a northern investment fund to assist the forest industry to transition to the ―new 
economy‖; and, perhaps more importantly, tenure reform and modification of the Crown Forest 
Sustainability Act to ―ensure more involvement by community stakeholders and workers‖.  As an 
alternative way forward, the report openly concentrated on questions surrounding necessary 
transformation in the forest industry and communities and focussed on structural issues such as 
tenure reform and development of the carbon/bio-economy, rather than asking for money to 
assist companies which were biding their time, waiting for market conditions to change.   
 While conventional industry was seen to be suffering ―a slow death‖ due to high energy 
prices (Sault Star, May 10, 2006: A10), a growing number of actors (e.g., Canadian Centre for 
Policy Alternatives 2006; Robinson 2007) were offering similar policy advice on tenure reform, 
the need to develop value-added products and manufacturing, NTFPs and ‗bio‘ economies, as 
well as northern capacity.  Concerned with the limits of debate and response to the ongoing 
crisis, the Northern Ontario Sustainable Communities Partnership (NOSCP) was another pro-
local control group to emerge in November 2006.  It represented a broad group of town 




government organizations and the general public.  An inaugural member remembered its 
inception and purpose: 
The organization came out of the forestry industry crisis in Northern Ontario... I mean it‘s 
been the talk of the town... and there were a group of us that came together in a very 
informal way that were unhappy with what we saw just as the public response to this 
industry crisis and particularly some of the things like the Minister‘s Council on Forest 
Sector Competitiveness, and the establishment of a couple of groups in the Northwest 
[i.e., Common Voice].  And the whole response seemed to have blamed government and 
then asked government to step in and fix the problems to make things go back to the way 
they were... We needed a deeper examination of why things had gone wrong, and that in 
fact the very structure of the forest sector was part of the problem.  And, so we started 
looking at are there alternative things that we can do?  And that‘s when we started 
becoming a bit more formal, we got together and we developed our charter, our 
community forest charter, looking at tenure reform as one of the major problems. (NGO 
3, community) 
 In late 2007, NOSCP offered the Northern Ontario Community Forest Charter to promote 
community-based decision making for public forests in Northern Ontario.  Drafted in the 
summer of 2007, it laid out a set of rights and responsibilities for Northern residents and 
communities, both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal, concerning human-forest relationships: 
The people and forests of Northern Ontario are intimately connected. The forests of 
Northern Ontario provide crucial environmental services, as well as significant social and 
economic benefits, for the region, the province of Ontario, Canada and the world.  
Recognizing the contribution of and challenges to existing forest-based industries, 
northern communities are ready and willing to assume responsibility for the shared 
stewardship of northern forests in light of growing environmental, economic and social 
challenges. (NOSCP 2007) 
 Clearly diverging from the interests of conventional industry, NOSCP‘s vision included 
the separation of forest management from mills; the creation of locally controlled community 
forests; respect and assistance for resolving Aboriginal and Treaty Rights through collaboration 
with First Nations; further protection of forest health; and fostering rapport with senior 
governments.  The Charter was intended to address what they considered deeper issues 
underlying the forestry crisis and to provide an alternative framework and terms for local actors 
who were willing to collaborate as stewards and developers of public forests in Northern Ontario 




At this time, pro-northern and pro-local sentiments fuelled calls for self-reliance and 
grassroots action in northern media and towns, urging forest towns and residents to become 
empowered and defend their perceived rights, responsibilities and heritage concerning public and 
northern forests.  For example, Northern Ontario Business (January 2007) managing editor Kelly 
Louiseize offered an opinion under the headline ―Protecting what defines the North‖: 
We cannot afford to be so passive-aggressive as to let what defines the North be taken 
away, without batting an eye.  Protecting the socio-economic fibre is what will ensure 
these resources stay around for years to come, and who better to steward them than the 
communities and the region who depend on their tax base.  
Northern economists Drs. David Robinson (Laurentian) and Livio Di Matteo (Lakehead), and 
Michael Atkins, President of Northern Ontario Business, provided additional motivation as part 
of an article series entitled ―Rethinking Northern Ontario‖ (Northern Ontario Business, October 
2007: 5): ―The North is dominated by big companies (most of them losing money) and big 
government.  Neither party is in any mood to think creatively.  They are either trying to survive 
financially or respond politically in crisis mode to layoffs.‖  Al Simard of STRONG provided 
equally compelling sentiments: 
As it is now we don‘t have any say in the management of our forests.... Since we formed 
in 2005 we‘ve said communities that depend on those forests should have a say instead of 
allowing a company to do whatever they like.... We have to become one collective voice 
because there doesn‘t seem to be enough co-operation and unity between Northern 
communities. (Timmins Daily Press, October 12, 2007: A3) 
The Common Voice (2007) group made a similar call for grassroots action: 
[Northwestern Ontario] can continue to rely on the Provincial and Federal Governments 
to respond to legitimate requests from the region and hope that the answer is both timely 
and appropriate to the expressed needs. Or, it can chart its own course by taking on those 
challenges and developing its own solution.... Northwestern Ontario is... a region that is 
unique in the Province of Ontario.... The complex decisions affecting the Northwest are 
best understood and made by those who live here. The strongest voice for this vast and 
magnificent region comes through the strength of a consensual union of common 
interests.  
The emergence of groups such as STRONG, Common Voice, NOSCP and the Northeast 
Superior Mayors Group marks a significant amplification of local and regional voices calling for 




communities related to provincial-industry driven resource development.  Regionally, there was 
a growing political appetite for increased local control in several sectors. 
 At the same time, alternatives were reluctantly addressed by traditional industry 
supporters, who maintained the status quo.  For example, statements by industry supporters 
worked to create uncertainty around value-added processing and tenure reform.  In a public 
presentation to discuss plans for the formation of Cooperative Sustainable Forest Licenses, a 
former OMNR assistant deputy minister turned consultant, Ray Riley, stated that ―community 
control of resources is not in the cards‖ (Thunder Bay Chronicle-Journal, March 17, 2007).  
OMNR was already working to reform the tenure system by creating ‗super SFL‘s‘ by 
consolidating existing large-scale licenses to be managed by groups of companies that would 
share reduced costs.  Presented as a way to broaden community stakeholder participation, 
decision making would be limited to those parties that could ‗pay to play‘, which would largely 
exclude most towns and First Nations from the newly created ―Co-operative‖ SFLs.  Speaking 
about the future of Ontario‘s industry and opportunities to develop unconventional products such 
as wood oils and plastics, Avrim Lazor, president and CEO of the Forest Products Association of 
Canada, told the Toronto Star (August 4, 2007: ID7): 
Ontario and Canada will remain ‗hewers of wood‘.  If [value-added] was feasible here, it 
would happen here.... The future lies in extracting and the first and secondary level of 
processing, not going up the value chain.  There are a million jobs in the logging 
industry.  There won‘t be a million jobs in that stuff.
12
 
Conversely, economists Drs. David Robinson and Livio Di Matteo believed ―It is no longer 
enough to be ‗hewers of wood‘.... We‘ve never stopped to see what it would take to change our 
assumptions, our habits and our vision from a traditional resource extraction economy to a 
proactive, innovative solutions-oriented society‖ (Northern Ontario Business, October 2007: 5). 
Chapleau‘s cedar mill proponent Wade Cachagee also embraced the idea of value-added: ―We 
think there‘s going to be a turn in the forest sector.... We [industry] have to start creating more 
products with the resource that we‘re using. We [Niska] plan on using a lot less fibre to create a 
                                                 




lot more jobs‖ (Northern Business News, March 2007: 38).  As new actors entered the 
discussion, new terms and understandings of the forestry crisis were introduced.  Problems and 
solutions were being reconsidered to broaden and further contextualize the events and main 
issues that had been for years centred on solving economic troubles laid out by forest companies 
as the way forward for communities around the provincial North. 
6.2.6. Collapse and Renewal in Northeast Superior Region (2007-2009) 
In 2007, the forest industry and communities in the Northeast Superior Region faced total 
regional economic collapse.  Earlier in 2006 a mine closure in Manitouwadge and untimely 
down time at Olav Haavaldsrud in Hornepayne (fire) had left an additional 370 people 
unemployed.  Subsequently, White River, Wawa and Dubreuilville all lost their major forestry 
employers.  On January 12
th
, 2007 Domtar spokesperson Lynne Gibson announced it would 
wind-down operations in White River affecting 236 workers over the course of the year:  
The operations at the White River Sawmill have been suspended indefinitely as of 
January 12.... This year, 2007, is forecasted to be a tough year for the industry, this 
closure for an indefinite period, is expected to last fairly long (Sudbury Star, January 12, 
2007: A5).   
It looked as though Conifex Inc., a newly formed eastern Canadian sawmilling company, would 
take over the Domtar operation.  However, the deal was subject to the transfer of licensing rights 
and fell through when the Quebec Ministry of Natural Resources withdrew Domtar‘s forest 
licence rights for its Grand-Remous and Malartic sawmills.  Also in January, ForestCare in 
Wawa closed and relocated its green houses and 3 full-time positions to southern Ontario, also 
shedding 60 seasonal jobs (Sault Star, July 18, 2007: A6).  Then, in May 2007, Weyerhaeuser 
spokesperson Laurence Pillon announced from Vancouver that the company would be moving to 
a ―modified operating posture‖ due to the decline of the U.S. housing market, dropping 20 
workers indefinitely from its plant in Wawa (Algoma News Review, May 3, 2007). 
  Conditions worsened in late October 2007 when Weyerhaeuser head office announced 
that the Wawa mill would be closed indefinitely; 132 employees were severed and provided with 
counselling and job transition services (Algoma News Review, October 24, 2007).  Weyerhaeuser 




difficult decisions and are not a reflection on the hard work of our employees.... They are the 
result of today‘s challenging business environment.‖  The closure of large wood processing 
facilities was accompanied by immediate negative consequences for spin-off and supporting 
businesses.  After 6 years in operation, Norwa Manufacturing wood pellet plant also closed 
because it depended on waste fibre from Weyerhaeuser.  MPP Mike Brown for Algoma-
Manitoulin linked the closures to ―forces beyond the government‘s control‖, further stating that 
he would ―work with community and business leaders in the area to bring in as much assistance 
as possible from the province‖ (Algoma News Review, October 27, 2007).  In mid-November, 
Dubreuil Forest Products announced it would idle its sawmill and layoff its remaining 140 
workers until the end of January 2008.  Responding to the closures, Wawa Mayor Howard 
Whent called for more senior government support and explained the municipal response, 
identifying the nascent NSFC as part of the solution: 
The temporary closure of Dubreuil Forest Products not only affects our neighbours in 
Dubreuilville, but like Domtar and White River, affects many of our residents as well 
who work there either directly or indirectly. Wawa is the service hub for the region and 
any loss of income in the area affects our businesses as well. The Government Agencies 
have been very quick to respond. However, it is time that the senior levels of government 
come to realize that this is more than just some ‗temporary glitch‘ that will go away.... 
We are doing [our] part as evidenced by the continuing efforts of the area municipalities 
(Northeastern Superior Mayors Group) to work together such as the newly created 
regional Forest Community Board under the [Natural] Resources Canadian Forest 
Program. (Algoma New Review, November 14, 2007) 
However, workers were not called back as was anticipated.  In response to the ongoing 
layoffs, Dubreuil Forest Products employee and Dubreuilville Mayor Helene Perth hoped the 
mill would ―eventually start again so that the workers in my community will get back to work‖ 
(Sault Star, January 31, 2008: A7).  Dubreuilville Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) Monique 
Ouelette bluntly stated, ―our community is in crisis and certainly the population is very worried 
of its future‖.  Dubreuil Manager Dave Jennings said that conditions beyond the company‘s 
control had caused the closure, adding: ―The entire forest industry is experiencing some of the 




The string of closures and reorganization confirmed the frustrations held by many local 
groups.  In October 2007, Dr. Peggy Smith, a Registered Professional Forester and Assistant 
Professor with Lakehead University, framed the problem as seen by local control supporters: 
We have been tied into a system that leaves us dependent on the whims of large, mainly 
foreign owned companies.  Those companies have operated with the blessing of 
provincial governments of all political stripes to take timber from publicly-owned lands, 
secured through long-term, large-area, evergreen licenses, export the timber they 
harvested in semi-processed form, with over 80% going to the U.S., without ensuring that 
people in resource dependent communities (both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal) have a 
say in the management or direction of the industry. (Algoma News Review, October 3, 
2007) 
With the forest industry in ruins, a provincial commitment to develop green energy sources from 
renewable resources was received by local control supporters as one positive solution.  Biomass 
‗waste‘ products such as the branches, bark and tops of trees were seen as a residual fibre stream 
that could potentially support new opportunities such as biofuels, wood pellets, and wood-fired 
co-generation plants, which would eventually create electricity and steam for industry and towns.  
These alternative energy projects were cautiously viewed as a win-win for governments, industry 
and towns that were looking for cheaper, cleaner and renewable sources of energy as well as for 
projects that could boost local economies by reinventing old operations and/or starting new ones.  
Steadily rising fuel prices, the crash of the American housing market and ensuing world 
economic collapse forced the energy issue.   
While most mills were idled and insolvent, mill licences were being handed back to the 
Province, freeing up previously allocated fibre.  On January 1, 2009 the Ministry of Natural 
Resources announced it would take the first step towards making forest biofibre available in 
keeping with the green energy agenda and efforts to revitalize the forest industry.  This included 
a request for expressions of interest to use available Crown wood resources from across the 
province.  Minister of Natural Resources Donna Cansfield suggested, ―It‘s not a different view 
for the forest industry, but it‘s an added view... The industry may not look the same as it did in 
the past‖ (Timmins Daily Press, January 22, 2009).  But, by spring 2009, The Working Forest 
(Spring #2, 2009: 4) claimed that forest industry investors were reluctant to adopt this new 




that have the investment capability and the fibre.  The political motivation of the wood pellet 
supply for electricity has provided a lot of scepticism‖.  Companies trying to survive the crisis 
remained protective of long established fibre allocations and operations and evidently were not 
eager to head in a new direction. 
Provincial decision makers were also pressed to examine options for reforming the 
Crown forest tenure system due to questions surrounding access to biomass and pressure from 
communities, First Nations and some in the forest industry to reallocate wood from idled mills.  
Several events and publications emerged from governments, First Nations, community groups, 
academics, and forestry professionals calling for a significant rethinking of Ontario‘s Crown 
forest tenure system, indicating increasing acceptance for the need to change.  This contributed 
to two key moves by the province.  
First, on April 22, 2009, Minister of Natural Resources Donna Cansfield announced to 
participants at the Ontario Professional Foresters‘ Association 52
nd
 Annual Meeting in Sudbury 
that the tenure system would be reviewed.  However, Judy Skidmore, publisher of Ontario‘s 
forest industry newspaper The Working Forest expressed industry‘s concern that ―provincial 
governments will take back dedicated industry working forest regions.  The reduced harvest and 
closed mills will give the anti-industry communist element in the government an easy grab for 
new ‗wilderness‘‖ (Working Forest, Spring #2, 2009: 4).  The expansion of Ontario‘s park 
system had recently removed land from the harvestable land base which in some areas exceeded 
the 12 per cent protection goal.  For example, according to one interview participant from 
industry, the Northeast Superior Region approached 16 per cent (Industry 7).  Weakened 
industry players in Ontario were familiar with B.C.‘s 2003 decision to claw-back 20 per cent of 
the annual cut from large holders for redistribution to new and small players, including First 
Nations and community forests and were concerned that similar reductions could occur in 
Ontario. 
Second, on June 23, the Premier announced that the economic aspects of forestry (i.e., 
industry relations) would be reassigned to the renamed Ministry of Northern Development, 




development and provide a champion in government for the forest industry.  These major 
announcements resulted from years of socio-economic difficulty and conflict among many forest 
actors.  As the tenure system has yet to be overhauled (provincial changes ongoing since March 
2009, see Table 1.1.) the implications of these moves are too early to detect. 
While many actors contributed to these pivotal changes, the ‗forestry crisis‘ and the 
meanings surrounding the situation link different actors with different perspectives, political 
motivations and power.  The next section outlines the main social framings advanced by 
conventional industry and local control supporters, and integrates the frames of interview 
participants in the Northeast Superior Region (May 2008 and July 2009) to update and enrich 
this analysis of evolving discourses surrounding Northern Ontario‘s ‗forestry crisis‘.  The 
following discussion also helps to synthesize ‗high level‘ public perspectives with local 
narratives as an entry point for analyzing the emergence of the NSFC. 
6.3. Current Social Framings of the Forestry Crisis: Conventional Industry and Local 
Control Movement 
6.3.1. Conventional Social Framings of the Forestry Crisis 
The aforementioned events and perspectives represent different sides of an evolving debate about 
whether the conventional industry of 150 years should be maintained and rebuilt or dismantled 
and transformed to increase local control, collaboration and benefits.  Each position holds 
different assumptions about the roles of different actors; the distribution of forest-derived 
benefits among local, provincial and international private-public-civic actors; how forests should 
be used in terms of the values that should be emphasized; and who should be in control of the 
forests and how decision making occurs. 
 Discussed below, the perspectives of interview participants provide an updated and 
localized analysis of the ‗state of the debate‘.  The subsequent analysis shows that actors 
mobilize identity and characterisation frames according to how they view themselves and others 
fitting in with their understanding of the problem domain and possible solutions.  Power frames 
point to who/what is considered to be powerful and the forms and sources of power at work.  As 




developed frameworks than others that reflect an awareness of other, often competing, views.  In 
this way, people can hold incomplete understandings and contradictory frames, and frames are 
not necessarily mutually exclusive. 
 The basic positions of the dominant conventional framings and the emerging local control 
movement are outlined below with reference to development of the ‗forestry crisis‘ (previously 
outlined) and actors‘ reflections on their recent experience in the Northeast Superior Region 
(from interviews) and outcomes. 
6.3.1.1. Conventional Diagnostic Frames 
The crisis in the forest industry right now is simple. The selling price for lumber—and 
it‘s all based on supply and demand—is well below our production costs. Now a lot of 
this red tape... high energy, high delivered wood costs... all contribute to higher 
production costs. The closer we can get those production costs to the selling costs, gets us 
out of the crisis much sooner or earlier.  (Industry 2) 
 
Sure... easy.  At its heart the problem is that the forest is owned outside the region in the 
sense that it‘s owned by the province of Ontario and is leased to producers so that the 
relationship is between increasingly outside producers and outside owners. Now we don‘t 
think of Toronto as foreign ownership but if you recognize that Northern Ontario... it‘s 
simply historic accident that it‘s not a province like Saskatchewan in which case it would 
have its own government. In which case the tax revenues from forests would stay in 
Northern Ontario... all those things are obvious. You realize that essentially you have a 
colonial resource economy. Revenues are extracted to pay for institutions in the south 
mostly.  The problem though... when you put it that way... [is] clearly a tenure problem. 
(NGO 1, community) 
These statements outline different diagnoses of the forestry crisis and articulate core views held 
by sponsors of the conventional industrial and local control discourses.  These statements were 
made by prominent representatives from each side of the emerging conflict when asked to define 
the main problem(s). 
 As is apparent in the first statement, and in many of the statements expressed in the above 
analysis, the conventional industry social framing defines the ‗forestry crisis‘ as a narrow set of 
problematic market and pricing conditions  further complicated by provincial policy challenges 
that drive up production costs and reduce profits (Table 6.1).  Given these conditions, Northern 




economic base theory and the comparative advantage principle, which have influenced Canada‘s 
and Ontario‘s approach to regional development since the 1800s.  Regions specialize in the 
production and export of commodities that make use of abundant factors of production, which in 
Northern Ontario implies natural resource intensive (i.e., high timber volumes) forms of 
production.  Under this model, economic growth is determined by external demand.   
 The basic entities are the inputs of production (i.e., capital, people, land/resources) and 
commodity markets that link self-interested private producers and investors to paying customers.  
Balancing inputs through increased efficiency relative to market prices is essential to staying 
profitable.  As discussed later, this set of challenges stands in marked contrast to the diagnosis 
provided by local control supporters. 
Table 6.1. Conventional Diagnostic Frames 
 
How is the problem(s) 
defined?  
 




 Poor markets; high production costs; lack of competitive 
environment in Northern Ontario created by unsupportive policy 
 
 Provincial government, external forces, anti-industry lobby 
 
One industry representative described the common outlook of conventional industry: 
We‘ve got to recognize that within Ontario certainly our practices and the amount of 
lands that are protected are significantly greater than the areas around us. And because of 
that we always have to watch that we‘re balanced as to not get out where our costs are too 
high. (Industry 4) 
Another industry representative explained a variation of this perspective as it was imparted to 
him by an industry ―old-timer‖, which he wrote on the chalk board in the meeting room during 
our conversation: ―There‘s four Fs to this business... Fibre, Fuel, Folks and Fx [currency]‖ 
(Industry 8). 
 From the conventional perspective, the ‗forestry crisis‘ or ‗perfect storm‘ is viewed as 
directly linked to a combination of external forces beyond industry‘s control (i.e., market 




well as to domestic or internal shifts such as labour costs due to rising standards of living and 
working conditions, electricity costs, and access to an affordable wood supply. For example: 
...when I look at Ontario, from the forestry perspective we‘re very uncompetitive. Ontario 
is. We have some of the highest wood costs and energy costs. Some of the largest red 
tape, complicated, convoluted policies, government policies that really inhibit how we 
can do business. (Industry 2) 
Well I think the forest industry in Northern Ontario is similar to the forest industry 
around the world.  It‘s held ransom... it‘s a commodity.  It‘s not a value-added product, 
it‘s a commodity and it‘s at the whim of the world commodity prices.  
(Province 5) 
 
 In this framing of the problem, ecological and social issues associated with operating on 
public land are also considered yet another set of ‗values‘ to be reduced and measured as 
monetary costs  by foresters and business managers (e.g., public involvement processes for plan 
development, environmental assessments, following ecologically-oriented management 
prescriptions, funding adjustment committees): 
Certainly one way to keep it from being competitive is to continue to... I‘ll call it... to 
have conflict over forestry. So the more conflict you have over forestry, the higher the 
costs go. (Industry 4) 
With the new environmental laws that are out and the bump up process... they had two 
individuals bump up the last forestry plan... cost the company three quarters of a million 
for one bump up... that‘s when you delay the forest management plan because you think 
there‘s something in it that is not right... that you think the MNR and the LCC are not 
addressing your concerns, so they bypass the LCC and go right to the Ministry of 
Environment.  It is just a simple letter saying ‗I don‘t agree. I want you to look at it‘.  So 
they delay the forest management plan for two years and they can‘t cut on that forest.  
And you gotta find outside wood or work at a new plan, which causes more damage than 
good and expense. (Industry 9) 
 Seeing some internal factors as within their sphere of influence, industry supporters 
blame the provincial government for policies that create an unsupportive business environment, 
namely high regional energy, fibre and to some extent, labour costs associated with forest 
management planning and production.  The above analysis of print news media shows that the 
provincial government was continually blamed by industry, municipal leaders and labour groups 
for actually causing the crisis and for its perceived slow and weak response.  Externalizing the 




6.3.1.2. Conventional Prognostic Frames 
Since interviewees holding a conventional diagnostic frame defined the problem as an economic 
forestry crisis, corrective actions and actors were identified in keeping with industry interests 
(Table 6.2).  Remaining operational and profitable in challenging conditions requires changes to 
what industry feels can be changed in its favour, and preferably for the least amount of it own 
money.  As evidenced by the over $600 million in provincial programs  introduced during 2005-
2006, this has involved lobbying for government aid and trying to influence policy changes to 
reduce ‗red tape‘ for process efficiencies (e.g., streamlining the forest management planning 
manual), as well as working to gain efficiencies through tweaking current in-house operations: 
Government has to step up to the plate and give the existing businesses that are there... 
help them change.  Change into something that can be more profitable or another type 
they can do with their business.... So the government needs to help, to say: ‗okay we 
know you can‘t do this anymore or he won‘t survive... but here‘s some programs that are 
going to help you.‘ (Industry 9) 
 
Table 6.2. Conventional Prognostic Frame 
 








 Both industry and government need to become more efficient; 
supermills; cut red tape and bureaucracy; better market wood 
products to increase demand; tweak tenure system 
 
 Government has been slow to react and unsupportive; industry 
to become more efficient with support from workers (and town 
when called upon) 
 
 
As shown in the previous section, balancing input factors meant increased downtime, layoffs and 
closures, and consolidation were also part of the response: 
We have to have a facility that competes because... your marketing... your competition 
today has evolved so it‘s global.  And in order to compete at that level you need to have a 
facility that has a cost structure that can compete.  So as you try to balance that, there is a 
desire to have a small mill in every community, but unfortunately they don‘t compete. 
(Industry 4) 
The economics near the end did not work for productivity issues associated with the 




 Industry representatives stated that working to increase demand for wood as a building 
product was a big part of the solution (Industry 2, 5).  Secure long-term access to fibre was 
considered essential to mitigating uncertainty for ongoing production and investment.  Even 
though licenses are evergreen (i.e., continually renewed), they fall short of providing the security 
investors desire to make long-term business decisions. For example: 
...the SFL holders and ourselves, we have a fibre commitment from the forest and we‘re 
not going to let that go easily.  If we knew that the Crown was going to keep the same 
available forest there for the next 20 years we would have a level of comfort.  But we 
don‘t know that and there are more parks now... this endangered species act... there‘s this 
and that... you‘re dealing with less [forest land] every year...  (Industry 1) 
You can do all the intensive silviculture that you want to [it] does not guarantee that the 
SFL is going to be there for them in 60, 80 years. So [companies] just do the minimum 
because they all really know it‘s not really theirs. (First Nations 2) 
 Reinvestment and research and development for product and market diversification were 
additional options but were not considered good risks during uncertain financial times and 
perhaps not the domain of industry but rather others in the technology and consulting industries.  
Nor were value-added manufacturing and the bioeconomy considered viable solutions for 
existing commodity producers.  In general, sponsors of the conventional view were restrained in 
their views about this potential and the role it could play in northern development.  The 
traditional resource economy was regarded as the past and future foundation and alternative uses, 
including those for energy production (e.g., cogeneration; wood pellets) were seen as smaller 
scale, niche and a part of the solution rather than a panacea for the industry, for example: 
I don‘t think that the solutions are all these little value added...  There‘s a place for that 
don‘t get me wrong.... But what I‘m saying is you absolutely need a strong primary forest 
products industry for any of these guys to exist. (Industry 3) 
People talk a lot about value added stuff.  Value added is simply adding labour to a 
component to increase its value. For me I think that opportunity is very limited. And the 
only reason why is our distance to markets.  (Industry 2) 
 Wanting to protect previous investment and established interests, both industry and some 
forest community residents and representatives wanted to maintain the status quo and get back to 
‗normal‘.  This is where company and community interest-based identities aligned to support 




...if the forest industry is doing well and there are jobs out there, the communities do well 
and people do well and it just flows down from there. If you‘re making 20 million a year 
you can afford to support different [community] groups. When a company does well the 
people do well. There‘s room for raises, there‘s room for bonuses. (Industry 2) 
 
Diversity... I‘m all for it.  Diversity builds stability. But at the same time I also believe 
there‘s nothing better for a White River or Chapleau or a Wawa than a strong primary 
industry, because all those other people will feed off of it. (Industry 3) 
I don‘t care if the system changes, I just care that my husband gets back to work, and that 
we can continue to live in the north. (Municipal 10) 
That mill doesn‘t open up in the next year, this town is going down.... It‘s gotta be the 
mill as our biggest thing. (Municipal 13) 
These industry, small business and municipal representatives and others recognized the past 
contribution of forestry operations to the community‘s economic base and looked to the future 
based on the same model.  Several others also looked to immediate extraction-based and 
industrial opportunities to save their towns, including aggregates, mining, bulk transportation and 
energy production (Province 1; Municipal 4, 8; Forest Worker 4). 
6.3.1.3. Conventional Identities and Characterisations 
Ontario‘s resource development has long been geared towards provincial revenue generation, 
which calls upon private investors to develop forest commodities to supply American housing 
markets.  As discussed in Chapter 5, this has contributed to the development of large-scale 
industrial forestry operations and a provincial bureaucracy to service the dominant industry.  
Based on capital investment alone (and so defined in economic terms), companies seemingly 
have the most to lose in terms of direct investment in forest operations, and in some cases 
company town infrastructure (e.g., road and hydroelectricity).  This situation has placed 
companies (and OMNR) in a position of inordinate control over northern forests and populations, 
as administrators and stewards of forests, forestry operations and company towns.  
Characterisations of industry and OMNR clearly point to this perceived role: ―You know, the 
power brokers are the politicians, the bureaucrats, the Ministry of Natural Resources I call the 
‗government of the north‘, and you know the big industry players‖ (NGO 3).  At the community 
level, the dichotomous roles of OMNR as the forest resource regulator and local residents as 




Figure 6.1. OMNR Mural, Marathon, Ontario 
 
 Companies also contribute greatly to municipal tax assessments where mills are located 
within town boundaries (e.g., White River).  The paternalistic identity of the company is evident 
when industry representatives speak about their roles and responsibilities in communities and to 
finding solutions to the crisis. For example: 
...there‘s no doubt that the mill is an economic driver for the community and without it  
there‘s many other things that start to fall apart within the community and so it‘s 
important to try to keep operating.  Can we keep operating and manage till things turn 
around?  We are certainly hoping so. (Industry 5)   
 So for us there are 1000 people who rely... their jobs rely on us. (Industry 4) 
Recognizing this dependence as well as their lead position on SFLs, industry representatives saw 
themselves as the ones who must make ‗the difficult decision‘ to determine a town‘s future 
(Industry 1, 2, 4, 5). 
 This framing of the problem as economic and forest industry-specific also positions 




the experts (Table 6.3).  Many industry representatives described themselves and their colleagues 
as the professionals needed to manage the forest: 
We got a general manager, we have an office manager, plus accounting and 
administrative stuff and then three foresters... and we look after this forest, right. We do 
all the forest management planning, FSC, audit, deal with the public, First Nations, liaise 
with government.  We‘re responsible for all the health and safety with the contractors.  
We hold the licence for the forest.... You have to have professional people doing the 
work. (Industry 7) 
I see us, and I say us as the forestry industry, as professionals in what we do.  And it 
takes a lot of knowledge and ability.  And I don‘t believe communities can run businesses 
like businesses can run businesses. (Industry 2) 
...our other important mandate, and we still hold it as the SFL holder for the White River 
forest, we will manage and maintain that forest on behalf of the Crown on a very high 
level.... We don‘t just have technical professional foresters, we have technical 
professional biologists we have technical planners, GIS. (Industry 3) 
This identity of the forest professional has endured in Canada for nearly a century, as has the 
structure of forest governance that gave rise to it initially (see Chapters 2 and 5). 
Table 6.3. Conventional identity frame of the expert forestry professional 
 
Who is frame sponsor 
relative to the problem? 
 
 
 the forest experts; manager of the forest for the Crown; professionals; the 
tough decision maker; provider; good business people; tenant 
 
 People who were somewhat indifferent to the local control movement questioned the self-
supporting identity of ‗the forestry professional‘ and made links to entrenched views and 
practices that have historically dominated human-forest relations (Table 6.4).  These individuals 
were from OMNR, federal government and First Nations, and were familiar with a range of 
forest actors in the Northeast Superior Region:  
Perhaps not everybody in MNR shares the same vision nor has the same values that the 
foresters have and I‘m being very respectful here... they very much have a common 
vision and perhaps a vision that equates down to volumes off a given area.  But there are 
so many other components that encompass sustainability.  And when you look at the 
forest management planning manual, foresters embrace all those other cultural values out 
on the landscape.  But I say they embrace them through a lens. There are many other 




There is still a forestry management... not a forest management... even though it‘s called 
the forest management plan, let‘s make no mistake about that and I don‘t care if you 
quote me.  The bottom line is that the forest is managed from a forestry perspective 
first.... Forestry is harvesting wood. (Federal 3) 
Even though my forester will say, ‗oh yes we know exactly how we‘re affecting the land 
we can measure everything that we‘re doing...‘ But in reality First Nations people have 
proven over and over again that you don‘t really know all the facts and how we‘re 
affecting the planet by cutting everything down. (First Nations 3) 
Participants pointed to the shared ‗perspective‘ of forestry professionals and that it was not 
shared by all with an interest in forest use.  These views were coupled with a perception held 
among representatives from industry (Industry 2, 7), municipalities (10,11,12,14), First Nations 
(2, 3), tourism and environmental NGOs (4, 5) and others that consultation and planning 
processes occur within a technically complex operating environment that is by design the domain 
of conventional forestry professionals, whether in industry, government or consulting.  This was 
thought to reinforce forestry professionals‘ position of dominance relative to local residents, 
other forest users and workers. 
Table 6.4. Characterization frames: The expert forestry professional 
Positive and negative views of 
others relative to the problem 
and solutions? 
 
 technically focused; authoritative; hard science; disciplinary 
 As one local control supporter observed, the conventional focus on commodity production 
and the structure of the tenure system has ―limited local people from getting involved in the 
sector except as, you know, workers‖ (NGO 3).  In keeping with the conventional social 
framings, the ‗northern resource town‘ and ‗mill town‘ evoke strong interest-based identities and 
characterisations that are part of a cultural narrative shaped since European settlement (Table 
6.5).  Many participants shared stories that have been told and retold about their culture, family 
and local histories, and identified a relationship among resource industries, workers and their 
towns, and the forest: 
We are here because of our sawmill. We are here because of our rail. Our town would not 




For years we‘ve relied upon mining and the forest sector and that‘s how we‘ve seen it. 
(Province 6) 
My parents came here in the late seventies. MNR had an office here. CP Rail was doing 
well. So they worked at the mill. (Municipal 12) 
Forestry, mining and tourism all have an economic value and it‘s critically important to 
Northern Ontario that they all exist. (Municipal 11) 
...this is an industrial land base that we‘re living on for the most part because logging is 
pervasive. It‘s everywhere. (Municipal 14) 
 
Table 6.5. Conventional Common Identity Frames: The resource or mill town 
Who is frame sponsor relative 
to the problem? 
 
 Resource dependent; extractive; industrial 
 An important observation is that three of the above individuals were recent post-secondary 
graduates who had either returned to or stayed in Northern Ontario to take entry-level positions.  
They mobilized similar interest-based identity frames produced through common experiences of 
living in the provincial North, which shape their future thinking and actions as professionals.  
Four of five were municipal representatives as well, pointing to conventional identity frames 
reproduced among the local administration and leadership.  For many dependent upon the 
forestry sector, whether forest workers, managers, OMNR employees, forest consultants or in 
support industries, the conventional view of the forest is that of  the ‗working forest‘, ‗fibre 
basket‘, ‗wood garden‘ or simply ‗the resource‘. 
 A municipal leader from northwestern Ontario participating at the March 2009 Northern 
Ontario Sustainable Communities Partnership (NOSCP) workshop in Thunder Bay on tenure 
reform highlighted the issue of the company town culture of dependency: ―the company has 
always taken care of us‖.  Residents and workers are accustomed to a subordinate working class 
identity fostered over generations and through a tradition of resource development that has 
provided high paying jobs and often created opportunities for younger, less-educated residents 
(Table 6.6).  Several participants linked disadvantaged characterisations of ‗the forest worker‘ to 




And what happened too with the sawmills was twenty year ago, you know you didn‘t 
need no education... you just walk in there and work, work, work. But now you know 
today there... all these people are thirty-five, forty years old... they got no grade twelve 
and they‘re not educated.  And they‘re stuck here. It‘s sad, like back then the mentality 
was the mill‘s there... go in there and make lots of money... grade eleven... work full 
time. (Municipal 13) 
At that time, times were different. You didn‘t need to get grade twelve to go work at the 
mill.  Back in high school days they made grade ten, right ‗I can spent two hours on the 
bus or get twenty bucks an hour with [the mill]‘ and now they‘re go‘in ‗I‘m kicking 
myself. (Province 1) 
Oh my God there‘s so many times working in that mill when I said... ‗why did I ever quit 
college?‘ The very first time I was interviewed it blew my mind.  I failed miserably.... 
I‘m the [typical] kind of guy and most people were at least my age and whatever heavy 
industry you come from.  They ask you a question [in the] interview... and you‘re hands 
on.  ‗This is what I do‘ [holds up hands]. (Forest Worker 1)  
 
Table 6.6. Conventional Characterization Frames: the forest worker 
Positive and negative views 
of others relative to the 
problem and solutions? 
 practically skilled; undereducated; dependent; options limited 
 
 An additional concern was that most skilled workers were leaving because they could find 
opportunity elsewhere.  Many participants from industry, economic development and 
municipalities saw this as a challenge to reopening mills.  This also created concern among 
community leaders who viewed many of these individuals as potential future community leaders 
and organizers who would do committee work and fundraising and help run the town and the 
mill.  This loss of labour was considered part of the larger forestry crisis affecting both mills and 
towns that would have a lasting impact by further eroding northern talent:  
Lost all the people... the tradesmen, the young people who were born and raised here. 
Like you know you have them for life here. Now they‘ve had no choice [but] to go 
elsewhere and they‘re not coming back. You know you lose people with roots here, it 
hurts you even more. (Municipal 8) 
I think the biggest challenge that the industry faces or that we‘re going to face is human 
resources.  Our northern communities... it‘s going to be tough to restart a mill because the 




Like right now to try to start up any of the mills would be... and I think locally the 
companies recognize it will be a problem. They don‟t have the labour force. (Province 1) 
 Many forest workers, residents and municipal officials support the main industries and 
look to the companies for opportunity and leadership.  Interest-based identities indicate a 
common identity frame linked to industrial forest extraction and a lifestyle based on a common 
vocation.  Local actors identify with previous generations of forest workers who have lived and 
recreated in the forest.  The Minister of Northern Development, Mines, and Forestry, Michael 
Gravelle, mobilized this common identity frame as an appeal for public participation in the 
tenure reform discussions:  
Forestry is unique among industrial sectors, in that those who use the forest also play a 
critical role in its replenishment. Forest workers – and the communities who depend on 
the bounty of our forests – enjoy a dynamic and living relationship with this great natural 
resource. (OMNDMF 2009) 
While the northern resource and mill town identity and characterisation frames seem 
inclusive and have remained stable over time, these social framings exclude different groups who 
do not share the view that commodities and large industry are the best way to produce wealth in 
the North.  For example, value-added wood and non-timber forest products advocates would 
have difficulty finding themselves in this identity, which excludes their specialized interests.  
This identity also excludes others in the community who may not share the same values and 
views about logging and industrial extraction (i.e., environmentalists). 
A key silence in the conventional discourse surrounding forest resource development is 
that of First Nations, as reflected in both the content analysis of news media and personal 
interviews (Table 6.7).  While about 20 per cent of the population in the Northeast Superior 
Region is Aboriginal (as shown in Chapter 5), as a group they have not benefitted 
proportionately from forest resource development given their Aboriginal and treaty rights.  One 
First Nation representative (4) stressed that while they were aware that the industry was 
struggling, the crisis and local closures had not been a problem for their reserve members:  
When [the company] shut down you know, there wasn‘t even a blip here eh... 




Another First Nation representative (3) pointed to their historic exclusion from the forest 
industry: 
Do you know how many [Aboriginal] people worked in the [local forest] over the last 
 20 years?  Maybe... five.  And the [non-Aboriginal] community 20  minutes away that has 
 a mill, they have 300 people working there.  Is there an injustice? 
 
Table 6.7. Conventional Characterization Frames: First Nations 
Positive and negative views 
of others relative to the 
problem and solutions? 
 Unorganized; withdrawn; dependent; troubled 
While First Nations were recognized as neighbours and ―part of our community‖ 
(Municipal 9), both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal participants remarked that it was an ongoing 
challenge to reconcile differences and foster a functional group identity that respected the 
distinct status and culture of First Nations and future interests of resource-based towns.  Mutual 
prejudices and lack of trust coloured characterisations of traditionally opposing groups:  
...the whole system out there [thinks]... ‗Fuck we‘re not going there, those fuckin‘ 
 Indians are crazy. (First Nations 4) 
Referring to working relations with an area forest company, another First Nations 
representative (1) stated:  
I got all the documentation and emails in my office that‘ll show you that we don‘t really 
 love each other.  
Different belief systems (First Nations 1) and consultation process and capacity issues (First 
Nations 3, NGO 1, Province/OMNR 4) were identified as contributing factors to lack of respect 
and trust. 
From the conventional view, industry representatives recognized a legal obligation to 
consult with Aboriginal peoples, and accommodate fibre allocations, plus a responsibility to 
maintain a working rapport with certain First Nations located on or near company-managed 
forests.  Industry and provincial representatives openly addressed the issue that industry-First 




(Province/OMNR 4), and in some cases were not validated through direct First Nations 
participation (Industry 4).  As discussed further below and in Chapter 7, the reframing of a 
common identity that included both Aboriginals and non-Aboriginals depended on the 
maturation of relations beyond that of legal obligation to willing collaboration, and the building 
of mutual appreciations and understanding (Gray 2003, 1989).  Efforts to improve First Nations 
involvement and rapport are often the work of individual band, industry and municipal 
representatives committed to developing relationships with one another, seeing potential benefits 
for their communities first, and the organizations they represent second.  This indicates a 
willingness to foster a reframing of identities that move from entrenched interest-based and 
institutional identities to place-based identities. 
Table 6.8. Summary of Conventional Framings of the Forestry Crisis 
Definition of the problem  
 
 
Attribution of blame 
 




Who should act 
 
 
Identity - the ‗forestry 
professional‘ 
 
Characterization - the forestry 
professional 
 
Common identity - resource 
mill towns 
 
Characterization  - the forest 
worker 
 
Characterization of First 
Nations 
Poor markets; high production costs; lack of competitive environment in 
Northern Ontario created by unsupportive policy 
 
Provincial government, external forces, anti-industry lobby 
 
Industry and government need to be more efficient; supermills; cut red 
tape and bureaucracy; better market wood products to increase demand; 
tweak tenure system 
 
Government has been slow to react and unsupportive; industry to become 
more efficient with support from workers (and town, when called upon) 
 
The forest experts; manager of the forest for the Crown; professionals; the 
tough decision maker; provider; good business people; tenant 
 
Technically focused; authoritative; hard science; disciplinary 
 
Resource dependent, extractive, industrial 
 
 
Practically skilled; undereducated; dependent; options limited 
 
 





6.3.2. Reframing for Local Control 
6.3.2.1. Local Control Diagnostic Frames 
Referring back to the opening statements of section 6.3.1.1, the narrative presented by the non-
industry individual (i.e., NGO 1) sets out key parts of the local control diagnostic framing of the 
so-called forestry crisis (Table 6.9).  This framing emphasizes different entities and reconfigures 
relationships among them to construct a different and nuanced view of problem(s) and 
solution(s).  For example, while local control sponsors acknowledged the economic challenges 
identified by the forest industry, the root of the problem is viewed to be the lack of local control 
that has been maintained through outdated top-down governance structures and processes (i.e., 
the tenure system and management planning processes), which alienate northern residents, 
governments and businesses from the public resources that northerners depend on as the base of 
their living and culture. 
Table 6.9. Local Control Diagnostic Frames 
How is the problem(s) 
defined?  
 
Who/what is primarily to 
blame? 
 
 Insufficient local control; undiversified commodity export focus; 
collaborative regional governance and capacity  in Northern 
Ontario constrained by unsupportive resource development 
policy; most benefits leave region 
 Large foreign corporations; provincial government; tenure 
system; external forces 
 Local actors, mainly towns and First Nations, feel they have been historically 
marginalized from the full benefits of forest development through limited participation in 
decision making and access to wood.  Speaking to the need for increased local control, 
participants from smaller forestry businesses (Industry 1, 5, 6), municipalities and local 
economic development (9, 16), First Nations (1), and the province (5) expressed that current 
decisions regarding forest management and business did not reflect local and broader economic, 
social and ecological values and interests.  To illustrate: 
I think one of the biggest problems really, why the forest industry is where it is, is that 
over time it evolved where the outcome of the forest industry has been driven by a very 
select few, larger companies and they‘ve been able to influence some policy exchanges... 
[pauses silently and thinks for about 15 seconds]… I think that when the decisions are 




where a facility is located, that‘s become a real problem.... Because, you know, the 
resources are local, the people are local, everything, you know... the assets in mind are 
local.  When decisions get made on the assets, be it human assets or whatever, a thousand 
kilometres away in Bay Street and it‘s totally driven by somebody‘s expectations on 
returns... on their investment... it has a tremendous social and economic impact in regions 
that they have no interest really about. (Industry 5) 
It is also ultimately the shareholders who make the decisions... they‘re not made for a 
year from now; they‘re made for this quarter, plain and simple.  It‘s for the shareholder. It 
comes down to money... doesn‘t come down to what‘s best for the community or what‘s 
best for the forest. (Industry 1) 
The thing with the bigger corporations is of course there‘s actually no control. There is 
nothing you can do.  It comes from somewhere else. (Municipal 16) 
 Local control advocates felt that regional resource development policy and governance 
(i.e., the tenure system) remained geared to export markets and foreign corporations and 
governments, both out of region and international.  Participants attributed this disparity to the 
tenure system.  Corroborating the survey findings presented in Chapter 5, the tenure system was 
considered outdated and inflexible.  The main concern was that the system restricts new entrants 
and the flow of fibre to new users and uses, which was seen as ―the number one killer‖ 
(Municipal 10) hampering new businesses, innovation and secondary manufacturing, for 
example: 
We‘ve got a small log home producer... outside of [town] and we have a fella‘ out here 
on the hill for a retirement business making timbers.  These guys have a hell of a time 
getting wood even though this mill... brings in wood that is too big for its own facility. 
(Industry 1) 
So, I think [the existing tenure system] really put a damper on any kind of innovation that 
could occur. I think our forests are still valuable and I think there‘s an immense number 
of different kinds of products that could come out of them... but essentially we weren‘t 
looking at that because we were so dependent on mills. (NGO 3) 
Critics of the conventional system point out that it was structured with a focus on the geographic 
heartland of southern Ontario and so resource benefits flow out of the northern hinterland  to the 
South, while northern talent is eroded and/or not developed.  In this view, it is difficult for 
communities to affect change and promote development for stability because they are 
simultaneously disempowered by and dependent upon a system that serves outside private and 




6.3.2.2. Prognostic Frames 
The local control movement embraces a bottom-up and decentralized approach to regional 
development based on  principles such as: self-reliance rather than dependence; cooperation 
rather than competition; redistribution rather than the accrual of wealth; equity and diversity 
rather than efficiency; and inclusive and open decision making rather than central control.  This 
social framing assumes that residents share a strong commitment to their communities and the 
North as a distinct region, based on place as well as interest-based identities.  Central to the 
prognosis is that a forest governance system is needed which empowers local actors and opens 
up the industry to diversify products and markets, recirculate benefits and foster the development 
of northern social and physical infrastructure (Table 6.10).  In turn, this would decrease 
dependence and burden on the provincial government, Southern Ontario, and foreign companies 
and markets.  The model would require and facilitate development of regional governance 
institutions. Indeed, many of the later reports discussed above made recommendations for policy 
institutes and development funds to support this sort of innovation in the North, whether 
technological or social.  Provincial and industry players, even internationally owned companies 
could still have an important role in resource development, without the instability of ‗sudden‘, 
short-term or narrowly defined decisions coming from distant centres.   
6.10. Local Control Prognostic Frame 
 
What action(s) must/should be taken? 
 
 




 tenure reform for devolution and decentralization; capacity 
building and enhancement; build value added 
 
 government must listen to the people and reform archaic and 




 Those advocating for increased local control (e.g., First Nations 1; Industry 1, 5; 
Municipal 15; NGO 1,2,3,4) indicated that the prognosis was to dismantle the current tenure 
system and place greater decision making control over forest resources in the communities.  As 
one NOSCP representative observed, ―We‘re in so deep now that it‘s hard to re-imagine the 
system. But we need to re-imagine the system‖ (NGO 3).  While there was variation in the 




(residents, government or business) must be in positions to make meaningful decisions regarding 
local resources: 
We have people making resource decisions from a degree-based wealth generation 
perspective and they‘re so far removed from the grassroots where the impacts are being 
felt that they‘re out of touch with reality. So to correct that you need to put resource 
decision making closer to where the resource is, where the intrinsic benefits can be 
optimised, and the intrinsic disbenefits are fully appreciated, not marginalised or consider 
to be extraneous to the decision making model. (First Nation 1) 
I think the success of the forest industry, remains in the hands, really, of local... of 
communities and local government and that we have to go back to the grassroots of what 
the forest industry was about. (Industry 5) 
As long as the communities have some kind of stake in their own forest.  I think that‘s 
what‘s key.  Does it have to be a cooperative forest? Not necessarily.  Does it have to be 
a community forest?  No.  But it has to be open, it has to be transparent and it has to leave 
room for a community to participate. (Municipal 15) 
These participants believed that local control could overcome problems caused by the existing 
top-down, centralised approach to forest management and industry.  It was implied that diverse 
forest values, community groups, and impacts would be represented in decision making because 
decision makers would have a shared attachment to place and sense of ownership and 
responsibility (e.g., ―tenure over your land base and your resource supply‖ (Industry 1); and 
―stake in their own forest‖ (Municipal 15).  Ideally, releasing the wood supply from conventional 
commodity-oriented industry players to include people who ‗fully‘ value and understand local 
forests would lead to product diversification, development of value-added manufacturing and 
NTFPs, and maximization of the value extracted from each tree and the ecosystem—all for broad 
local benefit. 
 In contrast, industry representatives and supporters (e.g., Industry 2, 3, 7, 9; Province 5) 
defended the status quo that served their interests and implicitly shaped their perceptions.  Local 
control was considered with the same doubt and negativity given to value-added and the bio-
fibre initiatives.  Local control perspectives were taken as oversimplified, naive and needless 
complications of the existing system, which basically already addressed local issues: ―Ontario 




seen.  It‘s like a quicksand of consultation‖ (Industry 3).  The following quotes represent the 
common perspective from conventional sponsors: 
The communities all seem to think that if they were controlling or driving the way land, 
timber, or resource were allocated they could do a lot better job of it.  But I think it a lot 
more complicated than that. (Industry 2) 
We can‘t let the mayor and council of a small community do it.  They don‘t understand 
the business. (Industry 9) 
 While imagining alternatives, pro-local sponsors were careful not to portray local control 
as a universal and trouble-free solution (NGO 2, 3; Municipal 15; Industry 6).  Despite optimism 
that the forest industry and management could be re-imagined, they shared concerns about local 
capacity that were central to the conventional counter argument.  But a distinction was that they 
were willing to consider local control on the premise that capacity did need to be developed, and 
could be developed: 
So we see more local control, and not that that‘s the answer... panacea... because it 
doesn‘t always solve all the problems.  But having more local involvement, and whether 
you‘re talking about mayors or municipalities, or the people generally who live and work 
in the area, including First Nations, I think First Nations involvement is absolutely 
essential....  And I try not to get into the box of saying ‗well, all we need to do to fix this 
is to have local control of community forests‘. (NGO 3) 
I think there needs to be a transition towards more local involvement.  But at the same 
time they may not have the expertise, or self-confidence....  Some of them might not even 
have the time.  You have to think... some of these mayors are part-time.  They should be 
fulltime [emphasis added]. (Industry 7) 
 Comments from both local control and conventional sponsors raise questions about the 
level of confidence in local leadership and administration and the current capacity of small towns 
to manage forests.  However, participants also had difficulty envisioning town-managed forests 
because it did not fit under the current arrangement that they were long accustomed to—the 
common experience was with large-scale industrial tenure.  This point is supported by the survey 
findings (Chapter 5) that found 10 of 11 provincial and municipal officials from the Northeast 
Superior Region were unaware of any other model or form of tenure that could be useful in 
Northern Ontario.  This uncertainty could be attributed to a dominant social framing of how 




regional identities and culture.  As a response to crisis, the willingness of pro-local advocates to 
try and reframe the problems and solutions indicates that double-loop learning processes are at 
work to ‗learn the way out‘ of challenges presented by conventional and dominant thinking. 
6.3.2.3. Identities and Characterisations: Local Control 
As external control was central to the local control framing of the problem, deep resentment 
surfaced in characterisations of ‗outside‘ decision makers and actors who influenced the region.  
Both industry and provincial government (Queen‘s Park; OMNR head office in Sault Ste. Marie) 
were seen as contributing to the crisis (Table 6.11).  Local control sponsors, some of whom were 
former forest workers, blamed industry for creating their own crisis: 
I feel for the forest companies sometimes but [I] also look at it like they drove their own 
bus in the direction, so...  (NGO 5, tourism) 
They didn‘t want to change, or they didn‘t see the necessity of changing.  They‘re the 
creator of their own problem. (Municipal 8) 
 
Table 6.11. Local Control: Characterization Frames of Large Forest Corporations 
Positive and negative views 
of others relative to the 
problem and solutions? 




Commodity producers were described as ‗whiners‘ (NGO 4, environment) and ‗outdated‘ 
(Municipal 8, 15) due to their reluctance to reinvest in facilities, diversify products and markets, 
and overharvesting and overproduction due to greed.  While one large industry representative 
insisted that dimensional lumber was a value-added product (Industry 3), a small industry 
representative felt that much more could be done: ―What we have are so-called high recovery 
modern sawmills that are butchering our wood for the benefit of making chips. We use the 




 There was also a key difference in how forest companies were described with respect to 
their role and the forestry crisis (Municipal 9; NGO 5, Tourism; Industry 1).  Rather than 
characterizing ‗the company‘ as warranting paternal reverence, local control sponsors 
emphasized the outside interests of private shareholders and decision makers and profit 
motivations as conflicting with community interests, for example: ―...the companies won‘t 
always do what‘s in the best interest of the communities—in fact quite often they‘ll do the 
opposite because it‘s in their best interest to do the opposite‖ (Municipal 9).  Various participants 
from small forestry businesses (Industry 1, 6), economic development and municipalities 
(Municipal 13, 14, 16) made the distinction between large foreign-owned companies and ‗local‘ 
companies owned by families or private individuals.  There has been a move towards 
consolidation, which has led to fewer mills held by fewer large companies.  Smaller, northern-
owned companies (e.g., Haavaldsrud, Niska North, Dubreuil Forest Products, former family-
owned Chapleau mills) were described as ‗community-minded‘, a social framing linked to the 
history of family-owned operations in Northern Ontario.  Smaller, especially locally-owned, 
companies were described as ‗different‘ in the sense that they were home grown and 
worker/family-centred as opposed to profit-centred, for example: 
I see a huge difference... personally I feel that Haavaldsrud would not do anything to 
harm our region or to hinder their business, right, they don‘t want to shut down anytime 
soon.  They would do the best so that they would be able to operate for the future... but I 
feel that Haavaldsrud would look at being sustainable in the future whereas Domtar 
would want to make money now because they don‘t have their roots here... Domtar 
would say ‗let‘s go in, make our money and then we‘ll go somewhere else when we‘re 
done‘. (Municipal 16) 
The only thing that Buchanan would be guilty of is trying too hard not to close. He tried 
everything. He probably closed a year too late. Like he knew he had the responsibility of 
a one-mill town there and he was doing everything in his power... like his staff was 
running numbers... he knew he was losing so much a month. (Municipal 13)  
 While some municipal representatives criticized the provincial government and OMNR 
as being indifferent (Municipal 9) and delayed (Municipal 13) in responding to mill closures, 
others (First Nations 2, Province 5, NGO 4, environment, Municipal 7) criticised the slow 




...I‘ve been telling MNR decisions have to be made yesterday... they can‘t say ‗liability 
this... let‘s check with our legal staff‘ because all these opportunities that are there right 
now, the opportunity will be gone by the time you guys decide what‘s going on.  It‘s 
gonna go back to status quo and you ain‘t getting them [industry] when they‘re strong. 
(First Nations 2) 
Some people attributed the perceived inaction of OMNR to a captured relationship with industry.  
However, several others saw that OMNR and the province were instead ―bombarded with crisis 
after crisis‖ (Industry 5), ―trying to cope‖ (NGO 4, environment) and that the turbulent 
conditions were ―all new to them‖ (Federal 4) (Table 6.12).  Despite these challenges, the 
provincial government was considered essential to realizing reforms, due to its authority.   
Table 6.12 Local Control: Characterization Frames: Province and OMNR 
 
Positive and negative views 
of others relative to the 
problem and solutions? 
 
 
 Overwhelmed; muddling through; intimidated by industry and prospect of 
mill closures; 
 
 Showing an important reframing of local identity, local control sponsors acknowledged 
responsibility for creating change and opportunity and through local collaboration in decision 
making and resource sharing: 
[the community level] that‘s where the new vision is actually going to come from 
because all the new possibilities come from reorganizing the people. (NGO 1) 
 
To go back to where I see this town is going... with many young managers and business 
owners, we‘re working together.  We‘re saying ‗as long as you‘re in the bush pull this 
species‘... we‘re sharing road costs.  We‘re not competing with each other, we‘re helping 
each other... the only way you‘re goin‘ to a move forward in any community is if 
everybody works for everyone‘s benefit.  (Industry 1) 
...the bad times have probably, may have turned out to be... I call it a ‗God send‘ for 
people to get focused on their communities and say ‗what is it going to take to move 
forward here?‘ Because we can‘t just keep dying a slow death here, little by little.... And 
for the most part I guess we started to accept it and we probably shouldn‘t have. But we 
did and now we have to change. (Industry 5) 
 Community leaders from municipalities, business and First Nations, for example, 




northern residents as resource ‗owners‘, ‗stewards‘ and ‗capable‘ decision makers, rather than 
simply labour for the mills—a point of divergence from the conventional view.  One First Nation 
representative (First Nations 1) suggested that a more inclusive approach was needed, based on 
the principles of cooperation and local control of resources.  This individual believed this would 
enable ‗northern people‘ to benefit from area forests rather than continue to fight over traditional 
resource rights and interests.  In addition to resource dependency, both Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal local control sponsors justified their increased involvement on the basis that the 
northern resident workforce had helped to generate provincial wealth, and that they must live 
with the environmental and socio-economic outcomes associated with mill closures and resource 
development.   
 They also saw that capacity did exist locally and could be developed and enhanced—if it 
was allowed to flourish through tenure and policy reforms.  Many people (Industry 6; Province 
6, 7; Federal 3; Municipal 9) suggested this would require governments, forest workers, First 
Nations and residents, among others, collectively to change the way they thought about forest 
products and communities and the acceptable roles and responsibilities of public-private-civic 
actors, in order to recognize the full potential of northern residents and forests, for example: 
We‘re too dependent on the corporation. The leadership around here is always depending 
on a company to come from heaven and save us eh... create 300 or 400 hundred jobs.  
And I‘m saying ‗no‘ that‘s always led to the bust and boom cycle we‘ve always gone 
through and it‘s time to change that.  Locally owned, locally controlled. And I think we‘d 
have more control over where we market... more flexible.  (Industry 6) 
In the future it‘s going to be a combination of things, not just simply cutting the forest 
down.  People are going to have to understand that. And a lot of people don‘t.  They just 
look at the traditional model. (Municipal 9) 
Local control sponsors perceived a need to move away from the boom and bust ‗mindset‘ 
(Province 6) and ‗culture‘ of commodity production (Province 7) associated with company-
OMNR-worker interest-based identities and problem definitions, to a position where local 
capacity could be mobilized and fostered as part of alternative and transformative solutions.  
Rethinking the roles and relationships among forest actors implies a need to reframe local 




Table 6.13. Summary of Local Control Framings of the Forestry Crisis 





Attribution of blame 
 
 
Action(s) to be taken 
 
 
Who should act 
 
 





Insufficient local control; undiversified commodity export focus; 
collaborative regional governance and capacity in Northern Ontario 
constrained by unsupportive resource development policy; most benefits 
leave region 
 
Large foreign corporations; provincial government; tenure system; 
external forces 
 
Tenure reform for devolution and decentralization; capacity building and 
enhancement; build wood value added and NTFPs industries;  
 
Government must listen to the people and reform archaic and unfair 
system; local people must organize and create future opportunities 
 
Irresponsible; whiners; outsiders; profit seeking and short term; resistant to 
change 
 
Overwhelmed; muddling through; intimidated by industry and prospect of 
mill closures 
 
6.3.3. Powerful Actors: Forms and Sources of Power 
Actors‘ perceptions of power relations are linked to common identity and characterisation frames 
as well as understandings of the main problems and solutions in the forestry crisis.  Social 
framings of the crisis also represent to varying degrees the interests of dominant and 
marginalized actors.  As such, interview participants were asked what individuals or 
organizations they thought had the most power over public forests in the Northeast Superior 
Region and why.  The question was kept purposefully broad to assess how power relations were 
perceived with respect to peoples‘ experiences in forest management, planning and policy in the 
Table 6.14. Dominant Actors: Agent-based Power Frames 
Source Actor 
Authority/Position Province/OMNR – landlord and CFSA 
 
Industry – licensed timber rights 
 
First Nations – Treaty and Aboriginal rights 
Expertise Industry – certified professionals in forest 
business/economics, science, engineering, biology, GIS 
Resources Industry – capital, equipment and personnel 
Relational Forestry Professionals – shared disciplinary training and 
association legislated to certify individuals in dominant and 




context of the ongoing crisis.  Participants‘ social framings of the sources of power provide 
evidence of how agent-based and structural power was exercised in the problem domain (Table 
6.14). 
6.3.3.1. Authority/Position 
Most people framed the provincial government and OMNR as the most powerful actor(s) based 
on 1) legislated authority and therefore decision making ability of the Province as owner of the 
resource for the people of Ontario, and 2) the OMNR as the assigned regulator.  Senior industry 
and provincial representatives, along with one forestry consultant, distinguished between the 
province and levels in the OMNR hierarchy.  For example, it was the ―central arm of [provincial] 
government, not necessarily the Ministry of Natural Resources‖ (Province 5) that set the 













Who has the most power over forests? 
 
The Ministry of Natural Resources, absolutely. Provincial government.  It‘s their 
land, it‘s their forests. The Minister of Natural Resources has the CSFA... it‘s very 
clear the Ministry of Natural Resources is the body that ultimately grants all 
harvesting licenses and ultimately the Minister is the person that grants all forest 
processing mill licenses.  So the Ministry of Natural Resources is the... from the 
forest sector‘s [perspective] the centre of power in North Superior.   
 
Some people think the industry has capture on the policy? 
 
Absolutely not. Come spend a week in my office. We react to the Minister. 
  
 As ―landlord‖ of the forest, the province was seen as the one actor that ―could make some 
change‖ (Industry 5) and remove ―roadblocks‖ (Industry 6) towards solving the forestry crisis for 
all sides.  While ultimate authority and decision making rested with the province, others 
suggested this was not totally unilateral.  For example, one senior industry representative noted 
that while higher level policies could be changed, the provincial government must demonstrate 
positive outcomes, and not ―just necessarily economic benefits, but it‘s social benefits, all those 
things...‖ (Industry 5).  A senior OMNR representative supported this observation: ―the political 
structure that we work under is very influential in terms of how public interest is received and 




power of other actors, namely industry, politicians and social groups, at work in decision making 
processes. 
 In terms of policy work, OMNR and industry representatives pointed to the Industry 
Relations Branch of the Forest Division of OMNR located in Sault Ste. Marie as the ―centre of 
power‖ for the Northeast Superior Region (Industry 3) and the highest provincial presence to 
preside over forestry, for example: 
We have the Forest Division at Sault Ste. Marie, Bondar [Place], and definitely that‘s the 
nexus of forest policy influence to our region and to our District. (Province 2) 
From a top-down decision making perspective, positional power held through the Industry 
Relations Branch, as the name implies, was ―solely committed to maintaining positive relations 
with industry‖ as the major client (Province 8).  One industry representative stated the 
importance of this connection: We do a lot [of lobbying] directly because we‘re in the Sault and 
are really connected with Bondar‖ (Industry 7).    
 Another industry representative pointed out how the province drove program policies 
(e.g., Lands for Life, Living Legacy, endangered species) and how, despite impacts on operating 
costs and wood supply, local industry and communities ―do not have that same level of impact 
upon the decision making as the province, because they‘re the ones who manage it‖ (Industry 4).  
It was on this level that ‗outside‘ environmental organizations were also framed by industry as 
having equal or more power to influence policy through relational and voice power: 
And you‘ve got a few people down South influencing this stuff and that‘s where the 
population base is. So the fact is these northern communities out there listen to them. And 
yeah industry does a lot of talking with the government to try to get things changed. I 
think the environmental groups still have a lot of influence.  (Industry 7) 
Another industry representative shared this view but seemed surprised to learn that non-industry 






The powers are the people who are vocal... the paid [environmental] lobbyists and 
the people lobbying the government that are directing the policy. And we as an 
industry tend to sit back more and be more passive about it.  
 










policy more than the forest industry.  And what I constantly hear from non-
industry groups is that the forest industry solely directs forest policy along with 
the provincial government. So you can see I get contrasting views... and it‘s 
curious that each side sees the other... [as most powerful]. 
 
That‘s a very interesting perspective and I‘ve never even really thought of it like 
that. I guess it depends what seat you‘re sitting in and that‘s how we feel. Yeah we 
have industry groups that try to direct policy... Ontario Lumber Manufacturing 
Association, Ontario Forest Industry Association. 
 
 
Acknowledging the competition between industry and environmental lobby groups, an NGO 
representative stated that OMNR had a limited ―stock list‖ that they consulted with from 
industry, environmental groups such as the Ontario Federation of Anglers and Hunters, 
recreationists, municipalities, and some First Nations (NGO 3).  As discussed below, non-state 
actors were perceived to use various sources of power (relational, coercion) to access provincial 
authority. 
 Traditionally less involved actors, such as those linked to municipal and federal 
economic development (Federal 4; Municipal 12, 15), tourism (Municipal 11, NGO 5), forest 
workers (1), and NGOs (NGO 4, environment), described OMNR as the most powerful actor in 
general, based on decision making authority.  However, these participants focussed on actions 
and directives emanating from district and regional offices.  OMNR was recognized as 
landowner and therefore the agency with decision making authority regarding licences and wood 
(re)allocations, plan certification, and as the entity responsible for safeguarding the forest 
resource.  Thus, OMNR‘s positional power, while linked ‗upward‘ to strategic initiatives, was 
framed by these actors with respect to more day-to-day forest management decision making. 
 However, while OMNR was seen as the most powerful actor due to its position to grant 
forest tenure and decision making authority to SFL holders, this delegation led some (Federal 3; 
NGO 4, environment; NGO 5, tourism; Municipal 16) to perceive industry as equal or more 
powerful as a result, for example: 
The current industry who has the access to timber... who then is really therefore in control 




From what I can see the forest management process is a very close marriage between the 
MNR in the holders of the forest units. In the White River forest the ones who have the 
control is what‘s dictated through licensing... it‘s Domtar and MNR.... So the marriage 
[is] between those two groups at the very core. Everything else around it is secondary to 
the actual forestry company.  (NGO 5, tourism) 
Given the daily experience of local residents as forest community officials, workers and 
recreationists, they perceived industry as having gained the most direct control on the land day-
to-day, which is the sphere in which most people live and work.  SFL holders were also 
perceived to have more power because they prepared plans that were reviewed and approved by 
OMNR: ―They control how the plan is developed and how the information is presented....  
MNR‘s secondary influential because they, you know, have the ability to say to industry ‗do it 
different, do it better‘‖ (NGO 4, environment).  This same environmentalist and an industry 
representative (7) also noted that OMNR often consulted industry when tweaking operational 
policy, such as streamlining the forest management planning manual
13
 and processes ―to make 
things easier for industry‖ (Industry 7).    
 Non-industry actors framed industry in a position of dominance relative to other actors 
due to its legal authority to harvest wood, its responsibility for public timber, its central role in 
forest management planning processes and in advising on operational policy change.  However, 
it could be argued that such activities were more publicly visible and so non-industry actors 
thought that industry had more power than it actually does.  Indeed, one industry representative 
provided this alternate view: 
The Ministry... [has] the ultimate authority. While industry writes all the forest 
management plans, to go right to the very front, the District Manager appoints the 
planning team with the plan author.  It‘s his decision, he can say ‗I don‘t want this plan 
author, get another one.‘ On the planning team there are always more MNR employees 
than there are industry employees.  That‘s not to say they do more work because I think 
we do the lion‘s share.  They review the plans so they have all the control.  I can tell you 
how different my plan would look if we were writing it.  Like ultimately when we‘re 
writing those plans with the Ministry we are agents of the Crown. (Industry 3)  
                                                 
13 The Forest Management Planning Manual ―prescribes the requirements for Ontario‘s forest management planning system‖ regarding ―renewal, 





In contrast, the advisory position of LCCs and other public forums was criticised as ‗token‘ 
because these forums were not ―set up for the average person‖ (Municipal 10) and they did not 
provide meaningful opportunities to participate in decisions that could affect ―wholesale‖ change 
(NGO 1, community; Municipal 8, 14).  Local control sponsors generally framed these forums 
and First Nations involvement mechanisms as ineffective and merely a form of placation. 
 Long treated as external to forest management planning and policy, First Nations, 
Aboriginal and Treaty Rights, and the court decisions upholding those rights, were identified in a 
supplementary fashion.  First Nations (1, 3) and others (Municipal 15, Industry 7) held that the 
positional power of government and industry came with the historic marginalisation of First 
Nations, for example, ―...government and industry can‘t rule with impunity anymore because the 
First Nations are waking up.  They know their rights and the courts are starting to back the First 
Nations‖ (First Nations 1).  First Nations were framed as rising to a position of future authority 
as their rights were increasingly upheld by court decisions and as much needed collaborative 
networks and capacity were developed. 
6.3.3.2. Expertise 
Participants identified expertise as another source of power.  Industry followed by government 
were considered most powerful in this category, undoubtedly reinforced by their historic 
position/authority and the bureaucratic and disciplinary structures that have developed around 
forestry practice and industry in Ontario (see Chapters 2 and 3).  The routine interaction of 
government and industry, and with the consulting firms that service both actors, involves trained 
professionals from forestry, engineering, business management and economics, biology and 
other technicians.   
 While improvements for public involvement have been made, public forests in Northern 
Ontario are managed by a technocracy in which forest professionals are ‗the experts‘ on and in 
public forests.  Through provincial government and industry, they have created a system that 
supports their interests while marginalizing the public, for example: 
I would say that unquestionably the industry is probably the single most influential.  First 
of all, they are professionals who know. We are all citizen representatives, and I‘m 




That‘s not the environment of the world you work at it every day, right?  I guess I can 
only go from my experience on Local Citizens Committee.  It‘s a technical environment.  
When you get in there are a lot of acronyms.  The management planning process evolves 
continuously in terms of new Ministry guidelines and policies and initiatives that come 
out.  It‘s not static.  So you‘re continuously being required to learn.... (Municipal 14) 
Congruent with the forestry professional identity frame, one industry representative (1) and RPF 
stated SFL holders ―hold a lot of strength and that comes from the fact that they hold a lot of 
expertise on what is possible what is doable‖.  The ability to conduct business, plan and 
undertake forestry operations within the system required a range of expertise (and resources and 
relationships) that industry alone possessed. 
 The LCC environment was frequently brought up as a key forum for public involvement 
whose members were perceived to be well-informed.  Still, given the technical operating 
environment of public workshops and committee meetings, ―it‘s difficult even for the Local 
Citizens Committee to follow the conversation because of the way the information is presented 
to them.  There‘s this huge volume of information...‖ (NGO 4, environment).  Two different 
RPFs acknowledged this challenge.  One observed that LCC members were underfunded and 
―not well trained so they don‘t understand a lot of the forest management issues‖ (Industry 6).  
The other ironically explained: 
Anybody who wants to be can be involved.  Forest management planning is an open 
public thing.  Part of the problem, though, is that the process is so complicated and so 
convoluted and policy driven and burdened that even the people that do it full time have a 
hard time understanding it.  So that‘s part of what makes it difficult for people to become 
involved.  It‘s way too complex for the ‗average Joe‘ to understand and even when you 
are involved every day. (Industry 2) 
Perceived power imbalances were attributed to both the nature and level of involvement (process 
design) and an information format that reinforced resource development interests and expertise 
by constraining non-expert input.  Many local control supporters confirmed and contested this 
arrangement, such as this tourism representative and former LCC member: ―certainly forest 
management comes back to forest companies.  It is their business.  I certainly agree that they 




 However, in order to ‗be there‘, local forest actors were made to adopt managerial 
technical jargon and concepts in order to effectively represent and pursue their own interests.  
This in itself is an example of structural power at work as it reproduces the dominant social order 
(Raik et al 2008).  One First Nations representative raised this issue with respect to OMNR 
requirements for Aboriginal consultation in forest management planning processes and 
cooperative SFL negotiations: 
I was really disappointed in the lack of direction when it came to how the First Nations 
was to be consulted and to what extent.  The only key sentence I found in that forest 
management plan was that First Nations have the right to have enlightened consultation. 
If you look at that sentence ‗enlightened consultation‘, what exactly does that mean?  
Does that mean that we‘re going to as long as they have a representative from the First 
Nations at that meeting... that they‘ve done their job?  And ‗a representative‘... what does 
that mean exactly?  Is it a grade school student...?  Is it a social worker...?  Is it a member 
of council? (First Nations 3) 
 This imposition of the conventional industrial approach constrained First Nations groups 










If you look at the configuration of the forest management plan... in the planning 
section alone there is maybe three people from MNR and 6 people from the 
company, the for-profit company, and there‘s one First Nations person. 
 
Seems like there is an imbalance there.  
 
Definitely. This is what I walked into. And on top of that I am sitting here as [a 
non-forester] right and they are all foresters. Now the only thing that I have going 
for me is that this company has to work with this First Nations and... Ministry of 
Natural Resources... so they should be servicing me as a First Nation.  They have 
to help me build capacity to have capacity to work and to benefit in that forest in 
order to have some kind of benefits for this First Nations.  So the first thing I 
asked for was a forester ‗if you want me to have enlightened consultation.‘ 
  
 Another First Nations representative (2) with forestry training scrutinized industry and 
provincial motivations, and concluded they actually limit the development of public expertise to 
intentionally discourage stakeholder involvement in cooperative SFLs and exclude their 




If industry was so keen on doing co-op forests, then why wouldn‘t they just take a month 
and send foresters from within the organization to go to the communities and have a two-
hour or four-hour whatever thing just in layman terms saying ‗this is why we do clear-
cuts and jack pine stands‘ and say ‗now you know‘.  They don‘t.  They don‘t want to 
educate them.  They just want to use excuses ‗well [other stakeholders] don‘t really know 
what they‘re talking about.  They can pay if they want to get involved. 
 Different sources of agent-based power were often linked where financial resources were 
needed to hire expertise that was internally absent.  First Nations, municipal and industry 
representatives commented on the lack of experience and training and problems with rollover in 
economic development positions in general (Municipal 10, 12; First Nations 3; Industry 5).  For 
example, many communities were remiss in efforts to diversify their local economy over past 
decades.  Prior to the recent crisis, Hornepayne and Dubreuilville never had a municipal position 
dedicated to economic development, and while White River did have an economic development 
corporation ―on paper‖, it had not been active for about ten years.   
 This limitation was due in part to overreliance on single employers, a focus on resource 
extraction, lack of resources and the associated mill town identity and culture of dependence that 
presumably eclipsed the perceived need and desire.  Towns and reserves previously had no need 
for developing forestry expertise and capacity for participation due to their ongoing exclusion 
from the forest industry, other than providing service centres and labour.  Moreover, while some 
communities were fortunate to have well-educated professionals returning to fill economic 
development and administrative positions, recently created positions in White River and 
Hornepayne were filled by interns funded by the Northern Ontario Heritage Fund Corporation on 
a contract basis rather than as fulltime municipal employees.  Economic development positions 
in Manitouwadge and within the Ministry of Northern Development and Mines were also filled 
with high quality yet recent university graduates with limited work experience.  One participant 
definitely felt outmatched: 
 I finished university... and got thrown into this job... as [the mill] was closing down.  I 
 guess it‘s when the economic development department was kind of established for the 
 town.  ‗We‘re in crisis... [and] you are?  What are you going to do to save us?‘  Know 




Accepting the municipality‘s marginal position in forest resource development, one university 
trained municipal representative deferred to the ‗experts‘: 
 We have to trust the professionals that are the bureaucrats... that they ultimately have 
 our best interests at heart.  They‘re trained.  They have masters and PhDs in forestry, 
 PhDs in bioenergy.  Yes it‘s great that the community needs to be involved in that but the 
 community doesn‘t necessarily need to be in charge of that. (Municipal 10) 
 The situation was similar for First Nations.  One representative pointed to the 
relationships between developing expertise and funding.  Band funding was limited and none 
was ―specifically geared to resource management or put under forestry or under mining‖ (First 
Nations 3).  Band council and administrative positions were often vacant and could not be filled 
internally even if there was funding.  Physical isolation combined with low pay (i.e., max 
$42,000/year) made it difficult to attract talent:  
 What you‘re ending up with is the lowest end of economic development.  Mostly 
 employment training stuff.  There are very few economic development officers who 
 would work for that kind of money in a remote semi-remote location. So unless you grow 
 your own, meaning that you have someone trained from within, and that will take 10 ...15 
 years to train, someone to get to the level that you need to be able to go to negotiate with 
 the government, right.  So that is a serious problem right now. That is one of the barriers 
 for First Nations right now when it comes to managing the natural resources. (First 
 Nations 3) 
6.3.3.3. Resources and Threat 
In addition to having personnel with specialized expertise, industry had the most investment 
capital to develop resources on a large scale and in remote, unserviced and thinly populated 
hinterland areas (Industry 6, NGO 5, tourism).  In keeping with the conventional mill town 
identity framing, industry brought the capacity and infrastructure to these places in the first 
place, whether roads, hydroelectric generation, or skilled people: ―I mean especially in Northern 
Ontario with these large tracts of land.  They‘re the only ones who have the pockets deep enough 
that they can make investments like that‖ (Industry 6).  Participants commented on the 
conventional arrangement among the industry, province, and towns. This was seen to create a 
situation ripe for coercion due to the ever-present promise of investment, campaign funding, and 




When you deal with forest companies there‘s only four or five and you‘re dealing with 
[a] large numbers of employees.  They‘ve been the stakeholder that we feel—that 
everybody feels—has influence because of the employment and the worth of these 
businesses (NGO 5, tourism) 
 Big forestry and mining companies were perceived to be ―driving the economy‖ 
(Municipal 11) and many at the same time contributing to political campaigns.  Many non-
industry actors (Federal 3; First Nations 2, 4; Municipal 10) were suspicious of this arrangement 
and felt it gave industry political leverage.  However, a senior OMNR representative framed the 
relationship as supportive rather than coercive: 
No doubt that goes without saying that those people who have had a business relationship 
with government in the past and have made significant investment, government isn‘t 
about to shut those people down ...you know we haven‘t announced that we‘re buying out 
licenses or cancelling forest licenses in Ontario, which is one of the underpinnings of the 
forest economy.  So anyone who does have a significant investment that supports the 
government‘s objectives for healthy sustainable communities is going to... the 
government‘s going to address their interests.  And... they put a huge effort to try to assist 
the current industry with restructuring and its competitiveness $700 million or more was 
put in. The forest sector competitiveness Secretariat has developed a whole strategy to 
help industry be more competitive. (Province 8) 
Some non-industry participants resented what they saw as coercion and had difficulty accepting 
the industry aid packages.  A tourism representative (NGO 5) framed this action as ―throwing 
money away‖ and a ―crime‖, while an environmental representative (NGO 4) thought it was 
ironic that forest resource inventories and road maintenance had been taken back by the province 
―but industry kept all the rights‖.  
6.3.3.4. Relational and Structural Power 
Relational or coalitional power derives from membership in and/or affiliation with a group of 
people who share and support a common view (Gray 2003).  Relational power is associated with 
common identity as linkages are fostered by drawing on shared interests or values (Putnum and 
Wondolleck 2003).  As described above, there is a perceived closeness and mutually supportive 
relationship between the forest industry and OMNR/province (although contested by many in 
industry and the government), based on client service, provincial revenue generation, and a 




forester from an NGO observed ―There‘s always been that quiet relationship between the 
government and forest industry‖ (NGO 3). 
 Moreover, there is a perception that such professional affiliations and interactions bond 
government and industry actors in what has historically been a closed forest policy network.  
Relational power has the significant effect of concentrating other sources of agent-based power, 
namely positional, expertise, and resources, held by these dominant actors.  This creates a sort of 
forestry ‗iron triangle‘ (Hessing et al 2005) or mutually supportive environment based on the 
shared economic and disciplinary interests of policy makers in the provincial government and the 
forest division, regional and district level MNR bureaucrats, and industry-employed forestry 
professionals and consultants. 
 Professionals with lengthy experience in forest management provided interpretations of 
agent-based relational power: 
In my experience that‘s very much the model that industry... that foresters... which I 
would suggest have designed the current model that we are aiming... it‘s designed by 
foresters, for foresters, for the forest industry, and it has been adopted and recognized and 
accepted by Ontario at large.... They are the biggest visible group that have an influential 
role I would suggest.... When you look at what is the strongest industry in Northern 
Ontario, or what has been traditionally, you can see the linkage there. (Province 8) 
I do remember when I was involved more heavily [involved in wood allocation 
negotiations] that all of a sudden a bunch of MNR management ended up in the private 
sector.  Certainly within a year of the decisions being made about where plants were 
going to be built, all of a sudden people started showing up...  you‘re back and talk to 
people who are from the industry.  It‘s a real tight fraternity right.  There is only a couple 
forester schools in Ontario.  In fact there are only a few in Canada, so the network is there 
sort of outside of the local networks that people would see.  So there is a mix that‘s 
taking place there that is not readily apparent and it‘s tough to participate in.... The real 
power brokers are the industry and of course their network within.  I see mill managers 
leave and slide into regional jobs at the MNR and I see, in the particular case I am 
thinking of, regional managers leave and slide into senior woodlands positions and I am 
thinking how does that happen?  It‘s obvious that there were some real tight relationships 
there.  There‘s no head hunting taking place.  There was probably a beer at the OLMA 
[Ontario Lumber Manufacturers Association] (Municipal 14) 
 The relational power of forestry professionals is supported by common training as well as 




regulation of the practice of professional forestry in Ontario and to govern members in 
accordance with the Ontario Professional Foresters Act 2000‖ (OPFA 2010).  Acceptable 
practices and norms have been defined within the prevailing model of industrial forestry that 
embraces forest science and economic models, which in turn validate what they are practicing as 
necessary and the ‗best‘ way to manage industrial forests.  Claims that forestry professionals and 
science are somehow insulated from or immune to power relations and political interests are 
dubious because of this network and shared allegiance to core beliefs, values and interests. 
 It is at this confluence of agent-based power that structural power is also more visible.  
Entrenched social structure enables and constrains actions and thoughts of the members who in 
turn can choose to either change or reinforce dominant social framings (Raik et al 2008).  
Structural power holds that actors gaining power from social positions act to preserve the status 
quo and reproduce dominant social structures that serve certain interests above others.  For 
example, to gain the benefits of entry and maintain their interests in the social hierarchy, aspiring 
professionals attend forestry, business and resource management schools where they learn to 
frame societal problems and solutions in a manner according to their discipline.  As part of the 
technocracy developed to enable forestry professionals to conserve forests and serve the public 
good, forestry professionals behave and think according to shared norms and use a technical or 
―secret language‖ (Magill 1991) in ways that validate their discipline and preserve the vested 
interests of the forestry fraternity (Beckley 1998).  In doing so, they marginalize other 
worldviews and interests, often unintentionally.  When asked why the industry and government 
would not change despite the failure of the forest economy, one participant with a long history of 
involvement in consultation processes observed this power at work: 
I guess it comes back to the people in the MNR.  Most of them have a forest background. 
Most of them have worked with the forest management plans and done it all their life.  So 
I guess they have the power to control them [but] they‘ve been brought up in that 
environment.  Now they don‘t want to go back and say I‘ve made... my life has been 
mistakes since day one.  They say ‗things are going fine‘. (NGO 5, tourism)  
 In other examples, an environmentalist and one First Nation representative discussed how 




conventional industry discourse as well as how they had acted to try to make improvements 
through dissent: 
I don‘t think my views have changed but I think I‘ve learned a lot more words to be able 
to express those views in a way that I can stay in a conversation longer.  I just think that 
when you‘re newer to the conversation and if your priorities are ecological, house and 
community sustainability... industry and MNR can run a pretty rapid circle around you... 
around ecological sustainability because there are a lot of terms that can be used in a way 
that are very confusing and it takes a while to learn the language.  Fifteen years ago I 
would‘ve gotten frustrated when someone would say, ‗we don‘t do clear-cutting here, we 
do multiple species harvest.‘  But I wouldn‘t have a rapid response.  And I knew I was 
being run around but I didn‘t have the language to dismantle it and now I have the 
language to dismantle it. (NGO 4, environment) 
So the forest management plan... when I first went there it was ‗alright, so this is the 
Bible that you go by?  So how do you change this?  Who does this forest management 
plan?‘  I met with the [MNR] forest management team but ‗there‘s no process that I know 
of [to change things for First Nations‘].  Just because something is the way it is for 100 
years, it‘s been exactly no matter what... ‗that‘s how we do it‘.  I don‘t really give a 
damn.  I‘m telling you this doesn‘t work.  This is a rigged... [system]. (First Nations 3) 
 The above outlined mutually supporting interests have shaped and controlled governance 
arrangements, although LCCs and First Nations opportunities introduced during the 1990s were 
a step forward.  Yet these forums continue to be subject to power relations that favour forestry 
professionals in that they are quite technical, time-constrained, under-funded and therefore 
unsupportive of the lay people and First Nations they are to include.  Rather than enabling lay 
participants to help transform the existing power structure to engage marginalized actors, 
participation processes are structured for and directed by professionals who generally share a 
disciplinary experience in forestry and managerial function, as well as the legislated authority 
and resources to manage.  They are also part of a larger forest management system that, as 
shown above, many see as oriented to an increasingly corporatized, commodity-based industry 
rather than to northern development.   
 Participants framed less powerful actors as disorganized and divided in situations of low 
relational power.  For example, First Nations were recognized by some (Industry 7, First Nations 




But the problem with First Nations is they‘re too disorganized. You got one community 
that‘s pro-logging. 20 km down the road the next First Nations thinks logging is nothing 
but a detrimental chaos atom bomb that hit the Earth. So when you meet with them all, 
well they‘re all over the board, right. This chief‘s saying ‗we should do this, we should 
do that‘, this chief‘s saying ‗I wanted to do that...‘ If they‘d joined forces, they would be 
at a powerful entity, big time. (First Nations 2) 
 The unorganized public was the other and most prominent group in this category (NGO 
4, 5, Municipal 10, 11; Federal 3; Province/OMNR 4, Forest Worker 1).  Participants described a 
variety of individuals perceived to have little time, money and/or incentive to become involved, 
such as the ―local passive person‖ (NGO 5), the ―private citizen‖ (Municipal 11), the ―townies in 
the bush‖ (Federal 3) and loosely affiliated forest users who were ―just a bunch of folks‖ 
(Municipal 8).  For some, this included non-forest users and even non-residents (NGO 4, 5).  
Others recognized that one way for local residents to gain power was to organize, for example:  
One of the things with representation is you have to be tied to something, you have to 
have a vested interest, you can‘t just represent your own interests if you‘re bait 
fishermen, you‘re representing your own interests but also representing other people 
doing the same thing. Sometimes you have to take the middle road here because [there 
are] people here who [think] differently that I represent.... When you‘re held accountable 
to an organization it certainly helps your credibility and representation. (NGO 5, tourism) 
The guy on the street.  The guy who got the boot from the mill that shut down... 
individually, yeah, he has no influence... You know it‘s the old thing, if we all got 
together....  (Forest Worker 1) 
One OMNR representative noted this challenge is their community: ―The local population here is 
not very well organized and structured to speak coherently... they speak as individuals when they 
want to address something related to forestry.  First Nations are a little better organized‖ 
(Province/OMNR 4).  Some also acknowledged that children, women, elderly residents and 
families had been affected by the crisis but that these groups were basically invisible (NGO 3, 4, 
5; Municipal 9).  Unorganized people without relational power were disadvantaged in forestry 
processes partly because lobbying was so important to influencing change, which in itself 
indicates the inadequacy of public and local involvement processes and disparate power relations 





An added benefit of affiliation is that it can provide a collective voice that can be heard if an 
appropriate forum exists.  One individual (Municipal 13) noted the absence of a crisis-specific 
public forum in their town early on and felt that this limited the voice of local people to express 
their concerns and ideas for solutions.  Others pointed to the establishment of labour and 
community adjustment committees as important forums (Municipal 12, Forest Worker 4) but 
these did not (or were not intended to) provide a medium for local-provincial stakeholder 
consultation on the forestry crisis.  Despite the existence of  the industry relations branch in the 
OMNR and two industry lobby groups (OLMA, OFIA), some felt industry  also lacked a similar 
forum and that they did not ―have the ear of government‖ (Province 5, Industry 2).  Tourism 
representatives too felt that they were not being heard and that the Ministry of Tourism was a 
―joke‖ and did not ―want to deal with our issues‖ (NGO 5, tourism).  Some believed LCCs 
provided the ―proper channels‖ (Industry 9) and ―huge opportunities for people to stand up and 
have their views heard‖ (Province 7) on forest management planning.  However, these venues 
were not intended for the kind of involvement being demanded locally.   
 As discussed above, municipal leaders and labour groups in the Northeast Superior 
Region called on the provincial government to establish inclusive public hearings to assess the 
nature of the forestry crisis, neither of which happened.  At the same time, several grassroots 
organizations emerged to provide discussion forums.  Analysis indicates that between 2003 and 
June 2009 there was a perceived need and explicit desire among municipal and First Nations 
leaders, local enterprise, among others, for a regional collaborative forum on the forestry crisis in 
the Northeast Superior Region to bridge diverse actors with the provincial government.  This 
finding confirms the observation of Hamersley Chambers and Beckley (2003) that Canadians are 
disenfranchised with respect to forest governance matters, which as shown here directly affect 
their communities.  No multi-sectoral, region-wide forums were formed; however, the provincial 
government did later hold public consultation sessions across the north (announced in fall 2009) 
with the aim of reforming the Crown forest tenure system.  The effectiveness of these sessions in 
terms of public participation, implementation of public input into forest policy, and the outcomes 




6.4. Discussion and Summary 
The different frames reflected in the above analysis illustrate a conflict over meaning involving 
different actors striving to make sense of industry and community collapse.  The ‗forestry crisis‘ 
is contested among various actors with different values and interests that shape how they 
interpret the problem domain and how they believe the situation should be resolved.  The frame 
analysis shows how power relations can impinge on local and non-local actors and how 
individuals and organizations construct and adopt social framings that align them with certain 
interests. 
The analysis shows that the ‗forestry crisis‘ was initially constructed by the industry and 
its lobbyists and government officials through the problematization of a set of conditions 
adversely affecting industry in its current form.  This articulated what became a ―master 
narrative‖ (Escobar and Paulson 2005: 257) of the crisis that advanced certain solutions and 
identities prevalent among actors with similar interests (i.e., companies, workers and 
municipalities).  As the industry began to decline, most groups (industry, municipal, unions, 
academics, media) blamed the provincial and to a lesser extent federal government for 
contributing to the ensuing crisis.  This blame was persistent and, as the contextual conditions 
changed, problems and solutions also changed while the provincial government response lagged. 
As the conflict developed, industry representatives (e.g., Tembec, Dubreuil, OFIA) 
mobilized interest-based and later place-based identity frames in efforts to unite workers and 
towns with the industry‘s views; however, conventional solution frames remained industry-
focussed (i.e., getting financial aid).  The industry response was to try and balance inputs of 
production and cut costs, which meant lost jobs, whether through gained ‗efficiencies‘ on the 
shop floor or layoffs.  As the industry declined and shared interest weakened with idled mills, 
labour groups shifted to local identity frames.  This reframing points to an important identity 
shift based on place and local values rather than industry interests and organizations.  At the 
same time, local control groups (e.g., NOSCP, STRONG) mobilized strong negative 
characterisation frames of ‗outside‘ companies ‗exploiting northern resources‘. They also 
appealed to ‗northerners‘ to be self-reliant and protect ‗their resources‘—the anchor of their 




As the industry weakened, it became clear to all stakeholders that the forestry 
professionals, namely industry leaders and government, could not handle the crisis by 
themselves.  This created room for emerging groups which framed the problem more broadly so 
that it was no longer solely the domain of government, industry and industry‘s lobbyists.  While 
some in industry referred to the forestry crisis as a ‗simple‘ problem that amounted to addressing 
‗factors‘ that challenged profitability, the failure to find an equally simple economic solution 
suggests the problem was and remains far more complex.  This also points to an important 
contradiction in the dominant problem framing; acknowledging this complexity early on would 
have pressured industry to entertain the framings of a wider range of actors in the region and 
possibly collaborate with traditionally marginalized actors (e.g., First Nations, towns and NGOs). 
There was a rapid response at the community level. But without active economic 
development competency in place, the less diverse, smaller and most dependent towns (i.e., 
White River, Hornepayne, Dubreuilville) were hit hard.  Indeed, interviews showed that 
municipal leaders and residents believed their towns would close without an operational mill. 
Moreover, several other small forestry businesses were lost, which exacerbated the problem 
(e.g., ForestCare, Norwa, Pineal Lake Lumber).  That the Chapleau mayor and council were 
‗shocked‘ every time job cuts were announced suggests that there was poor communication 
between the town and its major employer.  This remains a challenge in many Northeast Superior 
towns (as discussed in Chapter 7).  There was also desperation and competitiveness surrounding 
wood supply and potential business opportunities, among not only industry but municipal leaders 
and even provincial parliament members.  This suggests division in the region that elevated the 
mill town identity above the so-called ‗northern‘ identity.  All mills, except for Chapleau‘s 
Tembec ‗super mill‘, eventually were closed. 
Social framings were broadened and reconstructed as new and dissenting voices entered 
the debate.  Local control groups became increasingly vocal and emphasized the perceived need 
for tenure reform.  But aspects of the conventional discourse were remarkably stable and 
pervasive, as evinced by local control actors who used conventional ‗speak‘ in efforts to 
articulate alternatives.  For example, referring to the forest as ‗fibre‘ frames conventional uses, 




groups to reframe the problem(s) in a way that shifted attention away from purely economic or 
business factors to social and community development concerns, namely, local decision making 
control.  There was also increasing emphasis on the need to diversify products and operations, 
focus on local development opportunities, create more inclusive collaborative decision making 
processes and locally-owned industries rather than ones driven by external companies and 
supported by the federal and provincial governments.   
Although pro-local advocates tried to represent a range of interests from across the 
provincial North, some residents and municipal representatives remained supportive of the 
existing industrial model.  Some forest workers hoped for the return of the status quo because it 
was familiar and closely tied to local culture.  Many also positively framed the family or smaller 
privately owned mills and trusted them more than shareholder-controlled corporations with head 
offices in Montreal, Vancouver and Washington.  Industry‘s initial rejection of non-traditional 
alternatives (e.g., bioenergy) also caused some to frame industry as archaic, rigid and ‗whiners‘.  
The ongoing dissatisfaction among all groups with government aid packages and sweeping 
closures forced tenure reform on to the agenda. 
Interviews illustrated that it was difficult to re-imagine the forest industry and to reframe 
community identity as more than ―hewers of wood‖ because the existing culture of work and life 
was closely tied to company control and resource extraction. As triangulated by the survey 
findings, numerous participants framed the solution as local control but would/could not provide 
details about how that might look or be implemented.  As the crisis unfolded, the major drive and 
vision for the local control perspective was developed by local groups who wanted wholesale 
change (e.g., NOSCP, STRONG and NSFC).  By April 2010, the provincial government had not 
unveiled its new forest tenure system.  However, local human-forest relations will both shape 
and be shaped by the restructuring of public forest control.  Reconciling old and new identities 
would involve a significant reframing of the ‗mill town‘ and the nature of local forest 
dependence. 
Meaningful change to the tenure system would alter the concentration of power in 
professional forestry organizations and structures because the current tenure system reproduces 




would owe much to the apparently ‗small‘ actions of local actors to contest the dominant 
conventional social framings by advocating new roles and responsibilities for local actors, new 
governance structures, benefit streams and forest uses.  Alternative forums provided by local 
emerging collaborations were significant as local stakeholders never previously had a platform to 
facilitate broad discussion in order to address the crisis specifically.  As discussed in the next 
chapter, the Mayors‘ Group and Northeast Superior Forest Community Corporation were 





















CHAPTER 7 – SOCIAL FRAMINGS, POWER RELATIONS AND THE EMERGENCE 
OF THE NORTHEAST SUPERIOR FOREST COMMUNITY CORPORATION (NSFC) 
7.1. Overview 
Organizations devote considerable energy to developing collective understandings of 
history.  These interpretations of experience depend on the frames within which events 
are comprehended (Daft & Weick 1984). They are translated into, and developed 
through, story lines that come to be broadly, but not universally, shared (Clark 1972, 
Martin et a1 1985). This structure of meaning is normally suppressed as a conscious 
concern, but learning occurs within it. As a result, some of the more powerful phenomena 
in organizational change surround the transformation of givens, the redefinition of events, 
alternatives, and concepts through consciousness raising, culture building, double-loop 
learning, or paradigm shifts (Argyris & Schön 1978, Brown 1978, Beyer 1981). (Levitt 
and March 1988: 324) 
As synthesized above by Levitt and March (1988: 324), analyzing how and why social framings 
evolve within social organizations is one key to understanding organizational change. Social 
learning and framing theorists suggest that groups of people continually reconstruct social 
framings by interpreting and reflecting on experience, which develops common meanings and 
assists people to reproduce common stories consistent with organizational values and objectives.  
The reframing of identities, problems, and solutions based on reassessment of changing 
organizational values and objectives indicates a double-loop or conceptual learning (see Chapter 
3) mode necessary to actually shift the course of organizational actions.  This contrasts with 
single-loop or instrumental learning in which repetitive actions are simply ‗repaired‘ to produce 
desired outcomes.  However, story lines do not always become universal due in part to conflict 
among people with different beliefs, interests, values and opportunities.  From a critical 
perspective, then, understanding the social framings that guide decisions, actions and outcomes 
requires attention to power relations (Forsyth 2003; Armitage et al 2008). 
 In this chapter, I present an analysis of different social framings and forms and sources of 
power at work among the different actors within the NSFC. The NSFC is examined as an 
embedded unit of analysis within the broader forest policy community linked to the crisis domain 
(Gray 1989).  Shifting views and power relations are linked to different actors‘ actions that have 
shaped the development of NSFC, originally intended as an alternative and part of the response 




assert conventionally dominant social framings that challenge reframing efforts fundamental to 
socio-political change in forest communities and collaboration with First Nations.  The next 
section outlines the emergence of the Northeast Superior Forest Community Corporation and 
Northeast Superior Regional Chiefs Forum as part of the local search for solutions to the forestry 
crisis and forest governance reform. 
7.2. From Vernacular Region to Collaborative Governance Forum: Emergence of the 
Northeast Superior Forest Community Corporation 
The emergence of the NSFC and analysis of dominant social framings among actors can be 
divided into five overlapping phases: 
1) the antecedent North Eastern Superior Mayors‘ Group (NESMG);  
2) external consultancy; 
3) Forest Communities Program (FCP) and proposal development and site designation; 
4) NSFC operations; 
5) engaging with First Nations. 
7.2.1. Formation of the North Eastern Superior Mayors‘ Group (NESMG) 
The NESMG was initiated in February 2000 when the mayors and other municipal 
representatives from Chapleau, Hornpayne, White River and Wawa began collaborating to 
develop alternative solutions to perceived common problems.  Manitouwadge and Dubreuilville 
were invited to join shortly thereafter.  An early participant remembered a growing recognition 
that the towns needed to work together: ―we weren‘t in a crisis at the time, but we had some 
sense of what was coming‖ (NSFC 14).  Proximity, demographic and economic characteristics 
were the main factors behind the group‘s selection process (NSFC 8).  For example, nearby 
forest towns such as Marathon to the west and Hearst to the north were considered different, 
given their larger populations (2001 pop. 4416 and 5525, respectively) and economies.  
Municipal representatives also felt that the shared linkages were strongest among the six towns 
and residents. 
 As an informal network, the six towns had links to local government organizations and 
resources (e.g., personnel, staff) that could be mobilized.  Links were later developed with 




people and consultants) who were engaged at various times to share different perspectives 
(discussed below).  Known locally as ‗the Mayors‘ Group‘, this voluntary mayoral association 
contributed to coordinated decision making and also developed collective strategies for dealing 
with provincial and federal government officials.  Collaboration bolstered the collective voice 
and capacity of the communities that were ―essentially postage stamps in the middle of a vast 
unorganized territory‖ administered by the Province of Ontario (Albert et al 2006:7).  
  
 The group provided a forum to develop mutual understanding of common issues affecting 
Northeast Superior towns and of each other ―at a time when there was certain animosity between 
the towns‖ (NSFC 14).  Participants (e.g., NSFC 7, 11, 13; Industry 10) described a self-serving 
competitiveness among forest towns that coloured relations previous to such collaboration.  
However, ongoing interaction soon enabled recognition of their interdependence and common 
challenges, and an increasing willingness to work together: 
 ...the reality is, no one community can do it on their own (NSFC 6) 
In the beginning we were very supportive of our own communities and did things in a 
private way.  That‘s not the way we work anymore. If we‘re to survive [we have] to do it 
as a region. (NSFC 7) 
We lean on one to another... I guess that‘s why this here mayor‘s group was formed as 
those communities were so close knit and dependent on one another.  So if we see an 
opportunity we‘re gonna support it whether it‘s going to Hornepayne or to Wawa... it will 
benefit us all. (NSFC 9) 
Eventually, this association provided other benefits in the form of resource sharing and political 
prominence.  The Group also fostered a regional place and interest-based identity.  Many in the 
group openly stated they still had their differences (NSFC 6, 7, 9); however, loyalty to their 
region had contributed to a certain unconditional spirit of mutual support for individual pursuits, 
even where collaboration on certain projects was unwarranted. 
Recognizing common service challenges associated with rural transition, the group set 
out to undertake projects considered necessary to maintain and improve services and 
infrastructure to retain and attract residents and businesses as well as develop the regional 




achievements were realized to extend local cell phone service, maintain air service and local 
airports, attract healthcare professionals, and establish broadband coverage throughout the region 
(Albert et al 2006: 4).  The initial focus was on realigning and improving services within the 
region to support development.  As noted in Chapter 6, the group was also advocating as early as 
2003 for increased provincial support for forest communities affected by the emerging crisis. 
7.2.2. External Consultancy 
7.2.2.1. Institute for Northern Ontario Research and Development (INORD) 
Two separate sets of paid consultants with expertise in economics and forest products were 
instrumental very early and contributed ideas and energy to the eventual formation and direction 
of the NSFC.  Each was first associated with different NESMG projects and gained initial entry 
through Wawa and Chapleau.  By 2005, common challenges associated with Northern Ontario‘s 
forestry crisis motivated the Mayors‘ Group to experiment with developing a shared economic 
strategy based on the ideas of consultants from the Institute for Northern Ontario Research and 
Development (INORD) at Laurentian University, Sudbury.   
 Participants stated that the link to INORD came about through an earlier meeting 
between a representative of Wawa and a northern business leader at a regional municipal 
conference (NSFC 5, 7, 11).  Acknowledging the existing and future role for forests in their 
communities, the Mayors‘ Group set out with guidance from INORD to ―make the forest 
resources of the region work for the people who live in the six communities‖ (Albert et al 2006, 
3).  Central to this direction was the need for a greater level of local control and benefits from 
local forests than in the past.  In developing and adopting a regional economic development 
strategy, coordinating decision making, and sharing project revenues, the six communities were 
increasing structures and processes for integrated problem solving and developing an unofficial 
regional governance forum.  Through meetings and consultant advice, the six communities were 
also developing an alternative vision of the potential relationship between forest resources and 
communities within their region—one that refocused on non-conventional and value-added 




7.2.2.2. Chapleau Economic Development Corporation (CRDC) 
A second group of consultants (i.e., Biotrends and Forest Bioproducts Inc., Sault Ste. Marie; 
Planned Approach, Sudbury) had been actively working on innovative NTFP and forest value-
added projects under the leadership of the consultant EDO with the Chapleau Regional 
Development Corporation (CRDC).  CRDC was an arm‘s length economic development 
organization co-founded and chaired by a Chapleau town councillor and prominent local 
business person.  Although CRDC was not under the township organization, its core operations 
were funded by the municipality (NSFC 3).  CRDC also leveraged significant funding from 
different government programs. 
 One participant described the group as working to promote business opportunities 
through a network of forest industry investors and entrepreneurs and their respective political 
and business links (Local Enterprise 1).  For example, CRDC had developed a volunteer network 
of members and support staff from the local offices of the Township of Chapleau, Tembec, 
OMNR, MNDM, FedNor and local forestry jobbers and tourism, among others (‗Chapleau‘s 
Economic Plans Unveiled‘, Chapleau Express, May 2005).  Chapleau municipal and business 
representatives described the CRDC as motivated and dedicated to collaboration in Chapleau for 
community benefit (Local Enterprise 1, Municipal 14; Industry 9).  Although pursuing their main 
objective to promote local economic opportunities, a limitation was that CRDC was not 
regionally focussed and was not formally working with area First Nations (NSFC 3).  Among the 
NTFP projects being researched, plans for a small-scale blueberry plantation were well 
underway in Chapleau (as were separate plans for a plantation in Wawa) prior to NRCAN‘s FCP 
funding announcement. 
 Various interrelated events and conflicts began unfolding between the summer of 2006 
and the time the NSFC became operational.  Described as reactionary and attributed to 
constraints imposed by time limitations and FCP program requirements (NSFC 3), these 
conflicts nonetheless led to the eventual downgrading of relationships with consultants and, 




7.2.3 Forest Communities Program Announcement and Proposal Development 
Natural Resources Canada released a call for proposals for the FCP during the summer of 2006.  
A main goal of the program was to ―encourage the development of knowledge, information tools 
and best practices to help forest communities meet the challenges of transition in the forest 
sector‖ (NRCAN 2007).  The intention of the FCP was to also ―foster collaborative community 
efforts to help communities take advantage of new economic opportunities from forest 
resources‖ (NRCAN 2007).  This  ‗refocusing‘ on forest-based communities and knowledge 
development sought to increase local involvement in and benefits from sustainable forest 
management through providing funding and networking opportunities for new or existing 
community level organizations, which integrated public/private/civic perspectives towards 
building more sustainable forest communities.  Successful sites would receive up to $400,000 in 
federal funding annually for five years to establish research and programs aimed at generating 
economic opportunities, human capital, and knowledge on how to do sustainable forest 
management.  NRCAN expected matching funding would come from other sources. 
 Subsequently, when the funding opportunity was raised at a Mayors‘ Group meeting, 
Chapleau representatives indicated that they were already working on an application based on 
CRDC‘s ongoing NTFP work.  Participants and consultants (NSFC 3, 5, 6, 7, 11; Local 
Enterprise 1) from Chapleau and Wawa had different recollections about who inspired a joint 
application under the Mayors‘ Group on behalf of Northeast Superior Region; however, there 
was general agreement that a regional scope and integration of ideas from both sets of 
consultants would provide a stronger proposal.  However, CRDC was not directly involved with 
the Mayors‘ Group previously and participants stated immediate dissonance arose between the 
two groups who had been working separately for the municipalities until that point (NSFC 3; 
Local Enterprise 1, 2). 
 Both groups of consultants essentially negotiated with each other in drafting the proposal 
on behalf of the Mayors‘ Group, and each worked to advance their own project ideas.  Many 
participants observed this competition, as represented in the following comment:  
...these consultants all have vested interests.  Presumably in writing a proposal they 




themselves and, you know, there‘s always that risk.  At least if you‘re a consultant 
writing a proposal. (NSFC 13) 
The language and structure of projects and funding in the initial proposal clearly indicate 
attempts by consultants to meld ideas while retaining control (see Albert et al 2006).  In 
particular, the first major component was framed according to the technical focus of CRDC‘s 
ongoing alternative forest product development and local projects.  A technical committee 
consisting of CRDC consultants and others would advise a newly formed NTFP corporation to 
be located in Chapleau (Albert et al 2006: 17), which would eventually double as the head office 
for the site.  Affiliated consultant companies and their projects provided the core of this part of 
the proposal.  The independent role of CRDC (and its hired consultants) in forming the NTFP 
corporation, and access to future FCP funding, were stated to have Mayors‘ Group approval: 
Building on its work over the last three years, Chapleau recommended an approach to the 
Superior East Mayor‘s group that was accepted.  Chapleau is therefore taking the lead on 
the NTFP segment of the application.  The Chapleau Regional Development Corporation 
will create the NTFP Corporation and the Town of Chapleau will be responsible for the 
administration of the funds until such time as the newly incorporated body is formed and 
will transfer funds and responsibilities to the new corporation when it is ready to assume 
its duties. (Albert et al 2006: 17) 
 The second component of the proposal was clearly an extension of ideas emanating from 
INORD—high level strategic policy development and projects supporting the redesign of forest 
tenure and education aimed at capacity building and cultural change.  Associated projects would 
be directed by a Strategic Council that would act as the ―brains trust‖ and economic planning 
arm of the NSFC (Albert et al 2006: 28).  The opening page of the proposal was loaded with 
political overtones, stating that the proposed NSFC would work to shift the control of Crown 
forests to communities (as opposed to private forest corporations) as the crucial step in 
successfully developing value-added and non-timber forest product opportunities: 
The strategy involves careful steps to develop a population capable of adding value to the 
forest resources both before and after harvest, development of new training institutions, 
and expansion of a development corporation specifically to promote non-timber forest 
products.  It involves coordinated political action, improved access to forest resources, 
and experimentation with new tenure regimes.  It calls for forest inventories in the hands 
of the community itself, and it demands cultural change that only our community can 




 As discussed in Chapter 6, by 2005-2006 government and industry task forces, as well as 
several new local control advocacy groups that had formed across the North, were framing the 
forestry crisis in contrasting ways.  At the time, the strategy laid out in the Mayors‘ Group 
proposal clearly positioned NSFC with the local control movement.  As a further example, the 
proposal included a regular council meeting resolution (#RC06462) signed by members of the 
Mayors‘ Group stating that as a first priority their newly formed NSFC regional organization 
would ―promote community control of forests‖ (Albert et al 2006: 54). 
 The split between consultants was further represented in the proposed ―governance and 
financing‖ breakdown that flowed money to the Strategic Planning Council and NTFP 
Corporation, both of which would be part of an overarching regional council (the Mayors) to be 
formed to ―coordinate and fund shared activities‖ (Albert et al 2006: 16).  A major conflict with 
this model emerged later because the regional council that was supposed to be coordinating and 
funding strategic and technical council projects was in turn advised by the paid consultants 
behind the councils and projects.  Moreover, then CRDC Chair Richard Bignucolo provided a 
letter of support for the proposal (dated October 30, 2006), stating that CRDC would act as the 
―temporary body‖ for the NSFC through which ―all agreements and funding [could] be 
funnelled‖ until CRDC staff and the proposal authors could establish the regional incorporated 
board that would assume administrative control.  Dated October 31, 2006, the proposal was 
submitted to NRCAN from the CRDC on behalf of six towns.  The CRDC EDO was lead author, 
followed by three others from the two consultant factions. 
 Concomitantly, several other influential events occurred while the FCP proposal was 
being developed and processed by the federal government.  First, Ontario municipal elections 
occurred in fall 2006.  This led to an important shift in municipal leadership and power relations 
among municipal leaders and consultants driving the original NSFC proposal.  In particular, 
while discussing the timing and progression of the NSFC proposal process, several participants 
pointed to what one person called a ―dividing line‖ (NSFC 3) in Chapleau that separated two 
local groups vying for control of economic development plans—the town hall and the arm‘s 
length CRDC.  By August 5, 2006 the incumbent Mayor Earle Freeborn announced his plan to 




Freeborn was well-experienced and had been re-elected by acclamation in the previous two 
elections.  But prior to the September 2006 qualifying deadline, town councillor, CRDC Chair 
and local business leader Richard Bignucolo announced he would enter the mayoral race 
(―Bignucolo is running Mayoral Campaign with resident input‖, Chapleau Express, October 7, 
2006).  As the challenger, Bignucolo publicly framed his campaign in the context of the ongoing 
forestry crisis, focussing on a need for innovation and resource-based economic development: 
There are many opportunities awaiting us and we need to be ready to innovate around 
changes occurring in forestry, technology, and the environment.  Our community is living 
through a difficulty [sic] period of transition and I will be pleased to represent the citizens 
of Chapleau through our change process. 
 In the weeks before the election, the local newspaper ran several articles on new or 
promising local business achievements featuring either the incumbent Mayor or the challenger.  
Chapleau Express featured Mayor Freeborn cutting ribbons and shaking hands with local 
entrepreneurs who publicly thanked him for his supporting their projects (e.g., ―Start-up plans for 
bio-energy plant in Chapleau scheduled for 2007—Mayor Freeborn credited with helping to 
clear hurdles‖, November 4; ―A giant step into the future—Aux Trois Moulins windmill begins 
operation‖, October 6).  Notably, in early October 2006, Bignucolo was pictured travelling to 
Quebec under the auspices of CRDC with officials from MNR, Tembec and the lead author of 
the NSFC proposal to do reconnaissance for the blueberry project that was a key part of the 
technical aspect of the proposal (―Visiting Blueberry Production in Lac St. Jean, Quebec‖, 
October 2006).   
 Giving up his council seat to run against Mayor Freeborn, Bignucolo promoted CRDC‘s 
accomplishments and promise of new projects as a vehicle he would use to foster local change: 
―Just imagine what CRDC could accomplish if I were Mayor and could push the initiatives 
forward with my strong leadership‖ (Chapleau Express, November 4, 2006).  Days before the 
election, Bignucolo‘s campaign sought to clarify his position in the CRDC and lay claim to local 
business successes: ―In fact, the Chapleau Regional Development Corporation (CRDC), which I 
have co-founded and which I am currently Chair has been responsible for many of Chapleau‘s 




 The election was reportedly ―a very tight race‖.  The incumbent won by a margin of 85 
votes (608 to 523), based on a 54 per cent voter turnout (Chapleau Express, ―Freeborn at the 
Helm for next four years‖, November 18, 2006).  While Chapleau Express mildly stated that ―a 
few feathers were ruffled but everyone came out a winner‖, some participants said the race was 
heated at times and there were indeed clear winners and losers (NSFC 3; Local Enterprise 1, 2; 
Industry 9).  Several participants (NSFC 3, 5; Local Enterprise 1, 2; Industry 9) linked to various 
sides of the election and NSFC proposal remembered how the outcome shaped local power 
relations and economic development.  For example: 
There was the town hall that was funding the Chapleau economic development 
corporation.  Now the CRDC chair ran for mayor same time as [Mayor Freeborn] did and 
it was a close race.  [Mayor Freeborn] was elected—CRDC lost all their funding.  What 
happened was while this was happening when CRDC lost their funding the town said ‗we 
need to bring economic development back under the township banner so that we could 
have more control over it‘. (NSFC 3) 










It was right near the election and then the election happened, then our Mayor 
chose to pull funding from [CRDC] and open up their other one. 
 
Do you know why the mayor pulled the funding for the regional 
development? 
 
Would you want the guy that ran against you...? Everybody saw it. 
Indeed the re-elected Mayor‘s plans were made public days after the election:  
The initiatives for which the Mayor will seek consensus from Council are: the creation of 
100 new full time permanent jobs, update the Community Strategic Plan, a full review by 
Council of all current economic development projects, [and] a renewed vision for 
community and economic development for Chapleau‖ (emphasis added). (Chapleau 
Express, December 5, 2006) 
A new economic development committee would be formed by the township during the winter of 
2007, the Chapleau Economic Renewal Committee (CERC).  CRDC became inactive as Mr. 
Bignucolo (the chair) and other volunteers withdrew.  Discussed below, consultants and project 
ideas previously directed by CRDC then became linked with Chapleau municipal representatives 




 While the NSFC proposal was being processed by the federal government during the fall 
and winter of 2006-2007, further change occurred that realigned power relations among key 
actors involved in the NSFC proposal.  Fall 2006 municipal elections also caused a roll over in 
the Mayors‘ Group, which brought in new mayors in White River and Manitouwadge.  
Moreover, the 2006 incumbent mayor of Dubreuilville would later step down in September 2007 
(Personal communication, Township of Dubreuilville, April 13, 2010), and a new and less-
informed mayor was appointed.  Some participants (NSFC 3, 5) believed the roll over solidified 
Chapleau‘s leadership position on the NSFC project because Chapleau‘s Mayor was then the 
most senior and experienced, and Chapleau already had some staff associated with previous 
NTFP projects—both of which afforded organizational memory, capacity and leadership 
confidence.  The above individuals also stated that incoming mayors and councillors were also 
trying to get up to speed and would defer to Chapleau without fully understanding the back-
story. 
7.2.4. Initial Planning and Operations 
Some participants remembered being surprised that the NSFC proposal was successful (NSFC 1, 
3, 5).  Nonetheless, by spring 2007 the Mayors were informed that they had secured $1.6 million 
over five years to pursue their proposed projects.  The funding news brought all the contributing 
consultants back: ―everybody wanted a piece of the pie‖ (NSFC 9).  In April 2007, the newly 
created Chapleau Economic Renewal Committee had hired a new EDO.  The Mayors soon 
appointed this individual to oversee the creation of the strategic plan as required by NRCAN as 
the funding organization.  Early observers of the proposal development and initial negotiation 
processes with the federal government reflected on a perceived conflict of interest, pointing to 
the prominent decision making influence of these consultants in directing mayoral decisions, for 
example: 
But certainly at the first meeting we went to [between NRCAN and the Mayors‘ Group], 
the proposal authors took a leadership role—the academics, who [were] working on it at 
the time.  And we got a strong sense that it was a group of a lot of good ideas, but the 
municipal leaders were not the ones taking the lead at that meeting. (NSFC 12) 
In the initial part, yeah the consultants did swoop in and the problem there is not just the 




are actually in the place to get their hands dirty and say, ―we‘ve made these decisions‖ as 
opposed to, ―here is your plan‖. (NSFC 14) 
[The Mayors] started out very heavily dependent on consultants and that was a big 
concern of ours actually.  They had four consultants write their proposal that went into 
NRCAN two years ago.  Those consultants, you know, sort of hung on to a certain 
degree. (NSFC 13) 
 However, the hiring of CERC‘s EDO was a catalyst in the eventual downgrading of 
relationships with hired consultants.  As the new EDO was getting adjusted, the former CRDC 
EDO was working in a project management capacity, and Chapleau‘s forest product consultants 
were brought in to help revise the proposal and strategic plan, which would continue until fall 
2007.  But perceived conflict with the proposed organizational structure and financing arose 
immediately.  As one participant pointed out: ―[the consultants] built a structure that had two 
part-time consultant GMs reporting to nobody‖ (NSFC 3).  As chair of the Mayors‘ Group, the 
Chapleau Mayor was informed by the new EDO that the organizational structure was flawed and 
that it would fail the towns, making everyone look foolish if implemented. 
 The Mayors had publicly reaffirmed their support for the INORD partnership and 
ongoing projects on the front page of the Algoma News Review as recently as March 17, 2007 
(―The ‗Elephant Project‘ Moves Along – NESMG‖).  However, scrutiny of the proposed role for 
INORD in the initial proposal and INORD‘s previous work for the Mayors‘ Group generated 
discomfort among the new EDO and Mayors, due to a perceived lack of return for $120,000 
municipal investment.  This triggered a legal dispute between the Mayors and 
INORD/Laurentian University over intellectual property.  In short, some NSFC participants saw 
the dispute as a ‗misunderstanding‘ related to the recent roll over in Mayors and staff (NSFC 5, 
6, 9).  However, others from the NSFC group and broader policy community perceived a conflict 
of interest and believed there was a lack of deliverables (NSFC 3, 4, 12, 14; Province/OMNR 2).  
As a result, while some of INORD‘s local control language was used to frame the NSFC 
Strategic Plan (2007-2011), proposed INORD projects were dropped and their previously 
amicable working relationship disintegrated during fall 2007. 
 Redesign of the organizational structure met with resistance by the remaining consultants 




The biggest thing that [the consultants] fought... tooth and nail was that... the structure 
[was changed] so it reported to a GM and to a board.  Committees with cross 
representation so everybody talks.  The communities are represented on each of the 
committees so everyone is aware.  Everyone can have their own opportunities. If you 
have a project... [there is now] a method of how you bring it in amidst existing projects 
from one of the communities, up through the system so that everybody gets a fair shake. 
(NSFC 3) 
From a regional and organizational identity standpoint, the consultants were considered 
‗outsiders‘, which was deemed hypocritical by NSFC representatives (NSFC 3, 13) and also 
presented a practical challenge, for example: 
...none of [the consultants] lived in the actual Northeast Superior Region.  There was a 
great disconnect there from the actual work that was being done on the ground in terms of 
credibility, if you like, for the organization. It was probably a much harder sell to the 
members of the community you know if all the money is going outside the community to 
support consultants who come in and maybe do some work and then leave as opposed to 
trying to put some directly into the community, hire local people, and so on.  So they 
recognize that... the mayors recognize that.  After some discussion with [NRCAN], they 
began to sort of change their way of doing business.... They shouldn‘t be depending on 
outsiders to tell them what they should be doing.  It has to come from inside. (NSFC 13) 
 The Mayors would accept a proposal by Chapleau‘s Mayor that the CERC EDO who was 
overseeing the proposal revisions be hired as general manager for the newly formed corporation 
(Albert et al 2006).  In fact the proposal (Albert et al 2006: 56) included a letter of support dated 
October 23, 2006 and addressed to CRDC‘s EDO (lead author on the proposal) which outlined 
baseline cash funding ($80,000/ year for 5 years) for the NTFP corporation. Hired in October 
2007, this individual became more directly involved in the normative planning behind the 
organization and projects (NSFC 3, 5, 7, 13).  Thereafter, consultants were later systematically 
‗cut loose‘ due to the feeling that the region would not be successful if local representatives were 
not building their own future (NSFC 3).  This signalled the final move to negate consultant 
control.  It would also be significant for emerging organizational priorities and identity. 
The NSFC organizational identity began to form when the general manager was hired to 
set up the corporation as a physical presence in Chapleau during the fall of 2007.  It was at this 
same time that White River, Wawa and Dubreuilville were all reeling with mill closure 




Chapleau; however, some participants indicated that this initially created some tension in the 
region.  Not surprisingly, several individuals raised this ‗issue‘ during the interviews, but 
qualified their own comments as general knowledge rather than of their own belief.  A main part 
of the problem was how local media framed the funding announcement as Chapleau-centric 
(NSFC 6, 11; Municipal 10).  In September 2007, Northern Business News printed a special 
report for forestry under the headline, ―Forestry Funding Coming to Chapleau‖.  The special 
report stated: 
A northeastern Ontario mill town will be the epi-centre of a movement to commercially 
harvest the wealth of Northern Ontario‘s alternative bio-products on a regional scale.  
With $1.6 million in seed funding from Ottawa, the town of Chapleau has been chosen to 
make it happen. The forestry town of 2,300 was selected in July as one of 11 sites across 
Canada for Natural Resources Canada‘s (NRCan) new Forest Communities Program 
(FCP).  
All of the credit was given to the former CRDC EDO who was interviewed for the article, which 
focussed discussion on Chapleau‘s NTFP projects.  Passing reference to the involvement of the 
other five towns and ―three area First Nation communities‖ came in paragraph 10 and there was 
no mention of the Mayors‘ Group affiliation.  Participants agreed the funding announcement was 
a major accomplishment for the region (NSFC 1, 7, 11), but this article sent mixed signals about 
the intended participants and distribution of benefits, and who was in control.  It was also 
potentially damaging to the nascent identity of the organization. 
 Some former consultants and local business people (NSFC 5; Local Enterprise 1, 2; 
Industry 9) felt that Chapleau officials had outmanoeuvred the other towns and that most of the 
benefits would accrue there.  However, NSFC participants downplayed this as a mix-up and as a 
residual effect of consultant influence and gloating (NSFC 6, 11).  As one person summarized: 
So unfortunately, well the media which was driven by a couple of the consultants who 
were working on the proposal... ‗Chapleau this... Chapleau that....‘ See that gets back to 
the old stuff right, where that shouldn‘t be happening.  And Chapleau and the Mayors 
group and NSFC should have straightened that out right away because it‘s a harbinger of 





 Others thought this was a minor issue that did not affect the Mayors‘ working 
relationships (NSFC 7, 9, 10).  Municipal (Municipal 10) and provincial (Province 6) 
representatives outside of Chapleau saw that the focus on Chapleau was unavoidable due to the 
location of the head office and staff.  However, Chapleau‘s Mayor had also made it known that 
the NSFC would be Chapleau‘s economic development vehicle as the town was paying 
$80,000/year into the corporation, while the other five towns paid $10,000/year (NSFC 6; 7).  
This had much to do with Chapleau‘s initial plan for a solo application as well as the eventual 
transition of its new EDO into the general manager position.  One NSFC participant 
acknowledged this arrangement might be a perceived challenge to some community members, 
but also noted they were confident it was not a problem: 
I don‘t at all see it as an issue.  I think it demonstrates where we‘ve got the capability and 
the willingness to work together cooperatively, and the province is listening... Superior 
Mayors‘ Group has been going on for 10 years and those issues have never come to the 
table. (NSFC 9) 
In the spirit of unity, another participant simply cautioned: ―We have to make sure it [the NSFC] 
represents the whole region‖ (NSFC 6). 
 Federal representatives commented that a main strength of the application was that it 
represented an established group of ―politically-driven‖ and collaborating towns with a unified 
vision (NSFC 12, 13).  A major transition occurred when the Mayors‘ Group later became the 
original board of directors for the newly formed organization: the Northeast Superior Forest 
Community Corporation.  Participants remarked that it took some time for the nascent 
organization to get going: 
The program was announced in July of last year.  They have spent most of the last year, 
the Northeast Superior Group, trying to get up and running, developing their strategic 
plan, and figuring out exactly what they were going to do, talking to various potential 
collaborators.  And they‘ve made some pretty good progress given the time it‘s been 
functioning. (NSFC 13) 
It took them a year to sort of figure what they really want to do. I mean they‘ve got five 





 Presumably, the delay had something to do with the fact that existing CRDC structure 
and staff had not been used as the original proposal intended and that the organizational structure 
and project goals had changed significantly.  As one observer commented: 
This is the first year, so there were some kind of difficulties in getting up and running and 
then, ‗what do we do, we don‘t have any ideas?  The only ideas are the ones we had a 
long time ago.‘ You know so I think they‘ll get better. (NSFC 14) 
 The hiring of the new general manager and rollover in the Mayors‘ Group membership 
also worked to ‗reset‘ stakeholder relationships in the network.  By spring 2008, the OMNR, 
local forest companies and economic development groups were not engaged as had been 
originally proposed (NSFC 3, 4; Province/OMNR 4; Industry 9), for example: 
 
As far as functional connections, they haven‘t been made... and I don‘t know whether 
that‘s purposeful as the community forest tries to establish its power base because they‘re 
also staying away from the SFL‘s?  They‘re like... ‗we tried to talk to the community 
forest, you know, they will not return our calls. We tried asking what they‘re doing [and] 
whether we can play a part in it‘.  So that still needs to play out.  Whether that‘s 
purposeful or whether they are still so much at the organizational stage that their heads 
have not wrapped around that yet. (Province/OMNR 4) 
 From an organizational identity and implementation standpoint, the most important 
groups to be excluded were the local First Nations.  Discussed below, this move was initially 
damaging but subsequently was addressed by the NSFC board and staff with much motivation 
from First Nations. 
7.2.5. Engaging First Nations: Northeast Superior Regional Chiefs Forum (NSRCF) 
Interviews with First Nations representatives indicated that at the time the NRCAN proposal was 
submitted, relations between the Mayors‘ Group and First Nations were tenuous, and that the 
Mayors‘ expression of interest to collaborate with First Nations was viewed as ‗tokenism‘ 
(NSFC 4; First Nations 3).  Of the three First Nations listed as partners in the initial proposal 
(Albert et al 2006: 41), only the Chief of the Chapleau Cree First Nation provided a letter of 
support.  The other two groups, Pic Mobert and Missanabie Cree First Nations, apparently had 
stated a ―strong interest to participate in the project but more time [was] needed to explore their 
role in the project.  This [would] be started immediately and letters of support [would] follow‖ 




retracted as they felt it was taken out of context.  Band representatives felt they were initially 
misled on the nature of their participation and scale of the NSFC funding project (NSFC 4).  
Later interviews during the spring of 2008 and again in spring 2009 with First Nations (First 
Nations 2, 3, 4) representatives indicated a low level of awareness of and engagement with the 
NSFC. 
 Unsatisfied with their exclusion from the NSFC decision making, and seeing opportunity 
for more effective collaboration based on First Nations‘ traditional resource tenure and the 
capacity of non-Aboriginal communities, First Nations representatives indicated that they would 
intervene in project plans unless they were appropriately engaged: 
And so after the strategic plan came out and they [NSFC] stepped right into the trap, I 
went to them [NSFC] and said ‗I warned you, I warned you, I warned you... and now 
your process is dead because you get your funding from the federal government... 
fiduciary obligation and you can‘t move forward without duty to consult on the 
infringement of Aboriginal rights. We‘re mounting a political campaign and we‘re 
shutting down this process right now. That was in 2007. (NSFC 4) 
 
 Several NSFC and First Nations representatives (NSFC 4, 7, 9, 11, 13; First Nations 3), 
including other municipal (10) and federal (4) representatives, acknowledged that the failure to 
approach First Nations early in the process later became a major problem, for example: 
That project kind of got stalled a little bit because the First Nations communities were not 
engaged (NSFC 9) 
I warned them [the Mayors] very early.  I said I think you need to go and talk to First 
Nations right away.  But that was ignored.  They blew up... First Nations were pissed... 
had a meeting to talk to us: ‗we have a role to play‘.  And they‘re [NSFC] still trying to 
fix that relationship. (NSFC 11) 
 [The Mayors] started off wrong because they left First Nations out. (Municipal 10)  
Some NSFC representatives explained that the initial proposal to NRCAN was advanced 
primarily due to perceived time constraints rather than malice (NSFC 3, 13). 
 Having no previous ‗member‘ involvement in the Mayors‘ Group, First Nations planned 
to form their own regional group as a response to the perceived failings of regional natural 




Forum was intended as a counterpart to collaboratively critique the NSFC Strategic Plan, and 
was initiated so that the NSFC might better reflect a legitimate collaboration with First Nations. 
 In an initial step towards a meaningful partnership with First Nations, a Memorandum of 
Understanding was signed between NSFC and Chapleau Cree First Nation (CCFN) in February 
2008 wherein CCFN agreed to critique the Strategic Plan, circulate the critique to other area First 
Nations for comment, and host a regional First Nations meeting to assess common preferences 
for involvement among affected First Nations (CCFN 2008a: 1).   
 Soon after this arrangement was made, on March 2, 2008 NRCAN and Mayors‘ Group 
representatives travelled to Chapleau for the FCP contribution agreement signing event.  One 
month later, on April 5, 2008, Chapleau Express featured Mayor Earle Freeborn, President of the 
NSFC, signing the agreement on behalf of Chapleau.  The front page article, entitled ―Northeast 
Superior Forest Community and Natural Resources Canada to launch new initiative‖, highlighted 
the history of collaboration among the six towns and federal funding as parts of the regional and 
federal response to economic crisis.  Mayor Freeborn expressed gratitude for the funding, and 
stated that it would help ―address the crisis facing our region‘s economy‖.  He further identified 
participating communities and a prognosis based on conventional frames including natural 
resource dependence, the self-reliance of northerners, and economic values: 
All the communities of this region have been built because of our forest resource, and 
now our job is to come together as a collective to find sustainable new industries for our 
future economic wealth.  The NSFC will be the catalyst to move these types of initiatives 
forward.  
Mayor Whent of Wawa also expressed his support and framed the solution in economic terms.  
Notably, the article made no mention of First Nations, possibly because of the ongoing 
background work to foster positive municipal-First Nations relations.  First Nations were 
however represented at the launch to show their support prior to full partnership (NSFC 3).  
 Following a regional meeting on March 31, 2008 between Chapleau Cree, Missanabie 
Cree, Brunswick House and Michipicoten First Nations (Hornpayne and Pic Mobert sent 
regrets), NSFC was offered a critique in April 2008 outlining general and specific points of 




Strategic Plan that supported youth development, education, forestry research, capacity building, 
and local control of resources were deemed congruent with First Nations values and objectives.  
Major points of contention related to the unclear role of First Nations in the project, references 
that First Nations had participated in regional capacity-building strategies (unbeknown to the 
First Nations themselves), the need for greater recognition of Aboriginal rights and potential 
contributions, as well as the validity of First Nations claims to biomass resources and sacredness 
of medical forest plants (CCFN 2008a: 7-8).  Promoting a strong First Nations cultural and 
spiritual perspective, the proposed way forward included recommendations  to redraft the 
Strategic Plan to elevate the profile of First Nations, garner formal support from interested First 
Nations, secure funding to assist First Nations participation and confirm First Nations 
representatives to sit on NSFC committees (CCFN 2008a: 19).  NSFC worked to obtain 
additional funding from NRCAN to help the NSRCF enhance capacity for coordination and 
participation.  This funding was combined with significant funds leveraged independently by 
First Nations (NSFC 3, 4, 13, 15). 
 Shortly thereafter an article written by the NSFC general manager, entitled ―Co-operation 
Key to New Initiative Success‖, was published on the front page of the Algoma News Review on 
May 7, 2008.  In part, the article appears to have been intended to help improve municipal-First 
Nations relations and address the need for community awareness promotion.  The article 
introduced the new corporation as: 
...a new initiative that although some may have heard of, has not been described in any 
great detail.  There are questions in the community, in fact all the regional partner 
communities, surrounding who we are and what we are doing. 
One third of the article was dedicated to discussing plans for First Nations relationship building, 
stressing that: 
One of the key priorities for the NSFC is to build strong relationships with the First 
Nations within our project boundaries.  The Mayors of all six communities recognize that 
decisions involving lands and resources cannot be made without the direct involvement 
of area First Nations. Now that process funding has been secured, the NSFC is committed 
to advancing an aggressive relationship building initiative with the seven First Nations 




Such public recognition of First Nations rights and plans to foster partnerships through 
relationship building exercises indicates a reframing of organizational identity. 
 NSFC directors and staff further recognized the authority of First Nations to steer the 
process—but, equally important— the positive opportunities to work together with First Nations.  
However, the agreement to work together did not create an automatic friendship.  First Nations, 
NSFC staff and resource people, the Mayors and OMNR representatives all acknowledged that 
collaboration was very important but also admitted that there was ongoing conflict (NSFC 1, 3, 
4, 7, 8, 9, 11, 15; First Nations 3; Industry 1; Federal 4).  As of fall 2008, First Nations had 
selected one individual to represent them jointly as a NSFC voting board member.  Personality 
conflicts were noted by several individuals (NSFC 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11; Province/OMNR 4, 8), 
signalling additional challenges to be overcome.  Many were optimistic that this would be 
resolved (NSFC 1, 3, 4, 7), a sign of mutual commitment to collaboration. 
 Moreover, the fact that NSFC had only one individual as a point of contact representing 
up to nine area First Nations created confusion and mistrust for some NSFC and First Nation 
representatives.  Although relationship building and improving cross-cultural understanding were 
identified as important objectives by NSRCF and NSFC, there were concerns for mutual 
information sharing and financial disclosures, as well as about a lack of mayoral cross-
representation on the NSRCF (NSFC 3, 4, 7).  Some (NSFC 3, 6, 8, 11) characterized the First 
Nations representative as playing a gate keeping role, for example: 
...the issue is First Nations are being driven by somebody outside of this community... it‘s 
taken a consultant from [outside the region] to drive them and get them together, ‗this is 
what our thoughts should be on this‘ and holding their hands through the process—taking 
the leadership of it—and it‘s not somebody internal who‘s doing that.  So it always leaves 
us to the situation where is this [the consultant] or is this the Chiefs? (NSFC 3) 
Conversely, one NSFC representative identified perceived personal and practical challenges that 
they shared with First Nations and explained their situations were basically the same: 
First Nations Chiefs are like myself.  They‘re interested.  They‘re busy.  They‘ve got a lot 
of issues.  So they [NSRCF] are using one common facilitator to do their letter writing 
and their presentations, as we rely on our CAOs or [NSFC general manager].  So it‘s 




 Participants stated that an added challenge for First Nations was that they were working 
in parallel to regenerate their own culturally appropriate governance structures and relationships 
at the local and regional scale (NSFC 4; First Nations 3).  First Nations also noted that 
reconciliation and trust between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal communities would not be 
obtainable as a short-term objective.  This mismatch in time scales was identified by First 
Nations from the outset in the critique of the Strategic Plan (CCFN 2008a). 
 Interviews during May 2009 indicated a desire to have all the Mayors and Chiefs get 
together to discuss how working relationships could be developed.  NSFC representatives (NSFC 
3, 6, 7, 8, 11) believed that getting together would be constructive and would help initiate 
personal relationships and develop understanding of similarities and differences as the basis for a 
working relationship, for example: 
They need to have the Mayors and the Chiefs get together, right, not just this little weak 
conduit.  Do that twice or three times a year because through their familiarity develops 
good relationships... when everybody hears what everybody else is saying. (NSFC 11) 
Ironically, some thought it was still too early to meet due to perceived differences on both sides: 
We haven‘t had a meeting between the Chiefs and the Mayors, although it has been 
identified as an objective.  Although it‘s my personal view that the timing is not right for 
that yet because we still have some relationship building to do to ensure that when we do 
put them together that comes up with a constructive result, as opposed to something else 
going wrong. (NSFC 4) 
 An additional challenge to developing common understanding of problems and solutions 
and to forming a shared identity was disagreement between the NSFC president and the First 
Nations representative on a parallel project being pursued by NSRCF (NSFC 1, 3, 4, 6, 11).  As 
one participant explained: 
One of our biggest things is the relationship building with First Nations.  That‘s in the 
works.  A lot of stuff the First Nations would like to do, the Mayors don‘t agree with.  
Like we have to kind of meet in the middle.  Both sides have to take a loss sometimes. 
When you‘re used to doing something a certain way and somebody comes in and says 
‗we don‘t like that‘ it‘s a big learning curve.  And it‘s not something that‘s going to 
evolve overnight or be solved in the year.  It‘s going to take time to do that.  And both 




 The major point of friction was First Nations‘ plan for co-management of the Chapleau 
Crown Game Preserve, which if implemented would potentially reduce logging and therefore 
wood supply for the Tembec mill at Chapleau.  For First Nations, this approach was about 
―culturally appropriate community development‖ and the ―need to reconcile historical conflicts 
with the Crown‖ in order that First Nations‘ identity, economy and self-government could be 
restored and maintained, based on their connection to the land (CCFN 2008b: 5).  Participants 
(NSFC 4, 5, 7) stated that the disagreement was out in the open and that Chapleau‘s Mayor was 
forthright in his explanation to First Nations and others that he could not support a reduced 
harvest in the CCGP or elsewhere that would jeopardize local jobs—this seemed counterintuitive 
given all the mill closures in neighbouring towns.  While First Nations admitted that co-
management would mean reduced cutting in the CCGP, they did not want to put Tembec out of 
business and suggested that OMNR could make up the created supply deficit with fibre that was 
available elsewhere ‗on paper‘ (i.e., according to OMNR resource inventories).  One participant 
acknowledged the importance of both perspectives and attributed this impasse to 
status quo communities who say, ‗we can‘t give up what‘s there now.  We‘re willing to 
talk to you as long as we don‘t lose anything‘.  So where there‘s operating mills... not as 
much in Hornepayne... there has to be a will to talk about it at the table. (NSFC 6) 
This schism at the NSFC board level was also noted regarding potential fibre reallocations in 
White River: 
I really see that it‘s really polarized.  There are people that really believe that communities,  
to have a bigger stake in the resource, to be able to control some of it to be able to generate 
wealth, you know, we need to be able to have a stake to be able to say what some of those 
resources are going to be used for.  It‘s the other side that says that we need to make sure 
that the lumber companies that are operating here stay operating here.  So there‘s a shift of 
people that don‘t want to rock the boat because in Chapleau we still have a mill... if you 
don‘t want to do anything that‘s going to jeopardize the situation that‘s tenuous enough. 
Then you get the people from White River saying that our forest isn‘t being used, they‘re 
cutting it and shipping it out, and [they] I don‘t want that... (NSFC 3) 
 Conventional attitudes and protectionism from leaders were undermining NSFC‘s 
intention to ‗think differently‘ and transform local power relations.  Instead, NSFC project plans 




(jobs), and deemphasizing early plans for strategic policy development in support of meaningful 
local control over resources, whether for non-Aboriginal or Aboriginal communities. 
7.3. Initial Project Focus 
The NSFC mainly pursued project work on non-timber forest products, bioenergy, and capacity 
building to promote economic opportunities.  Efforts focussed on developing the organizational 
capacity to manage and operate what was essentially a local economic development and forest 
research organization that supported consultant-based feasibility research.  NSFC‘s approach 
was to develop a portfolio of feasibility studies in order to present business opportunities to 
would-be investors and entrepreneurs, local or otherwise.  Federal money provided to foster 
community involvement in forestry solutions was mainly being channelled through local and 
non-local consultants who could do the front-end work on studies intended to provide eventual 
returns to the communities when business opportunities were implemented. 
 By fall 2009, Level Plains Inc. had begun a nearly 165 ha blueberry plantation on private 
land at Wawa with support from the NSFC and NOHFC; the much earlier plans for Chapleau 
had been delayed due to a lack of supporting provincial policy and an entrepreneur to carry the 
project forward (NSFC 3, 7).  However, OMNR and industry partners remained supportive of 
NSFC‘s blueberry project plans (NSFC 13)
14
.  NTFP research projects were also expanding with 
Canadian universities.  Entrepreneurs with business ideas were also contacting NSFC for start-up 
assistance, ranging from funding to local networking. 
 Conversely, the application originally accepted by the federal government stressed the 
perceived need for self-reliance and cultural and institutional reform.  Reflecting those 
aspirations, the issues of tenure reform and the need to develop value-added processing and non-
timber forest products were at centre stage in the first section of the proposal (Albert et al 2006). 
One early participant observed a shift in direction: ―…when they started, when they put their 
proposal in back in 2007, they were talking about things like tenure‖ (NSFC 13).  When the 
                                                 
14 In late April 2010, Algoma-Manitoulin MPP Mike Brown announced $50,000 in provincial funding would be given the Northeast Superior 
Forest Community Corporation to explore regional economic opportunities for commercial blueberry cultivation.  The funding would be used to 




proposal was written, the focus on local control of forests and developing local talent for 
community economic development stood in contrast to concurrent forest industry appeals to 
government for increased security for industrial fibre allocations and reduced energy costs, for 
example, in order to create a more competitive business environment. One participant 
commented that the Mayors had worked with consultants to build a winning proposal based on 
alternative forest use and local political control only to ―depoliticize‖ by softening their pursuit 
of local control and tenure issues once federal funding was secured and NSFC was established 
(NSFC 5). 
 Against the backdrop of sweeping mill closures and local control advocacy, the FCP and 
NSFC program direction met with direct public criticism.  An earlier article in the Sault Star 
(―Forest-dependent towns have a brighter future than you might think‖, June 27, 2008) written 
by then FCP Program Director, Steve Dominy, of NRCAN promoted NSFC and FCP as  
...one way the government of Canada is stimulating a different conversation in the forest 
sector to help address the challenges being faced.... It is people living and working in our 
forest-dependent communities who will greatly influence the direction of change. They 
care about the forest and know it can continuously offer many products and services to 
their community. These residents have the will and imagination required to lead change 
towards ingenious solutions.  
While the above article implied a need for change and greater community involvement, on July 
4, 2008 a very direct response was published in the Sault Star, entitled ―Forest tenure 
arrangement needs changing‖.  A retired CFS employee and forest technician questioned the 
effectiveness of the federal program and Mr. Dominy‘s sentiments, pointing out that the forestry 
crisis was fundamentally a result of the failing Crown forest tenure system: 
The federal monies going into the Forest Communities Program may sound good.  
However, what can a community or group of communities hope to gain from this federal 
proposal?  The federal government has no jurisdiction over natural resources in Ontario. 
Research and study with federal dollars will not provide long-term employment 
opportunities and enterprise development without a change in forestland tenure 
arrangements. (Opinion piece by Fred Haavisto, Sault Star, Friday, July 4, 2008: A8). 
 Several NSFC representatives did see the need to explore tenure reform and opportunities 




acknowledged that the OMNR had management jurisdiction over the forests but that NSFC 
could develop partnerships and research as vehicles to drive change and learning about forest 
land tenure.  OMNR‘s March 2009 announcement that the tenure system would be reviewed 
meant that it was no longer a ―taboo‖ topic, as one participant stated it had been back when the 
NSFC was forming (NSFC 6).  Some reflecting on the development of the NSFC thought the 
organization should try to develop a model and/or policy for how tenure arrangements might 
change (NSFC 4, 13, 14, 15; Industry 1), for example: 
I‘d like to see them bring the tenure issue very much to the forefront right now. This is 
critical with the Minister‘s announcement in Sudbury and in fact the ministries behind 
tenure reform I think they would be really... I think they‘ll miss a golden opportunity here 
to be put on the map.  I would see them for example being a pilot project for an 
alternative tenure mechanism. (NSFC 13) 
Others were more reserved in their assessment of NSFC‘s perceived role, concentrating instead 
on understanding the various arrangements being tabled and how they could adapt to what they 
saw as ‗inevitable‘ provincial policy changes to the tenure system (NSFC 3).   
 Municipal and First Nations representatives in towns where mills had closed were 
interested and in some cases actively pursuing community-based tenure over former industry 
licences.  Collaborative community-based SFLs were in various stages of development for both 
White River-Pic Mobert First Nation and Manitouwadge-Marathon-Pic River Ojibway 
throughout 2008 and 2009 (―Rural communities view to be Sustainable Forest Licence Holders‖, 
Northern Ontario Business, March 2010; ―Town, band buy Domtar plant‖; Thunder Bay 
Chronicle-Journal, June 2009).  It is ironic that municipal government and First Nations 
involved in the NSFC were developing partnerships in support of local control and alternative 
forest resource development, but doing so outside of the NSFC forum, while similar and 
innovative First Nations-led co-management plans were not receiving support through NSFC. 
7.4. Evolving Organizational Frames and Power Relations in the NSFC 
7.4.1. Framing and Reframing the Problem: NSFC Diagnostic Frames 
As illustrated in the above discussion, a drive for self reliance and to ‗do things differently‘ led to 




previously in Chapter 6, the earliest experience by local leadership with layoffs and mill closures 
highlighted the total lack of communication with local mills (e.g., ―We never saw it coming‖ – 
Chapleau Mayor, 2004) and a perceived indifference of senior governments to the effects of the 
forestry crisis in Northern Ontario (e.g., ―unfortunately the province is not willing to move as 
quickly as is required‖ – Wawa Reeve, 2003; ―our municipality is trying to... get the ear of the 
provincial government.  I don‘t think we have it in Northern Ontario‖ – White River Mayor, 
2003).   
 The formation of the Mayors‘ Group and NSFC was linked to the efforts of collaborating 
individuals who, questioning the apparent failures of policy and management, reframed the 
problem in trying to identify promising new paths.  All participants explained the current forestry 
crisis in terms of the many economic factors affecting the existing industry (outlined in Chapter 
6), thereby acknowledging substantive facts emanating from the dominant social framings of the 
problem provided by industry/government reports and the media.  However, rather than 
passively accepting this diagnosis and the prescribed actions to fix the existing industry, 
municipal representatives pressed to identify more fundamental causes of the overall problem 
and developed their own nuanced understanding. 
 For some in the NSFC, a change in the vision and policies surrounding forest tenure was 
judged to be at the heart of the matter (e.g., NSFC 4, 5, 9, 11, 14).  Citing the failure of 
provincial forest policy and the Crown tenure system, participants underscored what they saw as 
the more fundamental aspects of the ‗real‘ problem, that is, a lack of local control and economic 
diversity.  This framing of the problem explains the initial focus of the NSFC proposal on 
projects for NTFPs, policy and tenure innovation, and bio-energy.  Although much of the early 
direction of the NSFC can be attributed to paid consultants from other areas of Northern Ontario, 
the adoption of these problem frames came through ―simple dialogue‖ (NSFC 6) in an alternative 
forum and through double-loop learning modes intended to ‗do the right thing‘ for their 
communities based on common interests.  One participant (NSFC 5) remembered that the 
Mayors were ―excited‖ overall about these new possibilities but that some were more reserved in 
their judgement, given potential conflicts over Crown resources with operating mills.  Still, the 




culture and relationships with forest ecosystems and how they ought to be managed and used in 
order to benefit northern populations. 
 Significant differences emerged in NSFC diagnostic framings and about which ones 
would actually guide action.  For example, the gradual downgrading of relationships with 
consultants who were willing to publicly criticize provincial forest policy and provide leadership 
for reforming the tenure system (i.e., INORD) enabled NTFP feasibility studies to eclipse this 
facet of the NSFC proposal.  Participants described a hesitance among the Mayors to pursue 
tenure reform because it was ‗very political‘ (NSFC 13) and ‗taboo‘ (NSFC 6). Referring to the 
change in direction, one participant commented: 
…the focus [of the NSFC] needs to be a how do you develop a campaign to get increased 
control of the forests locally? The Mayors kinda backed away from that. They got scared. 
(NSFC 5) 
Local political appetite for change was tempered with caution, given that some local leaders did 
not want to support projects or actions that might jeopardize the two operational mills (Chapleau 
and Hornepayne).  As long-time residents of Northern Ontario, most were also accustomed to 
resource development driving the local economy.   
7.4.2. The Solutions: Prognostic Frames 
The lack of local control was considered by some actors to be the root of the problem. It is not 
surprising that increased local control was considered a main part of the solution.  Participants 
suggested that increased local control could take on a variety of tenure forms.  However, this 
change in control was mainly envisioned through municipal involvement or more opportunities 
created for local business and other stakeholders by securing timber allocations for specialized 
value-added manufacturing, rather than only conventional large-scale commodity-based 
operations such as sawmills.  Indeed, communities that independently pursued SFL takeovers 
(e.g., White River- Pic Mobert First Nation) did so with combined plans to develop energy, non-
conventional as well as conventional products. 
 An important distinction can be made between those who were unsure about the benefits 




more meaningful collaborative partnerships between industry and municipalities, and those who 
supported municipal and First Nations involvement in Crown timber allocation processes (NSFC 
4, 5, 11, 14).  Others were more absolute about the need to ―wrestle control away from industry‖ 
(NSFC 4).  Another participant stated: 
On the forestry issue, I think the municipalities need to be consulted more. And that goes 
way back to the tenure issue. See no one wants to touch it.  If it were me and I were a 
Mayor, I‘d say ‗you‘re God damn right I want that [forest tenure]‘.  (NSFC 11)   
 Others were more open to any combination that would create conditions for a viable 
forest economy (NSFC 1, 8, 10, 16).  Whatever the solution, they believed that the onus was on 
the local people to make it happen because industry and government were not seen to be 
motivated to support change.  A shift away from the conventional thinking about and acceptance 
of industry-dominated forests and communities is indicative of double-loop learning processes 
among some NSFC participants.  However, aside from ongoing partnership work with OMNR 
and industry for blueberry plantations, this objective was pursued individually by partner towns.  
Proposed mill takeovers and First Nations co-management were not pursued through NSFC in 
that these projects were not unanimously endorsed by the Mayors. 
 NSFC participants said that through their experience with the NSFC and forestry crisis 
they had gained an appreciation for the complexity of forestry in Northern Ontario, and 
specifically in their region.  Despite their differences, both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal 
members said they had learned that they had to work together with the other communities, 
instead of competing with one another (First Nations 3; NSFC 4, 6, 7, 8, 11).  One participant 
referred to this as ―regional thinking‖ (NSFC 6), indicating a need to think about neighbouring 
towns and First Nations as part of a system (indicative of double-loop learning, see Keen et al 
2005): 
It‘s our interest to ensure that there‘s operations in the region. Collectively within the six 
Mayors, they see it that way.  The Weyerhaeuser shutdown, 130 workers or whatever it 
was, equally affected Chapleau because they were on the wood operations side... they 
were the truckers... so they lost big time also.  So it‘s interconnected and we came to 
know that.  It‘s like a card house, you pull one card out and the rest come down. We may 
not always agree, but we recognize that each card is important. What‘s good for one is 




 This change in perspective supported the development of a common place- and interest-
based identity.  Many expressed a preference and need for regional actors to collaborate in order 
to overcome what were viewed as ‗northern problems‘ (First Nations 3; NSFC 4, 6, 7, 10).  Once 
funding was secured, NSFC staff planned to systematically engage regional actors from First 
Nations, industry, parks, universities and other government organizations.  Admittedly, this was 
slow to occur (NSFC 1, 3, 13, 15).  Plans for growing partnerships would not be limited to 
industry and government, but were intended to move the discussion into an accessible public 
forum in which diverse perspectives and ideas could be shared and integrated into policy and 
practice.   
The emergence of the Mayors‘ Group and the later formation of the NSFC represent such 
a forum.  Mainstream debates among industry, labour and government focused on single-loop 
learning solutions, such as how to lower energy prices and delivered wood costs, and how to 
tweak fibre flows to improve the competitiveness of existing industry.  In contrast, the NSFC set 
out to develop solutions to diversify the forest economy, which later took the form of NSFC 
projects for identifying new products (e.g., NTFPs).  Emerging from bottom-up collaboration, 
the problem was reframed as a challenge caused by limited local access to fibre which in turn 
stifled innovation and northern talent.  Consequently, the NSFC placed additional value on the 
need to develop local solutions rather than only focussing on attracting the next big investor to 
the region.  Local leaders‘ shifting assumptions regarding the role of local resources and 
enterprise in diversification, and the perceived importance of creating local access to fibre, 
indicates double-loop learning. 
7.4.3. Identity and Characterisation Frames 
Organizational identity frames evolved throughout the process of development.  The reframing 
of identity first for the NESMG and then NSFC was a key to initial collaboration because actors 
recognized they needed to work together to solve their common problems rather than competing 
as individual communities.  However, this reframing was questioned by two separate large 
industry representatives who were accustomed to competition between towns for industrial 
opportunities, for example: 










development in our region‘... 
 
...They‟re saying it. 
 
 
They‟re saying it?  Then that‘s good to hear.  It‘s encouraging [laughs 
doubtfully]. 
 
 However, there was a strong commitment to working together and generally positive 
rapport between all of the mayors and local resource persons interviewed.  Direct observation of 
both a Mayors‘ Group meeting (in Dubreuilville) and a later NSFC meeting (in Hornepayne) 
confirmed this and upheld similar interview evidence from those within (NSFC 3, 7, 9, 13) and 
outside (e.g., Municipal 14; Provincial 6, 8) of the organization.  The Mayors formed a common 
identity based on their shared history of challenges and successes in local politics and local 
culture that contributed to what could be described as a sort of unconditional support for both 
individual preferences and overlapping interests.  This identity was propagated through their 
common voice which both municipal representatives and observers in senior governments and 
across the region recognized.  While the common identity and voice they developed was 
empowering, it contributed to a common discourse that also worked to limit dissent within their 
group. 
 Bridging the NSFC identity beyond local leadership to the community level was a 
challenge.  The NSFC organization admittedly failed to engage residents and local stakeholders 
early on (NSFC 1, 2, 3, 11, 13).  This may have occurred in part because the formation of a 
lasting and collective organizational identity was delayed by ongoing competition between 
consultants and municipal officials over what the NSFC should or would be.  There was also a 
rollover in municipal leadership and hiring of new staff which produced a steep learning curve at 
a formative process stage (2006-2008). 
 Some participants stated that early on the NSFC staff and board had a mixed and 
uncertain vision for the nascent organization (NSFC 3, 6, 14, 15; Industry 9).  The general 
manager‘s public letter in the Algoma News Review on May 2008 hinted at this challenge: ―Our 




not come together in such a big way until now.‖  One participant stated that a challenge to 
developing a NSFC marketing strategy was ―first, I guess developing what the message is going 
to be and then getting it out‖ (NSFC 3).   
 In May and June 2008, numerous participants within each partnering town characterised 
the NSFC as having no visible or vocal presence at the community level, indicating a low level 
of community engagement and awareness, for example: 
Number one in my opinion is a complete lack of communication from that organization.   
(Municipal 10) 
...people don‘t know who they are. People have no idea that Natural Resources Canada is 
giving money to the Northeast Superior Region.  People don‘t know that. (NSFC 2) 
Some suggested that even involved municipal representatives had little understanding: 
I would suggest that if you went into individual councils, you‘d get the same answer... 
municipal councils... even though their mayor is there, city councils themselves don‘t 
really know a lot about it [NSFC]. That‘s because the NSFC has not done a good job 
promoting themselves.  (NSFC 11) 
As discussed above, OMNR staff also wondered whether this was an intentional move by NSFC 
or whether it was a matter of limited capacity (Province 4).  Although public workshops were to 
be held in each of the partner communities during the summer and fall of 2008, four were 
cancelled after the first two meetings in Wawa and Hornepayne were very poorly attended (six 
people).  Low turnout was attributed to bad timing during the summer months and to public 
apathy (NSFC 1, 3, 10). 
 To address these challenges, a marketing and communications position was posted on 
July 19, 2008 (Chapleau Express) and temporarily filled (until June 2009) by an individual 
working at a satellite office in Wawa.  Overall, NSFC representatives thought the placement in 
Wawa was positive, but this created logistical challenges for the organization (NSFC 1, 2, 3).  
With the departure of their first hire, the marketing and communications contract position 




 Despite inconsistent public outreach and marketing development efforts, by May 2009 
some participants indicated that efforts to build relationships with potential partners had 
improved: 
They‘re just now at the stage where people are starting to realize that they‘re there. So 
like one of the things that they‘re doing is meeting with different agencies like Ministry 
of Northern Development and Mines and FedNor... you know, having one-on-one 
meetings... because right now they‘re probably not that familiar with Northeast Superior 
and what they are doing. (NSFC 15) 
You know MNR is asking me... ‗what‘s happening at NSFC? We‘re not hearing from 
them?‘  To me they [NSFC] need to be... meeting with Bondar, meeting with the key 
managers there.  They‘ve done it to a limited degree... (NSFC 13) 
As evinced by interviews with community members in May 2009, ongoing challenges to 
stimulate public awareness within the region led to different characterisations of the NSFC.  
Some community organizations described NSFC as ―working behind the scenes‖ (Province 13), 
while other community members were suspicious and felt that NSFC was not being transparent 
enough (Industry 9; Local Enterprise 1, 2). 
 The reframing of organizational identity to include First Nations marks a critical 
transformation achieved through more meaningful collaboration.  While some First Nations were 
listed as partners, the initial proposal framed organizational identity in a manner that totally 
excluded First Nations: ―As a regional organization, however, based on the authority of the 
elected councils the mayor‘s group is clearly a legitimate representative of the people of the 
entire region‖ (Albert et al 2006: 7).  Although some First Nations were listed as partners in the 
NSFC proposal and later Strategic Plan, they were confused by mixed signals from the 
organization and had difficulty identifying with project: 
In some cases First Nations are presented as partners and in others areas they are viewed 
as stakeholders... the Strategic Plan lists the name and population of the seven First 
Nations whose territories are covered by the scope of the Strategic Plan, implying they 
are partners in the process, yet the site description map...highlights the location of 
involved municipalities but not the affected First Nations. (CCFN 2008a: 8)  
Part of this challenge was that NSFC was working to adapt previous work done by consultants 




consultants and the hiring of new staff provided an important window for First Nations to assert 
their interests while the organization was still developing. 
7.4.4. Power Frames 
7.4.4.1. Authority and Resources 
NSFC respondents considered either the provincial government or forest industry to have the 
most power, followed by First Nations, confirming perceptions outlined in Chapters 5 and 6.  
The source of power most often identified with provincial government and First Nations was 
again legal authority, with the latter‘s rights being recognized by the courts, for example: 
Aboriginal people have pre-existing inherent rights to the land that they grant to the 
Crown, not the other way around‖ (NSFC 4).   
Their power is legitimate Treaty Rights.  (NSFC 14) 
NSFC representatives respected that First Nations could intervene with project plans (e.g., NSFC 
1, 8, 11) based on their legal authority; some felt this authority was used as a threat to sway 
support for First Nations objectives as part of the NSFC (NSFC 7).  As discussed above, it was 
area First Nations who insisted on having meaningful involvement with the Mayors, suggesting 
that some coercion was necessary. 
 While First Nations‘ authority regarding natural resources was widely recognized, this 
was seen to be limited by a lack of capacity.  Many non-Aboriginal NSFC representatives 
encouraged First Nations‘ involvement and projected their capacity to increase in the future 
(NSFC 3, 8, 9, 11, 13, 14, 15).  As outlined above, the NSRCF initiative was partially funded by 
NRCAN through the NSFC to help provide resources for capacity building. 
 At the same time, the view that industry had the capacity to unduly influence due to its 
political affiliation and capital/resources always seemed to arise: 
In terms of forestry, I think that companies still have way too much influence. They hold 
the [Sustainable Forest Licences]. They‘re the ones who hold the factories and the assets. 
They‘re the ones who employ the people.  [Ministry of Natural Resources] has influence 
of course, but then again it‘s the forestry companies who are contributing to the 




NSFC participants believed that industry had too much power and that communities were 
excluded from decision making (NSFC 3, 4, 6, 9, 11, 13, 14). This frame was linked closely with 
problem and solution frames for tenure reform and support for alternative wood uses, both 








...any one of these communities is not open to any forest related 
opportunities right now because the province won‘t license you and... 
industry is in control of fibre.  
 
So you can‘t get access to fibre?  
 
Not whatsoever... not whatsoever. So you‘re almost like a hostage, right.  
 
 Legal authority and sheer resources (e.g., capital, financial, human) suggest a capacity to 
influence through coercion or forced action, but the ability to constrain potential actions was 
viewed to be more important.  For example, NSFC did have ongoing working relations with 
Tembec and OMNR for its blueberry project plans; however, it was made clear to NSFC and 
OMNR that the company would not support the project if it would negatively affect its wood 
supply (NSFC 3).  Working together with industry and OMNR on Chapleau‘s blueberry project 
no doubt constrained opinions among Chapleau representatives who also wanted to maintain 
local forestry jobs but did want to pursue new opportunities (Municipal 14; NSFC 7).  Moreover, 
the ability of industry to control government forest policy agendas and ensure inaction was a 
central observation among those who perceived the need for tenure reform (NSFC 4, 6, 8, 9, 11, 
14), for example: 
We think the Crown is but they‘re not [laughing]. They‘re not.  The wood industry... the 
companies themselves are managing the Crown. (NSFC 9) 
Well it should be MNR right, but I have a feeling that the corporate agenda, not only does 
it influence the MNR, I think it really scares the living crap out of them to be honest with 
you.  I think the corporate agenda has the upper hand. (NSFC 14) 
 While NSFC was to embrace different ideas and innovation, some NSFC leaders had 
difficulty envisioning forest management outside of the long dominant forestry discourse.  For 
example, when asked if there were other actors who should be involved in forest management on 




Forest companies don‘t want other people involved. [They‘re] very protective of their 
resource, first of all, and what they do.  That‘s why they‘re sort of reluctant to do things 
together with value-added... I really don‘t know how to answer that question?  I don‟t 
know who would be suitable to support the forest industry?  (NSFC 7) 
Conversely, based on legal authority and resources, municipalities and the federal 
government were not seen as powerful actors relative to the OMNR and the forest industry 
(triangulated by the survey findings in Chapter 5).  The view was that municipalities were 
powerless because industry and government did not consult them or ignored them altogether 
(NSFC 6, 11), for example: 
You don‘t get the industries sitting down at the table with you.  So they‘re running as an 
independent organization disconnected from the communities. Now it doesn‘t mean they 
don‘t do a responsibility, but industries tend not... when it comes down to their own 
economic survival, they tend not to work with communities directly very much. (NSFC 
6) 
NSFC participants also did not consider themselves to have much influence on the only agenda 
that really mattered (i.e., forestry), for example:  
 Certainly the mayors and local councillors have no influence at all. (NSFC 14) 
We don‘t have much power.  The only power is what we give ourselves. (NSFC 11) 
Ironically, the Mayors overlooked that the federal government had endorsed their 
unconventional project plans—a vision developed by the early discursive work of the Mayors 
and consultants—by providing considerable funding and links to an international research 
network.  This later helped create a formal collaborative forum (the NSFC) right in the shadow 
of the region‘s traditionally dominant stakeholders (i.e., forest industry and Ontario Ministry of 
Natural Resources).  This support also boosted municipal influence through increased relational 
power (discussed below).  The federal government was funding the revolution, so to speak.  As 
the network and its thinking evolved, it gained power and legitimacy through its individual 
municipal affiliations as well as its association with one another, the Aboriginal communities, 
and the federal government which supported their vision for local control.  The formation of 
these relationships between traditionally marginalized actors served to subvert the power of 




a result, even though the Mayors, and subsequently the newly formed NSFC, had no formal 
authority over forest resource management decision making, they were not powerless. 
Other noteworthy sources of resource power were the main funding agencies in Northern 
Ontario business and development.  These were Northern Ontario Heritage Fund Corporation 
(Ministry of Northern Development and Mines), Community Futures Corporations and FedNor, 
which were mentioned time and again, for example: 
Northern Ontario Heritage Fund Corporation has been very supportive lately and I should 
also say FedNor‘s very supportive of Northern Ontario economic opportunities both to 
the traditional groups that support us. (NSFC 11) 
These and other sources of funding gained prominence in the absence of large industry 
employers.  Evidently many local projects, whether for infrastructure, strategic planning, and 
economic development interns, for example, were funded and assisted by these agencies.  As of 
June 2010, large amounts of money were soon flowing to NSFC from these federal and 
provincial sources (NSFC 3). 
7.4.4.2. Relational Power 
The relational power of the Mayors‘ Group was remarked upon numerous times by participants 
(Industry 10; NSFC 7, 8, 9, 11).  Many interpreted government and community recognition of 
their association and successes as a sign that any power they had, in the eyes of others, stemmed 
from coordination and cooperation, for example:  ―We are held up as an example in the North in 
terms of communities cooperating‖ (NSFC 11).  In particular, various NSFC representatives 
commented on how ongoing invitations for the Mayors to meet with political representatives 
(i.e., the Ontario Premier; Ministers from the Ministry of Northern Development and Mines, and 
Ministry of Municipal Affairs) and associations (Federation of Northern Ontario Municipalities), 
the awarding of the FCP site, and purported formation of ‗mayors groups‘ in other parts of 
Northern Ontario validated their relational power (Industry 10; NSFC 7, 8, 11).  Over time, this 
was also central to the development of the organizational identity of the Mayors Group and 
NSFC.  Reframing a regional identity through regular interaction and overcoming adversarial 




as their association gained political recognition: ―I mean that was the whole gravitation to the 
Mayors‘ Group was strength in numbers‖ (NSFC 9). 
At the same time, the structural power emanating from their association worked at times 
to limit dissent.  The Mayors had created a syndicate to lobby senior government based on a 
previously identified shared set of interests.  Many participants referred to the importance of 
their common voice or the idea that all of the Mayors in the region were singing the same tune, 
for example: 
The whole region has to survive and we have to do it together. It brings a strong voice to 
government as well.  You know when you have six mayors that sit down with the 
minister and talk the same talk... That‘s the way we‘re going to win. (NSFC 7) 
Mobilizing common framings of problems and solutions exercised the relational power of 
the Group through propagating a shared discourse.  As mentioned above, the Mayors recognized 
that providing common support for individual or group projects, whether through letters of 
support or funding, helped every community in the long term.  However, this pledge could also 
limit debate.  Projects  potentially politically detrimental to the Group, such as the White River-
Pic Mobert First Nation buyout plan with Domtar, were not supported by ‗the table‘ (NSFC 7). 
Organization of the Regional Chiefs Forum was also seen to boost the relational power of 
First Nations with respect to lobbying governments for change: 
...we‘re going to be stronger number one as a voice. It‘s not just one person, one Chief, 
me [and] my Chief standing there saying ‗this is wrong‘.  It‘s a group of First Nations 
saying ‗no‘. (First Nations 3) 
Much like the Mayors, First Nations collaborative efforts were also gaining support from 
government agencies: 
... we‘re kind of looking at them as a role model for the rest of the province. They seem 
to have a pretty good idea.  First Nations tend to follow what other First Nations are 
doing... ‗well that‘s a really good idea, let‘s do that‘.  So we figured [what] if we could 
stimulate almost pilot projects. We‘ve been saying for years that First Nations need to 
partner up here because try as they might they are not going to get an opportunity for 
each one individual.  They have to form some kind of a cooperative.  So in this case 
being six or seven should be a pretty good forest opportunity there and they seem like a 




And, as First Nations became more organized through their collective forum, their power was 
evident at the level of NSFC negotiations, for example: 
Now that they‘re starting to speak as a collective, they have a lot more impact on what 
happens.  They have a lot more say in how we drive the process. (NSFC 3) 
 Although still at an early stage in the NSFC, participants forecast strength would come 
through building municipal-First Nations relationships, for example: 
And the more they [First Nations] educate themselves, the more they‘re being active in all 
the processes that are being involved, which is a great thing. It's just that a new way for us 
too, it‘s a whole new kind of dynamic that we need to consider. I mean, it's a great thing, 
it‘s really good to see ...the mayors have been endorsing them one hundred percent, they‘re 
supportive of the First Nations in the region as well.  I mean, I think we‘re on to 
something, with the First Nations and the municipalities working together. We‘re going to 
have something here that nobody has anywhere. It‘s going to be really interesting to see 
how it plays out. (NSFC 3) 
The fall 2008 addition of First Nations collective voice and advance of their issues within the 
NSFC (i.e., reframing of identity) illustrates the effectiveness of relational power for mobilizing 
groups previously excluded from regional development efforts. 
7.4.4.3. Positional Power 
Some participants were also seen to have positional power that elevated their decisions and/or 
frames in group situations, such as at board meetings.  At least four individuals referred to the 
positional power and experience of Chapleau‘s Mayor as President and Chair of the NSFC and 
Secretary Treasurer of the Canadian Model Forest Network, for example: 
...there is a lot of stock put into what [Chapleau‘s mayor] says. He has a lot of history 
with being a politician. He has a lot of background. (NSFC 3) 
In Chapleau, [the mayor] has been there for a long, long time. Our Mayor has only been 
in this position for two years roughly... so there‘s a learning curve in that. (Municipal 10)  
Many (NSFC 1, 3; municipal 10) attributed this to the long experience of the Chapleau mayor 
with local politics relative to other officials and also that other Mayors had consciously limited 
themselves to filling their council positions on a part-time basis (NSFC 8).  The consolidation of 




forming NSFC, based on the location of staff and the head office in Chapleau.  Indeed, when it 
was recognized that the hired consultants would soon be positioned to control the NRCAN 
funds, a sympathetic staff member and facilities were offered to establish the organization which 
also reinforced Chapleau as the lead town, whether unintentionally or by design. 
 Once a formal organization was established and backed with federal funding, municipal 
representatives took on more of a leadership role.  Consultants and other ‗advisors‘ were 
disengaged due to potential conflicts of interest and the perceived need to maintain complete 
local control over the organization.  Certain pet project ideas were left to ‗die off‘ (NSFC 3)—
intentionally dropped altogether to remove any vestige of former consultant control or influence, 
and to distance rejected ideas from the ‗new‘ organizational identity.  This is an example of how 




This chapter analyzed the social framings collaboratively produced in a group of local 
representatives and their advisors—the Mayors‘ Group—that led to the development of a formal 
organization intended to promote community stability in Northern Ontario.  Guided by the 
conceptual framework, the analysis illustrates how power relations and socio-cultural contexts 
mediate the double-loop learning processes through which framing and reframing occurs.  In the 
above pages, I have illustrated how alternative problem and solution frames were developed and 
the role of power relations in advancing certain ideas over others in the creation of the NSFC.  In 
particular, the analysis shows how different sources of agent-based power (i.e., authority, 
resources, relational and positional) were exercised by municipal actors, consultants, and later 
First Nations, which were central to shaping organizational identity as a basis for collective 
action. 
 Formation of a collaborative regional governance structure created capacity but also 
introduced a power imbalance among local communities (as perceived by some municipal 




political leaders, consultants, and staff over organizational identity and, in turn, problem and 
solution frames, which contributed to shifting a organizational vision and preferences for 
actions/outcomes.  The early organizational phase of the NFSC, local leadership capacity, as well 
as entrenched support for conventional forestry perspectives among key NSFC players, 
constrained organizational support for and involvement in truly novel local control projects 
deemed essential in NSFC‘s Forest Communities Program proposal to the federal government. 
Based on a shared commitment to improving community relations and development in the region 
as a whole, local actors confronted a steep learning curve.  Together NSFC participants made 
progress in developing a collaborative governance structure and capacity and economic 
development innovation. 
     Timing of controlled and uncontrollable political, economic and social events created a 
turbulent context for working and learning together.  Unforeseen events and uncertain outcomes 
(e.g., municipal elections) also created opportunities for some local political actors (e.g., the 
Mayors, First Nations), while limiting those of others (consultants), as efforts progressed.  Long-
term leadership in Chapleau provided stability that assisted with the implementation of the Forest 
Communities Program amidst fluctuating political support and economic conditions.  The loss of 
industry amplified the role of senior governments and funding agencies at the community level, 
as well as local political intervention.  Specifically, federal and later provincial monies flowing 
through the NSFC and NSRCF shifted the dynamics of power among municipal leaders, First 
Nations, local enterprise, forest industry and consulting companies.  Social framings of the 
forestry crisis and NSFC‘s related role were constantly being adjusted according to what actors 
were dominant at different times throughout the organizational development process.  This 
highlights the importance of context to social framing processes and emphasizes the normative 
consideration that learning processes and outcomes serve certain interests and values. 
 The next and concluding chapter (8) provides a synthesis of the main research findings 
from Chapters 5, 6, and 7.  It highlights the main conceptual, empirical and methodological 
contributions, reviews strengths and limitations of this research, makes recommendations for the 





CHAPTER 8 – CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
8.1. Overview 
In the opening chapters, I established that Canadian forest management and planning have 
gradually shifted towards increased collaboration.  I argued that such changes warrant critical 
attention because the benefits of collaborative and learning-based approaches do not accrue 
automatically, nor are all interests served equitably.  Identifying conceptual overlap among social 
learning, political ecology and collaboration research, I set out to explore the utility of frame 
analysis (Dale 1989; Rein and Schön 1994; Gray 2003; Forsyth 2003) for understanding 
evolving perspectives and outcomes of the ongoing forestry crisis in Northern Ontario, and the 
emergence of the Northeast Superior Forest Community Corporation.  Accordingly, this research 
addresses the need for research that better accounts for how power relations affect learning in 
emerging collaborations (Sinclair and Diduck 2001; Keen and Mahanty 2006; Wildemeersch 
2007; Armitage et al 2008), and thereby contributes to a more nuanced understanding of social 
learning processes and outcomes. 
  The main research findings and conclusions are discussed below, organized as a 
response to the core research questions presented in Chapter 1.  A summary discussion leads up 
to each of the 14 conclusions.  The main research contributions (conceptual, methodological and 
empirical), research strengths and limitations, 10 recommendations for practice, and future 
research opportunities are then presented. 
8.2. Main Findings: Discussion and Conclusions 
8.2.1. How do different actors frame the forestry crisis in the Northeast Superior Region? 
The survey results and frame analysis established two main perspectives of the ‗forestry crisis‘. 
The first is based on conventional forest resource management in which companies hold the 
primary interest as policy agents in resource extraction and commodity export.  The second 
perspective presents an alternative view which advocates increased municipal and First Nations 
control of forests to establish equity and provide stability in resource towns.  Previous research 
(Salazar and Alper 1996; Beckley 1998; Baker and Kusel 2003; Donoghue and Sturtevant 2008) 




forest communities and hinges on different beliefs about how forests should be managed, 
including the range of values and interests to be considered, and the control and distribution of 
forest-derived benefits.  I have also shown that each perspective offers a different set of solutions 
as a response to crisis and conflict, although power relations (discussed below) worked to 
reinforce long dominant social framings at both the regional (Chapter 6) and local scales 
(Chapter 7).  These different sets of solutions are consistent with corporatist versus dependency 
models of forest politics found in previous situations of resource management conflict in Canada 
(Salazar and Alper 1996).  However, my research presents new evidence from a new case study 
in Northern Ontario. 
 My research shows that the dominant discourse of conventional forest management has a 
long history (by Canadian standards) in Northern Ontario.  Conventional forest management has 
played a formative role in shaping the patterns of resource and community development, forest 
governance arrangements, and identities of those living and working in Northeast Superior 
forests.  Under the current management structure, a set of contrasting interest-based identity 
frames link ‗dependent‘ forest resource towns, workers and First Nations to expert forestry 
professionals who manage Crown forests for increasingly large corporate entities and the 
provincial government (Chapter 6). 
 Confirming the observations of Donoghue and Sturtevant (2008), an entrenched 
community of interest, including both internal and external actors (e.g., investors, mill managers 
and workers, bush workers, and government regulators), has formed around a common goal 
and/or set of beliefs (i.e., timber extraction and scientific forestry).  These interests have 
historically reproduced uneven social relations and overridden communities of place and 
collective place-based identities.  Positive characterisations of locally-owned forest companies 
indicate support for extractive industries—and even trust and acceptance of a paternal 
relationship between residents and private companies—as long as ownership is perceived to be 
‗community minded‘, linked to other local businesses, and there is perceived recirculation of 
forest-derived benefits in nearby towns.  Survey findings too indicate a clear preference for 
increased municipal control of forest resources (i.e., devolution from the provincial to municipal 




Conclusion 1: In the Northeast Superior Region, social framings of forestry issues, as 
well as identities and local culture, are mediated by core-periphery dynamics. 
 In constructing the forestry crisis, dominant identity, diagnostic and prognostic frames 
were advanced early on as the basis for action (Tables 6.8; 6.13).  The frame analysis in Chapter 
6 showed that managers, residents and workers of Northeast Superior‘s resource dependent 
towns are accustomed to the regional boom and bust cycle of major primary industries.  Many 
participants were also aware that global forces of economic and corporate restructuring in 
developed market economies are contributing to long-term rural change in primary industries and 
associated communities (Hayter 2000).  Notably, the most recent downturn in the forest sector 
was not framed as a ‗forestry crisis‘ until corporate interests became convinced that conditions 
had exceeded those of past sectoral downturns in both magnitude and duration.  From the onset, 
the problem was framed by industry and the media based on economic challenges for forest 
companies.  Conventional framings became the ‗master narrative‘ (Escobar and Paulson 2005) 
against which all new ideas or alternate problem and solution perspectives were assessed.   
 Frame analysis of regional media showed that industry and government voices prevailed 
during the first several years (2001-2005) of the unfolding crisis.  Local control perspectives 
were initially easily silenced by dominant views and the ensuing scramble of closures and job 
loss across the North.  When labour and municipal leaders did speak out, community and labour 
issues were framed according to implications of the crisis for the industry first, rather than the 
socio-economic impacts on towns and residents.  Interviews showed that shrinking profits, 
declining competitiveness, wood or ‗fibre‘ supply challenges, political interference in the market, 
and rising operation costs had become common catchphrases even among dissenters. 
 Industry representatives in the media and interviews evoked interest-based identity 
frames to unify workers with companies, and, initially, forest workers, labour and municipal 
leaders backed the industry (sections 6.2.3, 6.2.4).  A combination of economic factors 
contributed to a full-scale crisis, beginning with the softwood lumber dispute, rising energy 
costs, rising currency rates, and fibre supply challenges.  Conventional problem frames 
externalized most of the blame onto provincial and federal governments characterised as 




while identifying industry as suffering ‗a slow death‘, ‗riding out the storm‘ and ‗surviving‘, 
served both to inspire collective action to save the ‗victim‘ (while placing responsibility 
elsewhere), and set the stage to rationalize future actions (Benford and Snow 2000). 
Conclusion 2: Social framings can remain stable over time (Elliot et al 2003: 413), 
reinforcing uneven social relations and normalizing recurring socio-economic difficulty. 
 Public controversy, resulting from corporate restructuring and the delayed response of the 
provincial government, generated a perception among dissenting groups that the existing 
industry and senior governments would at last fail the North.  Several grassroots groups 
presented alternate framings of the forestry crisis based on different assumptions regarding the 
appropriate organization of actors, fuller potential of forest products, services and workers 
themselves (i.e., northern talent), and redistribution of benefit streams (Table 6.8; 6.13) (section 
6.2.5).  This is not to say that local control sponsors denied the many substantive challenges 
facing the existing industry; rather, they determined that fundamental change was required and 
reframed the problem to propose alternate solutions, rather than supporting industry ultimatums 
to government to save the failing status quo. 
 Previous research shows that disparate economic interests (e.g., amenity vs. extraction) 
can produce geographically uneven and contested framings of forest environs and rural 
development both between (e.g., Wolf and Klein 2007) and within forest communities in 
transition (e.g., Gill and Reed 1997).  My research adds that, as a response to crisis, collaboration 
and double-loop learning among local actors can work to help rethink existing economic 
activities by reframing forest-community relations that structure forest use and control.  In this 
case, productive hinterland forest landscapes need not necessarily become part of ―consumptive 
landscapes‖ (Gill and Reed 1997).  Transforming governance arrangements and reframing 
identities, problems and solutions (Pahl-Wostl 2009) can provide a way forward for ―productive 
landscapes‖ that do not have a locational advantage (i.e., proximity to large urban markets) to 
remain productive but be more innovative.  The move by Chapleau and later the NSFC to 
promote and implement large-scale blueberry plantations across the region is one example 
(Chapter 7).  However, without a meaningful shift in the power dynamics, this transformation 




realization of meaningful change in forest governance must be driven internally to counter 
centralized and external control of resources and towns. 
 In the Northeast Superior Region, the initial emergence of the Mayors‘ Group (and other 
local control groups such as NOSCP and STRONG) created much needed space for open 
discussion among individuals from different backgrounds.  Together, they identified and 
constructed a more complete view of their shared problems.  This insight and understanding took 
forestry debates away from the usual topics (e.g., energy and transportation costs, licensing, fibre 
flows) associated with conventional power brokers, such as the provincial government and forest 
companies.  This discussion was facilitated through the establishment of a regional governance 
forum (i.e., Mayors‘ Group) to bridge smaller hinterland centres.   
 Initially under the radar, the Mayors‘ Group and its consultants advocated contentious 
ideas about tenure reform and directing control away from major forest companies, and also to 
encourage these ideas as a way to promote regional development.  Indeed, not all Mayors 
supported a local control view.  Still, these early efforts to consider alternative ideas and 
arrangements were part of the overall regional pressure on the provincial government to review 
the Crown forest tenure system beginning in March 2009. 
Conclusion 3: Catalyzed by societal crisis, informal regionally-based collaborative 
forums or „shadow networks‟ (Gunderson 1999; Olsson et al 2006; Goldstein 2008) can 
act as incubators for alternative ideas and learning in response to the limitations of 
existing policies and governance arrangements. 
 Survey and interview findings show that regional actors hold contrasting views regarding 
the current definition and principles of Sustainable Forest Management (section 5.4.4), as well as 
a tension between utilitarian and conservation-oriented views of the forest (section 6.3.1).  Such 
differences present an opportunity for learning among regional actors to help create awareness 
for SFM and the views of others in order to clarify a context-specific common vision.  The 
current focus on maintaining constant timber supplies for mills requires that forest conditions be 
held constant and reflects an outdated understanding and approach to managing forest 
ecosystems.  This is not surprising given the history and enduring image of the region.  However, 




institutions based on Sustainable Forest Management principles to guide human interactions with 
forest ecosystems in Northern Ontario.  First Nations can and should play an important role in 
this regard. 
Conclusion 4: In the Northeast Superior Region, framings of forest and community 
sustainability remain preoccupied with maintaining current timber supplies for corporate 
employers, prioritizing economic values that undermine local control objectives. 
8.2.2. Do actors‘ frames change over time?  How?  Why? 
Major forest industry leaders and lobbyists did not change their perspectives on the nature of the 
problems contributing to the ‗forestry crisis‘.  Industry and government focussed on instrumental 
fixes (single-loop learning), emphasizing technical solutions for gaining efficiency in policy and 
company operations.  This meant trying to reduce uncertainty for investment and removing 
barriers to competiveness in Ontario.  The frame analysis in Chapter 6 showed that tenure reform 
was not preferred by existing license holders as it would increase uncertainty for them and not 
address immediate challenges to help maintain struggling companies. 
 In the Northeast Superior Region, actors outside of the forest policy network gained 
understanding of the crisis through their personal and work experience.  This was true for 
municipal representatives, local enterprise, First Nations, forest workers and parks employees 
involved in advisory forums such as Local Citizen Committees, employed in the forest sector, or 
in the case of First Nations, involved in parallel processes with senior governments.  Participants 
became generally aware of the buzzwords and catchphrases used by industry and government to 
summarize the wider ‗forestry crisis‘ (e.g., ‗perfect storm‘; ‗delivered wood costs‘, 
‗competitiveness‘; ‗poor markets‘) (Chapter 6 and 7).  However, such processes did not provide 
effective opportunities for them to make substantive contributions to correct policies or plans, or 
to reflect on the nature of the problems and solutions, and so were limited in terms of promoting 
social learning (unlike other formal public involvement processes, see Hayward et al 2007, for 
example).  The refusal of First Nations and labour groups to sign-off on the final report of the 
Minister‘s Council on Forest Sector Competitiveness (2005) indicates that such venues were not 




others lobbied government heavily to establish locally responsive forums to discuss perspectives 
and knowledge, before finally sponsoring their own sessions. 
 As problems and understanding evolved, Northeast Superior participants reflected that 
they did not think a forestry downturn could ever get so bad—indicating that the current crisis 
had exceeded local experience.  Through collaboration, the Mayors‘ Group and NSFC 
participants developed a deeper appreciation for the complexity of the forest industry and policy 
environment (e.g., wood flows and the integration of facilities, forest products).  Sharing first-
hand experience also contributed understanding of the impacts on neighbouring towns and 
forests, and how, in turn, such impacts affected their own communities.   
 Local representatives also turned to professional consultants who provided critical 
expertise and outside perspectives on related problems.  This encouraged the local leadership and 
business people to start looking differently at the forest and the role of municipalities and First 
Nations in forest resource planning and business.  For some, this meant expanding the number of 
products and services to be extracted from forest ecosystems, while others sought transformation 
in forest governance.   
Conclusion 5: Sponsored forums (e.g., LCC) can help individuals to develop general 
understanding of key issues (single-loop learning); however, separate regional forums 
(e.g., Mayors‟ Group and NSFC) with facilitation can help introduce „new‟ perspectives 
to reconsider problems in specific contexts. 
 Even with prolonged decline in the Northeast Superior Region causing mill closures, 
bankruptcies and outmigration, conventional forestry supporters with vested interests maintained 
that large-scale industrial forestry was the best way to develop forest resources.  My analysis of 
documents and interviews illustrated that the colonial framing of the North as a ‗resource 
storehouse‘, and forests as the ‗economic engine‘, were integrated with strong identity and 
characterisation frames depicting northern communities and workers as resource producers 
(Chapters 6 and 7).  Traditional resource dependence has encouraged towns to compete fiercely 
with one another for outside investment opportunities. 
 Participants described a significant reframing of identities from individual, competing 




similarities and differences regarding common problems and opportunities to work together 
helped to build trust and capacity.  This outcome is consistent with experiences in the 
collaboration and social learning literatures (e.g., Gray 1989, 2003; Schusler et al 2003).  Mutual 
understanding of their interconnectedness encouraged thinking on a regional scale and 
coordinating action, whether for political lobbying or infrastructure development.  Common 
place-based identity frames considered more responsive to ‗northern‘ and local values took hold 
where interest-based identities no longer served local actors.  Trust and commitment to the 
Mayors‘ Group and NSFC eventually produced a sense of selflessness among towns.  A shared 
sense of pride also developed as achievements garnered outside recognition.  However, potential 
for conflict remained where ‗internal‘ challenges to existing enterprises and protectionism arose. 
Conclusion 6: Commitment to place rather than interests can provide an entry point to 
develop trust and mutual understanding of each other and shared problems, and enable 
reframing of a common identity based on shared values and problems/opportunities. 
 Cross-cultural collaboration within the NSFC also presented a new opportunity and 
challenge to reconcile lasting community divides.  Both First Nations and non-Aboriginal 
participants stated that slow growing respect for First Nations rights and leadership had 
encouraged a positive rapport based on common problem identification and benefits of working 
together.  Still, the lack of trust between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal communities limited 
openness between collaborating representatives, a bureaucratic barrier previously noted to create 
suspicion and support ―gatekeepers of information and power‖ (Critchley and Scott 2005: 153).  
As noted by several participants, a forum for direct interaction and open dialogue between 
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal leadership is needed to help familiarize long-separated 
communities.  Whether at the ‗water cooler‘ or ‗across the fence‘, informal personal interaction 
is important to developing understanding as a first step to relationship building.  Whereas deep-
seated mistrust institutionalizes conflict in formal organizational processes and structures, 
opportunities for periodic, informal personal interaction between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal 
people are important to foster collaboration. 
 Throughout the crisis, negative characterisations of the provincial and federal 
governments did not change.  Industry, labour, NGOs, municipalities and First Nations continued 




Non-industry actors perceived forest policy and management to be captured by industry; industry 
believed that large environmental lobby groups heavily influenced provincial decisions.  
Prominent reports on the state of the crisis commented that the forest industry as a whole was not 
supported by government and suggested moving the economic aspects of forestry into the 
Ontario Ministry of Northern Development and Mines. 
 As conditions worsened, government was continually blamed by actors from all sectors 
for being incompetent and/or unresponsive.  At the same time, there was a general avoidance by 
industry of actually accepting its role in the problem, and municipalities and First Nations were 
trying for increased involvement.  Most actors (including provincial representatives) framed the 
provincial government and OMNR as having the most power over forest resources (discussed 
below), and they believed it should be able to change or control conditions contributing to the 
crisis.  However, this belief points to false assumptions underlying actors‘ characterisation and 
diagnostic frames—assumptions that overlook conventional power structures and resource 
dependency in the periphery.  The problem was too narrowly defined and/or more complex than 
believed, and so could not actually be understood and solved by unilateral government action (or 
even government-industry action).  Moreover, the provincial government does not have as much 
control over problem variables and context as people think, or at least it does not have the ‗right‘ 
kind of power to fix this large-scale societal problem. 
Conclusion 7: Negative characterisations and flawed assumptions about the nature of the 
problem and capabilities of other actors contributed to conflict rather than collaboration 
to inhibit learning. 
8.2.3. What forms/sources of power are present and how do they influence, if at all, the 
construction of shared meaning (frame convergence/divergence)? 
8.2.3.1. Regional/Organizational Network 
At the regional/organizational network scale, both the survey findings (section 5.4.3) and 
interviews with regional actors (section 6.3.3) confirmed perceptions that the provincial 
government, forest industry and First Nations were the most powerful actors with respect to the 
ability to cause change.  However, the consolidation of agent-based power in industry (resource 
license rights, technical expertise and capital) was seen to overshadow other political actors.  




government was used to support industry.  Participants saw the relationships and disciplinary 
backgrounds of forestry professionals contributing to a strong common identity and 
relational/coalitional power based on shared interests and values (Gray 2003; Putnum and 
Wondolleck 2003) derived from common training and involvement in forest management.  This 
in turn supported a scientific forest management system.   
Conclusion 8: Relational power works to consolidate various forms of agent-based 
power in dominant actors rather than facilitating its distribution. 
 Although First Nations‘ authority was recognized by most stakeholder participants, this 
power was also seen to be undermined by First Nations‘ capacity limitations (i.e., resources and 
expertise).  Because of this, First Nations were characterised as potential and/or future leaders 
(rather than actual) in land and resource management.  Rather than being supported, the onus 
was on First Nations to demonstrate capacity for their ‗potential‘ power to be realized.  Uneven 
distribution of agent-based power, where one source of power ‗activates‘ another, exemplifies a 
relationship of paternal consent and colonial conditions that gave rise to dominant social 
framings in the first place. 
 From a structural view of power, meanings surrounding the forestry crisis reflect uneven 
social relations that infuse governance arrangements and shape perceptions and actions affecting 
forests and forest communities.  Forest knowledge and decision making is primarily based on 
social framings propagated by forestry experts—namely forest scientists, economists, policy 
makers and managers.  Shared disciplinary training and professional status, together with a 
technically complex operating and policy environment, reinforce the role of the expert and 
created need for trained professionals and associations.  It also created a need to have 
professional counterparts in supporting roles within the public, private and even civic 
components of the forest sector.  This is not to deny the need for and contribution and knowledge 
of forestry professionals, but to highlight that they are part of a system of forest governance in 
Ontario that has often separated local interests and residents (Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal) 
from forest decision making and knowledge development. Conventional power relations worked 




problems and solutions in economic terms with implications for the industry and dependent 
towns. 
 As less powerful groups, local control actors had to take the debate outside of 
conventional government-industry exchange to advance more inclusive framings of the crisis.  A 
number of reports were based on independent research and staged public involvement sessions 
(e.g., CEP, NOSCP).  The NSFC, among others, pressed for the development of NTFPs and 
development of value-added economies and education thought essential to rethinking the forest 
economy.  Conventional industry players saw novel forest uses as minor products and profit 
streams that could be developed alongside existing commodities.  However, from the local 
control perspective, the pairing of NTFPs with demands for increased Aboriginal and local 
control, and the integration of local and regional economic development, forest and energy 
resource management, and strategic planning indicates an attempt to actually reframe how 
governance arrangements should/could work to include local interests and forest values (Chapter 
7).  This reframing on the part of NSFC leadership indicates double-loop learning (Argyris and 
Schön 1978; Keen et al 2005). 
Conclusion 9: Dominant social relations influenced the perceived range of reasonable or 
desirable options as dominant actors bounded the problem to serve conventional 
interests, which in turn constrained debate about solutions. 
 Survey findings showed that many people want to elevate the power of and benefits to 
local residents, First Nations, and municipal governments in the Northeast Superior Region, 
while maintaining the dominant position of the provincial government.  Local residents and local 
government experienced the most amount of change, being elevated to higher positions of power 
(+40%, +39%, respectively) and benefits (+49%, +38%, respectively) based on normative 
considerations.  This is somewhat of a contradiction, given the enduring negative 
characterisations of senior governments.  At the same time, environmental, tourism, outdoor 
recreation and the federal government were seen as special interest groups that should have less 
influence over and benefits from forestry.  The level of perceived power was not considered 
proportionate to benefits received, suggesting that respondents recognized that individuals and 
groups with power over resources can choose to influence how benefits are distributed.  




problem understanding and solutions.  In general, there was a desire for strong public control 
(both at the municipal and provincial level) and leadership to improve forest governance. 
 While provincial and municipal interview participants and survey respondents called for 
fundamental change and some did offer specific practical and/or normative suggestions as to 
what could and/or should be changed, there is a limited awareness of other tenure regimes used 
around Ontario and in other regions.  Survey and interview findings showed that no overall 
preferred model for tenure emerged, largely due to a lack of knowledge of and/or experience 
with other models (sections 5.4.2; 6.3.2).  This is a key finding from a social learning 
perspective.  It also confirms a barrier identified by previous research with local forestry 
organizations in British Columbia, where grassroots organizations aspiring to become more 
involved in forest management were hindered by a lack of vision and understanding for practical 
options among leadership at both the local and provincial levels (Bullock et al 2009).  Given the 
lack of awareness about alternative tenure models among municipal and provincial leadership in 
the Northeast Superior Region, greater municipal and First Nations involvement requires detailed 
examination of how these groups should or could be engaged and what would be required (e.g., 
legislation, capacity building/enhancement) to implement such changes.  Local officials want 
devolution of power over forest resources from the provincial to municipal level. 
Conclusion 10: Public, civic and small industry actors in the Northeast Superior Region 
value public control of Crown forest resources at both the provincial and local level and 
want resource control devolved to local actors; however, leadership and residents 
require deeper understanding and a vision for implementation. 
 Perceptions of powerful actors highlight the important interplay of phenomena across 
levels (e.g., municipal-provincial, local-regional) and different scales (spatial, jurisdictional) 
(Cash et al 2007).  For example, those involved with provincial strategic policy juxtaposed ‗big‘ 
outside environmental groups with industry, based on public support and ‗noise making‘.  
Conversely, at the local level of jurisdiction scale, traditionally marginalized actors (e.g., 
municipal, grassroots NGOs, tourism, workers and residents) cited OMNR‘s physical presence 
and administrative role as mediating daily life in forest communities (section 6.3.1).  Within a 
hierarchical, top-down management structure, different actors had varying roles and power at 




different groups as powerful and with a visible impact on the forestry sector, community culture 
and economy as they saw it.  While political persuasion influences one‘s stance on an issue, 
actors may think differently about the same issue, for example, ―as an individual landowner 
directly affected by a decision‖ (Measham and Baker 2005: 95).  Mismatches between relevant 
knowledge and decision making and of jurisdiction and problem effects remain an ongoing 
source of conflict.  This is due in part to the challenge of bridging different scales and levels 
linking events and actors involved in the forestry crisis. 
 Conclusion 11: Framings of agent-based power are scale-dependent, which can cause 
 powerful (and disempowered) actors operating at different levels of jurisdictional scale 
 to be overlooked. 
8.2.3.2. Local/Organization 
The relationships among the Mayors initially strengthened their voice, resources and expertise.  
As in the wider region, relational power helped to draw together other forms of agent- based 
power.  This relationship facilitated single-loop learning, as the Mayors learned about shared 
problems and each other, and eventually began to reframe problems and solutions with 
consultant input.   
 The Mayors‘ Group had created a syndicate to lobby senior government based on a 
previously established shared set of interests and a common identity (i.e., mill towns).  The early 
arrangement reinforced structural power of existing roles and identities, and the real concern that 
operating mills and dependent towns needed to be maintained.  However, first-hand experience 
with the crisis and input from consultants built interest in changing forest governance systems.  
By reimagining the relationship of forest and towns, they were creating an alternate discourse in 
forest communities.  The early discursive work of the Mayors and their consultants worked to 
overcome negative structural and top-down authoritative power that maintained the failing status 
quo.  The purposeful consolidation of agent-based power can help to counterbalance power 
flowing through dominant social relations, but in turn introduces a new structure. 
 However, existing structural power also contributed to frame resistance among certain 
leaders who supported dominant interests in their communities (e.g., Chapleau).  Other 




communities ‗had nothing left to lose‘—they were not upholding a set of social relations that 
maintained the status quo when it no longer served them.  This is where positional power at the 
municipal level was also crucial to maintaining control of local political direction of the 
organization.  For example, when consultant input was perceived to threaten the political 
reputations of the Mayors‘ as well as remaining mill operations in Chapleau, the Mayor with the 
most experience and authority was able to limit dissent.  Control of the NSFC was retained by 
limiting the positional power of other local political leaders and consultants and positioning 
supportive employees.     
 Rollover of the Mayors also effectively erased organizational memory of process 
conflicts and cleared a path for NTFP pursuits in keeping with Chapleau‘s original proposal.  
This shaped the organization in favour of existing dependent power relations with industry and 
government and the lead town.  And while unified political lobbying on common issues was a 
main advantage of their informal Mayoral association, and the majority of towns (4 of 6) had 
experienced the withdrawal of their major forestry employers, partner municipalities and 
Aboriginals did not receive Mayors‘ Group endorsement for ongoing plans and proposals to take 
over existing forest licences. 
 These findings are in keeping with the work of Dengler (2007), who refers to the role of 
‗super-agents‘ who have special authority as interpreters of reality in governance regimes.  
Super-agents occupy multiple knowledge spaces within a network (e.g., positions) and are seen 
by others to hold legitimate and inordinate knowledge of problems and potential solutions.  
Within multi-level governance regimes:  
Super-agents are even more powerful than in a traditional top-down decision making 
structure because their power is bolstered both through other actors recognizing their 
central role in facilitating the collaborative environmental governance regime, and also 
through politicians external to the arena accepting the super-agents as brokers of 
knowledge in policy-regime.  (Dengler 2007: 451) 
As in the case of Dengler (2007), my research found that certain super-agents (e.g., the mayor of 
Chapleau) provided critical leadership to facilitate and maintain control of the NSFC for the 
common good of the region; however, unlike in Dengler (2007) this super-agent did not support 




Conclusion 12: Actors who possess unmatched positional and expertise power in 
collaborative arrangements and adhere to conventional norms can intentionally and 
unintentionally subvert reframing processes through limiting dissent, thereby controlling 
the organizational framings being advanced to guide action. 
 Agent-based power was important to First Nation actors asserting their position with 
respect to forest development and conservation in the region.  The early withdrawal of First 
Nations‘ support for the NSFC proposal and legal authority to intervene emphasized the 
positional power of First Nations.  However, these actions were perceived by the Mayors as 
demands or threats which created conflict with First Nations.  This initially did not promote the 
benefits of relational power as it had with the Mayors‘ Group.  Another barrier to learning 
together was the lack of capacity on both sides.  However, creation of the Regional Chiefs Forum 
and resource support from federal government and other funding streams contributed greatly to 
enhanced participatory capacity.  Still, the initial unwillingness of the Mayors to collaborate with 
First Nations due to perceived and real capacity and time limitations reflects colonial 
dependency characterisations (Saarinen 1992; Reed 1995) rather than working to build a 
common identity on empowerment as the basis for further reframing problems and solutions for 
the region. 
Conclusion 13: The reframing of a common place-based identity between Aboriginals 
and municipalities as the basis for future action requires the willing distribution of agent-
based power and meaningful recognition of Aboriginal and Treaty Rights. 
 
8.2.4. How does social learning—evidenced by the construction of shared meaning through the 
development of common frames—influence the way actors approach forest management 
problems related to policy, planning and practice? 
Reframing of problems and solutions (i.e., double-loop learning) leads to different actions and 
outcomes based on different assumptions and values (Argyris and Schön 1978).  Conventional 
industry supporters remained focussed on propping up the status quo and mainly lobbied for 
government protection while restructuring operations (Chapter 6).  Industry justified its 
continued control based on its expertise and the technical complexity of management as well as 




a preoccupation with single-loop learning.  Conventional interests emphasized usual fixes 
throughout the crisis.  
 Conversely, as an extension of the Mayors‘ Group, very early efforts were made to 
reframe NSFC‘s organizational identity away from the hinterland to place-based and wider 
community identities.  The Mayors recognized the complexity of the situation and drew on 
outside consultants to help them develop understanding for their interconnectedness and how the 
region functions as a system.  This is indicative of double-loop learning (Keen et al 2005).  Such 
actions and outcomes also support the assumed benefits of collaboration whereby different actors 
begin working together when problems exceed their individual capacity and understanding in 
order to share resources and ideas (Gray 1989).  The Mayors‘ Group then made efforts to 
establish a formal regional forum in response to failings of provincial government and 
conventional top-down forest management. Reframing enabled the Mayors‘ Group to shift 
towards regional planning.  Ensuing success encouraged ongoing and wider collaboration on 
other issues, including forestry initiatives such as the NSFC (Chapter 7). 
 However, as discussed above, a lack of agreement and dominant power relations 
combined to scale back interest in controversial alternatives such as community forestry and 
Aboriginal co-management.  Urging provincial policy makers to make room for NTFPs through 
piecemeal provincial policy change and partnering with major licence holders falls short of the 
kinds of reforms the Mayors and NSFC espoused.  And although the NSFC proposal, website 
and policy documents make frequent and widespread references to the need for meaningful 
community control of forests and change (e.g., ―For northerners to control the forests northerners 
have to begin thinking about the forests‖), this rhetoric has not been matched by actions. 
 For example, NSFC did not provide a formal response to major provincial 
announcements for tenure and administrative reform, or the spring 2010 announcement of the 
creation of Local Forest Management Corporations.  With respect to tenure policy, there is a 
window open now and a need/demand for public input to provide new vision at the provincial 
policy level.  NSFC appears hesitant to address fundamental policy issues central to economic 




Conclusion 14: NSFC espoused organizational frames are not fully matched by its 
current actions, which reflects capacity limitations, ongoing organizational development, 
and that other implicit frames are driving actions. 
 
8.3. Research Contributions and Opportunities 
8.3.1. Conceptual 
This research contributes to a better understanding of how power relations affect the social 
framings that drive action in settings of resource and environmental crisis and conflict, thereby 
helping to address an identified need (Armitage et al 2008) related to the advance of social 
learning theory.  It also furthers efforts to bridge framing and social learning theory (Dale 1989; 
Forsyth 2003, Bouwen and Taillieu 2004; Gray 2004; Tippet et al 2005; Pahl-Wostl et al 2007; 
Pahl-Wostl 2009).  I also provide support for the supposition that social learning is a political 
process inherent in multiparty collaboration, whereby reconciliation of individual and group 
identities occurs alongside the negotiation of problem definitions and solutions (Bouwen and 
Taillieu 2004).   
 A primary contribution of my research is the development and refinement of a conceptual 
framework to guide analysis of power relations and learning in collaborative settings (Figure 
8.1).  Figure 8.1 presents a more coherent and straightforward version of the provisional 
framework employed at the outset of this research (Figure 3.2).  I believe this iteration of the 
conceptual framework better represents the key items for focus, which are important to critical 
research on social learning, framing, and power relations in REM crisis settings. 
 Specifically, the conceptual framework focuses analysis on three interrelated 
components: the problem domain, which presents the main issue(s) to be addressed; the 
collaborative forum or platform where social learning occurs as a process involving diverse 
actors who deliberate and negotiate the meanings that emerge to guide actions; and, the 
contextual influences that differentiate site-specific social framings as well as experiences of 
problems and learning outcomes from those in other places.  In these ways, I provide a more 
specified framework than previous work (e.g., Argyris and Schön 1978; Kim 1993) that accounts 




modes, actions and outcomes.  The framework expands our view of social learning as a process 
involving actors and influences in wider society and across different scales and levels, rather 
than a bounded autonomous process that can be tweaked through prescribed interventions to 
produce certain desired outcomes. 












 The framework is transferrable in that it can be applied to different social organizational 
contexts and sectors in order to understand the various forms and sources of power at work in 
collaborative settings.  It was also helpful in guiding frame analysis of perspectives at two levels 
of social organization or social units of learning (Diduck 2010)—both the organizational network 
(e.g., policy community) and organizational levels of scale—demonstrating its ability to 
accommodate for different levels of network and jurisdictional scale (see Cash et al 2007). 
 My research highlights the importance of systematic frame analysis in social 






























characterized by uncertainty and conflict.  Specifically, the research contributes to understanding 
of how framing and reframing influences the course of emerging collaborations from antecedent 
conditions of under-organization to implementation.  Exploring different frames and making 
them explicit is critical to fostering social learning and effective participation in resource and 
environmental management (Pahl-Wostl and Hare 2004).  Exploring organizational frames 
through the incorporation of political ecology concepts to assess power relations in a Canadian 
hinterland setting also contributes to understanding First World (critical) political ecologies 
(McCarthy 2002). 
8.3.2. Empirical 
Through this research, I document regional and local perspectives surrounding the forestry crisis 
and augment research on forest governance concerning forestry towns and Aboriginals in 
Northern Ontario.  This research addresses a gap in the literature at a pivotal time of provincial 
policy and administrative reform, and supports the search for alternative tenure models to 
reinvigorate Ontario‘s forest economy and communities.  Documented findings will help groups 
from various sectors to better understand the perspectives and actions of others, as well as their 
own, in the context of the forestry crisis debate.  For example, NSFC representatives who 
reviewed and provided feedback on a previous draft of this dissertation (June 2010) cited this as 
a contribution.  The interpretations presented here serve as the basis for further reflection and 
discussion of current forestry challenges. 
 This research also documents the successes and challenges experienced in the formation 
of the Northeast Superior Forest Community Corporation as part of the Canadian Model Forest 
Network.  As such, it supplements NSFC organizational memory and provides information to 
support organizational and program development for NSFC, NSRCF and the Forest 
Communities Program.  Survey findings offer baseline data to decision makers within NSFC, 
NRCAN and OMNDMF regarding regional perceptions of the Crown forest tenure system and 
publicly preferred actions (Bullock 2009).  Preliminary findings have also been disseminated 
through conference presentations (Virginia Tech Symposium of Resilience 2008; CAG 2010) 




 This research also contributes an in-depth single case study for future comparison with 
case studies on Forest Community Program sites, and/or studies in local and regional 
organizational development, collaboration and social learning.  I established a university-
community research relationship with a new Forest Communities Program/Model Forest site to 
encourage relevant research and knowledge transfer.  Completion of this project provides the 
first step in the longitudinal analysis of perspectives within the NSFC and regional forestry 
crisis, serving to address the need for longitudinal research on social framings in the field of 
organizational social learning (e.g., Kim 1993; Tippet et al 2005). 
 8.3.3. Methodological Contributions 
My research demonstrates one way frame analysis can be used to interpret underlying 
assumptions and values guiding the actions of political actors.  I also tested the utility of a mixed 
methods approach to understanding evolving perspectives and various positions on a societal 
problem.  This approach was effective for developing a rich dataset, providing different angles 
on similar variables.  Moreover, adapting Gray‘s (2003) typology of frames helped me to collect 
and review a very large data set, and to then focus on a relevant subset. 
 I also demonstrate the utility of an embedded case study analysis for analyzing nested 
processes of social organization related to the same problem and regional context.  In particular, 
by linking data across the local and regional levels of forest governance, my analysis provides a 
robust perspective.  This was further supported by the comparison of a variety of data sources 
and forms.  Following an inductive and community-based approach, this research provides a 
research process model to assist the development of future case study research with community 
organizations.   
 This doctoral research established the foundation for a longitudinal study of social 
learning in an emerging organization and in a setting adapting to changes resulting from crisis 
conditions.  Future research based on the same conceptual framework, question format, and 
where possible, the same participants, provides an opportunity for consistent assessment of 




8.4. Research Reflections: Strengths and Limitations 
Given the local impacts of the crisis, and in some instances deep-rooted personal histories 
between and among different individuals and groups, some participants chose to discuss ‗messy‘ 
personal conflicts and other hostilities of local politics.  Other participants consciously stated 
their personal perceptions politely or mildly, framing their characterisations of others, problems, 
solutions and events in a way that made their public statements sound less venomous.  With this 
in mind, a challenge is to interpret local stories and how power relations and the dynamics of 
exchange evolved, and how this in turn shaped dominant social framings and actions, without 
having the analysis descend into destructive ‗he said-she said‘ diatribes.  From the point of view 
of the analysis, most participants appeared sincerely concerned for the future of the region and of 
their neighbours, although different views and disputes often emerged about preferred actions 
and outcomes. 
 While this research examines a broad range of actors and their perspectives, it does not 
specifically attend to cross-cultural considerations in social learning forums (see Davidson-Hunt 
2006).  As such it does not fully address Aboriginal learning styles and knowledge systems.  
Aboriginals‘ cultural differences regarding community values and framings of forest-human 
relationships were acknowledged by both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal participants during 
interviews.  However, conversation with Aboriginal representatives remained oriented to matters 
of forest management, economic development and community planning activities on which they 
were active and most had a Western education (high school plus university or college).  I 
acknowledge that to go beyond this level of Aboriginal engagement would require a cross-
cultural framework for social learning research, ideally developed with the potential Aboriginal 
partners. 
 I encountered several barriers in the field that offer lessons for mixed methods case study 
research.  Reporting back to partner organizations and getting feedback on research design and 
findings was difficult at times due to schedules and turnaround time.  However, regular 
communication with the NSFC and NORDIK Institute provided helpful input for the research 
design as well as logistical considerations for trip planning.  For example, it was brought to my 




helpful.  Most participants for interviews and surveys spoke English, given they were 
representatives of private-public-civic organizations.  Having completed the research, translation 
for French, Cree and Ojibway would have been ideal and will be considered for future 
publications where appropriate.   
 It is also possible that illiteracy reduced participation, especially for the survey.  Several 
municipal representatives referred to high illiteracy rates within the region (i.e., about 50 per cent 
of males between 40 and 55 are illiterate).  Although I was unable to verify this ‗regional fact‘, 
that some people may not read and/or write requires consideration in data collection instruments.  
This emphasizes the importance of understanding the socio-economic background of participants 
beforehand to inform research design. 
 The best strategy for initial contact with some participants was through face-to-face or 
phone correspondence.  Busy schedules and priorities can make even the most willing and 
supportive participants impossible to engage.  Most people will ‗make time now‘ if you are in 
town and keep a flexible schedule.  This said it was also costly to move back and forth between 
towns within the Northeast Superior Region during the 2008 oil shortage when gas reached 
$1.50 per litre in Northern Ontario.   
 Some cultural or community barriers to entry were also encountered.  The research was 
conducted under the auspices of the University of Waterloo with ties to the NORDIK Institute in 
Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario as well as the NSFC.  It turned out that some key people were 
deliberately avoiding me because of these affiliations (i.e., NSFC) due to previous histories and 
perceptions of which I was unaware.  There was also very low awareness for the NSFC and 
myself, reflecting the timing of my research work in relation to the start of the NSFC, which 
contributed to suspicion and indifference.  Being an outsider presented a challenge at times.  For 
example, one survey participant later stated he discarded the mailed copy because he did not 
know who I was; some interview participants were also sceptical of my affiliation with a 
‗southern‘ university.  At the same time, I acknowledge having some insider knowledge that was 
likely useful in gaining entry to the research site.  Living in this region for five years (and 
travelling, recreating, working and researching here for close to 18 years) afforded valuable 




 A limitation of the survey design was the challenge of developing and piloting the survey 
instrument.  Both time constraints and challenges of working with a purposive and small sample 
size negated optimal piloting opportunities which may have improved response rates and eased 
analysis.  Moreover, the survey could have been better timed as it was mailed at the end of the 
moose and deer hunting season, right before Christmas holidays.  Evidently, there were also 
different preferences for survey format (e.g., paper, electronic, telephone survey).  Nevertheless, 
a combination of electronic and paper formats (mixed-mode after Creswell 2003) was effective 
to reach people with different technologies and time limitations.  The survey also extended the 
data set, providing relevant data on my central research themes, but in different formats.   
 This research was intended to be the first step in a long-term study of NSFC‘s 
organizational development and social learning.  Document review was crucial to develop 
understanding of the case history, and conducting two sets of interviews one year apart was 
helpful to follow-up on potential changes.  However, given the short duration in between 
interviews, some participants had little to share in the form of new perspectives.  This result 
shows the importance of long-term repetitive inquiry to detect incremental slow change that 
might seem imperceptible in contrast to sudden numerous and big changes.  
 An inductive case study approach enabled me to build a robust dataset, which helped to 
increase triangulation as well as the breadth of understanding generated through research 
participation.  In addition to the wealth of interview and document data, attending and observing 
regional workshops and meetings was important to grounding observation from conversations 
and reports in the actual context of day-to-day events and debate.  This also provided an 
opportunity to observe how participants interacted with one another in public forums relevant to 
the research.  Moreover, presenting aspects of my research at conferences (Virginia Tech 
Symposium on Resilience, Fall 2008) during the research process provided valuable feedback to 
inform the ongoing research and conceptual framework. 
8.5. Recommendations 
The final section offers recommendations for the Northeast Superior Forest Community 




mission to promote education and ongoing learning, advocacy and influence public policy 
related to forest resource and community development in Northern Ontario. These suggestions 
may also be instructive for existing and emerging collaborative organizations.  In keeping with 
the purpose of this research, I focus on aspects of organizational governance and practice that 
would help to address conditions affecting power relations and social learning. 
Recommendation 1: Organize accessible regional public forums to increase public 
engagement with and support for the NSFC and NSRCF. 
 The NSFC and NSRCF together should organize context and culturally appropriate 
public workshops and/or online discussion forums to help engage regional residents and officials 
in further discussion and learning while simultaneously promoting awareness about the 
organizations.  NSFC representatives should also continue to participate in events organized by 
other groups.  These actions will help make the NSFC more visible.  In keeping with efforts to 
make forest governance more inclusive and open, assessing the perspectives of youth, elderly, 
women, Aboriginal residents and other groups typically affected by—but less represented in—
forest development matters is warranted. 
Recommendation 2: Promote open access to organizational information to improve 
transparency and elevate public awareness of NSFC decision making. 
 As a publicly funded organization, the NSFC should continue to support the 
dissemination of relevant information on northern communities and forests.  This should go 
beyond being a clearinghouse for NTFP information resources to include open access to 
organizational information, namely meeting minutes, agendas, and discussion materials, and 
where appropriate, government correspondence.  This would make NSFC decision making 
processes and rationale explicit, thereby improving transparency and awareness.  Such 
information could be made available through the NSFC website. 
Recommendation 3: Create opportunities for public review of and input to NSFC 
strategic plans. 
 The preferences and attitudes of forest groups throughout the region are important to 
NSFC decision makers and staff as they plan and pursue projects to promote effective 




Provided NSFC continues past its current federal funding period, the organization should create 
opportunities in each of the member communities for the public to reflect on and provide 
substantive input to the 2012-2017 strategic plan.  Claims to representation can be further 
substantiated by incorporation of public perspectives to guide the organization. 
Recommendation 4: Support partnerships with public-private-civic partners for tenure 
innovation. 
 Consideration of community perceptions regarding how tenure institutions shape 
interactions with area forests is especially important at a time when major provincial policy and 
administrative shifts are taking place that will affect how public forests are managed across 
Ontario.  The NSFC should continue to work with Aboriginal, government, industry and other 
relevant partners to explore options for increasing access for new entrants to wood fibre and 
NTFPs.  This should involve developing new models of tenure designed for use in the Northeast 
Superior Region, and could be based on partnerships with existing private interests and/or new 
opportunities provided by the reallocation of existing public resources to new entrants.  A 
continued focus on small-scale NTFP ventures is appropriate to supplement existing large-scale 
timber manufacturing.  It is also recommended that the NSFCC endorse the current plans and 
projects of its partner towns and Aboriginals (i.e., mill buy-outs and co-management) to fully 
recognize the desires of the entire region.  Endorsing ongoing projects is also more efficient than 
building new ones from the ground up. 
Recommendation 5: Commission research on and promote public understanding of 
current experience with other models of participatory governance and sustainability as a 
guide for action. 
 Collaboration, local involvement and diversity are central themes expressed by regional 
forest groups that must be kept in mind when considering adaptations of and/or alternatives to 
conventional industry models.  However, enhancing the participatory capacity for forest 
management by northern communities and a broad range of forest groups requires further 
understanding of tenure options and related forest management concepts (i.e., SFM), and their 
strengths and weaknesses, in order to develop effective institutional arrangements.  Some region-
specific reports already provide systematic analyses of practical tenure options (e.g., OMNR 




could be developed and made available through the NSFC website as an educational tool.  NSFC 
could pilot NTFP project(s) based on one or more of the previously outlined alternatives to 
create new opportunities and assess the advantages and disadvantages of certain models as a 
‗test‘.  Information resulting from these efforts would also be a valuable contribution to the 
Model Forest Network. 
Recommendation 6: Participate in dialogue surrounding current provincial initiatives for 
tenure and administrative reform. 
 NSFC advocates increased local control and acknowledges that developing supportive 
tenure arrangements is essential to facilitate economic and social development.  Ongoing 
provincial efforts to reform the Crown tenure and pricing system represent a crucial window of 
opportunity for forest groups to inform provincial strategic policy development.  As a purported 
advocate of regional forest-based development, NSFC should use this opportunity to assert its 
perspectives with OMNR regarding how the new system could better support NTFPs and also 
clarify the organization‘s position with respect to public forest use and control.  Active 
involvement in developing forest governance arrangements is inextricably linked to forest-based 
social and economic development and must be treated as such. 
Recommendation 7: Fully recognize Aboriginal and Treaty Rights and support the 
successful resolution of Aboriginal treaty settlement negotiations. 
 As an organization consisting of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal partners, NSFC must in 
principle respect Aboriginal Treaty Rights.  Expanding the board to include Aboriginal 
representation and supporting capacity-building efforts are positive developments.  The 
organization must also support the fair settlement of treaty negotiations in order to promote 
democratic forest governance and development.  Mitigating social conflict and capacity building 
will promote development in the region. 
 Recommendation 8: Consider restructuring the organizational arrangement to expand 
 representation on the board.  
 The NSFC began with the Mayors‘ Group and the addition of Aboriginal representation 
to the voting board membership was a key step towards collaboration.  Participating towns are 




at-large public members to represent regional interests (NTFP enterprise, education, parks, fish 
and wildlife, community health).  Ex-officio board member status for OMNR and OMNDMF 
also requires consideration, given provincial jurisdiction and roles in forest management 
planning. 
 Recommendation 9: Experiment with the creation of a decentralized organizational 
 model. 
 Early moves to restructure the NSFC organization were essential to ensure democratic 
process (e.g., ensure cross-representation on all committees; control by board).  There are 
additional options to increase equity while maximizing the use and development of existing 
capacity in the region.  While it is logistically easier to have a central office, NSFC should 
follow the inspiration of its Aboriginal partners and experiment with a decentralized approach to 
program development.  Different partner communities could lead on programmatic themes by 
hosting one of various organizational committees.  For example, given its membership, Chapleau 
is the clear lead on the NTFP Technical Team.  Perhaps White River and Pic Mobert would be 
appropriate hosts for the Bioenergy and Wood Technical Team, given existing ties to White 
River Forest Products.  These partner communities will be developing their expertise in 
cogeneration, wood pellet and lumber production and will gain knowledge and encounter lessons 
of value that could inform NSFC projects and decision making.  Decentralization would also 
establish a physical presence in partner communities and draw local leadership and capacity 
from whole region, thereby improving representation. This action would also work to support the 
ongoing work to build the organizational network with previously identified regional interests 
(e.g., Pukaskwa National Park). 
 Recommendation 10: Establish explicit rationale for and clearly identify the 
 geographical extent and boundaries for the organization. 
 NSFC should define and adopt its own territorial boundaries based on explicit rationale.  
The Strategic Plan refers to several treaty, ecological and political-administrative boundaries that 
overlap within the region, but concludes NSFC ―boundaries and area are not well defined‖ 
(NSFC 2007-2012: 7).  NSFC‘s current boundaries appear to be based on previously existing 




uses and regional development.  Using conventional boundaries also legitimizes existing 
company and OMNR political boundaries placed on the forest ecosystem, which relate more to 
the location of mills, wood supply and government offices.  Establishing clear geographical 
boundaries for the organization can improve local awareness and support (Bullock 2006).   
 Recognizing that economic and social conditions must be considered alongside 
ecological concerns, NSFCs territorial land base should reflect the new regional identity and 
include Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal concerns.  As such it would be appropriate for boundary 
identification to be guided by ecosystem-based planning principles.  Public involvement in 
boundary setting would be an interesting and useful activity to undertake as part of the 
recommended community workshops.  This would help to instill a sense of ownership and place-
based identity for area residents and create support for the NSFC. 
 
8.6. Future Opportunities and Research Questions 
Completion of this phase of my research presents a number of future opportunities and research 
questions to be pursued.  An obvious starting point is whether residents and organizations in the 
Northeast Superior Region want to participate in community-university research and, if so, what 
sorts of research questions they think need to be addressed. 
 With respect to my social learning research, three additional needs arise.  First, there is a 
need to better understand Aboriginal perspectives of the forestry crisis.  This would require 
interest and consent from Aboriginal partners and relationship building to facilitate the 
development of cross-cultural social learning forums and research, in order to fully address 
Aboriginal learning styles and knowledge systems.   
 Second, challenges with illiteracy and avenues for resident involvement in forest 
governance indicate a need to assess the potential role and limitations of new and existing 
learning forums within the Northeast Superior Region.  There is an opportunity to improve 




 Third, the NSFC is still at an early stage of development and is project/committee 
focussed.  With the approach of NSFC‘s first 5-year evaluation there is an opportunity to assess 
learning at the action group level to determine the efficacy of learning processes within the 
organization.  This would also provide further information that would be helpful for 
organizational evaluation. 
 Future research questions should also focus on the ecological outcomes of implementing 
preferred solutions (e.g., political ecology of blueberry production in the Northeast Superior 
Region).  This would support calls by First Nations for additional ecological knowledge on 
ecosystem state and function within the Northeast Superior Region to inform resource and land 
use management and planning.  Provincial announcements to revamp the provincial tenure 
system and establish local management authority corporations will open up additional 
possibilities.  
 As indicated in Chapter 6, during May and June of 2010 the provincial government 
organized seven public meetings to discuss the proposed tenure and pricing framework.  It would 
be useful to examine the effectiveness of these sessions in terms of implications for meaningful 
public participation, implementation of public input into forest policy, the short-term outcomes 
of new policies as well as their role in the shifting course of the overall debate surrounding 
Ontario‘s Crown tenure system.  From a social learning perspective, meeting participants could 
be interviewed to determine what was learned and whether meeting forums facilitated 
democratic debate and learning within the region. 
 The centrality of place-based identities in social learning processes and as the basis for 
local action were important themes that emerged quite late in the research process.  While place-
relevant literatures and related issues could not be treated adequately within the scope of my 
doctoral research, they are deserving of further attention.  Specifically, what are the links 
between place-based thinking and local and regional political (re)organization/development in a 
northern forestry context?  This is an important question considering current policy changes and 





 Finally, given the scope and nature of the qualitative data collected (i.e., open ended 
interviews, direct observation of public events) opportunity exists for other lenses to be applied 
to the same dataset.  In particular, much of the data collected through direct observation remains 
unanalyzed, providing a future opportunity. 
 
8.7. Conclusion 
This chapter highlighted and discussed my main research findings.  Fourteen conclusions were 
discussed to link back to the core research questions.  I then linked the discussion to my main 
conceptual, empirical and methodological research contributions.  These include the 
documentation and analysis of power relations and social framings of the forestry crisis in the 
Northeast Superior Region, in Northern Ontario, Canada, as well as the important events that 
were instrumental in the emergence of informal regional governance and the NSFC.  I also 
presented a refined conceptual framework, which draws together theoretical perspectives from 
the collaboration, political ecology, social learning and framing literatures, as well as insights 
from my doctoral research, to provide a heuristic for analysis that may be adapted to other 
settings.  Reflections from the research experience document some of the challenges experienced 
in the field and offer some practical suggestions for mixed-method researchers and future 
research with the NSFC, the Northeast Superior Region, as well as community-based research 
sites in general.  I outlined ten research-supported recommendations for the NSFC and FCP staff 
at NRCAN to consider, which offer practical suggestions for areas of organizational and 
program/policy development.  Finally, emerging questions were identified to provide re-entry 
points for future research that would be helpful in advancing our understanding of how social 









ABCPF (Association of British Columbia Professional Foresters). 2003. 2003 Opinion Poll. 
Available: http://www.abcfp.ca/. Accessed January 1, 2010. 
__________. 2004. 2004 Opinion Poll. http://www.abcfp.ca/. Accessed January 1, 2010. 
__________. 2009. 2009 Opinion Poll. http://www.abcfp.ca/. Accessed January 1, 2010. 
Adamowicz, W. and P. Burton. 2003. Sustainability and sustainable forest management. In P. 
 Burton, C. Messier, D. Smith and A. Adamowcz (eds.). Towards sustainable management 
 of the boreal forest (41-64). Ottawa: National Research Press. 
Albert, S., Robinson, D., Duchesne, L. and D. DeYoe. 2006. Transition strategy for the 
Northeast Superior Forest Community. Chapleau, Ontario. 
Allison, H. and R. Hobbs. 2004. Resilience, adaptive capacity, and the ‗Lock-in Trap‘ of the 
Western Australian agricultural region. Ecology and Society 9(1): 3. 
Angeles, L. and P. Gurstein. 2007. Introduction: Learning civil societies for democratic planning 
and governance. P. Gurstein and L. Angeles, In Learning civil societies: Shifting contexts 
for democratic planning and governance (3-22). Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 
 
Anthony Usher Planning Consultant and Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources. 1994. 
Partnerships for community involvement in forestry. A comparative analysis of 
community involvement in natural resource management - Community Forestry Project. 
Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario: OMNR. 
Apsey, M., Laishley, D., Nordin, V. and G. Paille. 2000. The perpetual forest: Using lessons
 from the past to sustain Canada's forests in the future. The Forestry Chronicle 76(1): 29-
 53. 
Argyris, C. and D. Schön 1978. Organizational learning: A theory of action perspective. 
Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co. 
Armitage, D. 2005. Adaptive capacity and community-based natural resource management. 
Environmental Management 35(6): 703-715. 
Armitage, D., Marschke, M., and R. Plummer. 2008. Adaptive co-management and the paradox 
of learning. Global Environmental Change 18(1): 86-98. 
Armson, K. 2001. Ontario forests: A historical perspective. Toronto: Fitzhenry and Whiteside. 
Ashton, B., Needham, T. and T. Beckley. 2007. How is Crown forest policy developed? Probing 




AWIC (Algoma Workforce Investment Committee). 2008. Investing in the future: A labour force 
study for the Superior East Region – Phase One. Wawa, Ontario: Algoma Workforce 
Investment Committee, Employment Ontario/Hawn and Associates Inc. 
Baker, M. and J. Kusel. 2003. Community forestry in the United States. Washington, Island 
Press. 
Ballamingie, P. 2009. First Nations, ENGOs, and Ontario‘s Lands for Life consultation 
 process. In L. Adkin (ed.). Environmental conflict and democracy in Canada (84-102). 
 UBC Press: Toronto and Vancouver.  
Bandura, A. 1977. Social Learning Theory. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall. 
 
Bank of Canada. 2009. Rates and statistics: Exchange rates. Available at 
http://www.bank-banque-canada.ca/en/rates/exchange_avg_pdf.html (Accessed June 1, 
2009). 
Baskerville, G. 1995. The forestry problem: Adaptive lurches of renewal. In L.Gunderson, C.S. 
Holling, and S. Light (eds.), Barriers and bridges to the renewal of ecosystems and 
institutions (37-102). Columbia University Press, New York. 
Beattie, K., Bond, W., and E. Manning. 1981. The agricultural use of marginal lands: A review 
 and bibliography. Ottawa: Lands Directorate, Environment Canada. 
Beckley, T. M. 1998. Moving toward consensus-based forest management: A comparison of 
industrial, co-managed, community and small private forests in Canada. Forestry 
Chronicle 74(5): 736-744. 
__________. 2003. Forests, paradigms, and policies through ten centuries. In B. A. Shindler, T. 
 Beckley and C. Finley (eds.). Two paths toward sustainable forests: Public values in 
 Canada and the United States (18-34). Oregon State University Press, Corvallis, Oregon. 
Behan, R. 1990. Multiresource forest management: A paradigmatic challenge to professional 
 forestry. Journal of Forestry 88(4): 12-18. 
Benford,  R. and D. Snow. 2000. Framing processes and social movements: An overview and 
 assessment. Annual Review of Sociology 26: 611-639. 
Bernard, H. R. 2006. Research methods in Anthropology: Qualitative and Quantitative 
Approaches, fourth, edition. Toronto: AltaMura Press. 
Bernard, A. and G. Armstrong. 1998. Learning and integration: Learning theory and policy 
integration. In J. Schnurr and S. Holtz, The cornerstone of development: Integrating 
environmental, social, and economic policies (45-68). Ottawa, Canada; Boca Raton, FL, 




Binkley, C. S. 1999. Forestry in a postmodern world or just what was John Muir doing running a 
sawmill in Yosemite Valley? Policy Sciences 31: 133-144. 
Bone, R. 1992. The geography of the Canadian north: Issues and challenges. Toronto: Oxford 
University Press. 
Bouwen, R. and T. Taillieu. 2004. Multi-party collaboration as social learning for 
interdependence: Developing relational knowing for sustainable natural resource 
management. Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology 14(3): 137-153. 
Brunswick House First Nation. 2010. Community Portal. Accessed on May 12, 2010. 
http://www.chapleau.ca/portal/en/community/brunswickhouse 
Bryant, R. 1998. Power, knowledge and political ecology in the third world: A review. Progress 
in Physical Geography 22(1): 79-94. 
Bryant, R. and G. Wilson. 1998. Rethinking environmental management. Progress in Human 
Geography 22 (3): 321-343. 
Bullock, R. 2006. An analysis of community forest implementation in British Columbia, Canada. 
Unpublished MES thesis. Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario. 
__________. 2009. Stakeholder perceptions of Ontario‘s Crown forest tenure system, Northeast 
Superior Forest Community. Prepared for the Northeast Superior Forest Community 
Corporation, Chapleau, Ontario. 
Bullock, R., Armitage, D. and B. Mitchell. In review. Implications of social learning and shadow 
networks for building resilient forest-based communities. In B. Goldstein (ed.), Planning 
for disaster: Building resilience through collaboration. MIT Press. 
Bullock, R., Hanna, K., and S. Slocombe. 2009. Learning from community forestry experience: 
Challenges and lessons from British Columbia. Forestry Chronicle 85(2): 293-304. 
Bullock, R. and A. Watelet. 2006. Exploring conservation authority operations in Sudbury, 
Northern Ontario: Constraints and opportunities. Environments 34(2): 29-50. 
Butler, J., Cheetham, B., and M. Power. 2007. A solutions agenda for Northern Ontario‘s forest 
sector. CEP/USW Taskforce on Resource Dependent Communities. 
 
Cash, D., Adger, W., Berkes, F., Garden, P., Lebel, L., Olsson, P., Pritchard, L. and O. Young. 
 2007. Scale and cross-scale dynamics: governance and information in a multilevel world. 
 Ecology and Society 11(2): 8. 
CCFM (Canadian Council of Forest Ministers). 2008. A vision for Canada‘s Forests: 2008 and 




CCFN (Chapleau Cree First Nation). 2008a. Critique of the Northeast Superior Forest 
Community 2007-2011 Strategic Plan: Final report. Chapleau Cree First Nation: Fox 
Lake Reserve, Chapleau, Ontario. 
__________. 2008b. Chapleau Crown Game Preserve First Nations consensus building process: 
Final report for fiscal year 2007-2008. Chapleau Cree First Nation: Fox Lake Reserve, 
Chapleau, Ontario. 
CCPA (Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives). 2008. Canada‘s forest industry reeling from 
market, monetary shocks. Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives 14 (10): 4. 
Centre for Community Enterprise. 2000. Community resilience: A resource for rural renewal and 
recovery. CCE Publications: Port Alberni, British Columbia. 
 
CFS (Canadian Forest Service). 2006. The state of Canada‘s forests 2005-2006. Ottawa: Natural 
 Resources Canada, Canadian Forest Service. 
CIFINRSSC (Canadian Institute of Forestry Interim National Recruitment Strategy Steering 
Committee). 2006. The crisis in post-secondary enrollments in forestry programs: A call 
to action for Canada‘s future forestry professional/technical workforce. A White Paper on 
Post-Secondary Forestry Recruitment. Forestry Chronicle 82(1): 57-62. 
 
CIFOR (Center for International Forestry Research). 2005. Recent experience in collaborative 
 forest management: A review paper.  Indonesia: Center for International Forestry 
 Research. 
Clapp, R.A. 1998. The resource cycle in forestry and fishing. Canadian Geographer 42(2): 
 129-144. 
Clark, T. 2002. The policy process: A practical guide for natural resource professionals. New 
Haven, London: Yale University Press. 
Clergue Forest Management Inc. 2005. Algoma Forest 2005-2025 Forest Management Plan 
summary. Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario, Canada: Clergue Forest Management Inc. 
Common Voice. 2007. Forging the future: An economic vision of Northwestern Ontario. 
Accessed on January 10, 2010. Http://www.commonvoicenw.org/resources. 
Conley, A. and M. A. Moote. 2003. Evaluating collaborative natural resource management. 
Society and Natural Resources 16(5): 371-386. 
Cote, M. and L. Bouthillier 2002. Assessing the effect of public involvement processes in forest 
management in Quebec. Forest Policy and Economics 4(3): 213-225. 
 
Creed, W., Langstaff, J. and M. Scully. 2002. A Picture of the Frame: Frame Analysis as 




Creswell, J. 2003. Research design: Qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods approaches, 
second edition. London: Sage. 
Critchley, V. and J. Scott. 2005. Changing governments: Councils embracing the precautionary 
principle. In M. Keen, V. Brown and R. Dyball, Social learning in environmental 
management: towards a sustainable future (146-169). London; Sterling, VA: Earthscan. 
Contreras, A., Lebel, L. and S. Pas-ong. 2001. The political economy of tropical and boreal 
forests, Scoping Report No. 3. Institutional Dimensions of Global Environmental 
Change/ International Project. Hanover, New Hampshire. USA. 
Dale, N. 1989. Getting to co-management: Social learning in the redesign of fisheries 
management. In E. Pinkerton, Cooperative management of local fisheries (49-72). 
Vancouver, BC: UBC Press. 
Daniels, S. and G. Walker. 1996a. Collaborative learning: Improving public deliberation in 
ecosystem-based management. Environmental Impact Assessment Review 16(2): 71-102. 
__________.  1996b. Using collaborative learning in fire recovery planning. Journal of Forestry 
94(8): 4-9. 
Davidson-Hunt, I. 2006. Adaptive learning networks: Developing resource management 
 knowledge through social learning forums. Human Ecology. 34(4): 593-614. 
Decter, M., Miller, D. R., Lamontagne, F. and Canadian Association of Single-Industry Towns. 
 1989. What we can do for ourselves: Diversification and single industry communities: 
 The implications of a community economic development approach. Ottawa, Ontario: 
 Economic Council of Canada. 
Dengler, M. 2007. Spaces of power for action: Governance of the Everglades Restudy process 
(1992-2000). Political Geography 26: 423-454. 
Denzin, N. and Y. Lincoln (eds). 2003. Strategies of Qualitative Inquiry, second edition. 
Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications. 
Dewulf, A., Craps, M., Bouwen, R., Taillieu, T. and C. Pahl-Wostl. 2005. Integrated 
management of natural resources: dealing with ambiguous issues, multiple actors and 
diverging frames. Water Science and Technology 52(6): 115-124. 
Dickason, O. 2002. Canada‘s First Nations: A history of founding peoples from earliest times, 3
rd
 
 edition. Toronto: Oxford University Press. 
Diduck, A. 2010. The learning dimension of adaptive capacity: Untangling the multi-level 
 connections. In D. Armitage and R. Plummer, Adaptive capacity and environmental 




Diduck, A., Bankes, N., Armitage, D., and D. Clark. 2005. Unpacking social learning in social-
ecological systems: Case studies of polar bear and narwhal management in northern 
Canada. In F. Berkes (ed.), Breaking ice: Renewable resource and ocean management in 
the Canadian north (269-290). Calgary, University of Calgary Press. 
Diduck, A. and B. Mitchell 2003. Learning, public involvement and environmental assessment: a 
Canadian case study. Journal of Environmental Assessment Policy and Management 
5(3): 339-364. 
Dillman, D., Smyth, J. and L. M. Christian. 2009. Internet, mail and mixed-mode surveys: The 
 tailored design method, third edition. New Jersey: John Wiley and Sons Inc. 
Domtar Inc. 2008. White River Forest 2008-2018 Forest Management Plan Summary. White 
 River, Ontario: Domtar Inc. 
Donoghue, E. and V. Sturtevant (eds.). 2008. Forest community connections: Implications for 
 research, management and governance. Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future. 
Douglas, D. 1995. Northern Algoma: A peoples‘ history. Toronto: Dundurn Press Ltd. 
Dorcey, A. and T. McDaniels. 2001. Great expectations, mixed results: Trends in  citizen 
 involvement in Canadian governance. In E. Parson (ed.), Governing the environment 
 (247-302). Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 
Drushka, K. 1985. Stumped: The forest industry in transition. Vancouver: Douglas & 
 McIntyre. 
________. 2003. Canada's Forests: A History. McGill-Queen's University Press,  Montreal. 
Dryzek, J. 2005. The politics of the earth: Environmental discourses, 2nd edition. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Dubreuil Forest Products Ltd. 2003. Magpie Forest 2004-2009 Forest Management Plan, Native 
background information report. Accessed: June 1, 2010. Available: 
https://ozone.scholarsportal.info/bitstream/1873/13634/19/2.6.2.3%20NBIR%20Missana
bie%20Cree.pdf. 
ECO (Environmental Commissioner of Ontario). 2005. 2004-2005 Annual Report: Planning Our 
Landscape. Toronto: Environmental Commissioner of Ontario. 
EDCW (Economic Development Corporation of Wawa). 2004. Wawa Economic Development 
Profile 2004. Economic Development Corporation of Wawa: Wawa, Ontario. 
Elliot, M., Gray, B. and R. Lewicki. 2003. Lessons learned about framing and reframing of 
intractable environmental conflicts. In R. Lewicki, B. Gray and M. Elliot, Making sense 




Escobar, A. 1999. After nature: Steps to an antiessentialist political ecology. Current 
Anthropology 40(1): 1-30. 
Escobar, A. and S. Paulson. 2005. The Emergence of Collective Ethnic Identities and Alternative 
Political Ecologies in the Columbian Pacific Rainforest. In S. Paulson and L. Gezon 
(eds), Political Ecology across Spaces, Scales and Social Groups (257-277). New 
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press. 
 
Fazey, I., Fazey, J. and D. Fazey. 2005. Learning more effectively from experience. Ecology 
 and Society 10(2): 4. 
Fitzpatrick, P. 2006. In it together: Organizational learning through participation in 
environmental assessment. Journal of Environmental Assessment Policy and 
Management 8(2): 157-182. 
Francis, G. 2004. Biosphere Reserves in Canada: Ideals and some experience. Environments 
 Journal 32(3): 3-26. 
Friedmann, J. 1987. Planning in the public domain: From knowledge to action. Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press. 
Funtowicz, S. and J. Ravetz. 1991. A new scientific methodology for global environmental 
issues. In R. Costanza, Ecological economics: The science and management of 
sustainability (137-152). New York: Columbia University Press. 
Forsyth, T. 2003. Critical political ecology: the politics of environmental science. London; New 
York: Routledge. 
Gill, A. and M. Reed. 1997. The reimaging of a Canadian resource town: Postproductivism in a 
North American context. Applied Geographic Studies 1(2): 129-147. 
Gimble, R. and K. Wellard. 1997. Stakeholder methodologies in natural resource management: 
A review of principles, contexts, experiences, and opportunities. Agricultural Systems 
55(2): 173-193. 
Glasbergen, P. 1996. Learning to manage the environment. In W. M. Lafferty and J. 
Meadowcroft, Democracy and the environment: Problems and prospects (175-193). 
Cheltenham, UK; Brookfield, Vermont: Edward Elgar. 
 
Goffman, E. 1974. Frame analysis: An essay on the organization of experience. New York: 
 Harper. 
Goldstein, B. 2008. Skunkworks in the embers of the cedar fire: Enhancing societal resilience in 
the aftermath of disaster. Human Ecology 36(1): 15-28. 
Goltz, E. 1992. The image and the reality of life in a Northern Ontario company-owned town. In 




the end of the shift: Mines and single industry towns in Northern Ontario (62-91). 
Toronto, Dundurn Press. 
Gray, B. 1985. Conditions facilitating interorganizational collaboration. Human Relations 
38(10): 911-936. 
__________. 1989. Collaborating : finding common ground for multiparty problems. San 
Francisco, Jossey-Bass. 
__________. 2003. Framing of environmental disputes. In R. Lewicki, B. Gray and M. Elliot, 
Making sense of environmental conflicts: concepts and cases (11-34). Washington: Island 
Press. 
__________. 2004. Strong Opposition: Frame-based resistance to collaboration. Journal of 
Community and Applied Social Psychology 14: 166-176. 
__________. 2006. Frame-Based interventions for promoting understanding in multiparty  
 conflicts. In T. Gössling, L. Oerlemans, and R. Jansen (eds.), Inside networks (223-
 250). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Greenpeace. 2009. Greenpeace submission on forest tenure reform in Ontario, October 27, 2009. 
 Available: http://www.greenpeace.org/canada/en/documents-and-links/publications 
 /greenpeace-submission-on-fores/. Accessed on July 1, 2010. 
Guba, E. 1990. The paradigm dialog. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 
Guijt, I., (ed.). 2007. Negotiated learning: Collaborative monitoring in forest resource 
management. Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future. 
Gunderson, L. 1999. Resilience, flexibility, and adaptive management: Antidotes for spurious 
certitude? Conservation Ecology 3(1): 7.  
Gunderson, L. and L. Pritchard. 2002. Resilience and the behavior of large scale ecosystems. 
SCOPE volume. Washington, DC: Island Press. 
 
Haley, D. and H. Nelson. 2007. Has the time come to rethink Canada‘s Crown forest tenure  
 systems? Forestry Chronicle 83(5): 630-641. 
Hamersley Chambers, F. and T. Beckley. 2003. Public involvement in sustainable boreal forest 
 management. In P. Burton, C. Messier, D. Smith and A. Adamowcz (eds.). Towards 
 sustainable management of the boreal forest (113-154). Ottawa: National Research Press. 
Hanna, K. and D. S. Slocombe (eds.). 2007. Integrated resource and environmental management: 
 concepts and practice. Don Mills, Ontario: Oxford University Press. 
 
Hayter, R. 2000. Flexible crossroads: The restructuring of British Columbia‘s forest economy. 




Hayter, R. and T. Barnes. 1997. Troubles in the rainforest: British Columbia's forest 
 economy in transition. In T. Barnes and R. Hayter (eds.). Troubles in the rainforest: 
 British Columbia's forest economy in transition. Victoria, BC: Western Geographical 
 Press. 
Hayward, G., Diduck, A. and B. Mitchell. 2007. Social learning outcomes in the Red River 
 Floodway environmental assessment. Environmental Practice 9(4): 239-250. 
Hoberg, G., Guy, R., Hinch, S., Kozak, R., McFarlane, P. and S. Watts. 2003. Image and 
 enrollments. Forum: A Publication of the Association of British Columbia  Professional 
 Foresters. Nov-Dec 2003: 22-23. 
Hessing, M., Howlett, M. and T. Summerville. 2005. Canadian natural resource and 
 environmental policy: Political economy and public policy. Vancouver: UBC Press. 
Holling, C. S. 1995. What barriers? What bridges? In L.Gunderson, C.S. Holling, and S. Light 
(eds.), Barriers and bridges to the renewal of ecosystems and institutions (3-36). New 
York: Columbia University Press. 
Hudson, B. M. 1979. Comparison of current planning theories - Counterparts and contradictions. 
Journal of the American Planning Association 45(4): 387-398. 
Hutchings, J., Walters, C. and R. Haedrich. 1997. Is scientific inquiry incompatible with 
 government information control? Canadian Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences, 
 54: 1198-1210. 
INAC (Indian and Northern Affairs). 2008. Robinson-Huron and Robinson Superior Treaties 
(1850). Accessed January 15, 2010. Available http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/al/hts/tgu/trob-
eng.asp. 
Johnson, R. 1991. Geography and geographers: Anglo-American human geography since 1945, 
fourth edition. New York: Edward Arnold. 
Kant, S. 2009. Global trends in ownership and tenure of forest resources and timber pricing. 
Unpublished draft manuscript prepared for Ontario Professional Forestry Association. 
Keen, M., Brown, V. A. and R. Dyball. 2005. Social learning in environmental management: 
towards a sustainable future. London; Sterling, VA, Earthscan. 
Keen, M., and S. Mahanty. 2006. Learning in sustainable natural resource management: 
 Challenges and opportunities in the Pacific. Society and Natural Resources 19: 497–513. 
Kim, D. 1993. The link between individual and organizational learning. Sloan Management 




Kimmins, J. P. 2002. Future shock in forestry: Where have we come from; where are we  going; 
 is there a ―right way‖ to manage forests? Lessons from Thoreau, Leopold,  Toffler, 
 Botkin and Nature. Forestry Chronicle 78: 263-271. 
Kraus, R. and L. Allen. 1998. Research and evaluation in recreation, parks and leisure studies, 
 2
nd
 edition. MA, USA: Allyn and Bacon. 
Kuhlberg, M. 2003. ―Nothing it seems can be done about it‖: Charlie Cox, Indian Affairs Timber 
 Policy and the Long Lac Reserve, 1924 - 40. Canadian Historical Review 84(1): 33-64. 
Lane, M. and G. McDonald. 2002. Towards a general model of forest management 
 through time: evidence from Australia, USA, and Canada. Land Use Policy 
 19:193-206. 
Lawson, J., Levy, M. and A. Sandberg. 2001. Perceptual revenues and the delights of the 
primitive: Change, continuity and forest policy regimes in Ontario. In M. Howlett (ed.), 
Canadian forest policy: Adapting to change (279-315). Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press. 
Lee, K. 1993. Compass and gyroscope. Integrating science and politics for the environment. 
Washington, D.C., Island Press. 
Lee, T. 1999. Using qualitative methods in organizational research. London: Sage 
Leeuwis, C. and R. Pyburn. (eds.). 2002. Wheelbarrows full of frogs: social learning in rural 
 resource management. Assen, Netherlands: Koninklijke Van Gorcum. 
Levitt, B. and J. G. March. 1988. Organizational learning. Annual Review of Sociology 14: 319-
340. 
Lewicki, R., Gray, B., and M. Elliot. 2003. Making sense of environmental conflicts: concepts 
and cases. Washington: Island Press. 
Liamputtong, P. 2009. Qualitative research methods, third edition. UK: Oxford University Press.  
Lindoff, T. and B. Taylor. 2002. Qualitative communication research methods, second edition. 
Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications. 
 
Lucas, R. 1971. Minetown, milltown, railtown: Life in Canadian communities of single industry. 
 Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 
 
Luck, L., Jackson, D. and K. Usher. 2006. Case study: A bridge across the paradigms. Nursing 
Inquiry (13)2: 103-109. 




Maarleveld, M. and C. Dangbegnon. 1999. Managing natural resources: A social learning 
perspective. Agriculture and Human Affairs 16: 267-280. 
Magill, A. 1991. Barriers to effective public interaction. Journal of Forestry 89(10): 16-18. 
Majone, G. and A. Wildavsky. 1979. Implementation as evolution. In J. Pressman and A. 
 Wildavsky, Implementation: How great expectations in Washington are dashed in 
 Oakland (163-180). Los Angeles: University of California Press. 
Marchak, P., Aycock, S. and D. Herbert. 1999. Falldown: Forest policy in British Columbia. 
 Vancouver: David Suzuki Foundation and Ecotrust Canada. 
Margerum, R. D. 2002. Evaluating collaborative planning - Implications from an empirical 
analysis of growth management. Journal of the American Planning Association 68(2): 
179-193. 
May, E. 2005. At the Cutting Edge: The crisis on Canada‘s forests. Toronto: Key Porter. 
McCarthy, D. 2006. A critical systems approach to socio-ecological systems: Implications for 
 social learning and governance. Unpublished PhD dissertation. School of Planning, 
 University of Waterloo: Waterloo, Ontario. 
McCarthy, J. 2002. First World political ecology: lessons from the Wise Use movement. 
 Environment and Planning A 34(7): 1281-1302. 
McCarthy, D., Whitelaw, G., Jongerden, P., and B. Craig. 2006. Sustainability, social learning, 
and the Long Point Biosphere Reserve. Environments 34(2). 
MCFSC (Minister‘s Council on Forest Sector Competitiveness). 2005.  Final Report – May 
2005. Minister of Natural Resources. 
McGurk, B., Sinclair, A. J. and A. Diduck. 2006. An assessment of stakeholder advisory 
committees in forest management: Case studies from Manitoba, Canada. Society and 
Natural Resources 19(9): 809-826. 
McLaughlin, M. 1976. Implementation as mutual adaptation. In W. Williams and R. F. Elmore, 
Social program implementation. New York: Academic Press. 
Measham, T. and R. Baker. 2005. Combining people, place and learning. In M. Keen, V. Brown 
and R. Dyball, Social learning in environmental management: towards a sustainable 
future (91-103). London; Sterling, VA: Earthscan. 
Menzies, N. K. 2004. Communities and their partners: Governance and community-based forest 
management. Conservation and Society 2(2). 
Mezirow, J. 1991. Transformative dimensions of adult learning. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass 




__________. 1994. Understanding transformation theory. Adult Education Quarterly 44(4): 222-
 232. 
Michaels, S., Goucher, N. and D. McCarthy. 2006.  Policy Windows, Policy Change, and 
 Organizational Learning: Watersheds in the Evolution of Watershed Management. 
 Environmental Management 38(6): 983-992. 
Michipicoten First Nation. 2010: Homepage. Accessed on May 12, 2010. 
 http://www.michipicoten.com. 
Miles, M. and M. Huberman. 1994. Qualitative data analysis: An expanded sourcebook, second 
edition. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage.  
Mitchell, B. 2005. Integrated water resource management, institutional arrangements, and 
 land-use planning. Environment and Planning A 37(8): 1335-1352. 
________. 2002. Resource and environmental management. Harlow, England and 
 NewYork: Prentice Hall/Pearson Education. 
________. 1989. Geography and resource analysis (2
nd
 ed). Harlow, England and New York: 
 Longman Scientific and Technical; Wiley. 
Moazzami, B. 2006. An economic impact analysis of the Northwestern Ontario forest sector. 
 Department of Economics, Lakehead University and Northwestern  Ontario Forest 
 Council. 
National Association of Home Builders. 2008. Housing Starts 1978-2007. Accessed 
 September 8, 2008. http://www.nahb.org 
 
Natural Resources Canada. 2006. Canada‘s Forests. Accessed August 25, 2008. 
 http://canadaforests.nrcan.gc.ca/articletopic/7. 
________. 2007. Forest Communities Program Announcement. http://cif-
 ifc.org/newsletter/august_2007/pdf/Forest_communities.pdf . Accessed August 15, 2007. 
 
Nelles, H. 2005. The politics of development: Forests, mines and hydro-electric power in 
 Ontario, 1849-1941, second edition. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen‘s University 
 Press.  
 
Nelson, H. 2008. Alternate Tenure Approaches to Achieve Sustainable Forest Management:  
 Lessons for Canada. Sustainable Forest Management Network, Edmonton, Alberta. 
New Democratic Party. 2007. Hampton puts forestry jobs first in Northern Ontario.    
 http://ontariondp.com/hampton-puts-forestry-jobs-first-northern-ontario. Accessed 




NAN (Nishnawbe Aski Nation). 2009. Homepage. Accessed January 15, 2010. Available: 
http://www.nan.on.ca/. 
Northeast Superior Forest Community. 2003-2008 Strategic plan. Northeast Superior Forest 
Community Corporation: Chapleau, Ontario. 
__________. 2008. Northeast Superior Forest Community Wikinorth site. Accessed April 1, 
2008:  http://wikinorth.ca/index.php?title=Northeast_Superior_Forest_Community 
NOSCP (Northern Ontario Sustainable Communities Partnership). 2007. Homepage. Accessed 
 online August 20, 2008. 
__________. 2007. Northern Ontario Community Forest Charter. Accessed on February 10, 
2010. Http://media.knet.ca/node/2991. 
NRCAN (Natural Resources Canada). 2006. Canada‟s Forests. Available at 
 http://canadaforests.nrcan.gc.ca/articletopic/7 (accessed August 25, 2008). 
NRTEE (National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy). 2005. Boreal futures: 
Governance, conservation and development in Canada‘s boreal. Ottawa: National Round 
Table on Environment and Economy; Renouf Publishing Co. Ltd. 
NSFC (Northeast Superior Forest Community Corporation). 2008. Northeast Superior Forest 
Community Strategic Plan, 2007-2012. Chapleau, Ontario. 
OFA (Ontario Forestry Association). 2009. Forest Awareness. Accessed on January 15, 2010. 
Available: http://www.oforest.ca/index.php/awareness. 
OFC (Ontario Forestry Coalition). 2006. Enhancing the economy of Northwestern Ontario. 
Northwestern Ontario Municipal Association. 
Olsson, P., Gunderson, L., Carpenter, S., Ryan, P., Lebel, L., Folke, C. and C.S. Holling. 2006. 
Shooting the rapids: Navigating transitions to adaptive governance of social-ecological 
systems. Ecology and Society 11(1):18. 
 
OMAA (Ontario Ministry of Aboriginal Affairs). 2009. Missanabie Cree First Nation Land 
Transfer. Accessed March 15, 2010. Available: http://www.aboriginalaffairs.gov.on.ca 
 /english/negotiate/missanabie/missanabie.asp 
 
OMAFRA (Ontario Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs). 2009.  Southern Ontario 
region at a glance. Available at http://www.omafra.gov.on.ca/english/stats/county/ 
 southern_ontario.htm. Accessed on November 12, 2009. 
 
OMEI (Ontario Ministry of Energy and Infrastructure). 2009. Fuelling Ontario: Oil and gas. Fuel 






OMNDMF (Ontario Ministry of Northern Development, Mines, and Forestry). 2009. Accessed 
May 1, 2010. Available: http://www.foresttenure.mndmf.gov.on.ca/English/Default.asp 
 
OMNR (Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources). 2002. Forest Management Plan for the White 
River Forest. For the twenty year period 2003-2023. Supplementary documentation: 
Native background information report – final draft. Available: 
https://ozone.scholarsportal.info/bitstream/1873/11838/24/Appendix%20D%20%20 
 Native%20Background%20Information%20Report.pdf. Accessed June 1, 2010. 
 
_________. 2006. Forest management planning in Ontario.Available: http://www.mnr.gov.on.ca. 
 Accessed February 1, 2009. 
 
__________. 2008. Ontario‘s tenure licensing system. Accessed September 1, 2008. 
 http://www.mnr.gov.on.ca/en/Business/Forests/2ColumnSubPage/STEL02_167460.html. 
 
__________. 2009. Forests Home. Accessed: February 1, 2009. Available: 
http://www.mnr.gov.on.ca/en/Business/Forests/index.html 
 
OPFI (Ontario Professional Foresters Association). 2010. Homepage. Accessed April 4, 2010. 
Available: http://www.opfa.ca/. 
Ostrom, E. 1990. Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action. 
Cambridge England; New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Pahl-Wostl, C. 2009. A conceptual framework for analysing adaptive capacity and multi-level 
learning processes in resource governance regimes. Global Environmental Change 19: 
354-365.  
Pahl-Wostl, C. and M. Hare. 2004. Processes of social learning in integrated resources 
management. Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology 14(3): 193-206. 
 
Palys, T. 1997. Research decisions: Quantitative and qualitative perspectives, 2
nd
 edition.  
 Toronto, Canada: Harcourt Brace & Company Canada Ltd. 
 
Parfitt, J. 2005. Questionnaire design and sampling, pp.78-109.  In Flowerdew, R. and D.  
 Martin, Methods in Human Geography, 2
nd
 edition. Harlow, England: Pearson Education 
 Limited. 
 
Parkins, J., Nadeau, S., Hunt, L., Sinclair, J., Reed, M., and S. Wallace. 2004. Public 
participation in forest management: Results from a national survey of advisory 
committees. Toronto: Canadian Forest Service, Northern Forestry Centre.  
Parson, E. and W. Clark 1995. Sustainable development as social learning: Theoretical 




Gunderson, C. S. Holling and S. S. Light (eds.)., Barriers and bridges to the renewal of 
ecosystems and institutions (428-460). New York, Columbia University Press. 
Parsons, R. and G. Prest. 2003. Aboriginal forestry in Canada. Forestry Chronicle 79(4): 779-
784. 
Patton, M. 2002. Qualitative evaluation and research methods. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 
Paulson, S., Gezon, L. and M. Watts. 2003. Locating the political in political ecology: An 
introduction. Human Organization 62(3): 205-217. 
Pedersen, L. 1995. Forestry in British Columbia: The current situation. Forestry 68(2): 83-92. 
Peet, R. and M. Watts. 1996. Liberation ecologies: Environment, development, social 
 movements. London; New York: Routledge. 
Pierce, R. 2008. Research methods in politics: A practical guide. Los Angeles, California: Sage. 
Plummer, R. 2006. Sharing the management of a river corridor: A case study of the 
comanagement process. Society and Natural Resources 19(8): 709-721. 
Plummer, R. and D. Armitage. 2007. A resilience-based framework for evaluating adaptive co-
management: Linking ecology, economics and society in a complex world. Ecological 
Economics 61(1): 62-74. 
Plummer, R. and J. FitzGibbon. 2004a. Some observations on the terminology in co-operative 
environmental management. Journal of Environmental Management 70(1): 63-72. 
________. 2007. Connecting adaptive co-management, social learning, and social capital 
through theory and practice. In D. Armitage, F. Berkes, and N. Doubleday (eds.), 
Adaptive co-management: collaboration, learning, and multi-level governance. 
Vancouver: UBC Press. 
Price, M. 1996. People in biosphere reserves: An evolving concept. Society and Natural 
 Resources 9: 645-654.  
PROFOR and World Bank. 2004. Ecosystem approaches and sustainable forest management: 
 A Discussion Paper for the UNFF Secretariat. The Forest Conservation Programme of 
 IUCN,  the Program on Forests, and the World Bank. February 28, 2004. 
Province of Ontario. 2008. Ontario‘s North, Industry Sectors: Forest Sector and value-added 
 products. http://www.2ontario.com/industry/gonorth_industry_forest.asp?gonorth=y. 
 
Putnam, L. and J. Wondolleck. 2003. Intractability: definitions, dimensions, and distinctions.  
 In R. Lewicki, B. Gray and M. Elliott (eds), Making sense of intractable environmental 




Pyne, S. 2004. Tending Fire. Washington: Island Press. 
Quaghebeur, K., Masschelein, J. and Nguyen, H. 2004. Paradox of participation: Giving or 
 taking part? Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology 14(3): 154-165. 
Raik, D., Wilson, A. and D. Decker. 2008. Power in Natural Resources Management: An 
 Application of Theory. Society and Natural Resources 21(8): 729-739. 
Rainforest Alliance. 2006. Forest management public summary for Tembec Industries Inc. – 
 Superior Forest. SmartWood Program. New York: Rainforest Alliance. 
Reed, M. 1990. Managing for sustainable development: A case study of a hinterland community, 
 Ignace, Ontario, Canada. Unpublished doctoral dissertation. Department of Geography, 
 University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada 
__________. 1995. Cooperative management of environmental resources: A case-study from 
 Northern Ontario, Canada. Economic Geography 71(2): 132-149. 
__________. 2003. Taking stands: Gender and the Sustainability of Rural Communities. 
 Vancouver: UBC Press. 
__________. 2007. Uneven environmental management: A Canadian comparative 
 political ecology. Environment and Planning A 39(2): 320-338. 
Reed, M. and McIlveen, K. 2006. Toward a pluralistic civic science? Assessing community 
 forestry. Society and Natural Resources 19: 591-607. 
Rein, M. and D. Schön. 1994. Frame reflection: toward the resolution of intractable policy 
 controversies. Basic Books: New York.  
Resilience Alliance. 2007. Resilience Alliance homepage. http://www.resalliance.org/1.php. 
Accessed September 1, 2007. 
Rikoon, J. S. 2006. Wild horses and the political ecology of nature restoration in the 
 Missouri Ozarks. Geoforum 37: 200-211.  
Robbins, P. 2006. The politics of barstool biology: Environmental knowledge and power  in 
 greater Northern Yellowstone. Geoforum 37: 185-199. 
Robinson, D. 2007. The social foundations for sustainability: carbon, creativity and the failure 
 of Canadian forestry strategy. Unpublished manuscript. 
Robinson, D., Robson, M. and R. Rollins. 2001. Towards increased citizen influence in Canadian 




Robson, M. and S. Kant. 2009. The Influence of Context on Deliberation and Cooperation in 
 Community-based Forest Management in Ontario, Canada.  Human Ecology - An 
 Interdisciplinary Journal. 37(5):547-558. 
Röling, N. 2002. Beyond the aggregation of individual preferences. Wheelbarrows full of frogs: 
Social learning in rural resource management. C. Leeuwis and R. Pyburn. Assen, 
Netherlands, Koniniklijke Van Gorcum: 25-47. 
Rosehart, R. 2008. Northwestern Ontario: Preparing for change. Northwestern Ontario 
 Economic Facilitator Report. 
Ross, M. 1995. Forest management in Canada. Canadian Institute of Resources Law, 
 Calgary. 
Saarinen, O. 1992. Creating a sustainable community: The Sudbury case study. In M. Bray, A. 
 Thomson and Institute for Northern Ontario Research and Development, At the end of 
 the shift: Mines and single industry towns in Northern Ontario (165-186). Toronto, 
 Dundurn Press. 
Salazar, D. and D. Alper. 1996. Perceptions of Power and the Management of Environmental 
 Conflict: Forest Politics in British Columbia. Social Science Journal 33(4): 381-399. 
Schusler, T., Decker, D. and M. Pfeffer. 2003. Social learning for collaborative natural 
 resource management. Society and Natural Resources 16(4): 309-326. 
Selin, S. and D. Chavez. 1995. Developing a collaborative model for environmental-planning 
 and management. Environmental Management 19(2): 189-195. 
Sendzimir, J., Magnuszewski, P., Flachner, Z., Balogh, P., Molnar, G., Sarvari, A. and Z.  Nagy. 
 2008. Assessing the Resilience of a River Management Regime: Informal Learning in a 
 Shadow Network in the Tisza River Basin. Ecology and Society 13(1):11. 
Shindler, B. A., Beckley, T. and C. Finley (eds.). 2003. Two paths toward sustainable forests: 
 Public  values  in Canada and the United States. Oregon State University Press, 
 Corvallis, Oregon. 
Sinclair, J. and A. P. Diduck. 2001. Public Involvement in EA in Canada: A Transformative 
Learning Perspective. Environmental Impact Assessment Review 21(2): 113-136. 
Sinclair, J. and K. Lobe. 2005. Canada‘s Model Forests: Public involvement through partnership. 
Environments 33(2): 35-56. 
Stake, R. 2003. Case studies. In N. Denzin and Y. Lincoln (eds.), Strategies of qualitative 
 inquiry, 2nd edition (134-164). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Smith, P. 1996. Aboriginal participation in forest management: Not just another ‗stakeholder’. 




__________. 2007. Creating a new stage for sustainable forest management through co-
 management with Aboriginal peoples in Ontario: The need for constitutional-level 
 enabling. Unpublished PhD dissertation. Lakehead University, Thunder Bay, Ontario. 
Statistics Canada. 2008. 2006 Community Profiles. Accessed September 1, 2008.  
http://www12.statcan.ca/english/census06/data/profiles/community/Index.cfm?Lang=E 
Stevenson and Webb 2003. Just another stakeholder? First Nations and sustainable forest 
management in Canada‘s boreal forest. In P. Burton, C. Messier, D. Smith and A. 
Adamowcz (eds.). Towards  sustainable management of the boreal forest (65-112). 
Ottawa: National Research Press.  
Stewart, N. 2005. Forest Industry Spiralling Crisis. Northern Ontario Business News [online]. 
Surtees, R. 1986. Treaty research report: The Robinson Treaties (1850). Treaties and Historical 
Research Centre, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada. Accessed June 1, 2010. Available: 
http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/al/hts/tgu/pubs/Trob/trerob-eng.pdf. 
Susskind, L., Field, P., van der Wansem, M. and J. Peyser. 2007. Integrating scientific 
information, stakeholder interests, and political concerns. In K.S. Hanna and D.S. 
Slocombe (eds.), Integrated Resource and Environmental Management: Concepts and 
Practice (181-203). New York: Columbia University Press. 
Teitelbaum, S., Beckley, T. and S. Nadeau. 2006. A national portrait of community forestry on 
public land in Canada. Forestry Chronicle 82(3): 416-428. 
Tharenou, P., Donohue, R. and B. Cooper. 2007. Management research methods. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Thompson, I. 2000. Forest vegetation of Ontario: Factors influencing landscape change. In A. 
Perera, D. Euler and I Thompson, Ecology of a managed terrestrial landscape: Patterns 
and processes of forest landscapes in Ontario (30-53). Vancouver, B.C.: UBC Press and 
Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources. 
Tippett, J., Searle, B., Pahl-Wostl, C., and T. Rees. 2005. Social learning in public participation 
in river basin management: Early findings from HarmoniCOP European case studies. 
Environmental Science and Policy 8(3): 287-299. 
 
Town of Chapleau. 2010. First Nations. Accessed June 1, 2010. Available: 
 http://www.chapleau.ca/portal/en/community/firstnations. 
Town of Dubreuilville. 2009. Township homepage. Accessed on May 12, 2010. Available: 
http://www.dubreuilville.ca/main.html. 





Trochim, W. 2005. Research Methods: The concise knowledge base. Cincinnati, Ohio: Atomic 
 Dog Publishing. 
 
US Home Builders Association. 2009. Accessed on June 1 2009. Available: 
http://www.nahb.org/reference_list.aspx?sectionID=130. 
 
UOI (Union of Ontario Indians). 2009. Union of Ontario Indians homepage. Accessed January 1, 
2010. Available: http://www.anishinabek.ca/index.php?option=com_content&task 
 =view&id=56&Itemid=37 
 
Venne, M. 2007. An analysis of social aspects of Forest Stewardship Council forest certification 
in three Ontario case studies. Unpublished MES thesis. Wilfrid Laurier University. 
Waterloo, Ontario, Canada. 
von Gadow, K., Pukkala, T., and M. Tomé (eds.). 2000. Sustainable Forest Management. 
 Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Wakenagun Community Futures Development Corporation. 2010. Chapleau Cree Community 
Profile. Accessed on May 12, 2010. http://www.wakenagun.ca.  
Walker, B. and D. Salt. 2006. Resilience thinking: Sustaining ecosystems and people in a 
changing world. Washington: Island Press. 
Wallace, I. 1987. The Canadian Shield: The development of a resource frontier. In L. McCann, 
Heartland and hinterland: A geography of Canada, second edition. Scarborough, Ontario: 
Prentice-Hall Canada Inc. 
Wals, A. (ed.). 2007. Social learning: Towards a sustainable world. Wageningen, Netherlands: 
Wageningen Academic Publishers. 
Warkentin. J. 2001. A regional geography of Canada: Life, land, and space. Scarborough: 
Prentice Hall Canada Inc. 
Webler, T. Kastenholz, H. and O. Renn. 1995. Public participation in impact assessment: A 
social learning perspective. Environmental Impact Assessment Review 15(5): 443-463. 
Wellstead, A, Steadman, R. and J. Parkins. 2003. Understanding the concept of representation 
 within the context of local forest management decision making. Forest Policy and 
 Economics 5: 1-11. 
Wildemeersch, D. 2007. Social learning revisited: Lessons learned from North and South. In A. 
E. J. Wals (ed.), Social learning: Towards a sustainable world, (99-116). Wageningen, 
Netherlands: Wageningen Academic Publishers. 
Wismer, S. and B. Mitchell. 2005. Community-based approaches to resource and  environmental 




Wolf, S. and J. Klein. 2007. Enter the working forest: Discourse analysis in the Northern Forest. 
Geoforum 38: 985-998. 
Woods, J. 2007. Harper views Ontario forest industry crisis. The Canadian Press, 
[online].http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20071027/harper_forestr
y_071027?s_name=&no_ads= 
Wynne, B. 1992. Uncertainty and environmental learning: Reconceiving science and policy in 
the preventive paradigm. Global Environmental Change-Human and Policy Dimensions 
2(2): 111-127. 
Yin, R. 2003. Case study research: Design and methods, 3
rd
 edition. Sage Publications Inc, 
 Thousand Oaks, California. 
Young, A. and W. Wilson. 2010. Maps of the Nipigon: Uncovering history through cognitive 
 cartographics.  Paper presentation at Canadian Association of Geographers Annual 
 General Meeting, June 6th, University of Regina, Saskatchewan, Canada. 
Zimmerer, K. 1996. Discourse on soil loss in Bolivia: Sustainability and the search for 
 socioenvironmental ―middle ground‖. In R. Peet and M. Watts (eds.), Liberation 



















Appendix A.  Pool of interview questions addressing core research questions 
1. How do different stakeholders frame the forestry problem? 
a. What is your training background, experience, position and affiliation? (identity) 
b. How long have you been involved (in forest management or NSFC specifically) and what is 
your role? (identity) 
c. Who else is involved? (characterisation) 
d. Please define the current forestry problem and main issues in the NSFC? (diagnostic, 
 characterisation) 
e. What do you consider to be the solution(s)? What should/can be done? (prognostic) 
f. Who do you think should be in charge of making the decisions to overcome the stated forestry 
problems? (social control) 
g. How should the forests be managed in Northern Ontario? (nature, general) 
 
2. How do stakeholders‘ frames change/not change overtime? Why? 
a. Have your perspectives changed over time since you first became involved (in forest 
management or NSFC specifically)? Why? 
-has your view of the problem and main issues changed and if so how? 
-have certain solutions become more appealing overtime? Why? 
-how would you describe your relationships with other stakeholders now? 
-how has your understanding of others changed? 
 
b. What has contributed to you changing/not changing your mind? 
 - Were there specific events that contributed to these changes (e.g., interactions  
 with other individuals and organizations; meetings; conferences; landmark  
 decisions; surprises; external changes)? 
 




3. What forms of power are present and how does this influence, if at all, the construction of 
shared meaning (frame convergence/divergence)? 
a. What individuals and organizations have the most/least influence/power? Why? (power) 
 
b. What makes the actors you describe powerful? 
 
c. Whose perspectives are given the most/least credence? Why? (power) 
 
d. How do the actors you describe influence stakeholder interactions and forest management 
 processes in the NSFC? Can you please provide specific examples? 
 
e. Can you think of any individuals or groups who should be involved in forest management in 
 the NSFC but are not? Why are they not involved? 
 
 
4. How does social learning (i.e., what has been learned in terms of constructing ―shared 
meaning‖ through developing common frames) influence the way stakeholders approach forest 
management policy, planning and practice? 
a. What has been learned about the identified forestry problem and main issues? 
b. Has your understanding of the problem changed through interactions with other stakeholders? 
 -How and why? 




Is there anything else you want to add regarding forest management in Northern Ontario or any 







Appendix B. Information Letter and Verbal Consent 
 
 
I am conducting research as part of my PhD in the Department of Geography and Environmental 
Management at the University of Waterloo under the supervision of Professors Bruce Mitchell and Derek 
Armitage. I would like to provide you with more information about this project and what your 
involvement would entail if you decide to take part. 
This study seeks to understand how learning occurs and what has been learned among different forest 
stakeholders in the Northeast Superior Forest Community with regard to Northern Ontario's current 
forestry crisis.  Specifically, this study will examine how power relations influence the development of 
understanding among public-private-civic groups. One way to study how groups of people learn together 
is to examine how different peoples' perspectives change overtime in relation to others‘ and to key events. 
To explore this, adults who have been involved in forest management and who have been affected by key 
issues facing the region will be interviewed as part of a two phase study consisting of two rounds of 
interviews (about 1 hour each time), to be conducted about one year apart where possible. 
This study focuses on learning and, therefore, change in forest stakeholders‘ perspectives in Northern 
Ontario, Canada. When faced with large-scale crises, individuals and organizations often respond by 
collaborating to share their understanding and resources towards the development of solutions to common 
problems.  It is important to understand how stakeholders with different levels of influence contribute to 
such processes, solutions, and forest policy and management outcomes.  Therefore, I would like to 
include you/your organization as one of several stakeholders to be involved in my study. I believe you are 
well-suited to speak to various forest-related issues affecting your community/organization. 
Participation in this study is voluntary.  Interviews will be conducted in a mutually agreed upon location. 
You may decline to answer any of the interview questions if you so wish. Further, you may decide to 
withdraw from this study at any time without any negative consequences by advising the 
researcher.  With your permission, the interview will be audio recorded to facilitate accurate collection of 
information, and later transcribed for analysis. All information you provide is considered confidential. 
You will be asked to answer questions about themes relevant to forest management in Northeast Superior 
Forest Community, namely, your involvement in forest management and perspectives on the forestry 
crisis; your perspectives on relationships among various participants in forest management; and, 
what has been learned regarding the forestry crisis and resultant changes to policy and practice. It will be 
important to identify stakeholder groups to distinguish their evolving perspectives and enhance the 
research, however, individual names and specific position titles will not appear in any thesis or report 
resulting from this study unless you indicate that you would like to be identified to receive credit for your 
contribution.  Should you express additional concern to the researcher that indentifying your stakeholder 
affiliation will make it possible for others to identify your remarks and identity, comments will not be 
INFORMATION LETTER AND VERBAL CONSENT 
(to be provided potential participants for review before the interview) 
 
Research Project:  SOCIAL LEARNING AS A FORMATIVE 
PROCESS IN COLLABORATIVE MANAGEMENT 
 
Ryan Bullock, PhD Candidate, 
Department of Geography & Environmental Management, 
Ph ne: Home 519-954-3833; Office 519-888-4567, ext 38176 




attributed by stakeholder affiliation. Anonymous quotations may be used in the resultant thesis, 
publications, and/or presentations. A copy of the report will be made available to you upon request by 
contacting the student investigator by email and telephone (listed below). Only researchers associated 
with this project will have access to the data. There are no known or anticipated risks to you as a 
participant in this study. 
Anticipated academic benefits include an enhanced understanding of how organizations learn and of the 
role(s) for local-level, collaborative forest management organizations in developing resilient 
communities, given their mandates and operational constraints. Anticipated potential benefits to 
participants include: reflecting on and taking pride in management strengths; identifying weaknesses and 
how they can be addressed; and, increasing mutual understanding of other people and organizations, their 
roles, and key issues related to forest management. 
If you have any questions regarding this study, or would like additional information to assist you in 
reaching a decision about participation, please contact me at 519.954.3833 or 518-888-4567 ext. 38176 
or by email at rclbullo@envmail.uwaterloo.ca.  You can also contact one of my supervisors: 
Professor Bruce Mitchell, 519-888-4567 ext. 33087 or email: mitchell@admmail.uwaterloo.ca; or 
Derek Armitage, 519-884-0710 ext. 2653 or email: darmitag@wlu.ca. Should you wish to 
participate in this research project please contact me via email, telephone, or surface mail, 
to the address indicated above, at your convenience. 
I would like to assure you that this study has been reviewed and received ethics clearance through the 
Office of Research Ethics at the University of Waterloo. If you have any comments or concerns 
resulting from your participation in this study, please contact Dr. Susan Sykes of this office at 519-




PARTICIPANT VERBAL CONSENT  
I have received a copy of this form.  I have read and understand the above information.  I 
have had a chance to ask any questions I have about this research.  I agree to participate in 
this study with the understanding that I can withdraw at any time without penalty by 
advising the researcher.  Verbal consent has been obtained. 
Do you agree to audio recording of the interview? Do you agree to the use of anonymous 




Appendix C. Mail Survey 
                                                                              
A Survey of Perceptions of the Ontario Crown Forest Tenure System in Northeast 
Superior Forest Community 
This survey is meant to gather information from a wide range of forest stakeholders in the Northeast 
Superior Forest Community (including Chapleau, Dubreuilville, Hornpayne, Manitouwadge, Wawa, and 
White River) based on their perceptions of the Ontario Crown forest tenure system and related issues.  
The confidential information you provide will be used by the Northeast Superior Forest Community 
Corporation to support project planning and for an academic research project on social learning in the 
Northeast Superior Forest Community, which is being conducted by Ryan Bullock, a PhD candidate with 
the Department of Geography and Environmental Management at the University of Waterloo.  By better 
understanding the diverse perspectives among forest stakeholders we can help address the current 
forestry crisis in Northern Ontario in support of sustainable communities, economies, and forests. 
 
The survey is brief and your participation is voluntary and anonymous. Only a summary of 
everyone’s answers and anonymous quotations will be used in public reports.  You may omit any 
question(s) you prefer not to answer. Please return the completed questionnaire to the survey 
drop box OR return it by mail in the self-addressed, stamped envelope provided by January 1, 
2009. 
 
We thank you in advance for taking the time to share your views and experience. If you have any 
questions about the survey please feel free to contact: 
 
Ryan Bullock, PhD candidate 
Geography and Environmental Management 
University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON 
Email: rclbullo@envmail.uwaterloo.ca     519-954-3833 ext. 38176 
 
Giselle Noel, Project Officer 
Northeast Superior Forest Community Corporation, Chapleau, ON 
Email: giselle.noel@nsfc.ca      705-864-2031 ext. 225 
 
Bruce Mitchell, Professor and Associate Provost 
Geography and Environmental Management 
University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON 
Email: mitchell@admmail.uwaterloo.ca     519-888-4567 ext. 33087 
 
This study has been reviewed and received ethics clearance through the Office of Research Ethics at the 
University of Waterloo. Should you have any comments or concerns resulting from your participation in 






1) Please indicate your level of understanding regarding Ontario’s Crown forest tenure system: 
  Very good   /   Good    /   Fair   /   Poor   /    Very poor 
 
2) Please list what you think are the main STRENGTHS (up to 5) of the existing Crown forest 
tenure system in Ontario? 








3) Please list what you think are the main WEAKNESSES (up to 5) of the existing Crown forest 
tenure system in Ontario?  







4) From your perspective, are certain forest-related activities/opportunities currently supported or 








5) From your perspective, are certain forest-related activities/opportunities currently NOT 
supported or constrained by the existing Crown forest tenure system in Ontario? (Please describe 
below) 




6) With regard to the activities/opportunities you described in questions 4 and 5, do you think 
anything can be done to improve the Crown forest tenure system in Ontario?  
Yes____ If YES, please describe SPECIFIC EXAMPLES of what you think would be useful  
  changes in the space below. 














8) Given the Ontario Government’s commitment to sustainable forest management, please list the 
characteristics (up to 5) that you think are important to a forest tenure system for sustainable 
communities, economies, and ecosystems in your region? 







9) In general, are you aware of any other model(s) or forms of forest tenure that you think might be 
useful in Ontario to improve the existing Crown forest tenure system?  
YES_____ If yes, please briefly describe other tenure model(s) and how they would   




10) Are you aware of the current tenure reforms that are underway to create co-operative 
sustainable forest licences (SFLs)? 
YES_____ If yes, what do you think are the major strengths AND weaknesses of co-  
 operative SFLs? 










10) Please rank (with 1 being the highest) the following groups according to which ones you think 
a) HAVE the most power and b) SHOULD HAVE the most power over public forest resources in the 
Northeast Superior Forest Community region: 
 
Groups a)  HAVE most power              
(1 = highest) 
b) SHOULD HAVE most power   
(1 = highest) 
Local government   
Provincial government/MNR   
Federal government   
First Nations   
Environmental/conservation groups   
Forest industry   
Outdoor recreational groups   
Local residents   
Tourism industry   
Other (please list)   
 
11) Please rank (1 being the highest) the following stakeholder groups according to which ones 
you think a) ACTUALLY benefit the most and b) SHOULD benefit the most from public forest 
resources in the Northeast Superior Forest Community region: 
Groups a) ACTUALLY benefit most 
(1 = highest) 
b) SHOULD benefit most 
(1 = highest) 
Local government   
Provincial government/MNR   
Federal government   
First Nations   
Environmental/conservation groups   
Forest industry   
Outdoor recreational groups   
Local residents   
Tourism industry   







12) Given Ontario’s commitment to sustainable forest management, list the forest values (up to 5) 
you think should be emphasized in forest policy, planning, and practice to promote sustainable 
communities, economies, and ecosystems in your region? 







14)  Do you have any other comments you wish to share regarding Crown forest tenure in 
Ontario? (Please use back of page if necessary) 
15) Please provide us with your individual information: 
a) With regard to forest resources, 
which group do you represent? 
(Mark X beside one) 
Aboriginal 




Other industry (please specify)  
Trappers 
Baitfishers 















Other (please specify) 
b) Number of years in this group  
c) Number of years in NSFC region  
d) Sex    (please circle one) Female   /    Male 






Appendix D. Survey Mailing List 
Algoma University 
Anishinabek Nation 
Bait Association of Ontario 
Borealis Forestry & GIS Services Inc. 
Brunswick House First Nation 
Buchanan Forest Products Ltd. 
C & D Slashing 
Canadian Forest Service 
Chapleau Anglers and Hunters 
Chapleau Arctic Watershed Snowmobile Club 
Chapleau ATV Club 
Chapleau Cree First Nation 
Chapleau Economic Development Corporation 
Chapleau Ojibwe First Nation 
Clergue Forest Management Inc. 
Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union 
Domtar Inc. 
Dubreuil Forest Products Limited 
Economic Development Corporation Wawa 
Economic Facilitator for Northwestern Ontario Federation of 
Northern Ontario Municipalities 
FEDNOR 
Forest BioProducts Inc. 
Friends of Fur 
Hornepayne First Nation 
Jackfish River Management Ltd. 
Keith Spencer Trucking 
Kenogami Lake Lumber Ltd. 
Lake Superior Conservancy and Watershed Council 
Lakehead University 
Laurentian University 
Magpie Forest Co-Management Committee 
Manitouwadge Economic Development Corp. 
Manitouwadge Public Consultation Committee 
Martel Forest Local Citizens Committee 
Michipicoten First Nation 
Michipicoten Rod and Gun Club 
Missanabie Cree First Nation 
Missinaibi Headwaters Outfitters 
MP, Algoma-Manitoulin-Kapuskasing 
MPP Algoma Manitoulin 
Municipality of Wawa 
Nagagami Forest Co-Management Committee 
Nature and Outdoor Tourism Ontario 
Nishnawbe Aski Development Fund 
Nishnawbe Aski Nation 
Niska North Inc.  
Nord-Aski Regional Economic Development Corp. 
Northern Haul Contracting 
Northwatch  
Northwestern Ontario Municipal Association 
Ojibways of the Pic River First Nation 
Olav Haavaldsrud Timber Company Ltd. 
Ontario Federation of Anglers and Hunters 
Ontario Forest Industries Association 
Ontario Forestry Association 
Ontario Forestry Coalition 
Ontario Fur Managers Federation 
Ontario Lumber Manufacturers‘ Association 
Ontario Minister of Natural Resources 
Ontario Ministry of Environment 
Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, Chapleau  
Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, Manitouwadge 
Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, Wawa 
Ontario Ministry of Northern Development and Mines 
Ontario Nature/Federation of Ontario Naturalists 
Ontario Parks 
Pic Mobert First Nation 
Pineland Forest Local Citizens Committee 
Pukaskwa National Park 
Raintree 
St. Mary‘s Paper Corp. 
Superior East Community Futures Development Corp.  
Superior North Community Futures Development Corp.  
Tembec  
The Wilderness Group  
Township of Chapleau 
Township of Dubreuilville 
Township of Hornpayne 
Township of Manitouwadge 
Township of White River 
Township of White River, Economic Development  
Tri-Timber Contracting Inc. 
True North Timber 
United Steelworkers 
Wawa Area Co-Management Committee 
Wawa Sno-Riders Club 
Weyerhaeuser 
White River Co-Management Committee 
Wilderness Pursuits 
Wildlands League 
 
 
 
